1
                                                             
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
         
            
In the matter of: )
)
------------------------ )       ISCR Case No. 07-07878
SSN: ---------------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Ray T. Blank, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
______________
LYNCH, Noreen A., Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted her Security Clearance Application (SF 86) on June 29, 2006.
On October 3, 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the basis for its preliminary decision to deny her
application, citing security concerns under Guidelines B (Foreign Influence) and C
(Foreign Preference). The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the revised adjudicative
guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and effective
within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on October 18, 2007; answered it on
the same day; and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. Department
Counsel was ready to proceed on February 25, 2008. The case was assigned to me on
the same day.  DOHA issued a notice of hearing on February 27, 2008. I convened the
Applicant waived her 15 days notice in this case.1
Department Counsel did not offer any documents for administrative notice at the hearing. I requested2
information on El Salvador after the hearing. Counsel provided U.S. Department of State Background Note
(September 2007). Applicant was advised about the document and did not object.
2
hearing as scheduled on March 7, 2008.  Government Exhibits (GX) 1 and 2 were1
admitted in evidence without objection.  Applicant testified on her own behalf, and2
submitted Applicant’s Exhibit (AX) A, which was admitted without objection. DOHA
received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on March 17, 2008.  Eligibility for access to
classified information is granted.
Findings of Fact
In her answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the factual allegations in ¶¶ 1.a, 1.c,
2.a, 2.b and 2.d. She denied the factual allegations in ¶¶ 1.b and 2.c. Her admissions in
her answer to the SOR and at the hearing are incorporated in my findings of fact.  I make
the following findings:
Applicant is a 33-year-old woman. She has been employed as an architect by a
defense contractor since March 2006. She is regarded by her employer as a diligent
employee whose ability to contribute to projects would be enhanced if she had a security
clearance (AX A).
Applicant was born and educated in the United States (U.S.) (Tr. 17). She
graduated from high school in 1993. She attended college and worked part time. She
graduated from a U.S. university in 2005. 
Applicant’s parents are living in the U.S. and are naturalized U.S. citizens. She
has one sister. While growing up in the U.S., Applicant visited El Salvador with her
parents during holidays each year. (Tr. 18). 
Applicant’s father was born in El Salvador. Her mother was born in Guatemala.
Her father and mother keep in touch with their extended family outside the U.S.
Applicant’s cousins are citizens and residents of El Salvador. Her uncles live
there and also her grandmother. (Tr. 37). Her uncles are professionals and are not
connected with the government. 
In 1999, Applicant met a citizen and resident of El Salvador on line. They started
to communicate by e-mail regularly. She met him in 1999. (Tr. 11). She visited him in
2000. In 2002, Applicant lost her job. She decided to move to El Salvador. Her decision
was based on her relationship with her boyfriend and her love of the culture and history
of the country. She intended to live there for the rest of her life.  She began the process
of obtaining Salvadoran citizenship, with her father’s help at the Salvadoran consulate in
the U.S. Her father provided his birth certificate to show that he was born in El Salvador.
Applicant stopped dating him in 2003. She sent an occasional email after that because he owed her3
money.
3
She obtained recognition of and pursued citizenship in El Salvador. She did not vote in
elections while there or receive any benefits. (GX 2). 
After living in El Salvador from February 2002 until December of 2002, Applicant
decided to return to the U.S. She missed the life in the U.S. Also, she was having
difficulty finding employment in El Salvador. Her relationship with her boyfriend ended.
She does not have any contact with him at this point.3
Applicant now lives with her parents in the U.S. Her father owns a home in El
Salvador and he and his wife plan to retire there perhaps in a year or so. The value of
the house is approximately $300,000 to $400,00. Applicant and her sister may inherit the
home at some point. (GX 2).
Applicant does not keep in touch with any of her cousins or relatives in El
Salvador. When she was living there she had some differences of opinions and now
chooses not to contact them. (GX 2). She hears news of them from her father. (Tr. 19). 
In October 2006, Applicant told a security investigator she was willing to renounce
her Salvadoran citizenship. She does not possess a passport from that country. (GX 1).
Whenever she traveled there or to any other country, she used her U.S. passport. She
never relinquished her U.S. citizenship.
Applicant testified she would be willing to renounce her Salvadorian citizenship in
order to work on preferred projects with her employer. She has no intention to live in El
Salvador again. She does not believe a situation would arise where she would be under
pressure because she has no contact with the extended family and they are not involved
in any political or government associations. 
Applicant was candid and straightforward at the hearing. She explained that when
asked by the investigators if she could be put under duress, she does not recall replying
yes. She also does not foresee that happening for any reason. She did honestly state
that she would not know what to do if someone threatened her parents but she knows
her primary allegiance is to the U.S. (Tr. 33). 
I take administrative notice of the following facts about El Salvador. El Salvador is
a democratic republic governed by a president and an 84 member unicameral Legislative
Assembly.  The Salvadoran economy continues to benefit from a commitment to free
markets and careful fiscal management. U.S.-Salvadoran relations remain close and
strong. U.S. policy toward El Salvador seeks to promote the strengthening of El
Salvador’s democratic institutions and general growth. El Salvador has been a
Department Counsel conceded that this case is not about heightened risk due to the country of El4
Salvador. Nor is this a case about Applicant’s loyalty to the U.S. (Tr. 12).
4
committed member of the coalition of nations fighting against terrorism and has also
provided a battalion to the efforts to bring stability to Iraq.4
Policies
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”  Department of the Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to . .
. control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person
access to such information.”  Id. at 527.  The President has authorized the Secretary of
Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information
“only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.”  Exec.
Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as
amended and modified.  
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the
criteria contained in the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG).  These guidelines are not
inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these
guidelines are applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An
administrative judge’s over-arching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common
sense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information
about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable.
The government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with
access to classified information.  This relationship transcends normal duty hours and
endures throughout off-duty hours.  Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the
possible risk the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible
extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified
information.
Clearance decisions must be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no
sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”  See Exec. Or.
10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is not necessarily a
determination as to the loyalty of the applicant.  It is merely an indication the applicant
has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have
established for issuing a clearance
Initially, the government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the
personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from
being eligible for access to classified information.  The government has the burden of
establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR.  See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.”  See v.
5
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994).  The guidelines
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the
criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability.  See ISCR Case No. 95-0611
at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996).  
Once the government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial
evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the
facts.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it
is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.”
ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).  “[S]ecurity clearance
determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.”  Egan, 484 U.S. at 531;
see AG ¶ 2(b). 
Analysis
Guideline B (Foreign Influence)
The SOR alleges Applicant’s cousin and numerous other relatives are citizens
and residents of El Salvador. (SOR ¶ 1.a). It also alleges Applicant’s boyfriend is a
citizen and resident of El Salvador. (¶ 1.b).  Finally, it alleges Applicant traveled to El
Salvador in 1999, 2000 and 2002 (¶ 1.c).  The security concern relating to Guideline B is
set out in AG ¶ 6 as follows: 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
A disqualifying condition may be raised by “contact with a foreign family member,
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident
in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation,
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.”  AG ¶ 7(a).  A disqualifying condition
also may be raised by “connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country
that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect
sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person,
group, or country by providing that information.”  AG ¶ 7(b).  Finally, a security concern
may be raised if an applicant is “sharing living quarters with a person or persons,
regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion”  AG ¶ 7(d). Applicant’s extended family
6
lives in El Salvador. She did have a boyfriend in 1999-2003 who lived in El Salvador.
Based on this evidence, AG ¶¶ 7(a), (b), and (d) are raised.
Since the government produced evidence to raise the disqualifying conditions in
AG ¶¶ 7(a), (b), and (d), the burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence to rebut,
explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  An applicant has the
burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to
the government.  See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).  
Security concerns under this guideline can be mitigated by showing that “the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of
the U.S.”  AG ¶ 8(a).  The totality of an applicant’s family ties to a foreign country as well
as each individual family tie must be considered.  ISCR Case No. 01-22693 at 7 (App.
Bd. Sep. 22, 2003). Similarly, AG 8(c) “contact or communication with foreign citizens is
so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation.” Applicant has no contact with extended family members living
in El Salvador. She does not intend to communicate with them due to her differences in
opinion based on her 2002 visit. She no longer has a Salvadoran boyfriend. It has been
almost six years since her time spent in El Salvador. Thus, the above mitigating
conditions apply in this case.¶
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States.  “The United
States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information
from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it,
regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to those
of the United States.”  ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). 
Furthermore, friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United
States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security.
Finally, we know friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States,
especially in the economic, scientific, and technical fields.  See ISCR Case No. 00-0317,
2002 DOHA LEXIS 83 at **15-16 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002).  Nevertheless, the nature of
a nation’s government, its relationship with the U.S., and its human rights record are
relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are vulnerable to
government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater
if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family member is associated
with or dependent upon the government, or the country is known to conduct intelligence
operations against the U.S.
All members of Applicant’s immediate family are citizens and residents of the U.S.
Her cousins’ specific occupation is not reflected in the record, but none of her extended
family is connected to the Salvadoran government.
7
Security concerns under this guideline also can be mitigated by showing “there is
no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the
foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such
deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be
expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.”  AG ¶ 8(b).
Applicant’s testimony at the hearing showed her willingness to sever her ties to El
Salvador. As such, her testimony supported this mitigating condition. 
Guideline C (Foreign Preference)
The SOR alleges Applicant, born a U.S. citizen, pursued and became a citizen of
El Salvador in 2002 (¶ 2.a), she stands to inherit a home from her parents in El Salvador
(¶ 2.b), she admitted that it was possible that she could be put under duress if pressure
or threats were to be used against her extended family (¶ 2.c), and when questioned she
declined to state whether she would betray U.S. secrets in order to help her extended
family (¶ 2.d).  The concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 9 as follows: “When an
individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the
United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions
that are harmful to the interests of the United States.”  
Dual citizenship standing alone is not sufficient to warrant an adverse security
clearance decision.  ISCR Case No. 99-0454 at 5, 2000 WL 1805219 (App. Bd. Oct. 17,
2000).  Under Guideline C, “the issue is not whether an applicant is a dual national, but
rather whether an applicant shows a preference for a foreign country through actions.”
ISCR Case No. 98-0252 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep 15, 1999).
A disqualifying condition may arise from “exercise of any right, privilege or
obligation of foreign citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen,” including but not limited to
“possession of a current foreign passport.”  AG ¶ 10(a)(1). Applicant does not possess a
foreign passport, AG ¶ 10(a)(1) is not established because there is no evidence
Applicant has a “current foreign passport.” In fact she never had one.   
Nevertheless, the record established she took action to acquire or obtain
recognition of a foreign citizenship while she was an American citizen. Thus, the general
disqualifying condition under AG ¶ 10(b) is raised. 
Because the disqualifying condition under AG ¶ 10(b) is raised, the burden shifted
to Applicant to rebut, explain, mitigate, or extenuate the facts.  Several mitigating
conditions are potentially relevant.
Security concerns under this guideline may be mitigated by evidence that “dual
citizenship is based solely on parents’ citizenship or birth in a foreign country.”  AG ¶
11(a).  This mitigating condition is not fully established in this case.
Security concerns under this guideline also may be mitigated if “the individual has
expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship.”  AG ¶ 11(b).  Applicant has stated
8
numerous times, including at the hearing, that she is willing to renounce dual citizenship,
if it is a condition for obtaining a clearance. Her testimony was sincere and credible on
this issue.
Allegations in ¶¶ 2.c and 2.d relate to the statements that Applicant made to
investigators in 2006. The allegations concern her extended family. She has no contact
with them. She answered immediately at the hearing that she does not have any
affiliation or affection for them since her 2002 trip.  Her comments were very candid
concerning her parents and any possible threats to them. While a concern may exist
hypothetically, these allegations do not invoke any Disqualifying Conditions under
Foreign Preference. Moreover, the situation of threat is very unlikely to arise in regard to
Applicant and the country of El Salvador. Her statements could be a factor for
consideration under the whole-person analysis. She was more honest than most people
would be when she said she loves her parents and would not want anyone to threaten
them. For all these reasons, the above allegations are found in favor of Applicant.
Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) extent to which
participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and
other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8)
the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the
likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall common sense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept.  Some of the factors in
AG ¶ 2(a) were addressed above, but some warrant additional comment.
Applicant is a mature, well-educated, very intelligent adult.  She loves her family
and is proud of her culture and heritage. She is a U.S. citizen who received her
education in the U.S. and lived her entire life in the U.S. except for a period of time in
2002.  She believed she would pursue a romantic relationship and live in El Salvador.
Applicant’s conduct of potential concern under Guideline C resulted from choices made
while young and during a previous romantic relationship. For the past six years she has
lived and worked in the U.S., her home country. She does not intend to live in El
Salvador and has not visited since 2002. I do not believe she is a threat to the United
9
States, but rather an honest, hard-working young woman, who possibly made
uninformed decisions early in her life, which she will never repeat.
After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guidelines B and
C, and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude
Applicant has mitigated the security concerns based on foreign influence and foreign
preference. Accordingly, I conclude she has carried her burden of showing that it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant her eligibility for access to classified
information.
Formal Findings
I make the following formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set
forth in the SOR, as required by Directive ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3:
Paragraph 1, Foreign Influence: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a-1.c: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Foreign Preference: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a-1.d: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                              
_________________
Noreen A. Lynch
Administrative Judge