DATE:  December 3, 2007
In Re:
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SSN: -----------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-24683
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
JOHN GRATTAN METZ, JR
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Emilio Jaksetic, Esquire, Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
John Ki, Esquire
SYNOPSIS
Applicant’s financial irresponsibility and deliberate falsification of his clearance applications
render him unsuitable for access to classified information. He is not subject to foreign influence
because of family members residing in South Korea. Clearance denied.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Applicant challenges the 25 May 2007 Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
Statement of Reasons (SOR) recommending denial or revocation of his clearance because of
Required by Executive Order 10865 and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, as amended and1
modified—most recently in August 2006 (Directive).
Although not alleged in the SOR, he similarly failed to disclose any financial difficulties he was experiencing2
as a result of his failed business venture, which he closed in July 2000.
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financial considerations, foreign influence, and personal conduct .  Applicant answered the SOR 201
July 2007, and requested a hearing. DOHA assigned the case to me 24 September 2007, and I
convened a hearing 30 October 2007. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) 9 November 2007.
PROCEDURAL RULINGS
At hearing, I granted Department Counsel’s motion to strike SOR 3.c. (Tr. 9-10). I also
granted Department Counsel’s motion to take administrative notice of certain U.S. Government
publications regarding the Republic of Korea (South Korea)(Tr. 22).
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant admitted the allegations of SOR 1.b., 1.c., 1.f., 2.a., and 2.d. Accordingly, I
incorporate his admissions as findings of fact.
Applicant—a 38-year-old systems engineer employed by a defense contractor since January
2001—seeks to retain the access to classified information he has had since approximately 2002.
When Applicant completed his clearance application in October 2001 (G.E. 1), he failed to
disclose any foreign travel within the last seven years (question 16).  In fact, he had traveled to the2
Republic of Korea four times within the last five years: July 1996, May 1998, November 1999, and
November 2000. When he completed a second clearance application in March 2006 (G.E. 2), he
again failed to disclose any foreign travel within the last seven years (question 18), omitting his
November 1999 and November 2000 trips to the Republic of Korea. Applicant’s explanation for his
omissions—that we was confused about the question and his dates of travel (Tr. 62-64, 78)—is
unconvincing, particularly regarding his October 2001 application, when he had traveled to the
Republic of Korea within the last year.
Applicant has a history of financial difficulties dating to at least July 2000, when he closed
a failed business venture—and found himself unable to keep up the payments on credit accounts he
and his wife had opened to fund the business. The SOR alleges seven delinquent debts totaling over
$51,000. Record evidence shows that Applicant had paid the account at SOR1.e. in 2003 (A.E. E),
that the account at SOR 1.b. and 1.f. are the same account, and that the account at SOR 1.d. and 1.g.
are the same account. Accordingly, I find SOR 1.b., 1.e., and 1.g. for Applicant. Applicant denied
the debt at SOR 1.a. on th grounds that the account was not his, he was merely an authorized user
on a business account of a previous employer. However, his evidence supporting that claim (A.E.
G), shows an account number that does not appear on any of the credit reports in the record, and that
account number is different from the debts alleged in the SOR, is listed as a joint obligation of
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Applicant, and was opened before Applicant went to work for that employer (who was the first
employer Applicant went to work for after he closed his business).
Of the three business debts Applicant acknowledges, the debt at SOR 1.c. (A.E. B) and 1.d.
(A.E. D) were paid and settled for less than the full amount of the debt by the original creditors
successors-in-interest in July 2007—about the time Applicant answered the SOR. The debt at SOR
1.f. was paid and settled for less than the full amount of the debt in September 2007 (A.E. C). Credit
reports in the record reflect that Applicant paid off a mortgage on a previous home in 2002, but had
been slow to pay his mortgage around 2000-2001 when his business was failing. Nevertheless, he
and his wife bought a second home, and a condominium that they rent. He claims to have never been
late on those mortgage payments.
Applicant immigrated to the U.S. from the Republic of Korea (South Korea) in 1986, and has
resided here since. He married his wife—another native-born South Korean he met in the U.S.—in
March 1995.  They have two sons, both U.S.-born citizens. Applicant became a naturalized U.S.
citizen in April 1997; his wife in February 1998. South Korea does not recognize dual citizenship,
and Applicant’s wife lost her South Korean citizenship when she filed a report of her U.S.
naturalization with South Korean government officials in September 2001 (A.E. H). Applicant and
his wife own their home in the U.S. They have no financial interests in South Korea. Applicant has
registered with the U.S. Selective Service, as required. 
Applicant’s brother is a naturalized U.S. citizen, residing in the U.S. His mother, step-father,
and step-brother are all legal permanent residents of the U.S., residing in the U.S.. They have all
resided in the U.S. over 20 years. His mother has applied for her U.S. citizenship. He has more
distant relatives—including an aunt who he has not seen in 10-15 years—who are resident citizens
of South Korea.
The South Korean government has an aggressive, effective intelligence-gathering operation
that targets economic and proprietary information in the U.S. However, its human rights practices
are generally respectful of democratic institutions. There is no evidence that it seeks to obtain
economic and proprietary information by pressuring its citizens through their ex-patriot relatives
living in the U.S.
Applicant’s co-worker considers him an honest employee and recommends him for his
clearance. However, he does not appear to be aware of Applicant’s financial difficulties or his
falsification of his clearance applications.
POLICIES AND BURDEN OF PROOF
The Revised Adjudicative Guidelines lists factors to be considered in evaluating an
Applicant’s suitability for access to classified information. Administrative Judges must assess both
disqualifying and mitigating conditions under each adjudicative issue fairly raised by the facts and
circumstances presented. Each decision must also reflect a fair and impartial common sense
consideration of the factors listed in Section 6.3. of the Directive. The presence or absence of a
disqualifying or mitigating condition is not determinative for or against Applicant. However, specific
adjudicative guidelines should be followed whenever a case can be measured against them, as they
See, Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).3
¶19.(a) inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts; (b) indebtedness caused by frivolous or irresponsible4
spending and the absence of any evidence of willingness or intent to pay the debt or establish a realistic plan to pay the
debt; (c) a history of not meeting financial obligations; . . . (e) consistent spending beyond one’s means, which may be
indicated by excessive indebtedness, significant negative cash flow, high debt-to-income ratio, and/or other financial
analysis;
¶20 (a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it is5
unlikely to recur . . . 
¶20.(b) the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person’s control . . . and6
the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances;
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represent policy guidance governing the grant or denial of access to classified information.
Considering the SOR allegations and the evidence as a whole, the relevant, applicable, adjudicative
guidelines are guidelines F (Financial Considerations), B (Foreign Influence), and E (Personal
Conduct).
Security clearance decisions resolve whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest
to grant or continue an Applicant’s security clearance. The government must prove, by something
less than a preponderance of the evidence, controverted facts alleged in the SOR. If it does so, it
establishes a prima facie case against access to classified information. Applicant must then refute,
extenuate, or mitigate the government’s case. Because no one has a right to a security clearance, the
Applicant bears a heavy burden of persuasion.
Persons with access to classified information enter into a fiduciary relationship with the
government based on trust and confidence. Therefore, the government has a compelling interest in
ensuring each Applicant possesses the requisite judgement, reliability, and trustworthiness of those
who must protect national interests as their own. The “clearly consistent with the national interest”
standard compels resolution of any reasonable doubt about an Applicant’s suitability for access in
favor of the government.3
CONCLUSIONS
The government established a case for disqualification under Guideline F, and Applicant did
not mitigate the security concerns. Government records reflect nearly $28,000 of delinquent debt
acquired before July 2000, that remained unaddressed until mid-to-late 2007—for practical purposes
until the eve of the hearing.  Applicant attributes these financial problems to his failed business4
venture, arguably a circumstance beyond his control. However, as his finances improved, he failed
to address the delinquent debts until faced with the security concerns raised by the government.
Further, as his finances improved, he chose to purchase a new home and an investment property
ahead of addressing his past-due debts. 
Applicant meets one of the mitigating factors for financial considerations. His financial
difficulties are both recent and multiple.  While the debts were due to circumstances beyond his5
control, he did not act responsibly in addressing his debts.  There is no evidence that he has sought6
¶20.(c) the person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem and there are clear indications that7
the problem is being resolved or is under control;
¶20.(d) the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts.8
Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 6.9
Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 7.(a).10
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credit counseling or otherwise brought the problem under control.  Although he paid  his outstanding7
debts just after the SOR was issued, and just before the hearing, the timing of the payments does not
constitute a good-faith effort to satisfy his debts.  Further, given his unwillingness to seek or use8
financial counseling, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Applicant will put his financial
problem behind him. I conclude Guideline F against Applicant.
Under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), an applicant’s foreign contacts and interests may
raise security concerns if the individual 1) has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, 2) may
be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way
contrary to U.S. interests, or 3) is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Foreign
influence adjudications can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the
foreign contact or financial interest is located—including, but not limited to, whether the country is
known to target U.S. citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism.  Evaluation of an individual’s qualifications for access to protected information requires9
careful assessment of both the foreign entity’s willingness and ability to target protected information,
and to target ex-patriots who are U.S. citizens to obtain that information, and the individual’s
susceptibility to influence, whether negative or positive. More specifically, an individual’s contacts
with foreign family members (or other foreign entities or persons) raise security concerns only if
those contacts create a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure,
or coercion.10
In this case, the government failed to establish a case for disqualification under Guideline B.
Considering first the country involved, South Korea and the U.S. enjoy good foreign relations.
Although South Korea is actively engaged in the collection of U.S. intelligence, there is no evidence
that collection activity makes Applicant or his family likely targets for coercion, duress, or influence.
Considering Applicant’s circumstances, the government produced no evidence that there was
a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion because
of Applicant’s limited family contacts in South Korea. His travel to South Korea raises no
independent security concerns, and his contacts with distant relatives there is limited. None of
Applicant’s close family members have any connection to the South Korean government. Further,
all his close family members reside in the U.S., and have for over 20 years. Additionally, Applicant
himself has been in the U.S. more than 20 years. His wife and children are here. All his financial
interests are here. Under these circumstances, I conclude that it is unlikely Applicant can be
pressured based on his family members in or from South Korea. Accordingly, I resolve Guideline
B for Applicant.
The government established a case for disqualification under Guideline E, and Applicant did
not mitigate the security concerns. Although Applicant’s travel to South Korea ultimately failed to
¶16.(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant and material facts from any personnel11
security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, . . . [or] determine
security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness. . .;
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establish any security concerns, his failure to disclose that travel had the potential to inhibit the
government’s evaluation of the potential foreign influence concerns. The language of the travel
questions is quite clear. Applicant has offered no credible explanation for his failure to disclose that
information. I conclude he deliberately concealed the nature and extent of his foreign travel on his
clearance applications.  In addition, none of the Guideline E mitigating conditions apply. The11
concealed information was relevant to a clearance decision. I conclude Guideline E against
Applicant.
FORMAL FINDINGS
Paragraph 1. Guideline F: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph b: For Applicant
Subparagraph c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph d: Against Applicant
Subparagraph e: For Applicant
Subparagraph f: Against Applicant
Subparagraph g: For Applicant
Paragraph 2. Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph a: For Applicant
Subparagraph b: For Applicant
Subparagraph c: For Applicant
Subparagraph d: For Applicant
Paragraph 3. Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT 
Subparagraph a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph c: Withdrawn
DECISION
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance denied
 
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John G. Metz, Jr.
Administrative Judge