DATE:  November 28, 2007
In re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 07-01509
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
ROGER C. WESLEY
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Julie R. Edmunds, Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Chester (Skip) Morgan, II, Esq.
SYNOPSIS
Applicant has a history of demonstrated judgment lapses associated with his use of classified
computer systems and related software in his work and in his use of accessing adult pornographic
materials and engaging in sex-related conduct in public areas.  Applicant’s collective actions resulted
in the denial of his requested access to sensitive comparted information (SCI).   Similar conclusions
are warranted here  under the personal conduct guideline based on Applicant’s demonstrated pattern
of poor judgment in a number of areas and circumstances.  Applicant’s collective actions represent
overall  poor judgment that is for the most part still too recent to mitigate.  Only Applicant’s past
access of adult pornographic material on his office computer and his related engaging in sexual
misconduct is sufficiently isolated and dated to be successfully mitigated.  Clearance is denied.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
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On June 7, 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA), pursuant to
Executive Order 10865 and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Directive), dated January 2,
1992, issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, which detailed reasons why DOHA could
not make the preliminary affirmative finding under the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant, and recommended referral
to an administrative judge to determine whether clearance should be granted, continued, denied or
revoked.
Applicant responded to the SOR on June 29, 2007, and requested a hearing.  The case was
assigned to me on August 3, 2007, and was scheduled for hearing on September 11, 2007.  A hearing
was held on September 11, 2007, for the purpose of considering whether it would be clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant, continue, deny, or revoke Applicant’s security
clearance.  At hearing, the Government's case consisted of seven exhibits; Applicant relied on two
witnesses (including himself) and three exhibits.  The transcript (R.T.) was received on September
19, 2007.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Before the close of the hearing, Applicant requested the record by kept open to afford him
the opportunity to supplement the record with documented proof of the curriculum materials he was
provided at a parenting course he attended 2004 following his NSA interviews.  There being no
objection from the Government, and good cause being demonstrated, Applicant was granted seven
days to supplement the record.  The Government was afforded three days to respond.  Within the
time permitted, Applicant provided documentation of the curriculum materials provided him in his
parenting course.  The submission was admitted as exhibit  D.
SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
Under Guideline E, Applicant is alleged to have been denied eligibility to access secret
compartmented information (SC) by another government agency in May 2004 based on information
that he (1) modified a line of programming on a classified computer (between 2001 and 2003) as a
prank so that a co-worker’s computer would beep at start-up; (2) accessed a classified computer
network at a U.S. government facility abroad on three separate occasions without authorization; (3)
accessed a U.S. government facility’s e-mails from the account of a co-worker (not logged off at the
time) while working at a facility abroad; (4) inadvertently carried classified computer disks in his
briefcase in either 1992 or 1993 from one classified facility to another; (5) viewed adult pornography
on his office computer and masturbated in his office and in the company restroom, for two hours a
day on average between 1995 and 1996; masturbated while driving his vehicle to and from work
three times a year prior to about May 2003; (6) used a chastisement device to discipline his children
between 1997 and 2004 that left bruises on his children’s legs; and (7) continued working on a
secure security system after being notified in October 2003 that he was no longer authorized to
access this system.  
For his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted to modifying a line of programming on a
classified computer system, but denied any exercise of questionable judgment.   Applicant admitted
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sending one or two e-mails from the account of a co-worker while working at a U.S. facility abroad.
Applicant also admitted to working on a computer system without authorization in 2003, but only
on few occasions.  Applicant denied the remaining allegations: some en totale, and others in part,
and added explanations.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant is a  43-year-old software developer who seeks a security clearance. The
allegations covered in the SOR and admitted by Applicant are incorporated herein by reference and
adopted as relevant and material findings.  Additional findings follow.
While employed as a contractor for another agency (NSA) between 2001 and 2003, Applicant
was twice granted conditional certification of access (CCA) in 2003 to access SCI.  He was first
granted access in March 2003 and then debriefed after his employer withdrew his sponsorship in
June 2003 (see ex. 3).   Following his employment by a new employer in July 2003 (O corporation),
this employer successfully sponsored him for CCA.  His CCA was rescinded, though, in February
2004 when he was unable to successfully complete his security processing.
Applicant was interviewed by an NSA investigator in October 2003 as a part of the agency’s
background investigation to determine his suitability to access SCI (ex. 4).  During this interview,
he disclosed computer-related information that NSA interpreted to entail security violations, sexual
misbehavior, and abusive child disciplining (see exs. 4 and 5).  
In or about 1992 or 1993, Applicant inadvertently carried classified unused computer disks
in his briefcase from one classified facility to another on multiple occasions.  According to
Applicant, these disks had never been used in a classified system: “They were just blank floppy
disks,” according to Applicant (R.T., at 38).  However, Applicant did not expressly  retract his
statements given to an NSA investigator in October 2003 when asked about the disks by Department
Counsel (R.T., at 72-75).  In this interview, Applicant, acknowledged, carrying secret level computer
disks in his briefcase from one DoD secret facility to another, discovering them on his return to the
facility’s unclassified location, and then taking steps to ensure the disks were properly secured in the
proper classified facility by the close of business (see ex. 4).  With the clarification that the disks in
question were unused blank floppy disks, Applicant’s statements made to the NSA investigator in
October 2003 about these disks are accepted and incorporated anew.
While working for at a U.S. Government facility in Australia (between 1997 and 2001),
Applicant remotely logged into a classified TS/SCI level network in Great Britain in an effort to
resolve software problems, or other errors he was experiencing with the network in Australia (see
exs. 3 and 4).  After successfully logging in, he accessed the director of systems logs and proceeded
to analyze the logs.  He recollected taking these actions on three separate occasions during this 1997-
2001 time period without obtaining authorization (R.T., at 71).  He subsequently acknowledged this
was likely incorrect action, since he was not authorized.  Applicant assured that he never attempted
to “crack” passwords on another user’s system.  Nor was it necessary to surreptitiously enter the
other user’s system, inasmuch, as he had not logged off of his system or engaged his screen saver
during Applicant’s interventions.
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During his period of employment in Australia, Applicant also recollects sending one or two
e-mails from the account of a co-worker who had not yet logged off her own computer.  Applicant
ensures he meant no harm by his intrusive actions and only intended the activity as a prank (see exs.
3 and 4).
While working for a prior defense contractor for a period in 2001, Applicant encountered a
specific office need for system administrator access to modify a line of programming on a classified
network (see exs. 3 and 7).  On this particular occasion during this 2001 time frame, Applicant  used
his own system administrator privileges to gain access to a female co-worker’s system profile.  The
modification caused his coworker’s computer to beep at start-up; it was intended as a prank, and
apparently did not cause any disruption in the network (see ex. 4; R.T., at 62-63).  Applicant
acknowledged, though, that “he was not supposed to access other people’s e-mail” (R.T., at 72).
Following his employment as a NSA contractor in September 2003, Applicant began working
in NSA facilities (see ex. 5).  Shortly after his start-up with NSA, he was given root access
passwords to the secure computer system in his office to facilitate his performing his assigned system
administrator duties.  Unbeknownst to him at the time, his supervisors had submitted his name for
privileged access to classified information (PRIVAC).  In October 2003, he was notified that he was
denied PRIVAC and could no longer work on classified systems.  After being told he did not have
PRIVAC and couldn’t administer classified systems without it,  he continued performing his system
administrator duties without supervision three times a week (see ex. 5; R.T., at 64-65, 86-87).  Two
months later (in December  2003), Applicant discontinued his unsupervised access to his classified
computer system.  By this time he had been notified of a scheduled second interview and polygraph
examination with NSA and knew that gaining access to NSA’s classified computer system without
PRIVAC was against NSA policy.  Knowing that he would likely be asked about his continued
working on the classified computer without PRIVAC would likely be explored in the scheduled
interview and polygraph, he ceased his unauthorized access (see ex. 5; R.T., at 88). 
Over a two-year period between 1995 and 1996, Applicant viewed adult pornography on his
unclassified office computer, in addition to masturbating in his office three to ten times and in the
company restroom on three to ten occasions (never completely shielded from potential public
observation).  He estimates that on average he viewed pornography in his office computer for two
hours per work day, and at times, as much as four hours per workday (see exs. 3 and 4; R.T., at 76-
80).  It is not clear whether there were specific guidelines in place with his employer at the time that
proscribed deliberate accessing of pornography on an office computer (compare exs. 3 and 7).
Nonetheless, the NSA’s SCI findings reflect drawn inferences that it was at the very least  a
disfavored company practice.  During this same contemporaneous period, and for a number of years
thereafter, he occasionally masturbated while driving his vehicle to and from work.  His last reported
act of masturbation while driving was in May 2003 (exs. 3 and 4; R.T., at 79).  Applicant insists he
never had any fear of detection or repercussions at work over the conduct (R.T., at 81).
For over seven years spanning 1997 and 2004, Applicant used a 12-inch cloth-covered ruler
known as a “chastisement device” (a device designed to change a child’s behavior by means of
administering corporal punishment) to discipline his  children.  He was introduced to this practice
through a course that consisted of meeting with other couples, exchanging ideas, and watching two
videos on child rearing that were produced by an identified Christian organization (see ex. A; R.T.,
at 50-51).  He purchased the chastisement device from his course hosts (R.T., at 52).  When first
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interviewed by NSA in October 2003, he described his chastisement practice in which a child is
“swatted a number of times equivalent to their age plus an additional one to two times” (ex. 4).
Describing his practice as one that is done “effectively and lovingly,” he acknowledged that he
“swatted his daughter too many times and two hard,” which resulted in bruises on his daughter’s leg
(ex. 4).  He admitted to causing  bruises on his daughter’s legs once or twice, while making every
effort to avoid applying the chastisement device on his children’s bare posterior.  Applicant also
acknowledged his use of the chastisement device on his younger son once daily, which he attributed
to his son’s need for daily disciplining (see ex. 4).
In a second interview with NASA (in January 2004), Applicant elaborated some on his use
of the chastisement device.  He traced his initiation of chastising his children to very early ages and
classified his use frequency of the device on his children as “regular” (see ex. 5).  He acknowledged
for the first time to unintentionally leaving bruises on the backs of his children on a few occasions
(possibly once a year) when the disciplined child moved during his striking action.  He stated in this
interview that he last left a bruise on his youngest son in 2003 (see ex. 5).  Applicant indicated he
had never been questioned by authorities over the manner in which he disciplined his children and
believed his actions were not excessive.
Applicant spoke in greater depth and detail about his chastising of his children in his third
and last interview with NSA in March 2004 (see ex. 6).  In this interview, he confirmed his
chastising his four-year old daughter two to three times per week for “pushing her six-year brother’s
buttons” (ex. 6).  He reaffirmed his chastising his younger son on a daily basis between 2000 and
early 2004, and thereafter three to four times a week for bullying his four-year-old sister and lying
(an automatic reason for chastising).  He indicated that his chastising of his other two daughters
varied: from no chastising for the past year with his nine-year old daughter to once a month
chastising of his oldest daughter for exhibiting a bad attitude and “saying mean things” to her
siblings (ex. 6).  Applicant repeated his leaving inadvertent bruises on his children once a year
between the years 1997 and 2004 and to occasionally striking the backs of their legs when any of the
children moved while he was administering the chastise device.  At hearing, he insisted he had no
intention to bruise or harm his children with his chastising actions.
After talking with co-workers following his March 2004 NSA interview,  Applicant enrolled
in a parenting course in April 2004 (see exs. 7 and D; R.T., at 59).  This class was administered by
a state department of social services, was entitled “Dads works” (ex. 7), and involved weekly
sessions with fathers seeking to learn about parenting skills (R.T., at 59).   From this parenting
course, he gained fresh tools and ideas for non-physical punishment of his children and, thereafter
threw the chastise device away.  Since taking his parenting course, Applicant insists he has not used
a chastisement device to discipline his children (R.T., at 59-60).
Based on all of the information compiled from NSA interviews covering Applicant’s
security-related activities and his personal practices involving his personal behavior over a 12-year
period, NSA denied Applicant access to SCI in May 2004 (ex. 3).  After weighing all of the available
information necessary to make an informed whole person assessment, NSA determined that
Applicant did not meet the DCID 6/4 standards for access to NSA/CSS SCI (see ex. 3).  Applicant
elected not to appeal NSA’s eligibility denial for SCI access (R.T., at 88).
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Applicant was interviewed by OPM in December 2006 in connection with his application
for a collateral clearance (see ex. 7).   The interview covered the same areas of inquiry developed
by NSA during its SCI investigation, and entailed considerable qualifications and minimizing of the
actions he acknowledged in previous NSA interviews.  For instance, when he was asked about his
continued use of a classified computer system without oversight in 2003 after being advised he did
not have PRIVAC, he indicated he did so only after he could not find a team member with PRIVAC,
and used the computer system for the limited purpose of repairing system errors.  Asked to address
his prior chastising of his children in this OPM interview (see ex. 7), he retreated on his previous
acknowledgments made to NSA interviewers.  In this interview, he assured that he did not use the
chastise device often and always applied it over the child’s clothes, “never against bare skin” (ex.
7).  Further, he indicated “the children were not bruised due to the use of the chastise belt” (see ex.
7).  Applicant indicated he did not enjoy disciplining his children with “the chastise belt” (ex. 7).
Asked at hearing about bruising his children with his chastisement device, Applicant did
recall one possible inadvertent experience with his younger son (R.T., at 56-57), but otherwise
denied ever inflicting any bruises on his children from his chastising.  Applicant did admit to one
instance of intentionally striking  his youngest daughter on her bare skin while she was bathing (R.T.,
at 57).
In his 2006 OPM interview, the OPM investigator also explored Applicant’s previously
acknowledged viewing of adult  pornographic material on his office computer.  For the first time he
recounted a cause and effect association between his viewing of pornographic material and his
withdrawing to his employer’s restroom to masturbate (see ex. 7).  At the same time, he trimmed
his previously admitted admissions of masturbating while driving: in this interview; in this interview,
he admitted  to just one instance of masturbating while driving (ex. 7).  
Applicant’s  FSO and project manager together credit Applicant with avoiding any security
violations and incidents between August  2004 and April 2007 (see exs. B and C).  Applicant is well
regarded by a coworker familiar with him.  This coworker describes Applicant as honest and
trustworthy and one who possesses a high sensitivity to guilt (R.T., at 26-27).   
POLICIES
The revised Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified
Information (effective September 2006) list Guidelines to be considered by judges in the decision
making process covering DOHA cases.  These Guidelines require the judge to consider all of the
"Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying” (Disqualifying
Conditions), if any, and all of the "Mitigating Conditions," if any, before deciding whether or not a
security clearance should be granted, continued or denied.  The Guidelines do not require the judge
to assess these factors exclusively in arriving at a decision.  In addition to the relevant Adjudicative
Guidelines, judges must take into account the pertinent considerations for assessing extenuation and
mitigation set forth in E.2.2 of the Adjudicative Process of Enclosure 2 of the Directive, which are
intended to assist the judges in reaching a fair and impartial common sense decision.
Viewing the issues raised and evidence as a whole, the following adjudication policy factors
are pertinent herein:
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Personal Conduct
The Concern: Conduct involving questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of
candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about
an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information.  Of special
interest is any failure to provide truthful and candid answers during the security clearance process
or any other failure to cooperate with the security clearance process. 
Burden of Proof
By virtue of the precepts framed by the revised Adjudicative Guidelines, a decision to grant
or continue an applicant's security clearance may be made only upon a threshold finding that to do
so is clearly consistent with the national interest.  Because the Directive requires Administrative
Judges to make a common sense appraisal of the evidence accumulated in the record, the ultimate
determination of an applicant's eligibility for a security clearance depends, in large part, on the
relevance and materiality of that evidence.  As with all adversary proceedings, the Judge may draw
only those inferences which have a reasonable and logical basis from the evidence of record.
Conversely, the Judge cannot draw factual inferences that are grounded on speculation or conjecture.
The Government's initial burden is twofold: (1) It must prove any controverted fact[s] alleged
in the Statement of Reasons and (2) it must demonstrate that the facts proven have a material bearing
to the applicant's eligibility to obtain or maintain a security clearance.  The required showing of
material bearing, however, does not require the Government to affirmatively demonstrate that the
applicant has actually mishandled or abused classified information before it can deny or revoke a
security clearance. Rather, consideration must take account of cognizable risks that an applicant may
deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information.
Once the Government meets its initial burden of proof of establishing admitted or
controverted facts, the burden of persuasion shifts to the applicant for the purpose of establishing his
or her security worthiness through evidence of refutation, extenuation or mitigation of the
Government's case.
CONCLUSIONS
Appellant comes to these proceedings as a software developer who acknowledged security-
related actions over a 10-year period that were neither authorized nor incidents that could be fairly
determined to fall within his established parameters of responsible authority.  While none of these
specific actions admitted to in NSA interviews associated with his 2003 SCI application were ever
investigated and found to reflect security violations meriting disciplinary actions, the cumulative
effect of these repeated actions over an extensive period of time raise security issues.  Although none
of Applicant’s cited irregularities with his computer or classified disks carried in his briefcase
involved stored classified information, his actions certainly raised questions about his judgment,
reliability and trustworthiness required for eligibility to access classified information.
Recurrent failures to adhere to established security procedures
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Under the Directive’s security violation guidelines in force, persons responsible for
safeguarding classified information in their custody and control are required to adhere to established
procedural requirements for operating classified computer systems and safeguarding classified disks,
and to avoid actions that might place classified information under their custody and control at risk
to compromise.  Applicant’s continued access to a classified computer system with the knowledge
of being denied PRIVAC and his deliberate mishandling of his classified computer systems under
his control (even for prank reasons) violated the procedural requirements of paragraph 5-100 of the
NISPOM for accessing classified network systems without authorization.  His actions warrant  one
of the disqualifying conditions (DC) of the Adjudicative Guidelines for personal conduct: DC 16 (c)
(credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is not sufficient for an adverse
determination under any other single guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports
a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of
candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that
the person may not properly safeguard protected information).
The importance of demonstrating sound judgment and willingness to comply with established
rules and guidelines regarding the administering of classified equipment and safeguarding classified
computer hardware and software cannot be overemphasized.  Protecting the nation’s security
interests against the risks of foreign coercion and intimidation remains a core governmental
responsibility that finds roots in our earliest Constitutional  history  and enjoys the sustaining force
of the courts.  Cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936). Applicant's
continued accessing of a classified computer system after being advised he did not have PRIVAC,
his failures to utilize his employer’s trusted authorization procedures for accessing other computer
systems, his misuse of a classified computer to cause a beep on a co-worker’s computer start-up, and
his carrying classified disks (even empty ones) to and from classified facilities in his briefcase over
an extended time period increased the security risks for potential compromise of classified
information.  His actions, as such, reflect adversely on his judgment and trustworthiness for
accessing classified information. 
In appraising the security significance of Applicant's history of misuse of classified computer
systems and software (i.e., the empty classified disks), some deliberate and some inadvertent,  careful
consideration was given to Applicant's full and open disclosure of his actions in the NSA interviews
that preceded his denial of SCI access in 2004.  While all of the developed information was based
on Applicant’s open disclosures to NSA interviewers, and not from any other developed sources, the
information does reflect judgment lapses by an experienced software developer that are security
significant.  While Applicant has since minimized some of the events he recounted to NSA
interviewers, the findings made in NSA’s 2004 decision covering Applicant’s application to access
SCI is well supported by information furnished by Applicant in a series of NSA interviews and was
never appealed by Applicant.  Despite his efforts to further explain and to some extent minimize the
events covered in NSA’s 2004 decision, the findings are credibly based and are sustained.
Because the developed infractions of company procedures governing the administering of
classified computer systems and software are derived from the guideline governing personal conduct,
and not the guideline covering security violations, these infractions must be assessed against the
backdrop of both the mitigating conditions of the new Adjudicative Guidelines and a whole person
assessment.   While a number of years have passed since the last reported infraction (in 2003), the
actions themselves cannot be considered minor, infrequent, or aged, when considered as a whole,
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and not in piecemeal.  To be sure, any of these actions considered alone or in isolation could  likely
be mitigated, especially given his more recent clean record.  It is their confluence that creates current
security concerns over Applicant’s demonstrated  judgment.  Given the circumstances in which these
incidents were elicited (viz., against the backdrop of a scheduled polygraph) and the absence of
documented counseling and/or specific restorative initiatives (such as additional briefings on
procedures for administering classified systems) to ensure his avoidance of recurrent incidents in the
future, potential mitigation conditions under the personal conduct guideline are not available to
Applicant.  Without the benefit of applicable mitigating conditions to the covered conduct,
successful mitigation is more difficult to demonstrate herein under the Guideline E guideline. 
Evaluating Applicant’s actions from a whole person perspective does not warrant any more
favorable conclusions either.  Even with credit accorded for his completing security training and
avoiding any adverse incidents over the past three plus years, the covered incidents are too numerous
and serious when considered together to warrant the application of  any of the mitigating conditions
of Guideline E in this proceeding.  Collectively, these covered classified computer and software-
related actions reflect a security significant pattern of judgment lapses that is too extensive and recent
to be mitigated at this time under any of the cited mitigation conditions under the personal conduct
guideline.
Applicant’s other covered conduct
Pattern misconduct attributable to Applicant also includes his regular viewing of adult
pornography on his office computer during a two-year period spanning 1995 and 1996 and his
engaging in masturbation in his office, in the company’s restroom, and while driving during this
same contemporaneous period, and thereafter when driving his car (i.e., to May 2003).  Applicant’s
regular disciplining of his four young children through the corporal application of a chastisement
device to their posteriors, and occasionally to their exposed legs and backs, over the course of seven
years spanning 1997 and 2004, was confirmed by NSA in its 2004 SCI access decision and was
never challenged by Applicant.  Applicant’s  acknowledged sexual misconduct and  harsh treatment
of his children (some of which resulted in bruises and red marks on his  children), reflect poorly on
his respect for his office rules and internal guidelines and his children’s well being and represent still
additional examples of demonstrated poor judgment.
Aside from the physical bruises and red marks occasionally inflicted on his children, regular
application of pain producing blunt instruments on children so young risks damaging their fragile
esteem systems during their early development and exposes these children to potentially irreversible
developmental deficits.  It is not at all clear that Applicant considered these risks before settling on
the discipline practice he chose after viewing a child rearing video with his hosts.  His regular use
of a chastisement device on his children in the way he recounted on multiple occasions to NSA
investigators does cast reasonable doubt on his judgment and trustworthiness and his overall ability
to demonstrate his current eligibility to access classified information.
Like his  computer-related conduct, Applicant’s pornography and sexual based actions are
not based on any specific guideline tailored to the specific conduct, but rather on the personal
conduct guideline that covers acts indicative of poor judgment and unreliability.  Specifically, this
conduct is covered by DC 16(c) of the Adjudication Guidelines for personal conduct.  Whether
Applicant’s collective actions can be mitigated due to age, infrequency, and/or unique circumstances
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that are unlikely to recur cannot be resolved solely based solely on the application of any of the
mitigating conditions. 
Both Applicant’s disciplining practices and his less recent accessing of pornography on his
office computer and engaging in masturbating in public areas over a prolonged period preclude the
application of the conjunctive provisions of MC 17(c) (the offense is so minor, or so much time has
passed, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast
doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment) of the guidelines for
personal conduct.  Based on the counseling he initiated to reassess his disciplining of his children,
he may take very limited application of two of the other mitigating conditions: specifically, MC
17(d) (the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the
behavior or taken positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused
untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur).
and MC 17(e) (the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to
exploitation, manipulation, or duress).  Applicant’s counseling efforts and corrective steps he has
taken in disciplining his children, while encouraging, are still too recent and uncertain, however, to
accord considerable weight. 
Recognizing that security clearance evaluations do not represent an exact science, some
whole person assessments are necessary to supplement the specific requirements of the relevant
mitigating conditions of the personal conduct guideline.  Applicant’s accessing of pornography and
related masturbation in public areas (inclusive of his office and while driving on public highways)
is now quite dated for the most part (primarily in the 1995-1996 time frame), and has not been
repeated since his last reported incident of masturbating while driving in 2003.  Even though the
judgment lapses implicit in this acknowledged behavior reflect part of a pattern of judgment lapses
manifesting in different areas and circumstances, this activity has unique characteristics and is one
that can be fairly evaluated separately without turning the evaluation into a unsustainable piecemeal
assessment.  So, although application of the mitigating conditions may not be fully available to
Applicant, without ignoring Applicant’s history of serious indiscretions in other areas of the record,
whole person assessment in these unique circumstances makes it highly unlikely that Applicant will
ever again engage in any of these sex-related activities. 
Less amenable to mitigation through either the mitigating conditions of the personal conduct
guideline or a whole person assessment is Applicant’s self-reported disciplinary use of a
chastisement device on his children.  To Applicant’s credit, he took advantage of a parenting course
following his last NSA interview.  Whether his parenting course has resulted in permanent
behavioral changes in Applicant is still uncertain at this point in time.  Applicant provided no
documentation of his course progress, his completion of the course, or what he learned from the
course.  His most recent OPM interview reflects some continuing denial of the ramifications of his
regular use of the discipline practice on his young children and complicates the process of making
predictive judgments about whether he can be expected to avoid recurrent use of the chastisement
device in the future.   Unlike his accessing pornography and employment of sexual relief actions in
public places, his harsh disciplining actions are generally more recent and more likely to generate
long term repercussions on the child recipients.
In balance, Applicant can safely be credited with mitigation of security concerns associated
with his use of poor judgment in accessing pornography and engaging in masturbation in public
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places and areas.  More time is needed, however, to make fair and reasonable predictable
assessments about his abstaining from inflicting the kind of corporal punishment on his children that
he acknowledged to NSA investigators in 2003 and 2004.  While Applicant is to be encouraged by
his accounts of changing his disciplining practices since taking his parenting course, it is still too
soon to mitigate the judgment lapses associated with his past actions.  So, while favorable
conclusions warrant with respect to the poor judgment allegations associated with his access of
pornography on his office computer and his related engagement in sexually oriented activity in
public areas, unfavorable conclusions are warranted with respect to the judgment allegations
covering his disciplinary practices.
In reaching my decision, I have considered the evidence as a whole, including each of the E2
2.2 factors enumerated in the Adjudicative Guidelines of the Directive.
FORMAL FINDINGS
In reviewing the allegations of the SOR and ensuing conclusions reached in the context of
the FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS, CONDITIONS, and the factors listed above, I make
the following FORMAL FINDINGS:
GUIDELINE E (PERSONAL CONDUCT): AGAINST APPLICANT
Sub-para. 2.a (numbers 1 through 5, 7 & 8): AGAINST APPLICANT
Sub-para. 2.a (number 6): FOR APPLICANT
DECISION
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant’s security clearance.  Clearance is denied.
Roger C. Wesley
Administrative Judge