DATE:  December 31, 2007
In Re:
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SSN: -------------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 07-01223
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
PAUL J. MASON
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Stephanie A. Hess, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
Applicant has successfully mitigated the foreign preference concerns triggered by her use and
renewal of a foreign passport after she received her United States (U.S.) citizenship and passport.
In addition, her omission of material information from her security clearance application resulted
from misunderstanding the question asked rather than a deliberate attempt to cover up her trip to Iran
in April 2002. But Applicant has not successfully mitigated the foreign influence security concern
caused by her family ties in Iran. Clearance is denied. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
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On August 13, 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA), pursuant to
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, dated January 2, 1992, as reissued through Change 4
thereto, dated April 20, 1999, and partially modified by revised adjudicative guidelines (AG) made
effective on September 1, 2006, issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to the Applicant. The SOR
indicated that based on foreign influence (Guideline B), foreign preference (Guideline C), and
personal conduct (Guideline E), DOHA could not make the preliminary affirmative finding that it
is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant.
DOHA recommended referral to an Administrative Judge to conduct proceedings and determine
whether clearance should be granted, continued, denied or revoked. On August 27, 2007, Applicant
provided her answer to the SOR and requested a hearing before an Administrative Judge. 
The case was assigned to me on October 18, 2007. On October 24, 2007, this case was set
for hearing on November 14, 2007. The government submitted five exhibits (GE 1-5), and Applicant
submitted two exhibits (AE A-B). Testimony was taken from Applicant and three witnesses. The
transcript was received on November 28, 2007.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant admitted the four allegations under paragraph 1 (foreign influence) and two
allegations under paragraph 2 (foreign preference). She denied the falsification allegation under
paragraph 3 (personal conduct) explaining that the missing information appeared under another
question in the security clearance application (SCA). 
Foreign Influence
Applicant is 44 years old, and began working in August 2005 as a software engineer for her
current employer. She was promoted to her current position as task leader. Also, she has been an
instructor of a local university since February 2005. Applicant was born in Iran in 1963. Shortly after
birth, her parents took her to the United Kingdom where she lived with her father while he continued
his education. When she was five years old, her mother developed pregnancy complications with
Applicant’s unborn brother, and the family returned to Iran for medical attention, and to provide care
for Applicant’s grandmother. At a later point (year not disclosed) in her life, she visited the United
States (U.S.) for a period while her father completed his veterinarians’ degree.
In 1989 or 1990, when Applicant was 26 or 27 years old, her parents persuaded her to move
to France to live with a family friend as they realized she was having problems adjusting to the
Iranian way of life. She met her soon-to-be husband in France, and they moved to the U.S. in May
1990. They were married in June 1990. She gave birth to two children during their marriage that
lasted until September 2002. Applicant became a naturalized U.S. citizen in September 1994 and
received U.S. passport in October 1996. In December 2003, Applicant obtained a graduate degree
in management and information from a U.S. university, after having received an undergraduate
degree in engineering from a U.S. university.
Applicant’s sister, grandmother, and aunt are resident citizens of Iran (subparagraph 1.a. of
the SOR). Her sister, 45 years old, is a retired nurse. In the 17-year-period Applicant has been in the
U.S., her contact with her sister has decreased from twice a year to sporadic. 
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Applicant speaks to her 86-year-old grandmother about twice a year. Before the grandmother
retired, she was a math teacher at a private, high school. She supplemented her income as a tutor.
The grandmother has not initiated the emigration process to live with Applicant because she does
not want to be a burden. Applicant’s aunt (his mother’s sister) 64 years old, is a citizen of Iran
residing with Applicant’s cousin in the western U.S. Occasionally, the aunt returns to Iran to visit
Applicant’s grandmother. 
Applicant’s brother, a 37-year-old engineer, is a citizen of Iran, and was residing at a
university in the northeastern part of the U.S. (subparagraph 1.b.) until November 2007, when he
moved to the south-central U.S. He has applied for U.S. citizenship and is awaiting his interview.
He used to travel to Iran occasionally to see their grandmother, but has not been to the country since
his marriage in April 2002. 
Applicant’s parents are dual citizens of Iran and the U.S., residing with Applicant in the U.S.
They are dual citizens as the government of Iran does not recognize U.S. citizenship. His mother was
born in Iran, and was a homemaker all her life. She is 66 years old. She became a naturalized U.S.
citizen in September 2001. Applicant’s father was born in Iran in 1927. He is a retired veterinarian.
He became a naturalized U.S. citizen in May 2001. Both parents have lived with Applicant since
about 2002. Both parents have returned to Iran on occasion to visit Applicant’s grandmother.
Applicant’s mother has visited Iran six or seven times since 1992. Applicant’s mother and father do
not travel together as one usually remains to babysit Applicant’s two children. 
Subparagraph 1.d. of the SOR alleges Applicant traveled to Iran in April 2002 and May 1996.
In April 2002, she asked for a visa and received a passport by the Iranian authorities. In May 1996,
Applicant used her Iranian passport to accompany her father back to Iran to visit a seriously ill sister
before she passed away. Furthermore, Applicant needed a respite from raising two young children
in a turbulent marriage while still attending school. 
Regarding the subject of returning to Iran, Applicant will not return for her grandmother’s
funeral because her practice is not to attend funerals. Overall, Applicant’s fear and distrust of the
Iranian government will prevent her from going back to Iran. Applicant predicted that if the Iranian
government tried to target her through detention of her mother, Applicant would report the incident
to the U.S., even though her mother’s dreadful position in detention would have a profound impact
on her. 
On September 16, 2003, Applicant was asked several questions about her ties and contacts
with foreign countries or individuals. She responded:
The only persons I have sponsored into the United States have been my parents. I do
not maintain contact with any other non-US citizens, inside or outside of the US. I
have not been employed by any foreign governments, military, or contractors with
government connections. Neither my family nor I provide financial assistance to
anyone residing in a foreign country or to financial educational institutions. I do not
have any financial interests in countries and do not have any financial obligations to
foreign countries or persons. I do not maintain any cultural an personal ties to foreign
countries. I have never had contact with anyone representing foreign organizations
or governments. Neither my family or I have never been imprisoned, detained, held
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captive, or had property confiscated in foreign countries. Other than my parents, I
have not sponsored any foreign nationals into the US. I cannot be blackmailed,
pressured, or coerced based on my foreign connections (GE 5).
In response to question 17 of GE 3 (answers to interrogatories dated April 6, 2007) Applicant
was asked about her net worth. She responded that it was almost $180,000.00, which included a
home, jewelry, furniture, a Persian rug, savings account, and also taking into consideration a student
and home loan. None of Applicant’s family members have ever been an employee or agent of a
foreign government. 
Foreign Preference
The foreign preference allegations center around Applicant’s renewal of an Iranian passport
on November 26, 2003 (subparagraph 2.a.), after she became a naturalized U.S. citizen on September
24, 1994, and obtained a U.S. passport on October 16, 1996. Having compared GE 3 with
Applicant’s testimony (Tr. 85-89) about the circumstances surrounding the passport renewal, it
appears that Applicant was reissued her passport because Iran does not provide visas to anyone born
in Iran. Applicant admitted she used her Iranian passport for entry and exit from Iran in April 2002
(subparagraph 2.b.) to attend her brother’s wedding. Applicant felt obligated to attend because she
is close to him, and she wanted to demonstrate her endorsement of the marriage. 
In her sworn statement (GE 5) dated September 16, 1993, Applicant indicated she still had
her passport and would relinquish it if necessary. Applicant made the same statement in an interview
in May 2006 (adopted by her on January 19, 2007 in her answers to interrogatories). At the hearing,
Applicant reiterated her position to turn over the passport because it expired in June 2007. She kept
the passport for one reason:
I only kept it sir, just because I didn’t want to come to you and say I put it in the trash
can. I wanted – If someone wants to have the information about it I though maybe as
the question [Department Counsel] asked, when did it expire, if they wanted to see
anything about it, I wanted to make sure I still have to – if it’s needed for any reason
for this hearing. Otherwise, I have no need for it (Tr. 90). 
Considering the record including Applicant’s credible testimony, I find she is willing to
surrender her passport.
Personal Conduct 
Paragraph 3.a. alleges that Applicant answered Section 18 of her April 2006 SCA falsely by
not disclosing all foreign travel. Though the allegation is technically correct, a closer examination
of her responses reflects she placed the missing information under Section 17: Your Foreign
Activities. After answering “Yes” to the question of having an active foreign passport in the last 7
years, Applicant provided a statement in the explanation space of the module that addresses her
travel to Iran in April 2002. She stated:
The dates in the dates of activity field above (3/2002 to3/2007, Iran) are the time the
passport has been active. I had no involvement or contact with any government
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agency or person. I went for a short visit to attend a wedding. I asked for a visa since
I am a U.S. citizen and would require a visa to travel there. They sent me a passport
instead. I have thought about sending the passport back, however I was concerned
that this may trigger suspicion and hassle from that government (GE 3, p. 26).
Having observed Applicant’s demeanor and conduct during her testimony regarding the
missing information, I find Applicant did not intend to conceal the missing information.
Character Evidence
The supervisor of Applicant’s division has known Applicant since July 2005 when they met
at a job fair. According to the supervisor, Applicant is an exemplary employee who is dedicated to
her work and who warrants a position of trust. The program manager has known Applicant
professionally for about two years through their work on the same projects in different jobs. The
manager believes Applicant is an excellent systems engineer who deserves to work in a position of
trust. Based on conversations with her, the manager recalled her indicating she is not supportive of
the Iranian government. Nor does the manager believe she could be pressured into doing something
wrong. The business operations analyst has worked next to Applicant’s work station for about two
years. She has found Applicant to be punctual and very professional in the conduct of her job
responsibilities. In observations of Applicant over the last two years, the business analyst opined that
Applicant does not appear to be the type of person who could be coerced to do something she was
against. 
Official notice has been taken of the following informational resource material concerning
Iran:
1. Background Note: Iran, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of near Eastern Affairs, dated
June 2007;
2. Consular Information Sheet: Iran, U.S. department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs,
dated June 5, 2007;
3.Travel Warning: Iran, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, dated May
31, 2007;
4. CRS Report for congress, Iran: U.S. concerns and Policy Responses, Congressional
Research Service, dated June 27, 2007;
5. Country Reports on Human rights Practices - 2006: Iran, U.S. Department of State,
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, dated March 6, 2007;
6. Country Reports on Terrorism 2006, Chapter 3 - State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview,
U.S. Department of State, OFFICE OF THE Coordinator for Counterterrorism, dated April 30, 2007;
7. CRS Report for Congress: Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments, Congressional
Research Service, dated March 8, 2007;
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8. The National Security Strategy of the United Stated of America, President of the United
States, dated March 2006;
9. The Iranian Regime: A Challenge to the World, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of
Public Affairs, May 1, 2006;
10. Making America Safer by defeating Extremists in the Middle East, Statement by President
of the United States, released by Office of the White House Press Secretary, August 28, 2007.
Areas of particular concern and relevant to the facts and circumstances of this case are
outlined below: 1. The U.S. has had no diplomatic relations with Iran for 27 years. 2. The
government of Iran is actively involved in obtaining nuclear weapons and/or weapons of mass
destruction, and state-sponsored terrorism. 3. Finally, the Iranian government has a poor human
rights record. 
POLICIES
Enclosure 2 of the Directive sets forth guidelines containing disqualifying conditions (DC)
and mitigating conditions (MC) that should be given binding consideration in making security
clearance determinations. These conditions must be considered in every case along with the general
factors of the whole person concept. However, the conditions are not automatically determinative
of the decision in any case nor can they supersede the Administrative Judge's reliance on his own
common sense. 
Burden of Proof
Initially, the government must establish, by substantial evidence, that conditions exist in the
personal or professional history of the applicant which disqualifies, or may disqualify, the applicant
from being eligible for access to classified information. See Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484
U.S. 518, 531 (1988) “[T]he Directive presumes there is a nexus or rational connection between
proven conduct under any of the Criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability.” ISCR
Case No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996) (quoting DISCR Case No. 92-1106 (App. Bd. Oct.
7, 1993)). 
Once the government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial evidence, the
burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts. “[S]ecurity clearance
determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.” See Egan, 481 U.S. at 531; see
Directive E2.2.2.
Foreign Influence (Guideline B)
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has divided
loyalties, or may be manipulated to help a foreign entity in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is
vulnerable to pressure by a foreign interest. 
Foreign Preference (Guideline C)
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Acting in way that shows a preference for a foreign country over the U.S., then he may be
prone to make decisions that are harmful to the U.S.
Personal Conduct (Guideline E)
Conduct involving questionable judgment, dishonesty or a lack of candor. 
CONCLUSIONS
Foreign Influence (FI)
The FI guideline focuses on an individual’s divided loyalties that may be manipulated to help
a foreign entity in a way that harms U.S. interests or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any
foreign interest. Adjudication under this guideline should consider the foreign country in which the
foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such considerations as
whether the foreign country is known to target U.S. citizens to obtain protected information and/or
is associated with a risk of terrorism. 
Applicant’s sister and grandmother are resident citizens of Iran. Applicant’s aunt is a citizen
of Iran now living with Applicant’s cousin in the U.S. In addition, Applicant’s brother is a citizen
of Iran living in the south central part of the U.S. FI DC 7.a. (contact with a foreign family member,
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign
country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation,
pressure, or coercion) applies even though Applicant’s aunt and brother are no longer residents in
Iran. Applicant’s aunt still occasionally travels to Iran. 
Applicant’s parents are dual citizens of Iran and the U.S. residing with Applicant in the U.S.
FI DC 7.d. (sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that
relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion)
applies. Applicant’s mother has returned to Iran on six or seven occasions and is currently in the
country. Her father has traveled to Iran on several occasions also. Applicant’s two trips to Iran
in1996 and April 2002 are more relevant to the FP guideline as showing a foreign preference than
influence and shall be discussed under that guideline. Subparagraph 1.d. is found for Applicant.
Family contacts and ties with persons in a foreign country are not automatically disqualifying
but require the applicant to present evidence in mitigation and extenuation that show she qualifies
for a security clearance. Iran’s enmity for the U.S. and poor human rights record place “a heavy
burden of persuasion” on an applicant to show his family members do not pose a security risk. See,
ISCR Case No. 04-11463 at 4 (App. Bd. Aug. 4, 2006) 
The only mitigating condition that receives serious consideration here is FI MC 8.a. (the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or
the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual
will be place in a position of having to choose between the interests of the foreign individual, group,
organization, or government and interests of the U.S.) Even though there is no evidence that any of
Applicant’s family members who are citizens of Iran are employees or agents of the government or
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any foreign power, Applicant’s family members in Iran are at risk of being brought under control or
exploited by an Iranian intelligence service. Hence, insufficient evidence has been presented by
Applicant to conclude that the positions or activities of these persons in Iran are such that it is
unlikely Applicant will be placed in a position of having to choose between the family member or
entity and U.S. interests. 
Security concerns associated with foreign influence may be mitigated under FI MC 8.c.
(contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little
likelihood that it could create a risk of foreign influence or exploitation). However, regarding
contacts with foreign citizens who are immediate family members, there is a rebuttable presumption
the contacts are not casual. ISCR Case No. 00-0484 at 5 (App. Bd. Feb. 1, 2002). Though her contact
with her sister and grandmother is limited, Applicant’s evidence has not rebutted the presumption.
Subparagraphs 1.a. through 1.c. and Paragraph 1 are found against Applicant. 
Foreign Preference (FP)
The concerns of the FP guideline are actions that denote a preference for a foreign country
over the U.S. Applicant’s conduct warrants the application of the FP DC 10.a.(1) (exercise of any
right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen or through the
foreign citizenship of a family member; including but not limited to possession of a current
passport). As set forth in 2.b., Applicant used her Iranian passport in April 2002 for her brother’s
wedding. This action occurred after Applicant became a U.S. citizen in September 1994 and received
her U.S. passport in October 1996. Applicant engaged in additional actions showing a preference for
Iran by renewing her foreign passport (2.a.) in November 2003. 
The government has provided substantial evidence to establish FP DC 10.a.(1). The burden
then shifts to Applicant to rebut, mitigate or explain the facts in attempting to meet her ultimate
burden of persuasion of demonstrating it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant her
a security clearance. Since Applicant’s actions in April 2002 and November 2003 occurred after she
received her U.S. citizenship and passport, FP MC 11. c. (exercise of the rights and privileges, or
obligations of foreign citizenship occurred before the individual became a U.S. citizen or when the
individual was a minor) does not apply.
When Applicant provided her sworn statement in September 2003, she volunteered to
relinquish her Iranian passport. The record is silent on whether she had been made aware that
possessing a foreign passport and/or using the passport (April 2002) could result in denial of a
security clearance. Throughout the security investigation, Applicant has restated her desire to
relinquish her passport. While describing her strong beliefs not to return to Iran at the hearing, she
renewed her offer to surrender her passport that had expired in June 2007. I conclude the totality of
her conduct in relinquishing the passport, combined with the strong evidence of her clear preference
for the U.S., as demonstrated by her U.S. citizenship for 14 years, her children’s U.S. citizenship,
her successful completion of undergraduate and graduate school in the U.S., and her U.S. property
interests, justify formal findings in her favor under FP MC 11.e. (the passport has been destroyed,
surrendered to the cognizant security authority, or otherwise invalidated) and subparagraphs 2.a.
and 2.b. Paragraph 2 of the SOR is resolved in her favor.
Personal Conduct (PC)
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The security concern of the PC guideline is behavior that manifests poor judgment and
dishonesty during the security investigation. Supplying incomplete or incorrect information on an
SCA is addressed under PC DC 16.a. (deliberate omission, concealment or falsification of relevant
and material facts from a personnel security questionnaire to determine security clearance
eligibility) Unquestionably, Applicant did not include her 2002 trip to Iran in Section 18: Foreign
Countries You Have Visited, in her April 6, 2005 SCA. However, I do not conclude she deliberately
omitted the information. Generally, when and applicant deliberately omits information from an SCA,
that information does not appear in any other area of the SCA. However, the missing information
about Applicant’s trip to Iran is supplied in her response to question 17 of her SCA. It is clear to me
the information missing from question 18 resulted from inadvertence rather than intention. With the
element of deliberateness not present in PC DC 16.a., subparagraph 3.a. and Paragraph 3 is resolved
in Applicant’s favor. 
Whole Person Concept (WPC)
In reaching my decisions under the FI, FP, and PC guidelines, I have carefully evaluated this
case under the general factors of the whole person model found at pp. 18 and 19 of Enclosure 2 of
the Directive. Those factors include: (1) the nature, extent and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, including knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency
and recency of the conduct; (4) the applicant’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the
extent to which the participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other
permanent behavioral factors; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure or
coercion; and, (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. Applicant’s praiseworthy job
performance evidence from supervisors or coworkers has been considered. Applicant has mitigated
the government’s evidence presented under the foreign preference and personal conduct guidelines.
However, given the theocratic nature of the Iranian government, where authority is vested in a few
officials, combined with the Iranian government’s hostile relationship with the U.S., its poor human
rights record, and Applicant’s contacts with immediate family members in Iran, the foreign influence
concerns have not been mitigated. 
FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal Findings required by Paragraph 25 of Enclosure 3 are:
Paragraph 1 (Foreign Influence, Guideline B): AGAINST THE APPLICANT.
Subparagraph 1.a. Against the Applicant.
Subparagraph 1.b. Against the Applicant.
Subparagraph 1.c. Against the Applicant.
Subparagraph 1.d. For the Applicant.
Paragraph 2 (Foreign Preference, Guideline C): FOR THE APPLICANT.
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Subparagraph 2.a. For the Applicant.
Subparagraph 2.b. For the Applicant. 
Paragraph 3 (Personal Conduct, Guideline E): FOR THE APPLICANT.
Subparagraph 3.a. For the Applicant.
DECISION
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is denied.
Paul J. Mason
Administrative Judge