KEYWORD: Guideline G
DIGEST: The Judge’s analysis of Applicant’s twenty year history of alcohol related incidents
was unsustainable because it was piecemeal in its approach to the disqualifying events and it
gave greater weight than was reasonable to the two months of abstinence.  The Judge did not
adequately address Applicant’s continued drinking after his second alcohol treatment program.
Favorable decision reversed.
CASENO: 06-08708.a1
DATE: 12/17/2007
DATE: December 17, 2007
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-08708
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Eric Borgstrom, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Thomas Albin, Esq.
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On October 9, 2006, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of
2
the basis for that decision–security concerns raised under Guideline G (Alcohol Consumption) of
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested a hearing.  On July 11, 2007, after the hearing, Administrative Judge Charles D. Ablard
granted Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Department Counsel filed a timely appeal
pursuant to Directive ¶¶  E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Department Counsel raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s decision is
arbitrary and capricious in that it reflects a piecemeal analysis and is contrary to record evidence.
Finding error, we reverse.
Whether the Record Supports the Judge’s Factual Findings
A.  Facts
The Judge made the following pertinent findings of fact: Applicant is a nuclear machinist
working for a federal contractor.  He has been arrested twice for driving under the influence of
alcohol (DUI) , once in 1985 and again in 1988.  As a consequence of the second incident, he lost
his drivers license, was require to pay a $500 fine, and to spend two days in jail, with six months
suspended.  In 1996 he voluntarily entered into an alcohol treatment program.  Although his
treatment was interrupted by hospitalization for pneumonia, he completed the program on an
outpatient basis.
In January 2004 he was found to be under the influence of alcohol while on his job.  He was
escorted from the workplace.  He entered the same facility as he had in 1996 and was diagnosed as
alcohol dependent.  The Judge found that, upon completion of the program in March 2004, he never
received a copy of the discharge summary, and consequently was unaware of this diagnosis, until
receiving notification from DOHA during adjudication of his security clearance application.  He
believed that he could drink in moderation, not realizing that he was alcohol dependent and,
therefore, required to abstain.
In September 2006 he was evaluated by a licensed clinical social worker, who concluded that
Applicant had experienced more than two years in post-inpatient treatment without relapse and that
his overall prognosis was good, provided that he monitor his alcohol usage and frequency.  
At the time of the hearing, Applicant had been abstinent from alcohol for two months and
had entered Alcoholics Anonymous (AA).  He did so that time due to his having finally seen the
discharge summary referenced above, which advised that he abstain from alcohol and attend AA or
some similar program.  He has a sponsor and does not intend to use alcohol in the future. 
B.  Discussion
The Appeal Board’s review of the Judge’s findings of facts is limited to determining if they
are supported by substantial evidence–“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support such a conclusion in light of all the contrary evidence in the record.”
Directive  ¶  E3.1.32.1.  “This is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility
of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative
agency’s findings from being supported by substantial evidence.”  Consolo v. Federal Maritime
3
Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620-21 (1966).  In evaluating the Judge’s findings, we are required to give
deference to the Judge’s credibility determinations.  Directive ¶ E3.1.32.1. 
In the course of arguing the issue on appeal, Department Counsel has raised numerous
challenges to the sufficiency of the Judge’s findings.  The Board will address these challenges in the
discussion below.
Whether the Record Supports the Judge’s Ultimate Conclusions
 A Judge is required to “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation
for” the decision, “including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choices made.’”
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983)(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  “The
general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests
of national security.’”  Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  The Appeal
Board may reverse the Judge’s decision to grant, deny, or revoke a security clearance if it is arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to law.  Directive ¶¶ E3.1.32.3 and E3.1.33.3.  
Once there has been a concern articulated regarding an Applicant’s security clearance
eligibility, there is a strong presumption against the grant or maintenance of a security clearance.
See, Dorfmont v. Brown, 913 F. 2d 1399, 1401 (9  Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991).th
After the government presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the applicant
to establish any appropriate mitigating conditions.  See Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  “The application of
disqualifying and mitigating conditions and whole person factors does not turn simply on a finding
that one or more of them apply to the particular facts of a case.  Rather, their application requires the
exercise of sound discretion in light of the record evidence as a whole.”  See, e.g., ISCR Case No.
05-03635 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 20, 2006).
In deciding whether the Judge's rulings or conclusions are arbitrary or capricious, the Board
will review the Judge's decision to determine whether:  it does not examine relevant evidence; it fails
to articulate a satisfactory explanation for its conclusions, including a rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made; it does not consider relevant factors; it reflects a clear error of
judgment; it fails to consider an important aspect of the case; it offers an explanation for the decision
that runs contrary to the record evidence; or it is so implausible that it cannot be ascribed to a mere
difference of opinion.  In deciding whether the Judge's rulings or conclusions are contrary to law,
the Board will consider whether they are contrary to provisions of Executive Order 10865, the
Directive, or other applicable federal law.  See ISCR Case No. 03-22861 at 2-3 (App. Bd. Jun. 2,
2006).
The Judge applied three Alcohol Consumption Mitigating Conditions (ACMC) to
Applicant’s case.  The first, ACMC 23(a), reads as follows: “so much time has passed, or the
behavior was so infrequent, or it happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to
recur or does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good
Directive ¶ E2.23(a).  1
Decision at 4.  2
See U.S. v. Bottone, 365 F. 2d 389, 392 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966) (“The trier is entitled,3
in fact bound, to consider the evidence as a whole; and, in law as in life, the effect of this generally is much greater than
the sum of the parts.”) See also Schulz v. Secretary of HEW, 1987 WL 15314 (DC NJ 1987) (unreported decision),
reversing an administrative law judge decision which considered various pieces of medical evidence separately rather
than as a whole. ( “[The ALJ] arrived at [his] judgement through a piecemeal analysis of the medical evidence,
considering separately rather than cumulatively the effects of plaintiff’s conditions.  Thus, the ALJ could not determine
the full extent of plaintiff’s disability.” )
“[Applicant] tends to drink by himself and is not able to go to work.  He has worked at [contractor] for 30 years4
and is at risk of losing his employment due to lost time.  He is having difficulty in recognizing that his alcohol use is
affecting his ability to go to work.”  GE 7, Discharge Summary dated March 12, 2004, at 1.  See also Tr. at 85: “Q:  Did
your alcohol use ever contribute to you missing time at work?  A: Not that I know of.  Q: Do you recall the problems
with being absent at work, though? A: I got warning slips, yes.”  
Tr. at 90.5
Directive ¶ E2.23(b).  6
Directive ¶ E2.23(d). 7
4
judgement.”   The Judge appeared to conclude that Applicant had met these criteria, in that his DUIs1
had “occurred three years apart 20 years ago and do not indicate a pattern.”   Department Counsel2
argues that the Judge’s reasoning on this point reflects a piecemeal analysis.  Department Counsel’s
argument has merit.  A Judge must evaluate an applicant’s case in light of all the evidence and must
consider specific facts in light of the record as a whole.  Failure to do so may result in decisions
made without reference to significant contrary evidence and which are not founded upon a realistic
understanding of an applicant’s true circumstances.   In this case, the Judge’s application of ACMC3
23(a) does not take into account his January 2004 on the job alcohol incident, Applicant’s having
undergone alcohol treatment both in 1996 and in 2004, his having missed work due to alcohol
consumption,  and the fact that Applicant’s misuse of alcohol has in the past alarmed his family and4
associates.   Therefore, the Judge’s treatment of the DUIs in isolation from Applicant’s extensive5
history of alcohol related problems distorted his presentation of the circumstances from which
Applicant’s security concerns flowed and impaired his conclusion that Applicant had met his burden
of production under this mitigating condition.
The Judge also extended favorable application to ACMC 23(b) and (d).  The former reads
as follows: “the individual acknowledges his or her alcoholism or issues of alcohol abuse, provides
evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence (if
alcohol dependent) or responsible use (if an alcohol abuser).”   The latter reads: “the individual has6
successfully completed inpatient or outpatient counseling or rehabilitation along with any required
aftercare, has demonstrated a clear and established pattern of modified consumption or abstinence
in accordance with treatment recommendations, such as participation in [AA] or a similar
organization and has received a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified . . . licensed clinical social
worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment program.”   The Judge found that7
Applicant had met his burden of persuasion regarding these two mitigating conditions.  Department
Counsel disagrees on the ground that the Judge did not take into account significant record evidence.
Compare with previous edition of the Adjudicative Guidelines, Directive ¶ E2.A7.1.3.4.  8
Black’s Law Dictionary (8  ed. 2004).  9 th
Decision at 4.10
GE 7 at 2.  11
Tr. at 81.  12
Tr. at 86.  There is no evidence that anyone involved in Applicant’s treatment ever advised him to be other13
than abstinent.  
5
Both of these mitigating conditions require Applicant to establish a pattern of abstinence or
modified/responsible use, depending upon Applicant’s diagnosis .  The word “pattern” describes “[a]8
mode of behavior or series of acts that are recognizably consistent.”   In the context of the two9
mitigating conditions under consideration, it would connote responsible use or abstention for a
period of time sufficient clearly to establish that an applicant’s trustworthiness and reliability are not
subject to question.  The Judge concluded that Applicant’s two months of abstention and AA
attendance preceding the hearing constitute such a pattern.  Even if the Board were to concur with
that, it would require accepting as credible Applicant’s testimony that he did not know he was
supposed to abstain from alcohol.  
The evidence is clear that Applicant continued to drink even after completion of his second
alcohol treatment program and admitted as much.  He claimed that he did not receive a copy of the
discharge summary upon his release from the program and, therefore, did not know that he was
diagnosed as alcohol dependent and that he should refrain from consuming alcohol.  The Judge
accepted Applicant’s explanation for his continued drinking.  Acknowledging that Applicant’s two
months of abstention preceding the hearing was brief, he stated that “the briefness . . . is overcome
by . . . the fact that he was not aware of the alcohol dependent diagnosis until he received documents
relating to this proceeding.”  10
There is nothing in the record to contradict Applicant’s testimony that he never got a copy
of the discharge summary.  Whether that supports a conclusion that he reasonably did not know he
was supposed to abstain from alcohol requires a closer examination.  The summary states that,
“[g]iven the duration of [Applicant’s] substance problem, it was felt that he needed to understand
the dynamics of addiction, its progressive nature and the medical consequences of using.  He was
asked to establish a pro-recovery routine, which would support his abstinence.  This included
attending education and therapy groups and AA/NA meetings every night . . .”   (emphasis added)11
That Applicant was advised during the course of his treatment to abstain from alcohol and to attend
AA is corroborated by Applicant’s own testimony: “Q: When you were being treated . . . did they
discuss with you the need to stay abstinent and not drink any alcohol?  A: During the counseling
sessions I suppose they did that . . . we read and we’d discuss each other but as far as saying that
there’s a need for abstinence I imagine that was said, yes.”   “Q: [Y]ou remembered discussions12
about abstaining from alcohol and how the people that you were in these group sessions with were
recommending that.  Is that right?  A: During the sessions, yes.  But not right prior to leaving.”  13
This is further corroborated by Applicant’s admission that, following his treatment, he did indeed
Tr. at 85.14
Compare with GE 4, a letter from a licensed clinical social worker concerning his interview with Applicant.15
She states that Applicant “has consumed alcohol . . . since six months after his treatment in 2004.”  
GE 4 at 3.  16
“Q: You didn’t have this discharge summary when you met with [social worker], is that right?  Q: I don’t17
believe so.”  Tr. at 81-2.  
Tr. at 77, 80.18
“He realizes the dangers of his occasional alcohol consumption . . . He states that he will seek assistance19
immediately if usage changes.  He agrees to this plan.”  GE 4 at 4.   
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abstain from alcohol, though he resumed drinking four months later “for no particular reason.”   14
   
Therefore,  whether or not Applicant actually received a copy of his discharge summary, there
is substantial record evidence that he had been counseled to abstain and yet, four months after his
treatment, resumed the consumption of alcohol.    The record evidence is contrary to the Judge’s15
finding that Applicant was unaware that he should abstain and vitiates the conclusion that his two
months abstention prior to the hearing is sufficient to establish the pattern of reformed behavior
contemplated by ACMC 23(b) and (d).  The Judge’s failure to address this significant contrary
evidence impairs his favorable decision.  
In any case, it is not viable for the Judge to conclude that Applicant has established such a
new pattern of conduct in light of Applicant’s extensive history of security-significant alcohol related
conduct.  Applicant’s alcohol consumption has been a problem since the 1980s.  Given the totality
of facts and circumstances in this case, two months’ abstention is simply not sufficient to overcome
such a lengthy history of alcohol consumption. 
We also note that the Judge concluded that Applicant had met the requirement of ACMC
23(d) of a “favorable prognosis by a . . . licensed clinical social worker,” having spoken with such
a person in September 2006.  She reported to DOHA the results of her interview with Applicant.
She stated that Applicant admits “to an occasional beer after working in the yard . . . he is fully aware
that should he ever exceed his one or two beers that he may relapse.”   She also stated that16
“[Applicant] feels confident that he can control this occasional usage.”  She opined that
“[Applicant’s] overall prognosis is good, provided he continues to self monitor his usage with
continued decrease in usage and frequency.”   While this letter is favorable to Applicant, Department
Counsel notes that the social worker did not have access to the 2004 discharge summary, with its
recommendations for abstinence and AA attendance.   Department Counsel notes that Applicant has17
apparently not followed the social worker’s recommendation for decreasing his alcohol consumption
below even the one or two beers that she referenced in her letter.  For example, he admitted to having
consumed four or five beers during a single day at some point after his appointment, and he admitted
that on an occasion in February 2007 he drank hard liquor to the point of intoxication.   These18
matters detract from the social worker’s favorable opinion of Applicant’s commitment to sobriety19
and are inconsistent with a reasoned judgement that Applicant has met his burden of persuasion
under this mitigating condition.  
Tr. at 105.20
GE 4 at 3.  Compare with the discharge summary, which described Applicant as “not in touch with the severity21
of his situation.”  GE 7 at 1.  
7
Department Counsel also draws attention to Applicant’s apparent reluctance to accept his
diagnosis of alcohol dependence.  At the end of the hearing his attorney asked him, “you concede
today that . . . you are considered alcohol dependent?  A: I don’t consider myself alcohol dependent
but I don’t know how to answer that question.  Q: . . . But you concede that professionals who have
looked at you at [rehabilitation facility] diagnosed you with alcohol dependence, is that correct?  A:
That’s their answer.”   In addition, Applicant was apparently equivocal in his discussions with the20
social worker, her letter stating that Applicant “feels his dependency on alcohol is not present.”21
Department Counsel persuasively argues that this reluctance detracts from Applicant’s claim that he
will abstain from any future use of alcohol and can control his inclinations to drink.  In light of the
forgoing, the record does not sustain the Judge’s favorable decision that Applicant met his burden
of persuasion that it is “clearly consistent with the interests of national security” for him to have a
clearance.  Egan, 484 U.S. at 528.  The Board concludes that the Judge’s favorable decision is
arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law.
Order
The Judge’s favorable security clearance decision is REVERSED.
Signed; Michael Y. Ra’anan       
Michael Y. Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairman, Appeal Board
Signed; William S. Fields         
William S. Fields 
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody            
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
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