DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
-------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 07-02460
SSN: ------------ )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Ray T. Blank, Jr., Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
 February 25, 2008
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Decision
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TESTAN, Joseph, Administrative Judge:
On August 31, 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued
a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to applicant detailing the security concerns under
Guidelines B, C, and E. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865,
Safeguarding Classified Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended;
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the revised
adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and
effective within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant answered the SOR in writing, and requested an Administrative
Determination by an Administrative Judge (AJ). Department Counsel issued a File of
Relevant Material (FORM) on October 24, 2007. Applicant did not respond to the
FORM. Based upon a review of the case file, pleadings, and exhibits, eligibility for
access to classified information is denied.
See, SOR Response. Applicant stated in Exhibit 5 that “the Jordanian government charges non-citizens
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substantial visitor fees and you’re required to submit immigration documents monthly.”
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Findings of Fact
Applicant was born in the United States in 1984. When he was about 12 years of
age, he moved to Jordan. He lived in Jordan from May 1996 to August 2002. He then
returned to the United States.
Because of his father’s Jordanian citizenship, applicant is automatically
considered a citizen of Jordan. Applicant exercised his Jordanian citizenship in 1990
when he applied for and received a Jordanian passport. He renewed this passport in
2006. Although applicant holds a United States passport, he uses his Jordanian
passport when he visits Jordan “because using an American passport would incur [sic]
undue stress and financial burden.”  He maintains his Jordanian citizenship because it1
is part of his culture.
Applicant’s parents and five siblings are dual citizens of Jordan and the United
States, and they all currently reside in Jordan. His father operates a business there and
his mother is an editor for a foreign newspaper. Applicant is in contact with his family in
Jordan at least once a week via email or telephone.
During an interview with a DoD investigator in October 2006, applicant stated he
“would like to live in Jordan at some point within the next ten years.” The Government
alleges that during the same interview, applicant failed to disclose he had traveled to
Jordan in July 2006, and that while there, got married. Because there is no credible
evidence that applicant was asked any question that would have required disclosure of
this information, this allegation, and Guideline E, are found for applicant.
The Government provided seven official United States publications with the
FORM that describe the economic, political and intelligence activities of Jordan. The
Government requested that these documents be admitted into evidence. I have
admitted the documents into evidence, and I take administrative notice of the following
facts found therein:
Jordan, which has a population of approximately 5.9 million, is a constitutional
monarchy that is pro-Western. Although the government respected human rights in
some areas, its overall record continued to reflect problems. While in Jordan, American
citizens who also possess Jordanian nationality may be subject to laws that impose
special obligations on Jordanian citizens.
Combating terrorism has been a major problem for Jordan. United States
personnel and assets in Jordan have been targeted by terrorists in recent years.
Terrorists use overt, covert, and clandestine activities to exploit and undermine United
States national security interests.
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Policies
The President has “the authority to . . . control access to information bearing on
national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to
occupy a position that will give that person access to such information.” (Department of
the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518,527 (1988).) In Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), the President set out
guidelines and procedures for safeguarding classified information within the executive
branch. The President authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant
applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” (Exec. Ord. 10865, Section 2.)
To be eligible for a security clearance, an applicant must meet the security
guidelines contained in the Directive. Enclosure 2 of the Directive sets forth personnel
security guidelines, as well as the disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions
under each guideline.
 
Initially, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts in
the SOR that disqualify or may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to
classified information. (Directive, Paragraph E3.1.14.) Thereafter, the applicant is
responsible for presenting evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts.
(Directive, Paragraph E3. 1.15.) An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating
that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security
clearance.” (ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).) “Any doubt as to
whether access to classified information is clearly consistent with national security will
be resolved in favor of the national security.” (Directive, Paragraph E2.2.2.)
A person granted access to classified information enters into a special
relationship with the government. The government must be able to repose a high
degree of trust and confidence in those individuals to whom it grants access to
classified information.
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
The security concern relating to the Foreign Influence guideline is set forth in
Paragraph 6 of the AG, and is as follows: 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
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States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
Paragraph 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying. Under Paragraph 7.a., “contact with a foreign family member, business or
professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign
country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement,
manipulation, pressure, or coercion” may be disqualifying. Under Paragraph 7.b.,
“connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential
conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect sensitive information or
technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by
providing that information” may be disqualifying. Lastly, under Paragraph 7.i., “conduct,
especially while traveling outside the U.S., which may make the individual vulnerable to
exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a foreign person, group, government, or country”
may be disqualifying.
Applicant has at least weekly contact with his immediate family members residing
in Jordan. In addition, since moving back to the United States in 2002, he has visited
Jordan numerous times, the last time in 2006 according to the evidence in the record.
Applicant’s presence in Jordan during these trips made him and his family members
potentially vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or coercion by not only the Jordanian
government, but also by terrorists operating in Jordan. These facts raise concerns
under all three disqualifying conditions.
Paragraph 8 sets forth conditions that could mitigate security concerns. Under
Paragraph 8.a., it is potentially mitigating if an applicant can demonstrate that “the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of
the U.S.” Under Paragraph 8.b., it is potentially mitigating if an applicant can
demonstrate “there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual*s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal,
or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S.,
that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S.
interest.” Lastly, under Paragraph 8.c., it is potentially mitigating if an applicant can
demonstrate that the “contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or
exploitation.”
None of the foregoing mitigating conditions is applicable. Applicant*s contacts
with his parents and siblings in Jordan are frequent and ongoing. His relationship with
them is one of loyalty and obligation, raising the concern that these relationships create
a risk for foreign influence or exploitation. Applicant failed to provide credible evidence
that it is unlikely he would be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign government and the interests of the United States, or that he is not
vulnerable to a conflict of interest.
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Guideline C, Foreign Preference
The security concern relating to the Foreign Preference guideline is set forth in
Paragraph 9 of the AG, and is as follows:
When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a
foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to
provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of
the United States.
Paragraph 10 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may
be disqualifying. Under Paragraph 10.a.1., exercising any right or privilege of foreign
citizenship after becoming a United States citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a
family member, such as possession of a current foreign passport, may be disqualifying.
Under Paragraph 10.b., taking action to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign
citizenship by an American citizen may also be disqualifying. The fact that applicant
applied for and received a Jordanian passport, and then renewed it while an adult,
requires application of these two conditions.
Paragraph 11 describes potentially mitigating conditions. The only one applicable
is 11a., which states, “dual citizenship is based solely on parents’ citizenship or birth in
a foreign country.”
“Whole Person” Analysis 
Under the whole person concept, the AJ must evaluate an applicant’s security
eligibility by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances.
An AJ should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG Paragraph
2(a): “(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances
surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and
recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
(5) extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the
conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the
likelihood of continuation or recurrence.” Under AG Paragraph 2c, the ultimate
determination of whether to grant a security clearance must be an overall common
sense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole
person concept.       
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case.
Applicant was born in the United States to Jordanian parents. Although he has
spent most of his life in the United States, he has strong ties to Jordan and to his
immediate family members living there, as evidenced by his voluntary weekly contacts
with these family members and his voluntary trips to Jordan. His voluntary actions could
leave him vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure and could cause the future
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compromise of classified information. I have carefully reviewed the administrative
record, applicant*s submissions, and the allegations in the SOR. I have weighed the
disqualifying and mitigating conditions of Guidelines B and C, and I have evaluated
applicant*s conduct in light of the whole person concept identified at Paragraph E2.2. of
Enclosure 2 of the Directive. After doing so, I conclude that applicant failed to rebut the
Government’s case under Guidelines B and C.
There is nothing in the record that suggests applicant is anything but a loyal
American citizen. Applicant*s allegiance, loyalty, and patriotism are not at issue in these
proceedings. Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 specifically provides that industrial
security clearance decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no
sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” Therefore,
nothing in this decision should be construed to suggest I have based this decision, in
whole or in part, on any express or implied concern as to applicant*s allegiance, loyalty,
or patriotism.
Formal Findings     
Formal findings for or against applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline C: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a through 1e: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 2.a and 2.b: Against Applicant
Paragraph 3, Guideline E: FOR APPLICANT
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with national security to grant applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                              
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JOSEPH TESTAN
Administrative Judge