DATE:  January 9, 2008
In re:
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SSN: ------------
Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 07-02027
DECISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
CAROL G. RICCIARDELLO
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Melvin Howry, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
SYNOPSIS
Applicant is a 55-year-old scientist who has worked for a defense contractor for five years.
He immigrated from Iran in 1977, and became a naturalized citizen in 1989. He is married and has
two children born in the U.S. He returned to Iran on two occasions to visit his incapacitated mother.
He has destroyed his Iranian passport, renounced all ties to Iran and intends to never return.
Applicant has successfully mitigated all security concerns raised under Guideline C, foreign
preference and Guideline B, foreign influence. Applicant is not a security risk. Clearance is granted.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Tr. 28.1
Tr. 23, 28, 36.2
Tr. 27.3
2
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant or continue a
security clearance for Applicant. As required by Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 ¶ E3.1.2
(Jan. 2, 1992), as amended, DOHA issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) on August 28, 2007
detailing the basis for its decision–security concerns raised under Guideline C (foreign preference)
and Guideline B (foreign influence) of the revised Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) issued on
December 29, 2005 and implemented by the Department of Defense effective September 1, 2006.
The revised guidelines were provided to Applicant when the SOR was issued. Applicant answered
the SOR in writing on September 12, 2007, and elected to have a hearing before an administrative
judge. The case was assigned to me on November 16, 2007. With the consent of the parties, I
convened a hearing on December 11, 2007, to consider whether it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. The Government offered two
exhibits that were marked as GE 1-2 and admitted without objection. The Government also
requested I take Administrative Notice of official U.S. State Department documents that were
marked as Hearing Exhibit I. Applicant did not object and I took administrative notice of the
documents. Applicant testified on his own behalf and offered two exhibits that were marked as AE
A-B and were admitted without objection. DOHA received the hearing transcript (Tr.) on December
17, 2007.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant is a 55-year-old senior scientist who has worked for a defense contractor since
2003. He is married and has two children. Applicant was born in Iran and moved to the U.S. in 1977
to study and obtain an advanced degree. He holds a doctorate in physics and prior to his federal
employment he taught physics at several universities.  He became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1989.1
His wife was born in Iran and is also a naturalized citizen of the U.S. Both of his children, 11 and
7 years old, were born in the U.S. and are citizens. 
Applicant vehemently denies he is a dual citizen of Iran and the U.S.  He does not consider2
himself a dual citizen and specifically stated that when he became a U.S. citizen he pledged his
allegiance only to the U.S. He has lived in the U.S. for 31 years and considers all of his emotional
ties to be to the U.S. Applicant’s wife’s parents are deceased and her only sibling, a sister, lives in
California. She has no contact with anyone from Iran.
Applicant’s mother was a permanent resident of the U.S.  She  split her time living with both3
Applicant and his brother, who lived in New Jersey, for periods of six to nine months and then about
every 18 months she would return to Iran for a couple of months. On her last trip to Iran in 1991, she
became ill and was unable to travel back to the U.S. She developed Alzheimer’s disease about five
Tr. 39-40.4
Tr. 37-38.5
Tr. 25.6
Tr. 32, 42.7
AE A.8
Tr. 40-41, 50.9
Tr. 42-44, 47.10
Tr. 26.11
Id. and 31, 40.12
Tr. 34-35.13
3
years ago and remained in Iran until her death two months ago. During the past several years her
disease progressed and she was unable to recognize any of her children.  4
Applicant felt a duty and obligation of a loving son to visit his mother in Iran. He had not
returned to Iran for 18 years. Iran would not issue him a visa because he was born in Iran and was
now an American citizen.  He was frightened they would harass him because he had changed his5
name from a traditional Muslim name to a traditional American name.  Applicant was required to6
obtain an Iranian passport if he wanted to visit his sick mother in Iran. Applicant obtained an Iranian
passport and visited his mother twice before her death. His stays lasted approximately 12-14 days.
He did not return for her funeral.  With his mother’s passing, Applicant has no desire or sense of7
duty to return to Iran and has destroyed his expired Iranian passport by shredding it on December 6,
2007, in the presence of his security manager.  He intends to never return to Iran. He was unaware8
of a formal procedure to renounce any ties to Iran due to his birth there, but he is willing to comply
with such, if they exist.  9
When his mother was living, Applicant offered to his siblings living in Iran, money to assist
in the care of his mother. They told him they did not need the money and that she was being cared
for. However, as a gesture of affection and concern for his mother he sent them approximately
$1,000 a year.  10
Applicant has two brothers and a sister who are citizens and permanently live in Iran. None
of them worked for the government of Iran. They are all retired and do not receive government
pensions. They are 71, 65 and 63 years old respectively. Applicant has offered to sponsor them to
immigrate to the U.S., but none is interested in moving at their age.  Applicant does not feel11
obligated to them in anyway because he has made the offer. He contacts them approximately twice
a year, once on the Persian New Year and again on their birthday.  He also has a sister who is a12
Canadian citizen who lives in Canada, but visits Iran about once a year, because she has property that
she checks on. Her husband is deceased.  Applicant has two other brothers, one is a U.S. citizen13
Tr. 48-49.14
AE B.15
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2006; Iran, U.S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy,16
Human Rights, and Labor, dated March 6, 2007 (Country Reports on Human Rights) at 1, 7.
Background Note: Iran, U.S. Department of State Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, dated June 200717
(Background Note) at 7.
Country Report on Human Rights at 20.18
Background Note; Country Reports on Terrorism 2006, U.S. Department of State Office of the Coordinator19
for Counter-Terrorism, dated April 30, 2007 (country Report on Terrorism). .
Country Report on Terrorism, at 2.20
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living in New Jersey, and the other is a Canadian citizen living in Toronto. He speaks with both
frequently.14
Applicant’s supervisor notes he has made significant contributions to the Department of
Defense in a variety of areas and supporting different programs. He has demonstrated enthusiasm,
insight and a keen sense of dedication in advancing the programs in support of national security. He
is seen as a person with integrity and coupled with his talented, inventive and unique skills he is
considered a valued employee.15
Iran is a constitutional Islamic republic with a theocratic system of government in which
Shi’a Muslim clergy dominate the key power structures, and ultimate political authority is vested in
a learned religious scholar.  The U.S. has not had diplomatic relations with Iran since 1980.  The16 17
President’s National Security Strategy has stated that the United States “may face no greater
challenge from a single country than from Iran.”18
The U.S. Government has defined the areas of objectionable Iranian behavior as:
• Iran’s efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction;
• Its support for and involvement in international terrorism;
• Its support for violent opposition to the Middle East peace process; 
• Its dismal human rights record; and
• Iran’s intervention in the internal affairs of Iraq.19
The U.S. has designated and characterized Iran as the most active state sponsor of terrorism.
Iran provides critical support to non-state terrorist groups.  20
The government of Iran has committed numerous, serious human rights abuses against the
Iranian people. Abuses include political killings and incarceration; summary executions, including
of minors; disappearances; religious persecution; torture; arbitrary arrest and detention, including
prolonged solitary confinement; denial of due process; severe restrictions on civil liberties-speech,
press, assembly, association, movement and privacy; severe restrictions on freedom of religion;
Id.21
Travel Warning: Iran, U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs, dated May 31, 2007.22
Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).23
Id. at 527.24
Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960). 25
ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).26
Id.27
Id.; Directive, Enclosure 2, ¶ E2.2.2.28
Executive Order 10865 § 7.29
See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7.30
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official corruption; violence and legal and societal discrimination against women, ethnic and
religious minorities, and homosexuals; trafficking in persons; and child labor.  21
The State Department continues to warn U.S. citizens to consider carefully the risks of travel
to Iran. The children of Iranian citizens are considered Iranian citizens by Iranian authorities, since
Iran does not recognize dual citizenship. As a result, U.S.-Iranian dual citizens have been detained
and harassed by the Iranian government.  22
POLICIES
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”  As Commander in Chief, the President has23
“the authority to . . . control access to information bearing on national security and to determine
whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person
access to such information.”  The President authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to24
grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information “ only upon a finding that it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to do so.”  An applicant “has the ultimate burden of25
demonstrating that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security
clearance.”  “The clearly consistent standard indicates that security clearance determinations should26
err, if they must, on the side of denials.”  Any reasonable doubt about whether an applicant should27
be allowed access to sensitive information must be resolved in favor of protecting such sensitive
information.  The decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not necessarily a28
determination as to the loyalty of an applicant.  It is merely an indication that the applicant has not29
met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a
clearance.30
The revised Adjudicative Guidelines set forth potentially disqualifying conditions (DC) and
mitigating conditions (MC) under each guideline. In evaluating the security worthiness of an
applicant, the administrative judge must also assess the adjudicative process factors listed in ¶ 6.3
6
of the Directive to be considered in evaluating a person’s eligibility to hold a security clearance.
Additionally, each security clearance decision must be a fair and impartial commonsense decision
based on the relevant and material facts and circumstances, the whole-person concept, along with
the factors listed in the Directive. Specifically these are: (1) the nature and seriousness of the conduct
and surrounding circumstances; (2) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (3) the age of the
applicant; (4) the motivation of the applicant, and the extent to which the conduct was negligent,
willful, voluntary, or undertaken with knowledge of the consequences; (5) the absence or presence
of rehabilitation; and (6) the probability that the circumstances or conduct will continue or recur in
the future. Although the presence or absence of a particular condition or factor for or against
clearance is not outcome determinative, the revised adjudicative guidelines should be followed
whenever a case can be measured against this policy guidance.
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying, as well as those
which would mitigate security concerns, pertaining to the adjudicative guidelines are set forth and
discussed in the conclusions below.
CONCLUSIONS
Based upon consideration of the evidence, I find the following adjudicative guidelines most
pertinent to the evaluation of the facts in this case:
Foreign Preference
Foreign Preference is a security concern when an individual acts in such a way as to indicate
a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide
information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.
Based on all of the evidence I have considered Foreign Preference Disqualifying Condition
(FP DC) 10(a) (exercise of any right, privilege or obligation, of foreign citizenship after becoming
a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family member; This includes but is not limited
to (1) possession of a foreign passport…). Applicant is recognized as a citizen of Iran because he was
born there. After becoming a U.S. citizen he obtained an Iranian passport and traveled to Iran on two
occasions to visit his ailing mother. I find the above disqualifying condition applies.
I have considered all the Foreign Preference Mitigating Conditions (FP MC). I especially
considered FP MC 11(a) (dual citizenship is based solely on parents’ citizenship or birth in a foreign
country), FP MC 11(b) (the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship),
and FP MC 11(e) (the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security authority,
or otherwise invalidated). Applicant is considered a citizen by Iran because he was born there.
However, he also acknowledged his citizenship by obtaining and validating his Iranian passport after
he became a U.S. citizen. So his citizenship is not based solely on his birth, but also by his later
actions of using his Iranian birth to obtain an Iranian passport. I find FP MC 11(a) does not apply.
It is important to note that Applicant obtained an Iranian passport for the sole purpose of visiting his
sick mother and not for any political or other reason. He felt a duty and obligation as a loving son
to visit his mother. He did so on two occasions. Applicant credibly testified that he does not consider
himself a dual citizen and when he became a U.S. citizen he renounced his Iranian citizenship. Iran’s
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regulations required him to obtain a passport if he wanted to see his mother before she died. He does
not intend on ever returning to Iran. He has destroyed his Iranian passport in the presence of his
security officer. He is willing to follow any requirements Iran may impose on him to formally
renounce any perceived ties he may have with that country. I find FP MC 11(b) and (c) apply. 
Foreign Influence
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has divided
loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person,
group, organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure
or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the
identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including,
but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.
I have considered all of the Foreign Influence Disqualifying Conditions (FI DC) and
especially FI DC 7(a) (contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate,
friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a
heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion) and FI DC
7(b) (connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict
of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the
individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information).
Applicant has two brothers and a sister living in Iran with whom he speaks twice a year. He has a
sister who is a Canadian citizen, who travels to Iran annually. Applicant traveled to Iran in 1999 and
2002. Iran is a country that has a poor human rights record and terrorist components creating a
heightened risk of foreign influence. I find both of the above disqualifying conditions apply.
I have considered all of the Foreign Influence Mitigating Conditions (FI MC) especially (FI
MC 8(a) (the nature of the relationships with the foreign person, the country in which these persons
are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely
the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.), FI MC (b) (there is no
conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign
person, group, government, or country is so minimal or the individual has such deep and
longstanding relationships and loyalties to the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve
any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest), and FI MC 8(c) (contact or communication with
foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk
for foreign influence or exploitation). Applicant visited Iran twice to see his mother since becoming
a U.S. citizen. His mother has died and he credibly testified that he will never return to Iran. He had
provided his siblings with money for his mother in the past, but with her passing this is no longer
an issue. He has brothers and a sister who are citizens and residents of Iran. At one time, Applicant
offered to sponsor them to immigrate to the U.S. They did not want to and Applicant does not feel
any moral obligation to them. He has minimal contact with them twice a year to wish them greetings
on the new year and for their birthday. He has contact with his sister in Canada who travels to Iran.
However, Applicant’s total and unconditional obligation and commitment is towards his wife and
children in the U.S. His contact with family members who have ties with Iran is casual and
infrequent. He never intends to return to Iran and believes he has fulfilled his moral obligation by
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his offer to sponsor his siblings. Applicant has no interest in Iran and has infrequent contact with his
relatives there. His sense of loyalty is exclusively to the U.S. His wife and children are U.S. citizens
and he sees no reason why he would return or feel compelled to take action to aid Iran. He has no
financial or business interests in Iran. He has been a U.S. citizen for 18 years and but for his mother
becoming ill he would likely have never returned. All of Applicant’s trips to Iran were prior to him
applying for a security clearance. There is little likelihood that Applicant has any conflict of interest,
but if he did it is clear, due to his longstanding loyalty to the U.S. and the likely minimal nature of
the conflict, he would resolve it in favor of the U.S. I find all the above mentioned mitigating
conditions apply.
Whole Person Analysis
In all adjudications, the protection of our national security is the paramount concern. The
objective of the security-clearance process is the fair-minded, commonsense assessment of a person’s
life to make an affirmative determination that the person is eligible for a security clearance. Indeed,
the adjudicative process is a careful weighing of a number of variables in considering the “whole
person” concept. It recognizes that we should view a person by the totality of their acts, omissions,
motivations and other variables. Each case must be adjudged on its own merits, taking into
consideration all relevant circumstances, and applying sound judgment, mature thinking, and careful
analysis.
I considered the whole person in evaluating the case. I considered Applicant’s credibility,
demeanor and responsiveness when testifying. Applicant is a loyal American who returned to his
birth country because his mother was ill. His mother is deceased and although he has some family
remaining in Iran his contacts are infrequent. Applicant’s life is now and has been since 1977
connected to the U.S. Iran required he obtain a passport for entry to visit his mother. He visited her
in Iran twice before she died. He has since destroyed his passport and is willing to renounce his
citizenship and any ties with Iran. After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under
Guidelines C and B, and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude
Applicant has mitigated the security concerns based on foreign preference and foreign influence. I
find Applicant is not a security risk. Accordingly, I conclude he has carried his burden of showing
that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant him a security clearance.
FORMAL FINDINGS
The following are my conclusions as to each allegation in the SOR:
Paragraph 1. Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: For Applicant
Paragraph 2. Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
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Subparagraph 2.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 2.c: For Applicant
Subparagraph 2.d: For Applicant
Subparagraph 2.e: For Applicant
DECISION
In light of all of the circumstances in this case, it is clearly consistent with the national
interest to grant or continue a security clearance for Applicant. Clearance is granted.
Carol G. Ricciardello
Administrative Judge