DATE:  December 21, 2007
In re:
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SSN: ------------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 07-02121
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
ROGER C. WESLEY
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Julie R. Edmunds, Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
Applicant (a U.S. citizen by birth) has a wife with dual citizenship with Taiwan and the U.S.
Members of her immediate family (i.e., her father and three siblings) are citizens of Taiwan and
reside there.  His much larger commitments to the U.S. enable him to  mitigate any potential risk to
undue foreign influence concerns under Guideline B. Taiwan, while a country reported to gather
economic and proprietary intelligence against the U.S. and its companies, retains strong mutual
strategic interests with the U.S.  Taiwan is a country with a history of democratic traditions and
respect for human rights and the rule of law.   Clearance is granted.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
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On May 25, 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA), pursuant to
Executive Order 10865 and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Directive), dated January 2,
1992, issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant, which detailed reasons why DOHA could
not make the preliminary affirmative finding under the Directive that it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant, and recommended referral
to an administrative judge to determine whether clearance should be granted, continued, denied or
revoked.
Applicant responded to the SOR on July 5, 2007, and requested a hearing.  The case was
assigned to me on September 20, 2007, and was scheduled for hearing on October 30, 2007.  A
hearing was convened on October 30, 2007, for the purpose of considering whether it would be
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant, continue, deny, or revoke Applicant’s security
clearance.  At hearing, the Government's case consisted of two exhibits; Applicant relied on two
witnesses (including himself) and four exhibits.  The transcript (R.T.) was received on November
7, 2007.
Besides its two exhibits, the Government requested administrative notice of nine documents:
Background Note: Taiwan, U.S. Department of State (April 2007); Taiwan: recent Developments
and U.S. Policy Choices, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (October 2006);
Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage 2000,
National Counterintelligence Center; Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney (WD
NY April 2006); Press Release,  U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney (ED VA January 2007);
Statement of Facts [stipulated], United States v. Keyser, Crim. Case No.1:05CR543, (ED VA
December 2005); Intelligence Threat Handbook [Unclassified/For Official Use Only), Interagency
OPSEC Support Staff (IOSS) (June 2004); Background Note: China, U.S. Department of State
(January 2007); 2006 Report to Congress, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
(November 2006); Focus on Economic Espionage, FBI, Investigative Programs, Counterintelligence
Division.
Administrative or official notice is the appropriate type of notice used for administrative
proceedings.  See ISCR Case No. 05-11292 (App. Bd. April 2007); ISCR Case No. 02-24875 (App.
Bd. October 2006).  Administrative notice is appropriate for noticing facts or government reports
that are well known.   See Stein, Administrative Law, Sec. 25.01 (Bender & Co. 2006).  For good
cause shown, administrative notice was granted with respect to the above-named  background reports
addressing the geopolitical situation in Taiwan.  Administrative notice was extended to the
documents themselves, consistent  with the provisions of Rule 201 of Fed..R. Evi.  This notice did
not foreclose Applicant from challenging the accuracy and reliability of the information contained
in the reports addressing Taiwan’s current state.  
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
At the outset of the hearing, Department Counsel moved to amend the SOR to substitute
brother for brother-in-law in sub-paragraph 1.e and delete the allegation of Applicant’s travel to
Taiwan in February 2007 in sub-paragraph 1.f  of the SOR.  There being no objections, and good
cause being demonstrated, Department Counsel’s motion was granted.  With the requested
substitutions approved, Applicant admitted allegations 1.e and 1.f in their entirety.
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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS
Under Guideline B, Applicant is alleged (a) to have a wife who is a dual citizen of Taiwan
and the U.S.; (b) a father-in-law who is a citizen and resident of Taiwan, and who was employed by
a Taipei city government from approximately 1957 to 1986; ©) a brother-in-law who has been
employed as an associate professor at a Taiwan medical center), his wife and their two sons who are
citizens and residents of Taiwan; (d) a sister-in-law (who has been employed by a Taiwan
environmental protection administration since May 1982), her husband and their children who are
citizens and residents of Taiwan; and (e) a second  brother-in-law who is a citizen and resident of
Taiwan.  Additionally, Applicant is alleged to have traveled to Taiwan in August 2001, April 2002,
February 2005, and February 2007.  His wife is alleged to have visited Taiwan in August 2005. 
For his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted most of the allegations in the SOR with
explanations.  He denied his wife’s brother-in-law is a citizen and resident of Taiwan; he claimed
he is her brother, not her brother-in-law.  He also denied traveling to Taiwan in August 2005; he
claimed his wife (not he) traveled to Taiwan at that time.  He claimed three of his wife’s relatives
(i.e., his father-in-law, brother-in-law and sister-in-law have applied for immigration to the U.S.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant is a 47-year old systems engineer  for a defense contractor who seeks to retain his
security clearance.  The allegations covered in the SOR and admitted to by Applicant are
incorporated herein by reference and adopted as relevant and material findings.  Additional findings
follow.
Applicant’s background
Applicant (a U.S. citizen by birth) has worked on defense projects that required a security
clearance for most of the past  20 years he has been employed in the defense industry (R.T., at 70-
71).  He is quite familiar with the practices of other countries trying to collect industrial and sensitive
information and is regarded as a mentor at his company on foreign economic collection issues (R.T.,
at 74, 78-79).
Applicant met his  spouse (W) in early 2001 through a mutual friend who had immigrated
to the U.S. about 10 years before (R.T., at 40-42) .  He exchanged correspondence with W in 2000
before she met Applicant personally during a family visit to the U.S. in 2001 (R.T., at 42, 81).
Applicant reciprocated and traveled to Taiwan in August 2001 to see W.  After a brief courtship,
Applicant and W were married in Taiwan in April  2002 (R.T., at 43). W, in turn, immigrated to the
U.S. in September 2002 to live with Applicant (R.T., at 43).  Once in the U.S., she applied for U.S.
citizenship.  She became a naturalized U.S. citizen in July 2006 and obtained a U.S. passport the
following month (R.T., at 66-67).   Before immigrating to the U.S., W  was a licensed nurse in
Taiwan.  Once she arrived in the U.S. with Applicant, she applied for and obtained a registered
nursing license.  She has been unsuccessful, though, in obtaining nursing employment in the U.S.
(R.T., at 44).  
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Since immigrating to the U.S., W has  made several return trips to Taiwan.  She made trips
to Taiwan in 2002 (accompanied by Applicant) and 2003  to care for her ailing father (R.T., at 44-45,
81).  Since she did not yet have a U.S. passport, she used her Taiwan passport for both trips.  In
February 2005, Applicant and W traveled together to Taiwan to see her father and siblings.  She
returned to Taiwan six months later (in August 2005) for a surgical procedure and remained in
Taiwan for a brief period to recuperate under the care of her family (R.T., at 45).  She returned to
Taiwan one more time in February 2007 to see her family. On this trip, she used her U.S. passport
(R.T., at 66-67).  While she retains her Taiwan passport, which is not scheduled to expire for another
10 years (R.T., at 67-68), she has no intention of using it in future travels to Taiwan.
W’s father survived her mother and  is a citizen and resident of Taiwan.   Her father has lived
and worked all of his natural life in Taiwan. Before retiring in 1986 (at the age of 76), he was
employed as a health inspector for a Taipei city government department of health (R.T., at 46-47).
He currently receives monthly retirement benefits from the Taiwan government (R.T., at 47).
Applicant and W have since returned to Taiwan on several occasions to care for W’s father during
periods of illness.  She has regular telephone contact with her father (R.T., at 49), but neither
Applicant or herself provide any financial support to him (R.T., at 47).  W’s father  has come to visit
Applicant and W2 on several occasions (i.e.,  in 2002, 2003 and 2004).  
W’s brothers and sister have spent time in the U.S.   One brother studied at a prestigious
American university in the 90s and currently is on the medical faculty of the prestigious Taiwan
National Defense Medical Center (R.T., at 49-51).  His wife is employed in the economics
department of the Taiwan government (R.T., at 53-54).  This brother accompanied W's father on his
last visit in 2004, and applicant maintains regular telephone contact with him (R.T., at 51-52). 
Besides her aforementioned brother, W has a sister (age 50) who is both a citizen and resident
of Taiwan.  She is employed as an administrative assistant for a Taiwan environment agency (R.T.,
at 57-58).  Her husband works for a private Taiwan company.
W has another brother (older than the first) who is also a citizen and resident of Taiwan.  As
a polio survivor, he requires a wheel chair to ambulate and works only on small tasks.  He  receives
government disability benefits and will need to remain in Taiwan to retain his benefit eligibility
(R.T.,at 60-61).  His wife sells chewing gum (R.T., at 60).  Applicant talks regularly (every week or
two) to her sister and first  brother, but has little contact with her oldest brother.  Applicant himself
occasionally speaks to W’s family members (usually just to exchange greetings), but never about any
substantive topics that involve his work (R.T., at 81-82).  He recalls one instance in which he
reviewed a draft of his brother-in-law’s academic paper intended for publication in a medical journal
(R.T., at 82-83).   His face to face interactions with his in-laws have been limited to those few
occasions he met with them while traveling with W to Taiwan and during the several visits of W’s
family members to the U.S.
W, with Applicant’s support, has filed immigration applications on behalf of her father,
sister, and younger brother in March 2007 (see exs. A through C; R.T., at 47-48, 51, and 56).  She
expects the immigration process to be completed  in less than a year for her father, but not for a
number of years in the cases of her brother and sister (R.T., at 56-57).  She is considered very
knowledgeable, patriotic towards the U.S. (her newly adopted home), and a solid contributor to
American society as a nurse by those with Applicant’s employer who have to come know her (see
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ex. D).  Neither Applicant nor W know of any reason why W's family members could be at risk of
coercion or pressure from any members of the Taiwan intelligence or military organizations (R.T.,
at 65).
Applicant is highly regarded by his colleagues at work.  Both his human resources specialist
and his site manager credits him with outstanding performance, reliability and trustworthiness (ex.
D).  His strong ethics have made him one of his company’s most trusted and valuable employees.
He is considered technically gifted, a dedicated team player, and a solid performer who is always
conscious of security requirements.  Applicant’s facility clearance officer (FSO) credits him with
demonstrating a strong sense of duty and responsibility toward proprietary, sensitive, and classified
information.   His FSO reports that  he has never committed a security violation.  In recognition of
his demonstrated loyalty, reliability, and trustworthiness, Applicant is scheduled by his company to
be deployed to Iraq in early 2007 (see ex. D).
Taiwan’s country status
Taiwan has a rich history that dates back 12 to 15 thousand years.  Dutch and Spanish
colonists claimed the island in the 16  and 17  centuries (see Background Note: Taiwan, U.S.th th
Department of State (April 2007)).  Migration from the Chinese mainland over time supplanted the
aborigines peoples of Taiwan.  Japan exerted considerable influence over Taiwan following China’s
ceding of Taiwan to Japan in 1895 (see Background Note: Taiwan, supra, at 3).
Following the end of World War II in 1945, Taiwan reverted to Chinese rule.  Civil war
erupted soon after the reversion between Chiang Kai-Shek’s KMT government and the increasingly
influential Chinese Communist Party guided by Mao Zedong.  When the civil war ended in 1949,
2 million refugees (predominantly nationalists) fled to Taiwan, where Chiang Kai-Shek established
a separate provisional KMT capital in Taipei (see Background Note: Taiwan, supra, at 3). Mao’s
victorious Communist party, in turn, established the People’ s Republic of China (PRC).
For the past one-half century, Taiwan has demonstrated steady economic development and
today is a major international trading power.  Its accession to the WTO in 2002 represented a
significant achievement and strengthened its standing in the expanding global economy. 
Taiwan has exhibited steady political development as well since its establishment as an island
government.  Changes reflect a continuing liberalizing process that culminated in the tightly
contested election of Chen Shui-bian in 2000 (see Background Note: Taiwan, supra, at 3).   Chen’s
DPP party won major parliamentary victories in 2000 and again in 2004, enabling Chen to become
the first opposition party candidate to win the presidency.  Chen was re-elected in 2004 on a platform
that included a “defensive referendum” (Background Note: Taiwan, supra, at 6).   Such referenda
have been historically perceived to be closely linked to the question of Taiwan’s independence.
Today’s Taiwan political system can appropriately be described as a multi-party democracy
under a Constitutional umbrella comprising five branches: executive, legislative, judicial, control
and examination.  By all accounts, Taiwan has a good human rights record and demonstrated respect
for the rule of contract in its commercial relations.
Taiwan’s PRC relations
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The PRC does not recognize Taiwan’s independence, and insists that there is only “one
China” (see Background Note: Taiwan, supra, at 6).  Despite differences over the PRC’s one China
policy, Taiwan and the PRC have enjoyed increased contacts over the past decade.  With Taiwan’s
continued relaxation of its PRC policy regarding unofficial contacts, cross-strait interactions have
grown significantly.  Efforts by the PRC, however, to resume cross-strait dialogue without any
preconditions have been hampered by the PRC’s insistence that the two sides first reach consensus
that there is only “one China” before restarting talks (see id.).  Cheng has recognized the PRC’s “one
China” insistence but to date has declined to condone the concept.  With both sides unwilling to
compromise this obstacle, they have cautiously felt each other out with smaller intermediary steps
like cross-strait cargo and passenger charter flights, sale of Taiwan agricultural products in the PRC,
and PRC tourists visiting Taiwan (see id).  
The PRC operates a large and sophisticated intelligence bureau, entitled the MSS (see
Intelligence Threat Handbook [Unclassified/For Official Use Only), Interagency OPSEC Support
Staff (IOSS), at 71 (June 2004).  The MSS maintains active intelligence gathering operations in
Taiwan (see id., at 72).  These operations use clandestine agents to collect intelligence on Western
consortia investing in the PRC who are suspected of involvement in attempts to democratize the
PRC, as well as other pro-democracy groups thought to be engaging in anti-communist activities (see
Intelligence Threat Handbook, supra, at 72)
U.S.-Taiwan relations
In a joint communique with the PRC in January 1979, the U.S. announced its recognition of
the government of the PRC as the sole government of China and that there is but one China, of
which Taiwan is a part (see Background Note; China, U.S. Department of State, at 8 (January 2007).
The Joint Communique stated that within this context the people of the U.S. will maintain cultural,
commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.
To implement the Joint communique, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in
April 1979.  President Carter, in turn, signed the legislation into law on April 10, 1979.  Besides
providing the legal basis for maintaining the U.S. unofficial relationship with Taiwan, the TRA
reinforced the U.S. commitment to providing defense assistance to Taiwan.  The TRA expressly
provides for the continued sale of appropriate defensive military equipment to Taiwan and declares
that peace and stability in the area are in U.S. interests (see Background Note: Taiwan, supra, at 9).
And even though the U.S. terminated its Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan following its de-
recognition of the latter, it has continued its sale of appropriate defensive military equipment to
Taiwan (see id.).
While ambiguously written, the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security against cross-Strait
aggression by the PRC’s military forces is implicit in the TRA’s coverage of U.S. responsibilities
towards Taiwan.  This implicit construction is oft-used to support proponents of a “two China”
policy.  To be sure, initial actions of the Bush Administration in 2001 provided cause to conclude
the new President had abandoned longstanding U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” in favor of a
policy that placed a clearer emphasis on Taiwan’s interests at the expense of the PRC (see Taiwan:
Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Choices, CRS Report to Congress, at 13 (October 2006)).
More recent developments, though, reflect the smoothing of U.S.-PRC relations as a part of the
broader war on terrorism.  
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Currently, the U.S. does not support Taiwan independence and opposes unilateral steps by
either side to alter the status quo (see Background Note; China, supra, at 20).  For so long as
Taiwan’s national security remains under threat (both veiled and unveiled) from the PRC, Taiwan
can be expected to pursue the development of its military amidst expectations of  military assistance
from the U.S.  Stressing self-reliance, Taiwan maintains a large military establishment (accounting
for 15.3 per cent of its central budget).  Its principal mission is to defend itself against the PRC,
which has not renounced the use of force against Taiwan (see Background Note: Taiwan, supra, at
8).   With its unchanged public policy of maintaining  “strategic ambiguity” in its official relations
with Taiwan, the U.S. can be expected to continue its support of Taiwan’s island security with the
sale of defensive military equipment.
Taiwan’s economic collection practices
Based on past reports to Congress, Taiwan is considered one of the most active collectors of
U.S. economic and proprietary information.  In its 2000 Annual Report to Congress on Foreign
Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, the preparers  list Taiwan as well as the PRC among
the most active collectors (see 2000 Annual Report  to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection
and Industrial Espionage, National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC), at 16).   Specific incidents
are cited  in the NACIC Report that identify offenders of proprietary information thefts and attempts
to acquire export-restricted products (see id., 7-10). 
Recent espionage convictions document ongoing collection activities covering theft of
sensitive and proprietary information by and for Taiwan companies (see, e.g., 2006 Report to
Congress, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, at 139 (November 2006); Press
Release, U.S. Department of justice, U.S. Attorney (WD NY April 2006); Press Release, U.S.
Department of Justice, U.S. Attorney (ED VA January 2007), and Statement of Facts (stipulated),
No. 1:05CR 543 (December 2005).   Multilateral export control regimes in place are voluntary and
not universally adhered to by member nations (see id., at 143).
Stress points between Taiwan, the PRC  and the U.S.
In its November 2006 Report to Congress, the Security Review Commission describes the
PRC as a country intent on acquiring and exploiting the knowledge developed by multiples of
collection agents: legally, if possible, and otherwise illegally by espionage (see 2006 Report to
Congress, supra, at 138.  The PRC’s concerted efforts to acquire sensitive technology poses a
considerable challenge to U.S. counterintelligence measures.  Recent indictments of Chinese citizens
for espionage have served to highlight the PRC’s spying activities in the U.S. (see id.).  Violating  its
own 2004 U.S.-China agreement, the PRC oft-fails to schedule timely end-use inspection visits of
dual-use items licensed for export to the PRC.  Better export controls can be effective only if they are
multilateral in scope (see id.).  Multilateral export controls and arms embargoes, however, do  provide
additional insurance against altering the cross-strait military balance that has been long maintained
(see id., at 144).
Without effective dual use export controls in place, the PRC can be expected to acquire dual
use technologies with military potential from the U.S. and Taiwan through the U.S. and other source
countries.  Reported intelligence, though, is lacking on any Taiwan use of its collection resources in
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the U.S. to supply the PRC with needed military technology (alone or through technology with known
dual use capabilities).
Other stress points between the PRC and Taiwan are reflected in periodic PRC military
exercises in the Taiwan Straits (see Background Note: China, supra, at 19).  More frequent U.S.-PRC
high-level exchanges have the potential to reduce cross-strait military tensions (id., 19).  
POLICIES
The revised Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified
Information (effective September 2006) list Guidelines to be considered by judges in the decision
making process covering DOHA cases.  These Guidelines require the judge to consider all of the
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying (Disqualifying Conditions),
if any, and all of the Mitigating Conditions, if any, before deciding whether or not a security clearance
should be granted, continued or denied.  The Guidelines do not require the judge to assess these
factors exclusively in arriving at a decision.  In addition to the relevant Adjudicative Guidelines,
judges must take into account the pertinent considerations for assessing extenuation and mitigation
set forth in E.2.2 of the Adjudicative Process of Enclosure 2 of the Directive, which are intended to
assist the judges in reaching a fair and impartial common sense decision.
Viewing the issues raised and evidence as a whole, the following adjudication policy factors
are pertinent herein:
Foreign Influence
The Concern: “Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has divided
loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group,
organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or
coercion by any foreign interest.  Adjudication under the this Guideline can and should considered
the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located,
including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target
United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.”
Burden of Proof
By virtue of the precepts framed by the Directive, a decision to grant or continue an
Applicant's request for security clearance may be made only upon a threshold finding that to do so
is clearly consistent with the national interest.  Because the Directive requires Administrative Judges
to make a common sense appraisal of the evidence accumulated in the record, the ultimate
determination of an applicant's eligibility for a security clearance depends, in large part, on the
relevance and materiality of that evidence. As with all adversary proceedings, the Judge may draw
only those inferences which have a reasonable and logical basis from the evidence of record.
Conversely, the Judge cannot draw factual inferences that are grounded on speculation or conjecture.
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The Government's initial burden is twofold: (1) It must prove any controverted fact[s] alleged
in the Statement of Reasons and (2) it must demonstrate that the facts proven have a material bearing
to the applicant's eligibility to obtain or maintain a security clearance.  The required showing of
material bearing, however, does not require the Government to affirmatively demonstrate that the
applicant has actually mishandled or abused classified information before it can deny or revoke a
deliberately or inadvertently fail to safeguard classified information.
Once the Government meets its initial burden of proof of establishing admitted or controverted
facts, the burden of proof shifts to the applicant for the purpose of establishing his or her security
worthiness through evidence of refutation, extenuation or mitigation of the Government's case.
CONCLUSIONS
Applicant is a U.S. citizen by birth who married a woman (W) in 2002, who historically was
a citizen and resident of Taiwan.  She immigrated to the U.S. shortly thereafter to be with Applicant.
She became a U.S. citizen in 2006 and has since petitioned for U.S. immigration approvals on behalf
of her father, brother and sister (all of whom are citizens and residents of Taiwan).   Security issues
of concern to the Government focus on members of Applicant’s in-laws (i.e., his wife’s father, sister
and two brothers)  who are citizens and residents of Taiwan,  a country  historically friendly to the
U.S., albeit, one with a reported history of economic collection activities in the U.S.
Department Counsel  urges security concerns over risks that W's father and siblings (all
citizens and residents of Taiwan) might be subject to undue foreign influence by Taiwanese
authorities to access classified information in Applicant’s possession or control.  Because Applicant’s
in laws  reside in Taiwan, they present potential heightened  security risks covered by disqualifying
condition  (DC) 7(a) (contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate,
friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a
heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion) of the
Adjudication Guidelines for foreign influence.  The citizenship/residence status of these non-
immediate family members in Taiwan pose some potential concerns for Applicant because of the risks
of undue foreign influence that could compromise sensitive or classified information under
Applicant's possession and/or control. 
Because of W’s living arrangements with Applicant and her dual status as a citizen of Taiwan
and the U.S, some consideration of DC 7(b) (connection to a foreign person, group, government, or
country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect
sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or
country by providing that information) and DC 7(d) (sharing living quarters with a person or
persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk or foreign
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion) are warranted as well.  W’s contacts with her father
and siblings, most of whom have been associated with Taiwan government service at the local or
national level, afford her some potential for accessing Taiwan officials who might be interested in
proprietary, sensitive, or even classified information that Applicant is privy to.  Still, none of W’s
family members have any identified affiliations or contacts with Taiwan officials known to be
associated with intelligence or military organizations interested in collecting proprietary or sensitive
information in the U.S.
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Further, from what is known from the presented evidence, none of W's  immediate family
residing in Taiwan have any political affiliations with Taiwan’s government, have any history to date
of being subjected to any coercion or influence, or appear to be vulnerable to the same.  W's father
occupied a relatively low non-political position with the Taipei city government before his retirement
in 1986, and does have a government pension.  One of her two brothers has medical training and
serves on the faculty of Taiwan’s National Defense Medical Center; while her only sister has long
been employed by a Taiwan environmental protection agency.  None of these recited positions,
however,  involve intelligence or military operations and, as such, are not likely to make any of these
relatives foreseeable subjects of interest to Taiwan foreign data collection officials.  Moreover, all but
one of Applicant’s identified extended  family members have an application pending for approved
immigration to the U.S.  Taking the explanations of W about her immediate family at face value, any
risk of undue foreign influence on Applicant and/or his in-laws would appear to be insubstantial and
clearly not of the magnitude that could make them subject to a heightened security  risk of pressure
or compromise under Guideline B.
Taiwan, although a country reported to have targeted U.S. economic and proprietary interests
in the past, enjoys a special relationship with the U.S. through the TRA, and is a democratic
government with a history of respect for human rights and the rule of law.  While Taiwan has been
an active collector of economic intelligence in the U.S., it has not been known to use acquired
information to harm U.S. strategic interests.  Taiwan remains a member in good standing with the
WTO and a constructive trading partner with the U.S., who at times has itself been targeted by agents
of the PRC for intelligence collection on Western groups thought to be promoting democracy and
engaging in anti-communist activities directed at the PRC.
The Adjudicative Guidelines governing collateral clearances do not dictate per se results or
mandate particular outcomes for applicants with relatives who are citizens/residents of foreign
countries in general.  What is considered to be an acceptable risk in one foreign country may not be
in another.  While foreign influence cases must by practical necessity be weighed on a case-by-case
basis, guidelines are available for referencing in the supplied materials and country information about
Taiwan. 
The special relationship that has existed between the U.S. and Taiwan over the past half-
century has been one marked by mutually reconcilable political and economic interests.   Reports of
Taiwan intelligence gathering against U.S. companies are counterbalanced by Taiwan’s history of
friendship and partnership in a defense pact formalized in 1979.  The mutually supportive bonds that
have linked Taiwan’s special relationship with the U.S. have not been weakened by either the TRA,
or the  geopolitical forces that have shaped the U.S.’s evolving relationship with the PRC.  Whatever
potential heightened security risks arise as the result of Applicant's having in-laws with citizenship
and residency in Taiwan are by every reasonable measure mitigated.  
Taiwan remains a friend of the U.S. and is a country whose democratic institutions are not
incompatible with our own traditions and respect for human rights and the rule of law.  Unlike the
old Adjudicative Guidelines the new ones do take account of the covered country’s demonstrated
relations with the U.S. as an important consideration in gauging whether the particular relatives with
citizenship and residency elsewhere create a heightened security risk.  The geopolitical aims and
policies of the particular foreign regime involved do matter.  Taiwan, while reported to target the U.S.
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and its companies in the past for economic and proprietary information, is still a country with no
known recent history of hostage taking or disposition for exerting undue influence against family
members to obtain either classified information, or unclassified economic and proprietary data. 
As for security concerns associated with the presence of Applicant's extended family members
in Taiwan  (a country whose interests have recently been and continue to be friendly to those of the
U.S.), any potential heightened risk of a hostage situation or undue foreign influence brought in the
hopes of eliciting either classified information or economic or proprietary data out of Applicant
through his wife’s family members residing in Taiwan is  an acceptable one.  Applicant, accordingly,
may take advantage of one important mitigating condition: MC 8(a) (the nature of the relationships
with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the persons or activities of
these persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of
having to choose between the interests of a foreign a foreign individual, group, organization, or
government and the interests of the U.S.). 
 MC(8(b) (there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or
obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has
such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be
expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest) has application, too, to
Applicant’s situation.  Both at home and through those in senior positions with Applicant’s employer,
W has demonstrated loyalty, patriotism, and professional commitments to the U.S. since becoming
Applicant’s spouse in 2002, and a naturalized citizen in 2006.  Whatever potential conflicts she may
have through her dual Taiwan citizenship and contacts with her family members in Taiwan have been
more than counterbalanced by her demonstrated U.S. citizenship responsibilities.  
From a whole person perspective, Applicant has consistently demonstrated his steadfast
commitment to respecting and protecting proprietary, sensitive, and classified information.  He is a
citizen by birth who has held a security clearance for the better part of 20 years without a security
violation.  He is considered an exemplary contributor to his employer and can be expected to
prioritize his loyalties to his country and commitments to protecting proprietary, sensitive and
classified information to which he has access over any potential conflicting interests with members
of his wife’s family members still residing in Taiwan.  
Whole person assessment also serves to minimize W’s exposure to conflict of interests with
her Taiwan family members.  Not only does W reside exclusively with him in the U.S., but she and
Applicant have made concerted efforts to gain immigration approvals for her father and two of her
siblings.  Neither Applicant nor W are aware of any risks of coercion or pressure that any of W’s
family members might be exposed to, and the likelihood of any pressure or coercion being brought
to bear on any of W’s family members would appear to be minimal at this time.   Put another way,
Applicant has no visible conflicts of interest with Taiwan citizen/residents or property interests in
Taiwan that could be at risk to exploitation or compromise by Taiwan military or intelligence
officials.  
Overall, any potential security concerns attributable to Applicant's family members in Taiwan
are sufficiently mitigated to permit safe predictive judgments about Applicant's ability to withstand
risks of undue influence attributable to his familial relationships in Taiwan.  Favorable conclusions
warrant with respect to the allegations covered by Guideline B.
12
In reaching my recommended decision, I have considered the evidence as a whole, including
each of the factors and conditions enumerated in E2.2.2 of the Adjudicative Process of Enclosure 2
of the Directive.
FORMAL FINDINGS
In reviewing the allegations of the SOR in the context of the findings of fact, conclusions,
and the factors and conditions listed above, I make the following separate formal findings with
respect to Applicant's eligibility for a security clearance.
GUIDELINE B: (FOREIGN INFLUENCE): FOR APPLICANT
Sub-paras. 1.a through 1.f:: FOR APPLICANT
 DECISION
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly consistent
with the national interest to grant or continue Applicant's security clearance. 
Roger C. Wesley
Administrative Judge