DOHA acted under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February1
20, 1990), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program  (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the revised adjudicative
guidelines (RAG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and effective within the
Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
---------------- )       ISCR Case No. 
SSN: ----------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Julie. R. Edmunds, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
______________
METZ, John Grattan, Jr., Administrative Judge:
On 27 April 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guidelines
J and E.  Applicant answered the SOR 13 November 2007, and requested a hearing.1
DOHA assigned the case to me 3 January 2008, and I convened a hearing 14 February
2008. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) 22 February 2008.
 
2
Findings of Fact
Applicant admitted the SOR allegations. Accordingly, I incorporate his
admissions as findings of fact. He is a 33-year-old computer technician employed by a
defense contractor since September 2003. He seeks to retain the security clearance he
obtained while in the military in 1995.
In 1998, Applicant was arrested for DUI, and ultimately convicted. Aside from its
significance as adverse information required to be disclosed to the government, the
1998 arrest has no independent security significance as criminal conduct or alcohol
consumption.
When Applicant applied for a security clearance in September 2001 (G.E. 1),  he
deliberately concealed his DUI conviction by answering “no” to question 24 (alcohol/
drug arrests). He repeated this false answer on an October 2002 clearance application
(G.E. 2). In January 2003, Applicant was polygraphed by another government agency
because he was seeking access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). In
August 2003, he was denied access to SCI for reasons largely irrelevant to his current
application. However, he appears to have retained his security clearance.
In July 2004, Applicant deliberately concealed his DUI arrest and his SCI access
denial by answering “no” to questions 23(d) (alcohol/drug arrests) and 26(b)
(clearance/access denied/suspended/revoked) (G.E. 1). In his September 2004 sworn
statement (G.E. 4), he acknowledged that he purposely omitted this information
because he did not want to have his clearance revoked, because he needed it to retain
his job. At hearing, he suggested—incredibly—that he omitted the information because
he thought the government already had it. He acknowledged that the clearance
applications were not being sent anywhere that the information was known.
Applicant expresses remorse for his falsifications. His character references, who
include his wife, a coworker, and a supervisor, extol his work ethic and integrity. None
but his wife appear aware of the issues in this case.
Policies
The Revised Adjudicative Guidelines (RAG) list factors to be considered in
evaluating an Applicant’s suitability for access to classified information. Administrative
Judges must assess both disqualifying and mitigating conditions under each issue fairly
raised by the facts and circumstances presented. Each decision must also reflect a fair
and impartial common sense consideration of the factors listed in RAG ¶ 2(a). The
presence or absence of a disqualifying or mitigating condition is not determinative for or
against Applicant. However, specific adjudicative guidelines should be followed where a
case can be measured against them, as they represent policy guidance governing the
grant or denial of access to classified information. Considering the SOR allegations and
See, Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).2
¶16.(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant and material facts from any3
personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct
investigations, . . . [or] determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness. . .;
¶17.(a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification4
before being confronted with the facts;
3
the evidence as a whole, the relevant, applicable, adjudicative guidelines are Guideline
J (Criminal Conduct) and Guideline E (Personal Conduct).
Security clearance decisions resolve whether it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue an Applicant’s security clearance. The government
must prove, by something less than a preponderance of the evidence, controverted
facts alleged in the SOR. If it does so, it establishes a prima facie case against access
to classified information. Applicant must then refute, extenuate, or mitigate the
government’s case. Because no one has a right to a security clearance, the Applicant
bears a heavy burden of persuasion.
Persons with access to classified information enter into a fiduciary relationship
with the government based on trust and confidence. Therefore, the government has a
compelling interest in ensuring each Applicant possesses the requisite judgement,
reliability, and trustworthiness of those who must protect national interests as their own.
The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard compels resolution of any
reasonable doubt about an Applicant’s suitability for access in favor of the government.2
Analysis
The government established a case for disqualification under Guideline J and E,
and Applicant did not mitigate the security concerns. He deliberately concealed his DUI
arrest (and later his access denial) from the government.  He did so knowing that these3
issues were of security concern to the government, and believing that his clearance was
at risk if he told the truth.
None of the Guideline E mitigating conditions apply. The concealed information
was relevant to a clearance decision. Applicant’s falsifications kept the government from
evaluating his DUI arrest (and access denial) in a timely fashion, and at a time when the
arrest particularly might have raised significant security concerns. Applicant did not
disclose the arrest until his polygraph.  But he continued to conceal the arrest on his4
clearance application in July 2004.
Record evidence clearly establishes that Applicant intended to conceal his DUI
arrest and later access denial from the government and effect the course of his
¶31.(a) a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses; (c) allegation or admission of criminal conduct,5
regardless of whether the person was formally charged, formally prosecuted or convicted;
4
background investigation. This conduct violated 18 U.S.C. §1001,  whether or not he5
was successful in effecting the course of his investigation. However, in this case his
falsifications did alter the investigation, as it appears he was granted his clearance at
least twice because of it.
Applicant’s failure to disclose his DUI arrest and access denial demonstrates a
lack of candor required of cleared personnel. The government has an interest in
examining all relevant and material adverse information about an Applicant before
making a clearance decision. The government relies on applicants to truthfully disclose
that adverse information in a timely fashion, not when it is perceived to be prudent or
convenient. Further, an applicant’s willingness to report adverse information about
himself provides some indication of his willingness to report inadvertent security
violations or other security concerns in the future, something the government relies on
to perform damage assessments and limit the compromise of classified information.
Applicant’s conduct suggests he is willing to put his personal needs ahead of legitimate
government interests. I resolve Guideline J and E against Applicant.
Beyond the specific guidelines alleged by the government, the generally
applicable disqualifying and mitigating conditions lead to the same result. Falsifications
are a core security concern [RAG &2(a)(1)]. His behavior was deliberate and not due to
circumstances beyond his control [RAG &2(a)(2); RAG &2(a)(5)]. His misconduct was
both recent and frequent [RAG &2(a)(3)]. Applicant was not a neophyte when he made
his falsifications, and as a military member had better reason than most to know the
necessity of being truthful on his clearance applications [RAG &2(a)(4).)]. Rehabilitation
or behavioral changes are difficult to measure under these circumstances [RAG &
2(a)(6)]. He clearly sought to mislead the government about his DUI arrest and later
access denial, or was at least willing to benefit from his misconduct [RAG &2(a)(7)].
Applicant’s willingness to put his personal needs ahead of legitimate government
interests increases his potential vulnerability and he has not demonstrated that the
misconduct is unlikely to recur [RAG & 2(a)(8); RAG & 2(a)(9)]. The concern is whether
Applicant would disclose situations or circumstances, whether deliberate or inadvertent,
that raise security concerns. Overall, the record evidence leaves substantial doubt
about Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. Accordingly, I
conclude Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns arising from his
falsifications.
Formal Findings
Paragraph 1. Guideline J: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph a: For Applicant
Subparagraph b: Against Applicant
5
Paragraph 2. Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph d: Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant. Clearance denied.
                                              
                                             
JOHN GRATTAN METZ, JR
Administrative Judge