DATE:  December 31, 2007
In Re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 05-05277
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
CHARLES D. ABLARD
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Nichole Noel, Esq. , Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
Applicant failed to mitigate personal conduct security concerns relating to violation of
regulations and agreement to refrain from conduct that might create an impression of impartiality
by attempting to obtain a significant pay increase for a domestic partner and pressuring his employer
to grant such an increase. He also failed to mitigate security concerns by failing to state on his SF
86 that he had left his employment after allegations of misconduct as a result of investigation of the
actions taken to benefit his partner. Clearance is denied. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 13, 2007, the Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) pursuant to Executive Order
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10865, Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry as amended and modified, and
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (Directive), dated January 2, 1992, as amended and modified, issued a Statement of
Reasons (SOR) to Applicant which detailed reasons why DOHA could not make the preliminary
affirmative finding under the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant
or continue a security clearance for Applicant. DOHA recommended the case be referred to an
administrative judge to determine whether a clearance should be granted, continued, denied, or
revoked.
In a sworn written statement, received May 11, 2007, Applicant responded to the allegations
set forth in the SOR, and requested a decision without a hearing. On May 24, 2007 the government
requested a hearing to fully develop the record. The case was assigned to me on August 21, 2007.
A Notice of Hearing was issued August 30, 2007 for a hearing held on September 12, 2007. The
Government introduced ten exhibits in their case in chief and another four in rebuttal. Applicant
introduced 47 exhibits. All were accepted into evidence. A government investigator testified for the
government. Applicant and one witness testified on behalf of Applicant. The witness testified by
telephone from another city over the objection of the government. The transcript was received on
September 20, 2007.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant denied with explanation the three SOR allegations of personal conduct security
concerns relating to his misuse of his authority as a federal employee and failure to report his
departure from that employment after investigation for misconduct. After a complete review of the
record, I make the following additional findings of fact:
Applicant is a 36-year-old employee of a major defense contractor working as a program
manager since September 2004. Before his present employment he was for 18 months a Navy
employee working on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs as a federal program analyst. Before
his federal employment he worked for another defense contractor for four years as an FMS case
manager providing technical support for the FMS work. His domestic partner also worked for the
same company. When he took his federal government position he was made responsible for
management oversight of the work of his former company but in view of possible conflict with the
interests of his partner who still worked there, he was restricted pursuant to specific  regulatory
authority (5 CFR 2635.502, and SPAWAR Instruction 127521B) from having any authority over his
work, promotion, or funding (Exh. 3, p. 7, and Exh.10). 
As a result of this decision, the supervisory responsibility was divided between Applicant and
a colleague with each having responsibility for four specific personnel in the company. The colleague
had exclusive responsibility for oversight of Applicant’s partner. 
Despite the restrictions placed on him and to which he had agreed (Exh. 3, p. 7, and Exh. 5,
p.2), in 2003 Applicant began an effort among his colleagues and supervisors to provide substantial
pay increases for four employees of the company including his partner (Exh. 7). On January 15,
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2004, the partner was terminated by the company for lack of performance and was hired by a
competitor company. Ten days later Applicant initiated an effort to terminate the work of the
partner’s former employer and direct it to his new employer (Exh. 3 p. 20). This was allegedly in
retaliation for the failure to obtain the pay increases for the four persons (Exh. 3 p. 25). 
An inspector general’s hotline complaint on January 30, 2004, initiated a lengthy
investigation of Applicant by the Navy Inspector General which was completed on June 1, 2005
(Exh. 3). He submitted statements to the investigator (Exh. B 9 and 32). The investigation revealed
that there was no basis for the action attempted against the partner’s former employer. It concluded
that Applicant had broken his agreement to refrain from any supervisory influence over his partner.
As a result of the investigation, Applicant was assigned on February 9, 2004, to other work
for the Navy in a policy position (Exh. 11, p. 8). He resigned seven months later on September 26,
2004, and went to work for his present employment the following day. When he filed his application
for a security clearance on February 2, 2005, (Exh. 1), he answered in the negative to Question 20
Your Employment Record relating to leaving a job by mutual agreement following allegations of
misconduct, or unsatisfactory performance, or unfavorable circumstances. 
Consideration has been given by the U.S. Attorney’s office to prosecution of Applicant under
18 U.S.C § 208 which provides that a federal employee may not participate through recommendation
in a contract in which he or his spouse has a financial interest. Also considered was prosecution for
extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 208. Prosecution was declined by the U.S. Attorney for budget
considerations (Report of Adverse Information Exh. 5). 
Applicant has held a security clearance since April 2002. He is well regarded by some
colleagues at this former employer and at his present employer (Exh. 42) where he has been
promoted over the past two years (Exh. B 41). He was interviewed and submitted an eleven page
statement to the investigator from the Office of Personnel Management in connection with the
investigation of his security clearance application (Exh. 2). 
The evidence submitted and testimony by Applicant raised a number of issues, such as
whether the pay increases for the four employees were justifiable, the fact that others in addition to
his partner were to receive them, the competence of the partner’s employing company, and whether
Applicant himself might have benefitted from the pay increase for his partner since they shared some
household expenses. None of those subjects are relevant to the issues raised by the SOR and it is
unnecessary to rule on them. 
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POLICIES
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S.
518, 528 (1988). As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to control access to
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information bearing on national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently
trustworthy to occupy a position that will give that person access to such information.” Id. at 527.
An evaluation of whether the applicant meets the security guidelines includes consideration
of the following factors: (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances
surrounding the conduct; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and
maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the voluntariness of participation; (6) the presence or absence
of rehabilitation and other behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential
for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
-------Security clearances are granted only when “it is clearly consistent with the national interest to
do so.” Executive Order No. 10865 § 2. See Executive Order No. 12968 § 3.1(b).
Initially, the Government must establish, by something less than a preponderance of the
evidence, that conditions exist in the personal or professional history of the applicant which
disqualify, or may disqualify, the applicant from being eligible for access to classified information
See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. The applicant then bears the burden of demonstrating it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance. “Any doubt as to
whether access to classified information is clearly consistent with national security will be resolved
in favor of the national security.” -----“[S]ecurity clearance determinations should err, if they must,
on the side of denials.” Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. See Executive Order No. 12968 § 3.1(b).
CONCLUSIONS
Upon consideration of all the facts in evidence, and after application of all appropriate
adjudicative factors, I conclude the following with respect to all allegations set forth in the SOR:
The revised Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) are applicable to cases with an SOR dated after
September 1, 2006. The Government established each of the allegations under Guideline E Personal
Conduct alleged in the SOR Such conduct might indicate questionable judgment, unreliability, and
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations and could indicate that the person may not
properly safeguard classified information (AG 15). The specific conditions applicable to this case
are AG ¶ 16 d (3) involving rule violations, and AG ¶ 16 (a) concerning Applicant’s deliberate
omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire
used to conduct investigations or to determine security clearance eligibility. 
Mitigating conditions (MC) that might be applicable include under AG ¶ 17(a) that the
individual made prompt, good faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification
before being confronted with the facts, and under AG ¶ 17(c) if the fact that the offense is so minor,
or so much time has passed, or happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur
and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment.
Applicant was well aware of the restrictions placed on him regarding oversight of his partner.
He violated those restrictions by seeking to obtain a substantial pay increase for him and then
retaliating against the partner’s employer when those efforts failed.. He also was aware of the
investigation of his conduct but had transferred to another job for seven months when he resigned
to take his present position. Apparently he was performing well but was not in a field that he enjoyed
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(Exh. 2). He also realized that there would be some “stigma” relating to the events that led to the
investigation and conclusions if he stayed on in his government employment (Exh. 2, p. 8). Thus,
while his departure was his decision and not as a result of his being discharged, it was under
circumstances that required it to be reported at Question 20 since he had left his employment after
allegations of unsatisfactory performance in his former work assignment. No mitigating conditions
apply.
In all adjudications the protection of our national security is of paramount concern. Persons
who have access to classified information have an overriding responsibility for the security concerns
of the nation. The objective of the security clearance process is the fair-minded, commonsense
assessment of a person’s trustworthiness and fitness for access to classified information. The “whole
person” concept recognizes we should view a person by the totality of their acts and omissions. Each
case must be judged on its own merits taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, and
applying sound judgment, mature thinking, and careful analysis. 
In evaluating Applicant’s behavior in terms of the “whole person concept”(AG ¶ 2), an
applicant may mitigate security concerns by demonstrating the factors leading to the violation are
not likely to recur(¶ 9),), and evidence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes (¶
6). The incidents that gave rise to this proceeding may not be likely to recur. However, the SOR
allegations all relate to the security clearance process and his willingness to follow government rules
that affect honesty and integrity of the workplace and candor and accuracy in providing responses
to security clearance applications..  
After considering all the evidence in its totality, and as an integrated whole to focus on the
whole person of Applicant, I conclude a security clearance should not be granted to him. 
FORMAL FINDINGS 
Formal findings as required by the Directive (Par. E3.1.25) are as follows:
Paragraph 1. Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a.: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b.: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c.: Against Applicant
DECISION
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or renew a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance
is denied. 
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Charles D. Ablard 
Administrative Judge