DATE:  November 20, 2007
In re:
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SSN:  -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-25891
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
ELIZABETH M. MATCHINSKI
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Fahryn Hoffman, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
David P. Price, Esq.
SYNOPSIS
Applicant is a dual citizen of Lebanon and the U.S. since she acquired her U.S. citizenship
in August 2003. Foreign influence concerns persist because of her close bonds to her parents and
sisters who are resident citizens of Lebanon, and to her brother, a Lebanese citizen living in the
United Arab Emirates. Foreign preference concerns raised by her possession and use of a Lebanese
passport are mitigated by her surrender of the foreign passport. Clearance is denied.
See Consular Information Sheet, Lebanon, dated October 20, 2006 (I); Background Note: Lebanon, dated1
February 2007 (II); Travel Warning, dated June 14, 2007 (III); Country Reports on Terrorism-2006, Chapters 2 (IV),
3 (V), and 6 (VI),  released April 30, 2007; Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2006: Lebanon, dated March
6, 2007 (VII); and Fact Sheet Foreign Terrorist Organizations, dated October 11, 2005 (VIII).
See CRS Report for Congress: Lebanon, dated November 28, 2006 (IX).2
The three Justice Department press releases, dated March 29, 2006 (X), March 1, 2005 ((XI), and August 9,3
2005 (XII), concern criminal proceedings in U.S. District Court are hearsay and do not involve Applicant. The March
29, 2006, press release reports the indictment in the District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, of 19 individuals for
operating a global racketeering conspiracy in support of Hizballah between 1996 and 2004. The March 1, 2005, press
release reports the guilty plea of a U.S. resident in that same district court to conspiracy to provide material support to
Hizballah, a designated foreign terrorist organization. The August 9, 2005, press release reports the guilty plea in the
Eastern District of Arkansas of a Canadian-Lebanese dual citizen to criminal charges: attempting to provide material
support to Hizballah, attempting to export military night vision equipment to Hizballah, conspiracy to export sensitive
military equipment from the U.S. without a license, and to money laundering.
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant or continue a
security clearance for Applicant. As required by ¶ E3.1.2 of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6
(Jan. 2, 1992), as amended, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) on May 7, 2007, detailing
the basis for its decision–security concerns raised under Guideline B (foreign influence) and
Guideline C (foreign preference) of the revised Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) issued on December
29, 2005, and implemented by the Department of Defense effective September 1, 2006. The
guidelines were provided to Applicant when the SOR was issued. Applicant answered the SOR on
May 31, 2007, and elected to have a hearing before an administrative judge. The case was assigned
to me on July 25, 2007.
I convened a hearing on October 17, 2007, to consider whether it is clearly consistent with
the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Two government exhibits
(Ex. 1- 2) and nine Applicant exhibits (Ex. A-I) were admitted, and testimony was taken from six
witnesses in addition to the Applicant. DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr.) on October 25,
2007.
RULINGS ON PROCEDURE
On July 20, 2007, the government requested administrative notice be taken of several
proposed facts concerning Lebanon and the organization Hizballah (Hezbollah). For source
documentation the government relied on publications from the U.S. State Department  and the1
Congressional Research Service,  and on press releases from the U.S. Department of Justice.2 3
Applicant did not object to my review of the government’s source documents for purposes of
administrative notice but expressed a general concern as to the weight and/or relevance of some of
the information proposed for notice. After weighing the reliability of the source documentation and
The criminal support for Hizballah is relevant to the extent it shows Hizballah remains an active terrorist4
organization that continues to garner support from rouge individuals.
3
assessing the relevancy and materiality of the facts proposed, I took administrative notice of certain
facts as set forth below.4
FINDINGS OF FACT
DOHA alleged under Guideline B, foreign influence, that Applicant’s parents (SOR ¶ 1.a),
three sisters (SOR  ¶ 1.c), one aunt, uncles and several cousins (¶ 1.f) are resident citizens of
Lebanon; that one brother is a citizen of Lebanon living in the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) (SOR
¶ 1.e); that she sends her parents between $100 and $200 each month (SOR ¶ 1.b); and that she
traveled to Lebanon in at least 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2007 (SOR ¶ 1.d).
Under Guideline C, foreign preference, Applicant was alleged to be exercising dual citizenship with
Lebanon and the U.S. (SOR ¶ 2.a), and to have used a Lebanese passport instead of her U.S. passport
to enter and exit Lebanon in at least 2003 and/or 2004 (SOR ¶ 2.b).
When she answered the SOR, Applicant admitted the Lebanese citizenship and residency of
her parents, sisters, and extended family members, the Lebanese citizenship and U.A.E. residency
of her brother, her voluntary monetary support for her parents in Lebanon, and her travels to Lebanon
to see them. She averred that another brother, who is a U.S. resident citizen, has applied for her
parents to immigrate to the U.S. Applicant denied any preference for Lebanon despite her dual
citizenship and use of her Lebanese passport. She claimed she used the passport to avoid the expense
of obtaining visas. She indicated that she had surrendered her Lebanese passport and had no intent
to use a Lebanese passport again.
After a thorough consideration of the pleadings, exhibits, and transcript, and having agreed
to take administrative notice, I make the following findings of fact.
Applicant is a 33-year-old senior electrical engineer who earned a master’s degree in
electrical engineering from a public university in the U.S. in October 2002. She has worked for her
current employer, a defense contractor, since about October 2002, and seeks a secret-level security
clearance so that she can participate in the systems integration and further optimization of functional
elements she has designed and bring her expertise to bear in the discussion of conceptual designs as
the company pursues new business opportunities. Her continued employment is not contingent on
the clearance.
Applicant was born in Lebanon in April 1974. She is the youngest of eight children (five
daughters and three sons) born to Lebanese native citizens who are now in their early 70s. Her father
was a street vendor before he retired. Her mother did not work outside the home. 
Applicant graduated as valedictorian with a bachelor of science degree in electrical
engineering and communications from a Lebanese university in summer 1996. In December 1996,
Applicant entered into an arranged marriage to a Lebanese native who had immigrated to the U.S.
Applicant first met him in 1995 when he came to Lebanon for vacation. Applicant came to the U.S.
on a spouse visa after their wedding in Lebanon. The marriage lasted but one year.
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In May 1997, Applicant began working as a microwave design engineer in the U.S. On the
recommendation of her supervisor, Applicant began graduate studies toward a master’s degree in
engineering at a public university in September 1997 while working full-time. Applicant was hard
working, an intelligent engineer. In May 2000, Applicant started a new job as an electrical engineer
for a micro circuits company. She was laid off in July 2002.
In August 2002, Applicant married her current spouse, who is a native of the U.S. They met
in fall 1998 while taking the same night class in microwave engineering at the university. In mid-
October 2002, Applicant was awarded her master’s degree in electrical engineering.
That same month, she was hired as a digital design engineer by her current employer on the
strong recommendation of the supervisor with whom she had worked closely from 1997 to 1999. He
had moved on to the company three years before, and was happy to recommend Applicant because
of her diligence when they worked together in the past. Applicant continued to be a conscientious
employee, committed to her work, reliable, professional in her dealings with coworkers. She has
consistently demonstrated critical key abilities in the field of digital, radio frequency, and analog
electronic circuit design and testing. Managing engineers and coworkers familiar with her work over
the past five years, but knowing little of her family situation in Lebanon, consider her to be a
valuable asset, ethical, and worthy of a security clearance. Her friends have found her to be honest,
sincere, willing to help, and dedicated to her family.
On August 7, 2003, Applicant became a naturalized U.S. citizen, taking an oath to renounce
all foreign allegiances, to support and defend the U.S. Constitution and its laws, and to bear arms
or perform noncombatant service or civilian service on behalf of the U.S. if required. On August
15, 2003, Applicant was issued her U.S. passport. In September 2003, Applicant and her spouse
traveled to Lebanon to visit her family. She used her Lebanese passport to enter Lebanon so that she
would not have to pay a $20 fee required of U.S. citizens. (Tr. 175)
On November 2003, Applicant completed a security clearance application (SF 86) that was
later reviewed and re-signed on July 19, 2004. Applicant disclosed that she  recently acquired U.S.
citizenship and a U.S. passport, but also that she was a dual citizen of Lebanon and held a Lebanese
passport valid to April 30, 2006. She listed her parents and siblings only by name and date of birth
(with errors as to her mother’s and eldest sister’s birth dates), providing citizenship information for
only the siblings who had been naturalized in the U.S. and were living in the U.S.  As for her parents
and other siblings, “UNK” was erroneously entered in response to whether the listed family member
was deceased. Applicant reported foreign travel to Lebanon in December 1997, December 1998,
August 2000, August 2001, and September 2003, and weekend trips to Canada in June 2000,
February 2001, March 2002, June 2002, August 2002, and September 2002.
Applicant and her spouse traveled to Lebanon to visit her parents and siblings in July 2004,
July 2005, and December 2006. They took their daughter with them on the last two trips, and
registered with authorities as required on all their trips. They stayed with her parents while in
Lebanon at her parents’ residence outside of Beirut, and had in-person contact with her three sisters
during these trips. Applicant used her Lebanese passport to enter Lebanon in July 2004. The record
When she answered the SOR, which alleges that she used her Lebanese passport during her trips in at least5
2003 and/or 2004 (SOR ¶ 2.b), Applicant indicated she used her Lebanese passport once in/out of Lebanon. Yet, at her
hearing, she testified, “I believe I used it two times before I know I’m not supposed to use it and that was just to enter
Lebanon because it was easier. There was a line for citizens, a line for non citizens, and there is a fee if you are a non,
if you don’t hold a passport, so it was just a convenience at that point.” (Tr. 159) Applicant now admits that she used
her foreign passport in lieu of her U.S. passport at least twice, which according to the record would have been in
September 2003 and July 2004. It is not clear whether the July 2005 trip was before or after her interview with the
investigator. If before, she is likely to have used her Lebanese passport on that trip but it was not clearly established.
Little is known about the interview apart from Applicant’s testimony that she acted on the advice of the6
investigator with regard to her surrender of the foreign passport.
5
is inconclusive as to which passport she used to enter Lebanon in July 2005.  In February 2006,5
Applicant surrendered her Lebanese passport to the Consulate General of Lebanon on the advice of
the investigator who had interviewed her for her background investigation,  so she entered Lebanon6
in December 2006 on her U.S. passport. Applicant does not intend to reacquire a Lebanese passport.
Applicant and her spouse had planned to travel to Lebanon in September 2006 but postponed
the trip until December 2006 due to the war between Hizballah and Israel. During their trip in
December 2006, Applicant and her spouse saw no signs of hostile activity in the vicinity of her
family members,  but they were unsuccessful in an attempt to go to downtown Beirut because “there
was stuff going on.” (Tr. 127) They are planning to return to visit her family in December 2007, but
have not yet made travel arrangements to avoid having to cancel in the event of an outbreak of
hostilities in Lebanon. None of her relatives living in Lebanon has visited her in the U.S. Her parents
do not speak English and it is too difficult to get a visa for them. A sister had been twice denied a
visa to travel to the U.S.
If she could keep only one citizenship, Applicant would choose to retain her U.S. citizenship,
although she is not willing to renounce her Lebanese citizenship to obtain a security clearance.
Knowing she can lawfully keep her foreign citizenship, her preference is to remain a dual citizen
(“maybe when I retire, maybe it will give me some benefits, if Lebanon is a peaceful place and I
thing of maybe owning a summer house, or a winter house probably would be better, so it has maybe
some benefits in the very, very, long future.”). (Tr. 174)
Applicant and her spouse own their home in the U.S. As of September 2006, the property was
assessed at $577,000. As of October 2007, the mortgage balance was $378,050.20. (Ex. A) Applicant
had her own checking and savings account in which she had a total balance on deposit of $3,576.90.
A joint savings account had $11,442.12 on deposit. (Ex. C) Applicant is vested in a retirement
account at work totaling $61,731.87, and has $34,397.72 in an individual retirement account. (Ex.
D) Her spouse is employed by a defense contractor as a senior engineer and program manager for
space components. He holds a secret-level security clearance, which was granted to him in June
2005. (Ex. E) Her spouse has $13,655.33 in retirement assets with his current employer, $47,675.81
in another 401(k) account, and $26,809.31 in an individual retirement account. They also had
$3,210.61 in a college savings plan (529 plan) for their young daughter. (Ex. D) Applicant has no
financial assets in Lebanon.
As of October 2007, Applicant’s parents and three of her sisters were still resident citizens
of Lebanon, living within a 15-minute radius by foot. One brother was still living in the U.A.E., and
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three siblings were in the U.S. Applicant had telephone contact with her parents once weekly.
Applicant and her three siblings in the U.S. were each contributing $400 monthly toward the
financial support of their parents. Applicant was giving a brother her share to wire over to her
parents. She and her siblings in the U.S. had recently agreed to increase their contributions from
$100 to $400 monthly as their parents had increased prescription costs. One of Applicant’s brothers
has applied for their parents to immigrate from Lebanon to the U.S. Applicant’s parents own their
current residence, an apartment in Lebanon. They also receive rental income from land that her father
inherited. 
Applicant’s oldest sister (sister #1) is 49 years old and employed as an elementary public
school principal in Lebanon. She is a widow with four children whose ages range from 12 to 22.
Applicant converses with her sister by telephone a few times a month. Applicant’s next eldest sibling
(sister #2) is 47 years old and is married to a pediatrician in private practice in Lebanon. Sister #2
has three children, all minors, and is employed as a public school inspector after a career as a
classroom teacher. Applicant calls this sister once a month. Sister #3 in Lebanon is 45 years old and
unmarried. She teaches English in a private school. Applicant speaks with her by telephone a few
times a week. Sister #3 was twice denied a visa to visit Applicant in the U.S. Applicant understands
it was because her sister is single and owns no property, so there was a fear that she would remain
in the U.S. A brother in the U.S. (brother #2) is sponsoring this sister’s immigration to the U.S.,
having filed an application three or four years ago.
Applicant’s parents and siblings in Lebanon know that she is an engineer but she has not told
them who she works for or that she is applying for a security clearance. Applicant is aware of her
responsibility to report to her employer any pressure, direct or indirect, placed on her through her
relatives in Lebanon. To Applicant’s knowledge, none of her relatives had been targeted as of
October 2007.
Applicant has two uncles, one aunt, and ten cousins who are resident citizens of Lebanon.
She does not have a close relationship with these extended family members. She sees them no more
than once a year when she is in Lebanon, and otherwise has no contact.
Applicant has three brothers and one sister living outside of Lebanon. The eldest (brother #1,
age 43) is a dual citizen of the U.S. and Lebanon since his naturalization in the U.S. in July 2002.
He has been in the U.S. more than 19 years and is engaged to a native U.S. citizen. He is a computer
engineer. His fiancee is a thoracic surgeon who has a personal relationship with Applicant and her
spouse. She testified to Applicant and Applicant’s brother being “scared that their family is [in
Lebanon] but not having any concern that the family’s activities would put them in the line of danger
in any way.” (Tr. 95) Applicant’s future sister-in-law does not doubt that Applicant would “do the
right thing” if her relatives were pressured. She considers Applicant to be “very honest, very
straightforward, a very strong sense of morals and ethics . . . a very caring person.” (Tr. 92-93)
Brother #2 is a 41-year-old mechanical engineer who lives not far from Applicant with his spouse
and two-year-old daughter. In the U.S. since 1988, he is a dual citizen of Lebanon and the U.S. since
his naturalization in August 2001. His spouse is a native U.S. citizen who is employed as a technical
writer. Brother #3 is a 39-year-old mechanical engineer working in the U.A.E. He is married to a
Russian citizen, whom he met while pursuing his bachelor’s and graduate degrees in Russia. They
both have permanent residency in Canada. They have a five-year-old daughter and are pursuing
Hizballah has been designated by the U.S. Department of State as a foreign terrorist organization  as has Asbat7
al-Ansar, against which the Lebanese government has taken action. See State Department’s Fact Sheet, Foreign Terrorist
Organizations, dated October 11. 2005.
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Canadian citizenship. Sister #4 is a 36-year-old computer science professional working in California.
She and her spouse are both naturalized U.S. citizens.  
I take administrative notice of the following facts. Lebanon is a parliamentary republic at the
eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea. From 1975 to 1991, it was convulsed in a religious and
ethnically-driven civil war. Regional tensions persisted, with the terrorist organization Hizballah7
targeting Israel from within Lebanon and Israel retaliating. Israeli troops withdrew from Lebanon
in May 2000 after 22 years of Israeli occupation. The level of violence along the Israeli-Lebanon
front decreased dramatically until a month-long war between Hizballah and Israel in July/August
2006. The conflict ended in a cease-fire imposed by a United Nations Security Council resolution
and enforced by the presence of international peacekeeping forces in Lebanon.
Syria, which views Lebanon as part of its territory, maintained a military presence in Lebanon
from March 1976 until April 2005, when it withdrew under international pressure. Syrian
intelligence assets remain in Lebanon, and Syria continues to have a strong influence in Lebanese
politics.  Influential persons in Lebanon critical of Syrian interference in Lebanon have been targeted
for assassination, and more than 32 have died since October 2004. The U.S. considers Syria to be
a state sponsor of terrorism. Pro-Syrian forces, led by Hizballah, began months of massive
demonstrations and occasional violence in November 2006 with the aim of bringing down Lebanon’s
democratically elected government.
        
Lebanon has a mixed record with respect to human rights. The government had taken
significant steps to increase freedom of assembly and association and to prevent unauthorized
eavesdropping of private citizens until the conflict between Israel and Hizballah in 2006. There were
no reports of politically motivated disappearances caused by government forces, but security forces
abused detainees and in some instances used torture in 2006. There were instances of arbitrary arrest,
government corruption and lack of transparency, restrictions on freedom of the press, limitations on
freedom of movement for unregistered refugees, violence against women and children.  
Lebanon does not have a history of targeting U.S. citizens to obtain protected or sensitive
information. The U.S. seeks to maintain its traditionally close ties to Lebanon, and to help preserve
Lebanon’s independence, sovereignty, national unity, and territorial integrity. The U.S. supports the
full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1559 that required all remaining foreign
forces withdraw from Lebanon and the disarming of all militias, including Hizballah and several
Palestinian groups in Lebanon. The Lebanese government has not taken the necessary steps to disarm
extralegal armed groups, including Hizballah. Hizballah has a strong bloc of supporters in Lebanon’s
parliament who continue to view it as a political party. The Lebanese government has taken action
against extremists such as Asbat al-Ansar that has been linked to al-Qaida, but threats of attacks
against western and Lebanese government interests by the extremist group Fatah Al-Islam and other
militant groups led the U.S. State Department in June 2007 to strongly urge American citizens to
deter travel to Lebanon.
The situation in the U.A.E. is relevant because Applicant is close to her brother, who resides there. What can8
be distilled from the government’s source documents (see Country Reports on Terrorism , April 30, 2007) is generally
favorable.
8
The government of the U.A.E. repeatedly condemned terrorist acts in the region in 2006, and
it was generally cooperative in counterterrorism and law enforcement efforts. Cooperation has been
hampered by the lack of a mutual legal assistance treaty between the U.A.E. and the U.S.8
POLICIES
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S.
518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to . . . control access to
information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently
trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person access to such information.” Id. at 527.
The President authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for
access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national
interest to do so.” Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb.
20, 1960). An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with
the national interest to grant or continue [her] security clearance.” ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3
(App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).
The revised Adjudicative Guidelines set forth potentially disqualifying conditions (DC) and
mitigating conditions (MC) under each guideline. In evaluating the security worthiness of an
applicant, the administrative judge must also assess the adjudicative process factors listed in ¶ 6.3
of the Directive. The decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not necessarily a
determination as to the loyalty of the applicant. See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. It is merely an indication
the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have
established for issuing a clearance.
CONCLUSIONS
Guideline B—Foreign Influence
Under Guideline B, foreign influence, foreign contacts and interests may be a security
concern if the individual has divided loyalties, or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government that is not in U.S. interests, or
is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can
and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial
interest is located, including, but not limited to, such considerations as to whether the foreign country
is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with
a risk of terrorism. (AG ¶ 6). Applicant’s parents (SOR ¶ 1.a), three sisters (SOR ¶ 1.c), two uncles,
an aunt, and several cousins (SOR ¶ 1.f)  are resident citizens of her native Lebanon. Another brother
is a Lebanese citizen living in the U.A.E. (¶ 1.e). Applicant admits she has close relationships with
her parents and siblings. Her contacts with them, at least once weekly with her mother and sister #3
and monthly with her father and other siblings, bear that out. Disqualifying condition (DC) ¶ 7(a)
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(contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person
who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion) is implicated.
Since immigrating to the U.S. in late December 1996, Applicant traveled to Lebanon eight
times to visit her parents and sisters. She has been accompanied by her spouse since their marriage
in August 2002, and they took their daughter with them in July 2005 and December 2006. These
trips to Lebanon (SOR ¶ 1.d) are not security disqualifying in their own right absent evidence of any
incidents during those trips that raise her vulnerability to exploitation, pressure or coercion (see ¶
7(i) ( conduct, especially while traveling outside the U.S., which may make the individual vulnerable
to exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a foreign person, group, government, or country)). Routine
checks and registration with authorities are not sufficient to apply DC ¶ 7(i), but the trips are relevant
in that they demonstrate Applicant’s bond with her parents and siblings. Similarly, Applicant’s
voluntary financial support for her parents at $400 per month is not a financial interest within the
meaning of DC ¶ 7(e) (a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign country,
or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which could subject the individual to
heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation). Rather it shows that Applicant has a strong
sense of personal obligation to care for her parents. While this is certainly commendable, it heightens
the risk.
Applicant does not share the same close personal relationship with extended family living
in Lebanon (uncles, aunt, cousins). She has in-person contact with them at most once a year and only
if they happen to come by when she is at her parents’ home. Mitigating conditions (MC) ¶ 8(a) ( the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or
the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual
will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interest of a foreign individual, group,
organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.) and ¶ 8(c) (contact or communication with
foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood it could create a risk for
foreign influence or exploitation) apply in mitigation of her contacts with extended family members.
However, her frequent contact with her parents and siblings precludes favorable
consideration of ¶ 8(c) relative to her immediate family. The familial bonds are too strong to satisfy
the first prong of ¶ 8(a). Furthermore, Lebanon, while not known to target U.S. citizens to obtain
protected information, is associated with a risk of terrorism. U.S. State Department publications
chronicle the history of instability in Lebanon, and the continuing influence of Syria, which is a state
sponsor of terrorism. Although Syria withdrew its troops under international pressure in 2005, covert
intelligence assets remain. Moreover, as recently as November 2006, pro-Syrian forces, led by
Hizballah, began months of massive demonstrations and occasional violence with the aim of
bringing down Lebanon’s democratically-elected government. Efforts to undermine Lebanese
sovereignty create an unstable political climate that heightens the risk. Lebanon remains a very
dangerous place for its citizens and visitors alike, leading the U.S. State Department in June 2007
to warn against travel to Lebanon. When Applicant and her spouse were in Lebanon in December
2006, they were prevented from traveling into Beirut, although they observed no violence or
demonstrations in her parents’ immediate vicinity.
Applicant argues for a distinction between the risk to physical security that exists in an
unstable environment, and the types of concern that rise to the level of compromising Applicant’s
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ability to safeguard national security. Applicant’s position makes sense only if terrorism is viewed
solely as a criminal activity. Terrorism is not limited to indiscriminate acts of violence intended to
incite fear. It often has political aims, and where it is allowed to operate unchecked or is condoned
one has to question the ability and/or willingness of a government to protect its citizens against
interference, coercion, or other abuses. Under Guideline B, the risk of terrorism within a foreign
country is a relevant consideration independent of whether the foreign country is known to target
U.S. citizens to obtain protected information. The DOHA Appeal Board recently found error in a
DOHA administrative judge’s failure to consider in depth the substantial impact of terrorist
organizations operating within Lebanon. (See ISCR Case No. 05-11292, Apr. 12, 2007).
Applicant’s parents are retired and her sisters are in the education field. There is nothing
about their particular occupational endeavors that suggests military, intelligence, or security
responsibilities. It is noted that sister #3 was twice denied a visa to visit her in the U.S. While there
is nothing to contradict Applicant’s testimony that it only was because her sister is single and owns
no property, the denial of a visa raises questions about this particular sister’s situation, activities,
and/or associations about which little is known. Despite State Department warnings, Applicant
continues to travel to Lebanon to visit her family members. She is hoping to go to Lebanon with her
spouse in December 2007, but is waiting to make travel arrangements until one month before her
intended departure so that she does not lose money if she has to cancel the trip due to an outbreak
of hostilities. Less of a risk is associated with Applicant’s brother in the U.A.E. given that country’s
relative stability and cooperation in fighting terrorism, although concerns persist because of his
Lebanese citizenship and the strong family bonds to those in Lebanon. MC ¶ 8(a) does not apply in
mitigation of the strong bonds to her immediate family members abroad.
The risk of undue foreign influence presented by Applicant’s affections for her family
members may yet be mitigated by countervailing strong ties in the U.S. (See MC ¶ 8(b) (there is no
conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign
person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve
any conflict of interest in the U.S.)). Since immigrating to the U.S. in late December 1996, Applicant
has established connections to the U.S. that weigh in her favor in assessing whether she is likely to
resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. Her spouse and daughter are U.S. native-born
citizens. All of her financial assets are in the U.S. (employment, home ownership, 401K and other
retirement assets). She has developed close friendships here, and three of her siblings are U.S.
resident citizens. She voluntarily acquired U.S. citizenship in August 2003. Yet, even with these very
significant ties are relatively recent, and she has a strong desire to retain her connection through
citizenship to her native Lebanon.
Applicant submits that she would immediately report any attempt at improper influence to
her facility security officer. A statement of intention about what an applicant will do in the future
under some hypothetical set of circumstances is not entitled to much weight, unless there is record
evidence that the applicant has acted in an identical or similar manner in the past under identical or
similar circumstances. See ISCR Case No. 99-0511 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2000); ISCR Case No. 01-
26893 (App. Bd. Oct. 16, 2002). Applicant is reputed among her friends and coworkers to hold high
ethical and moral principles, but it is not enough to mitigate the security significant foreign influence
concerns that exist. 
 
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Guideline C—Foreign Preference
When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over
the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are
harmful to the interests of the United States. (AG ¶ 9). A native of Lebanon, Applicant came to the
U.S. after having just married a naturalized U.S. citizen who had immigrated from Lebanon. When
the marriage failed, Applicant remained in the U.S. for the job opportunities and because she had the
support of three siblings, who were already living here.  In August 2002, she married a native U.S.
citizen, and one year later became a U.S. citizen herself. In September 2003 and again in July 2004,
Applicant used her Lebanese passport to travel to Lebanon to see her parents and sisters, even though
she was traveling with her spouse, who held only a U.S. passport. Her active exercise of her foreign
citizenship bears serious foreign preference concerns under disqualifying condition (DC) ¶ 10(a)(1)
(exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen or
through the citizenship of a family member. This includes but is not limited to: (1) possession of a
current foreign passport). As someone who embraces her dual citizenship, it is simply not believable
that she used her Lebanese passport solely to avoid a $20 visa fee that she could easily afford (see
Tr. 159, 175).
Applicant surrendered her Lebanese passport to the Lebanese Consulate in February 2006
following her interview with a government investigator. Mitigating condition (MC) ¶ 11(e) (the
passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security authority, or otherwise
invalidated) applies. She is unwilling to renounce her Lebanese citizenship unless required to do so,
even if it cost her a clearance. She testified it is because of some benefit of that citizenship (such as
reduced property taxes) that she might enjoy on her retirement, but it is more likely her emotional
and familial ties to Lebanon (see Guideline B) that lead her to maintain her Lebanese citizenship.
Renunciation of foreign citizenship is a mitigating condition (see MC ¶ 11(b) (the individual has
expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship)), but it is not required. Applicant has
demonstrated her willingness to comply with DoD requirements by surrendering her Lebanese
passport as soon as she became aware of the security concerns raised by the use of that passport.
Although she is eligible to reacquire a Lebanese passport, she testified credibly that she has no intent
to obtain a Lebanese passport in the future.
Whole Person Analysis
The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person’s life to make
an affirmative determination that the person is eligible for a security clearance. AG ¶ 2(a). Applicant
has a record of dedicated contributions to her employer and several witnesses consider her capable
of fulfilling the day-to-day fiduciary obligations of a clearance. However, this is not enough to meet
her heavy burden of overcoming the foreign influence concerns. Not enough is known about her
siblings’ associates and activities in Lebanon. Those coworkers attesting to her security suitability
know little of her family in Lebanon. The coworker who has known Applicant since 1997 was made
aware of her travels to Lebanon only from reading the SOR. Moreover, she plans to continue to
travel to Lebanon. Should her parents and sister #3 gain U.S. permanent residency and immigrate
to the U.S., it could reduce significantly the security risk. However, as the situation now stands, I am
unable to make the affirmative finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant
her access to classified information.
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FORMAL FINDINGS
Paragraph 1. Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f: For Applicant
Paragraph 2. Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: For Applicant
DECISION
In light of all of the circumstances in this case, it is not clearly consistent with the national
interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is denied.
Elizabeth M. Matchinski
Administrative Judge