DATE: December 28, 2007
In Re:
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SSN: ------------------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-26020
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
WILFORD H. ROSS
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Jennifer I. Goldstein, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
The Applicant has considerable connections with Thailand.  His wife is a citizen of Thailand,
his father is a retired senior officer in the Thai military, his in laws live in Thailand, and two of his
children currently attend school there.  He failed to submit sufficient evidence showing that he has
an unequivocal connection to the United States.  The Applicant is not currently eligible for a security
clearance.  Clearance is denied.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 14, 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA), pursuant to
Executive Order 10865 (as amended) and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Directive), dated
January 2, 1992, issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to the Applicant, which detailed reasons why
DOHA could not make the preliminary affirmative finding under the Directive that it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for the Applicant and
recommended referral to an Administrative Judge to determine whether a clearance should be denied
or revoked.
The Applicant responded to the SOR in writing on July 10, 2007, and requested a hearing.
The case was assigned to another administrative judge on August 21, 2007.  The case was received
by the undersigned on August 23, 2007, and a Notice of Hearing was issued on September 6, 2007.
A hearing was held on September 25, 2007, at which the Government presented two
documentary exhibits.  Testimony was taken from the Applicant, who also submitted one exhibit.
The Government also requested that Administrative Notice be taken of certain adjudicative facts
about the Kingdom of Thailand.  The request for Administrative Notice is marked Administrative
Judge Exhibit I, and the documents attached to the request are marked as Administrative Judge
Exhibits I(1) through I(4).  The transcript was received on October 5, 2007.
RULINGS ON PROCEDURE 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the Department Counsel moved to amend the SOR to
comport with the evidence.  Subparagraph 1.c. was amended to read, “Your spouse is a citizen of
Thailand.”  Subparagraph 1.e. was amended to read, “Two of your five half-siblings are citizens and
residents of Thailand.”  A new subparagraph 1.i. was added to the SOR stating, “Your two sons
currently attend school in Thailand.”  The Applicant admitted these amended subparagraphs.
(Transcript at 102-108.)
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Applicant is 48, married with three children, and has a Master of Science degree.  He
is employed by a defense contractor as an engineer, and he seeks to retain a Secret-level DoD
security clearance previously granted in connection with his employment in the defense sector.
The Government opposes the Applicant's request for a continued security clearance, based
upon the allegations set forth in the Statement of Reasons (SOR).  The following findings of fact are
entered as to each paragraph and guideline in the SOR.  They are based on the Applicant's Answer
to the SOR, the exhibits and the live testimony.
Paragraph 1 (Guideline B - Foreign Influence).  The Government alleges in this paragraph that the
Applicant is ineligible for clearance because he has foreign contacts and interests that could lead to
the exercise of poor judgment, unreliability or untrustworthiness on the part of the Applicant.
Subparagraph 1.d. as amended above, states that the Applicant has five half-siblings.  That is1
incorrect.  
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The Applicant was born in Thailand in 1959.  He emigrated from Thailand in 1976 when his
American step-father, who was in the American military, returned to the United States with the
Applicant’s mother and family.  The Applicant became a naturalized American citizen in November
1985.  His wife was also born in Thailand.  She is a Permanent Resident Alien in the United States.
They were married in 1991, and have three children.  All the children were born in Thailand, but the
Applicant has filed the certification with the State Department declaring that they are American
children born abroad.  (Government Exhibit 1, Transcript at 48-49.)  The Applicant and his wife
have over $2,000,000 in assets in the United States.  (Government Exhibit 2 at 4.) 
The Applicant has one brother, two half-brothers and five half-sisters.  His brother, two half-
brothers and one half-sister are American citizens.  The Applicant does not know the citizenship
status of two of his half-sisters who were born in Thailand of American fathers but live in the United
States.  Two of his half-sisters, one on each side of his family, are citizens of Thailand and reside
there.   (Transcript at 68-84.)1
The Applicant’s mother-in-law and father-in-law are citizens of Thailand and reside there.
They are both retired and are independently wealthy.  The Applicant, his wife and children have a
close relationship with her parents.  (Transcript at 61-66.) 
The Applicant and his wife lived in Thailand between 1991 and 1997.  They were newly
married, the Applicant had been laid off by his job in the United States, and the Applicant’s wife
wanted to be close to her family.  The Applicant withdrew the assets from his 401(k) plan before
moving to Thailand so that they would have money.  After they moved to Thailand, his in-laws
financially assisted the Applicant and his wife in founding and running a computer company in
Thailand.  The company was not financially successful and, after draining their assets, including the
money from his 401(k), the Applicant made the decision to return to the United States in 1997 to find
work.  (Transcript at 38-43.)
The Applicant unintentionally did not have taxes withheld from his 401(k) funds when he
withdrew them in 1991.  When he returned to live and work in the United States in 1997, the IRS
filed a tax lien and garnished his wages to pay the back taxes, interest and penalties.  The Applicant
worked overtime for about a year and was able to pay off the back taxes.  The lien was released in
1998.  (Transcript at 27-30.)
The Applicant’s two older children are attending school in Thailand as of the date the record
closed.  They have been in Thailand since December 2006 and are due to return to the United States
in March 2008.  During most of this time the Applicant’s wife and youngest child have also been in
Thailand.  When his wife is in Thailand, he speaks to her every day.  (Transcript at 90-93.)  
In addition to the times when the Applicant and/or his family have lived in Thailand, they
have traveled there at least four additional times on extended trips.  These trips occurred annually
between December 2002 and August 2006.  (Transcript at 87-90.)
All of the following statements are supported by the documents submitted by the Department2
Counsel in support of her request for administrative notice.  (Administrative Judge Exhibit I and
attachments.)
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The Applicant’s biological father is a retired brigadier general in the Royal Thai Army.  The
Applicant was unsure of his father’s position, but it appears to be related to the medical field.  The
Applicant testified that he was closer to his late American step-father than he is to his father.
(Transcript at 98-101.)  The Applicant, however, does have a relationship with his father.  They
communicate by telephone several times a year.  When the Applicant travels to Thailand, which he
does on about a yearly basis, he stays with his father for several days.  His father knows the
Applicant works in the defense industry and that he has a security clearance.  (Transcript at 52-61.)
During his testimony, the Applicant expressed considerable support for the military coup that
toppled the elected civilian government in Thailand in 2006.  (Transcript at 21-23.)  The coup, and
other pertinent matters involving Thailand, will be discussed immediately below.
The Applicant has many contacts with Thailand.  Accordingly, it is appropriate to discuss the
situation in Thailand at this time.   The Kingdom of Thailand is a constitutional monarchy.  The2
current ruler is treated with deep reverence and respect.  On September 19, 2006, the current ruling
regime came to power through a bloodless coup, whereby military leaders overthrew the
democratically elected Prime Minister.  The coup leaders, now called the Council for National
Security, assert that the Prime Minister was corrupt and that the last election was fraudulent.  In the
following months they abolished Parliament, declared martial law, and issued decrees limiting civil
liberties including limits on free speech, free press and freedom of assembly.
Thailand has a free-enterprise economy with a well-developed infrastructure, and pro-
investment policies.  Approximately 40% of Thailand’s labor force is agricultural, with rice being
the most important crop.  It also has an increasingly diversified manufacturing sector.  The United
States is Thailand’s largest export market and second largest supplier.
In the past, Thailand had excellent military relations with the United States, including joint
training and maneuvers.  In addition, Thailand cooperated with the United States on a wide variety
of foreign policy issues, including the Global War on Terror.  However, as a result of the military
coup in September 2006, the United States suspended Foreign Military Financing, International
Military Training funds, and peace-keeping operation funds with Thailand.
The United States Government, through the State Department, has criticized the Thai
government’s overall human rights record for several years.  Prior to the coup, the Thai constitution
prohibited such practices as torture and arbitrary arrest and detention.  However, instances of
disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrests and detentions have been reported under past and present
Thai regimes.  The Emergency Decree and martial law orders in effect since the coup permit
authorities to conduct searches without a warrant.  Further, despite constitutional protections
afforded to freedom of speech and the press, the coup leaders have suspended these rights and have
banned articles, messages, speeches and any other type of discourse that could undermine the coup.
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Finally, Thailand’s southern provinces continue to be the source of sectarian violence
between Muslim insurgents and Thai security forces.  While the extremist groups primarily focus
on Thai government interests in the south, recent violence has also targeted public places, including
tourist areas.
Mitigation.
The Applicant submitted several letters from co-workers and supervisors.  He is described
by these people as a loyal, intelligent, trustworthy and reliable friend and colleague.  (Applicant’s
Exhibit A.)
POLICIES
Security clearance decisions are not made in a vacuum.  Accordingly, the Department of
Defense, in Enclosure 2 of the 1992 Directive, has set forth policy factors which must be given
"binding" consideration in making security clearance determinations.  These factors should be
followed in every case according to the pertinent guideline.  However, the factors are neither
automatically determinative of the decision in any case, nor can they supersede the Administrative
Judge's reliance on his own common sense, as well as his knowledge of the law, human nature and
the ways of the world, in making a reasoned decision.  Because each security clearance case presents
its own unique facts and circumstances, it cannot be assumed that these factors exhaust the realm
of human experience, or apply equally in every case.  Based on the Findings of Fact set forth above,
the factors most applicable to the evaluation of this case will be set forth under CONCLUSIONS,
below.
In addition, as set forth in Enclosure 2 of the Directive at pages 18-19, “In evaluating the
relevance of an individual’s conduct, the [Administrative Judge] should consider the following
factors [General Factors]:
(1) The nature, extent and seriousness of the conduct
(2) The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include
knowledgeable participation
(3) The frequency and recency of the conduct
(4) The individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct
(5) The voluntariness of participation
(6) The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent
behavior changes
(7) The motivation for the conduct
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(8) The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation or duress
(9) The likelihood of continuation or recurrence.”
The eligibility guidelines established in the DoD Directive identify personal characteristics
and conduct which are reasonably related to the ultimate question of whether it is "clearly consistent
with the national interest" to grant an Applicant's request for access to classified information.
In the defense industry, the security of classified industrial secrets is entrusted to civilian
workers who must be counted upon to safeguard such sensitive information twenty-four hours a day.
The Government is therefore appropriately concerned where available information indicates that an
Applicant for clearance may have foreign contacts and interests that may lead to poor judgement,
untrustworthiness or unreliability on the Applicant's part.
The DoD Directive states, "Each adjudication is to be an overall common sense
determination based upon consideration and assessment of all available information, both favorable
and unfavorable, with particular emphasis placed on the seriousness, recency, frequency, and
motivation for the individual's conduct; the extent to which conduct was negligent, willful,
voluntary, or undertaken with the knowledge of the circumstances or consequences involved; and,
to the extent that it can be estimated, the probability that conduct will or will not continue in the
future."  The Administrative Judge can only draw those inferences or conclusions that have a
reasonable and logical basis in the evidence of record.  The Judge cannot draw inferences or
conclusions based on evidence which is speculative or conjectural in nature.  Finally, as emphasized
by President Eisenhower in Executive Order 10865, "Any determination under this order...shall be
a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the
loyalty of the applicant concerned."
CONCLUSIONS
It is the Government's responsibility to present substantial evidence to support the finding
of a nexus, or rational connection, between the Applicant's conduct and the continued holding of a
security clearance.  If such a case has been established, the burden then shifts to the Applicant to go
forward with evidence in rebuttal, explanation or mitigation which is sufficient to overcome or
outweigh the Government's case.  The Applicant bears the ultimate burden of persuasion in proving
that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant him or her a security clearance.
In this case the Government has met its initial burden of proving by substantial evidence that
the Applicant has foreign connections which could cause a security concern (Guideline B).
The Applicant, on the other hand, has not successfully mitigated the Government's case,
except in part.  Subparagraph 1.g. is found for the Applicant as I find it has no current security
significance.
The Applicant has many and varied connections to Thailand on both sides of his family.  The
Applicant obviously loves his late American step-father and considers this man his real father.
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However, he is not estranged from his father, a retired general in the Thai Army.  Their relationship
may not be particularly close, but the fact remains that he stays at his father’s house and talks to him
on the phone several times a year.  In addition, there is the extremely close relationship the
Applicant, his wife, and his children have with his in-laws.  As described above, two of the
Applicant’s children are currently attending school in Thailand.  The Applicant and his wife also
lived in Thailand for six years after he lost his job in 1991, where his in-laws provided the Applicant
and his wife considerable financial assistance.  
All of these connections must also be viewed in the context of the current Thai government,
and its strained relations with the United States after the coup.  The Applicant certainly has a right
to indicate his support for the coup, but that support must also be considered in determining whether
he should have a security clearance at this time.  To his credit, the Applicant repeatedly stated that
he is a loyal American citizen, that he understands his responsibilities as a security clearance holder,
and that he would bear arms against Thailand if necessary.  However, given the depth and extent of
his current connections with Thailand, he has failed to meet his burden of showing an unequivocal
connection to the United States.  He is not eligible for a security clearance at the present time.
Based on the evidence the Government has presented, the following Disqualifying Conditions
apply to this case: 7.(a) Contact with a foreign family member . . . who is a citizen of or resident in
a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement,
manipulation, pressure, or coercion; (b) connections to a foreign person . . . that create a potential
conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology
and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person . . . by providing that information; and (d)
sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship
creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.  I have also
considered the information concerning the current Thai government, which came to power through
a military coup, provided by Department Counsel in Administrative Judge’s Exhibit I and its
attachments I(1) through I(4). 
The Applicant has not provided compelling evidence to show that the following Mitigating
Conditions also apply to this particular case, given his particular background:  7(a) the nature of the
relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions
or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed
in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization,
or government and the interests of the U.S.; and (b) There is no conflict of interest, either because
the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country
is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the
U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S.
interest.
 
On balance, it is concluded that the Applicant has not successfully overcome the
Government's case opposing his request for a DoD security clearance.  Accordingly, the evidence
supports a finding against the Applicant as to the factual and conclusionary allegations expressed in
Paragraph 1 of the Government's Statement of Reasons.
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FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal findings For or Against the Applicant on the allegations in the SOR, as required by
Paragraph 25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1: Against the Applicant.
Subparagraph 1.a.: Against the Applicant.
Subparagraph 1.b.: Against the Applicant.
Subparagraph 1.c.: Against the Applicant.
Subparagraph 1.d.: Against the Applicant.
Subparagraph 1.e.: Against the Applicant.
Subparagraph 1.f.: Against the Applicant.
Subparagraph 1.g.: For the Applicant.
Subparagraph 1.h.: Against the Applicant.
Subparagraph 1.i.: Against the Applicant.
DECISION
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for the Applicant.
Wilford H. Ross
Administrative Judge