DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 07-08013 
  ) 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Melvin Howry, Esquire, Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro Se 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
RICCIARDELLO, Carol G., Administrative Judge: 
 
On August 30, 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued 
a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the security concerns under Guidelines C and 
B for Applicant. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding 
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1990), as amended; Department of 
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review 
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the revised adjudicative 
guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and effective 
within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006.  
  
 Applicant answered the SOR in writing on September 28, 2007, and requested a 
hearing before an Administrative Judge. The case was originally assigned to another 
administrative judge and reassigned to me on November 16, 2007. DOHA issued a 
notice of hearing on November 20, 2007, and I convened the hearing as scheduled on 
December 13, 2007. The government offered Exhibits (GE) 1 through 3, which were 
received without objection. Applicant testified on his own behalf and submitted Exhibits 
(AE) A through C, without objection. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
                                                          
on December 19, 2007. Based upon a review of the case file, pleadings, exhibits, and 
testimony, eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
 
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings 
 
Request for Administrative Notice 
 
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice 
of certain facts relating to Colombia. There was no objection to the request. The request 
and the attached documents were not admitted into evidence but were included in the 
record as Hearing Exhibit I. The facts administratively noticed are set out in the Findings 
of Fact below.  
 
 The correct spelling of Applicant’s middle name was changed on the original 
SOR due to a typographical error. 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 Applicant’s admissions to the allegations in the SOR are incorporated herein. In 
addition, after a thorough and careful review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, I 
make the following findings of fact. 
 
Applicant is a 31-year-old master scheduler for a federal contractor. He was born 
in the U.S. to Colombian parents and moved to Colombia with his parents when he was 
very young. He remained in Colombia where he grew up. He is a dual citizen of 
Colombia and the U.S. Colombian law requires American citizens born in Colombia or 
who otherwise have Colombian citizenship to have both a Colombian and U.S. 
passport. He possesses a Colombian passport and uses both his American passport 
and Colombian passport when traveling to Colombia.1 At the hearing, Applicant 
translated a document that was in Spanish that pertained to Colombian law that 
requires dual citizens to comply with Colombian law.2 
 
 Applicant’s parents are divorced. Both are citizens and residents of Colombia, as 
is his stepmother, sister and grandmother. His mother had worked for a government 
agency, but has since left its employment. His father owns a family business. Applicant 
owns shares in the business worth approximately $7,500.3 From 2001-2004, he 
received dividends from the shares. Applicant has a savings account in Colombia. He 
stated “I do have a savings account of about $50. I don’t use it. I just have it just, you 
1 Tr. 23-26; HE I. 
 
2 Tr. 25-26 
 
3 Tr. 33-35. 
 
 
3 
 
 
                                                          
know, for whatever. If someday I need to retire over there, I wanted a history of credit, 
so I just keep it.”4 
 
 Applicant completed his primary, secondary and university education in 
Colombia. After he graduated from college he was employed from 1997-1999 in 
Colombia. He returned to the U.S. in 2000 to earn a master’s degree in business from 
an American university, which he did. He likes where he lives in the U.S. and decided to 
stay. He does not know if he will return to Colombia in the future to reside.  
 
 Applicant returns to Colombia at least annually to visit his family and friends and 
for special occasions. He has a close familial relationship with his immediate family and 
is in contact with them weekly. He has contact with his grandmother usually once a 
month. He also is in regular contact with his uncles. One uncle is the regional manager 
for a Colombia bank and another is studying to be a professional officer in the 
Colombian Air Force. He has two godchildren with whom he is close. Applicant contacts 
his family by phone or email on a regular basis. In answers to interrogatories Applicant 
listed 20 relatives (including those listed above) and 88 friends with foreign citizenship, 
mostly Colombian, with whom he maintains contact. The contact ranges from a couple 
times a year to daily.5 
 
 In a statement made in July 2007, Applicant was unwilling to destroy, surrender 
or return his Colombian passport. He stated at his hearing “I said I didn’t want to destroy 
it, but I was willing to surrender it…. I haven’t surrendered it yet, I asked the director of 
security at [work] how that worked to see if I was supposed to surrender it to them ....”6 
Applicant still possesses his Colombian passport. When asked what his intention was 
he stated, “My intention is, since I still need it whenever I go to Colombia, I asked the 
security office if they had a place where, if I give it to them to hold it until I have to travel 
to Colombia, in which case, every time that there’s an international trouble, I need to go 
and speak to them….”7 He has not destroyed it or returned it to Colombian authorities, 
or otherwise invalidated it. He has not renounced his citizenship in Colombia and 
although he stated he was willing to do so, his demeanor was that it was with 
reluctance. 
 
 Applicant voted in the Colombian elections in May 2006. When asked why he 
stated because it was his right to as a Colombian national.8 He further explained “it was 
a critical election because of all the problems with the guerrillas and the terrorism that 
4 Tr. 33. 
 
5 Tr. 35-36, 42; GE 2. 
 
6 Tr. 27. 
 
7 Tr. 27-28. 
 
8 Tr. 29-30. 
 
 
4 
 
 
                                                          
was affecting the country, the need for a strong president was vivid. So it’s—I figure, if I 
could vote for the guy that was strongest, I would be helping, and so I did.”9 
 
 Applicant provided three character letters that attested to his character and 
integrity as a responsible and skillful employee. He is considered trustworthy, has the 
highest degree of professionalism, and conducts himself in a courteous manner.10 
 
 Colombia is a constitutional, multiparty democracy and the second most 
populous country in South America. Any person born in Colombia is considered a 
Colombian citizen. There are travel warnings for U.S. citizen by the Department of State 
highlighting the dangers of violence by narcoterrorist groups and other criminal 
elements in Colombia. Foreigners continue to be victims of threats, kidnappings, and 
other criminal acts and there are severe restrictions on travel to and within Colombia for 
American residing there for official duties. Victims of violence have included journalists, 
missionaries, scientists, human rights workers, and tourists including children. The 
Secretary of State has designated three Colombian groups as Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations that have carried out bombings and other attacks. They have also 
targeted critical infrastructure, public recreation and modes of transportation. They have 
also targeted civilians, government workers, politicians and soldiers. One terrorist 
organization has held three U.S. citizen government contractors as hostages since 
2003. The government of Colombia’s record on human rights has improved, but there 
are still serious problems, including unlawful and extrajudicial killings, forced 
disappearances, insubordinate military collaboration with criminal groups, torture and 
mistreatment of detainees, and other serious human rights abuses.11 
 
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an Applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
Administrative Judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition 
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list 
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in 
evaluating an Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The Administrative Judge’s over-arching 
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common sense decision. According to AG ¶ 
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as 
the “whole person concept.” The Administrative Judge must consider all available, 
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in 
making a decision. 
9 Tr. 30. 
 
10 AE A, B and C.  
 
11 HE I. 
 
5 
 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on 
the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences 
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. 
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security 
decision.  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or 
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally 
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of 
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline C, Foreign Preference 
AG ¶ 9 expresses the security concerns involving foreign preference: When an 
individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the 
United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions 
that are harmful to the interests of the United States. 
I have considered all of the foreign preference disqualifying conditions and 
especially considered AG ¶ 10(a) (exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign 
citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family 
member. This includes but is not limited to: (1) possession of a current foreign passport 
. . . and (7) voting in a foreign election). Applicant continues to possess a valid 
Colombian passport and voted in the 2006 Colombian election acknowledging it was his 
right to do so as a Colombian national. I find AG ¶ 10(a) applies. 
 
6 
 
 
I have considered all of the foreign preference mitigating conditions under AG ¶ 
11 and especially considered (a) (dual citizenship is based solely on parents’ citizenship 
or birth in a foreign country), (b) (the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce 
dual citizenship), (c) (exercise of the rights, privileges, or obligations of foreign 
citizenship occurred before the individual became a U.S. citizen or when the individual 
was a minor), (d) (use of a foreign passport is approved by the cognizant security 
authority), (e) (the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security 
authority, or otherwise invalidated), and (f) (the vote in a foreign election was 
encouraged by the United States Government). 
Applicant’s dual citizenship status is not based solely on his parents’ citizenship, 
but is based on his exercising the rights of a Colombian citizen. He maintains his 
Colombian passport and uses it to enter Colombia, which is required by law. It is a valid 
passport. He has not surrendered it. There is no evidence the use of his Colombian 
passport was approved by the cognizant security authority. His exercise of foreign 
citizenship occurred while he was a U.S. citizen. Applicant also voted in a Colombia 
election, as he believed was his right as a Colombian citizen. There was no evidence 
that the U.S. government encouraged him to vote in the election. He reluctantly stated 
he would renounce his Colombian citizenship. I find (b) applies. However, this mitigating 
condition alone is not enough to overcome all the evidence which supports Applicant’s 
foreign preference to Colombia. 
Guideline B, Foreign Influence 
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concerns regarding foreign influence: Foreign 
contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has divided loyalties or 
foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, 
group, organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable 
to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can 
and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or 
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether 
the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected 
information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism. 
I have considered all of the foreign influence disqualifying conditions under AG ¶ 
7. I have especially considered (a) (contact with a foreign family member, business or 
professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign 
country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, 
manipulation, pressure, or coercion), (b) (connections to a foreign person, group, 
government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the 
individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s 
desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information), (e) (a 
substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign country, or in any 
foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which could subject the individual to 
heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation). 
 
7 
 
 
Applicant has consistent and regular contact with his immediate family and 
numerous family and many friends in Colombia. He has two family members who are 
quasi-connected to the government; one is a military student and the other an uncle 
who works for a national bank. Applicant also has a nominal financial interest in a family 
owned and operated company and maintains a financial footprint in Colombia so he can 
establish credit in the event he chooses to retire there. Although Applicant has many 
family and social connections in Colombia I do not have any evidence to conclude those 
connections create a heightened risk or conflict of interest. I also find that the nominal 
financial interest Applicant has in Colombia does not create a heightened risk of foreign 
influence or exploitation. Colombia is an ally in the war on terrorism and although they 
have narcoterrorist organizations in their country, there is no evidence that they have 
attempted to obtain protected information. I find none of the foreign influence 
disqualifying conditions apply. 
Whole Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole person concept, the Administrative Judge must evaluate an 
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s 
conduct and all the circumstances. The Administrative Judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): “(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness 
of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include 
knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) extent to which participation 
is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent 
behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, 
coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.” 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security 
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration 
of the guidelines and the whole person concept. 
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant is a U.S. citizen by birth, 
but lived most of his life in Colombia. He maintains a Colombian passport and has voted 
in the Colombian presidential election in 2006. As he stated, it was his right as a 
Colombian national to do so. Even though he stated he is willing to renounce his 
Colombian citizenship, the other evidence clearly leads me to conclude he has not 
mitigated the security concerns raised under the foreign preference guideline. 
 
 Applicant has strong family and social ties to Colombia, but there was not 
evidence to support that those ties created a heightened risk or a potential conflict of 
interest. None of his family has close ties to the Colombian government. I find he has 
mitigated the security concerns raised under foreign influence.  
 
 
 
 
 
8 
 
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline C:   AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 1.a-e:   Against Applicant 
   
 Paragraph 1, Guideline B:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 2.a-n:   For Applicant 
   
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
CAROL G. RICCIARDELLO 
Administrative Judge