KEYWORD: Guideline F; Guideline E
DIGEST: Applicant offered explanations for his failure to disclose unfavorable information of
security concern on his security clearance application.  The Judge appropriately considered those
explanations in light of the record evidence as a whole.  Applicant has not demonstrated that the
Judge’s finding of deliberate falsification is error.  Adverse decision affirmed.
CASENO: 06-24669.a1
DATE: 03/14/2008
DATE: March 14, 2008
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 06-24669
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On May 2, 2007, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the
basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  The SOR was
The Judge found in favor of Applicant under Guideline F.  That favorable finding is not at issue on appeal.1
As part of his appeal, Applicant submits evidence which was not considered in the proceeding below.  The Board cannot
consider new evidence on appeal.  Directive ¶ E3.1.29.
Decision at 3.2
Id at 10.3
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subsequently amended to add allegations under Guideline E (Personal Conduct).  Applicant
requested a hearing.  On October 29, 2007, after the hearing, Administrative Judge Matthew E.
Malone denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Applicant timely appealed pursuant to
the Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issues on appeal: whether the Judge erred in concluding
Applicant’s falsification of his security clearance application was deliberate; whether the Judge erred
by concluding that the security concerns raised under Guideline E had not been mitigated.1
(1) Applicant contends that he did not deliberately falsify his security clearance application
(SF-86) by failing to disclose unfavorable information of security concern in response to four
different questions.  In support of this contention, he argues that when he was updating his SF-86,
he was advised by his facility security officer (FSO) to only correct specific information and sign the
final page, and to not provide any additional adverse information.  As a result, Applicant believes
he is being made a “scapegoat to others not doing their job.”  Applicant’s argument does not
demonstrate that the Judge erred.
In his findings of fact, the Judge noted that Applicant had “. . . held security clearances up
to and including TS/SCI continuously since 1989.”   He then appropriately considered Applicant’s2
explanation for why he failed to disclose the information in question in light of the record evidence
as a whole.  Based on this assessment, the Judge reasonably concluded that Applicant’s claims to
have relied on the guidance of his FSO were implausible: “Having extensive experience in the
clearance process, Applicant knew or should have known he was responsible for his answers and
statements made to the government.  His assertion that an FSO knew of certain changes to be made
in Applicant’s questionnaire and directed those changes, but somehow limited Applicant from
updating possible adverse information, taken together with all of the evidence of his delinquent
debts, is simply untenable and strains credulity.”   On this record, the Judge’s findings of deliberate3
falsification are sustainable.  See Directive ¶ E3.1.32.1; ISCR Case No. 04-03849 at 2-3 (App. Bd.
Jan. 26, 2006). 
(2) Applicant also contends that the Judge erred in concluding that the security concerns
raised by his falsifications had not been mitigated, based upon the favorable record evidence,
particularly his lengthy military and civilian service, his many years of holding a security clearance
without adverse incident, and his favorable life changes since 2003.  Again, Applicant has not
demonstrated that the Judge erred.
Once the government presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the
applicant to establish mitigation.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  The presence of some mitigating evidence
does not alone compel the Judge to make a favorable security clearance decision.  As the trier of fact,
the Judge has to weigh the evidence as a whole and decide whether the favorable evidence outweighs
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the unfavorable evidence, or vice versa. See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-17691 at 3 (App. Bd. Jul.19,
2003).  An applicant’s disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue
for a different interpretation of the evidence, is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the
evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.
In this case, the Judge weighed the mitigating evidence offered by Applicant against the
recency and seriousness of the disqualifying conduct, and considered the possible application of
relevant mitigating conditions and whole person factors.  The Judge found in favor of Applicant
under Guideline F.  However, the Judge reasonably explained why the evidence which Applicant had
presented in mitigation was insufficient to overcome the government’s other security concerns.  The
Board does not review a case de novo.  The favorable record evidence cited by Applicant is not
sufficient to demonstrate the Judge’s decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g.,
ISCR Case No. 02-28041 at 4 (App. Bd. Jun. 29, 2005).  Given the record that was before him, the
Judge’s ultimate unfavorable clearance decision under Guideline E is sustainable.
Order
The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Michael Y. Ra’anan
Michael Y. Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairman, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields     
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody         
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board