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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
------------------------ )       ISCR Case No. 06-09685
SSN: ---------------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Alison O’Connell, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
______________
Decision
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MATCHINSKI, Elizabeth M., Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted his security clearance application (e-QIP) on November 21,
2005. On September 17, 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
issued to Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the security concerns
under Guidelines E and M. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865,
Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended;
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the revised
adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and
effective within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant responded to the SOR in writing on October 11, 2007, and requested a
decision based on the record without a hearing. On October 29, 2007, previously
assigned Department Counsel requested a hearing. The government was prepared to
proceed on December 7, 2007, and the case was assigned to me on December 20,
2007. On January 17, 2008, I scheduled a hearing for February 28, 2008. 
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The hearing was convened as scheduled. Two government exhibits (Ex. 1-2) and
two Applicant exhibits (Ex. A-B) were admitted without any objections and Applicant
testified, as reflected in a transcript (Tr.) received on March 10, 2008. At Applicant’s
request, the record was held open until March 13, 2008, for him to submit work
performance evaluations and awards. On March 11, 2008, Applicant timely forwarded
five documents. The government did not object to their admission, and they were
received as Exhibits C through G. For the reasons discussed below, eligibility for access
to classified information is denied.
Findings of Fact
DOHA alleged under Guideline E, personal conduct, that Applicant misused a
government computer and system in April 2005 by posting sexually explicit material
onto a server at work from a personal portable drive (SOR ¶ 1.a); that he misused the
government computer by maintaining sexually explicit material on his government-
owned work computer in April 2005 (SOR ¶ 1.b); that during an investigation into the
posting of inappropriate adult material on the server he initially denied any involvement
(SOR ¶ 1.c) and that he had saved the adult material on his work computer (SOR ¶
1.d); and that he was terminated from his job because of his violations of company
policies on the use of government equipment and his attempts to conceal facts during
the company’s investigation (SOR ¶ 1.e). The misuse of the government computer
system by posting sexually explicit material on the server and by maintaining sexually
explicit materials on his work station were also alleged under Guideline M, use of
information technology systems (SOR ¶ 2.a).
Applicant provided a detailed answer indicating that he had inadvertently posted
the sexually explicit material on his work computer. Working long hours at home,
Applicant indicated he had transported non-sensitive files using his personal memory
disks and that he unintentionally grabbed the folder containing sexually explicit material
along with his work folder and copied both onto the portable media. While loading the
work files onto the system, he also grabbed the folder with the sexually explicit material.
As for maintaining sexually explicit material on his work computer, Applicant explained
that the loading of files was accidental. Applicant admitted that during the company’s
investigation, he had initially denied he had loaded any adult material on the server,
although after seeing the files he knew they were his but “still had no idea how they got
there.” Applicant admitted that inappropriate files had apparently been on his hard drive
since he used his computer as an intermediary in moving from the media to the server,
but he denied any awareness prior to the investigation. Applicant acknowledged his
employment termination for a mistake that cost him and his family dearly. He indicated
he was now “overly conservative” and never commingles files nor uses portable media.
After consideration of the evidence of record, I make the following findings of fact:
Applicant is a 51-year-old senior systems engineer who has worked for his
current employer, a defense contractor, since October 2005 (Ex. 1). He seeks a secret-
level clearance for his duties in systems architecture and design, involving a military
destroyer program (Tr. 19, 38, 43-44). 
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In May 1980, Applicant was awarded his bachelor of science degree in general
engineering from a U.S. military academy (Ex. 1, Tr. 41-42). The following month, he
married his first wife (Ex. 1). He served on active duty with a secret-level security
clearance until May 1985 when he was discharged at the rank of captain (Ex. 1, Tr. 42).
In about 1992, Applicant went to work at a national laboratory for a company
hired to oversee the contractors maintaining and operating the site for the U.S.
government. Applicant stayed on at the facility under the employ of a succession of
contractors that maintained the facility over the years.  (Ex. 1, Tr. 44-45).
In June 1997, Applicant and his first wife divorced (Ex. 1). She had left him with
their three children to raise on his own. His son was born in August 1988 and his two
daughters were born in September 1990 and November 1993 (Ex. 1, Tr. 32, 42-43). In
August 1997, Applicant married his second wife, but they divorced in September 2002.
In July 2004, Applicant wed his current spouse, and his household expanded to include
her four biological children. In December 2004, Applicant legally adopted her youngest,
a boy born in November 1998 (Ex. 1, Tr. 43).
Applicant was happy in his new marriage, which included some sexual
experimentation, taking pictures of themselves performing sexual acts, watching X-rated
movies, and viewing sexually explicit material on their computer together (Tr. 32, 61, 71-
72). So that his children were not exposed to this pornographic material, Applicant kept
the sexually explicit images on personal portable media (a computer jazz drive) (Tr. 28-
30, 51, 71). He testified most of the files were given a generic identifier, “like AA, A1"
(Tr. 54). Applicant promised his spouse that he would not view any pornographic
material by himself, but he intermittently viewed sexual images from his jazz drive on his
desktop at work (Tr. 58-59). Applicant denies ever viewing pornographic websites at
work (Tr. 58). He was unaware at that time that files accessed by the computer were
cached (Tr. 28), but he knew it was against company policy to view pornographic
material on his work computer (Tr. 60).
The information resources used by employees of the cleanup project were
government property. Information resources included all government-owned or
government-funded data communication equipment and services, located on or off site,
including but not limited to personal computers, laptop computers, workstations,
networking services, mainframes, associated peripherals and software, and government
provided access to electronic mail, the intranet, and the Internet. Under section 1 of the
employee handbook applicable to those on the cleanup project, government or
company equipment was to be used for official business only. Employees were
specifically advised in the handbook that the use of government equipment or services
to intentionally access, download, or otherwise transmit any sexually explicit material
would not be tolerated and would result in discipline up to and including discharge (Ex.
2).
As of April 2005, Applicant was involved in the clean up project at the laboratory
where he oversaw and supported the lead on the chemical management system. With a
Applicant testified that the material went straight from the portable drive onto the server and that nothing from1
the portable drive should have remained on his desktop’s hard drive (Tr. 52). 
The inappropriate material did not include any child pornography (Ex. 2).2
This statement was not included in the evidentiary record available for review.3
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new contractor taking over in May 2005, Applicant had been looking at various
commercial systems to manage and report the laboratory’s hazardous and radiological
waste, as the home-grown system had become very expensive to maintain (Tr. 47).
Applicant put in long hours at work and home evaluating a commercial software system
and the laboratory’s requirements (Tr. 70). Applicant transported the information to work
on at home via his personal jazz drive that also contained sexually explicit images. He
kept the information segregated in different folders (Tr. 50).
On April 20, 2005, Applicant inadvertently posted a folder containing about 50
images and videos of a sexually explicit nature, including images (“four or five, or a
dozen”) of him and his spouse performing sex acts, onto the server at work (Tr. 60-61).
While uploading onto the server the data he had worked on at home the night before,
Applicant grabbed from his jazz drive not only the folder containing the work data, but
also a folder on which he had stored sexual images and videos (“if you touch another
folder that you didn’t mean to, and if you don’t notice that you did and you just grab and
drag and drop it. . . .”) (Ex. 2, Tr. 30-31, 50-51).  On April 26, 2006, another employee1
on the cleanup project found the inappropriate adult material on the laboratory’s server,2
and reported it. During an investigation, Applicant was linked with ownership of the
folder through his user id and records showing that his office computer was logged onto
the server when the folder was uploaded. Firewall logs for Applicant’s work computer for
2005 to date did not show any access to obvious adult sites (Ex. 2).
Applicant was interviewed by the investigator on April 28, 2005. He was told up-
front that the investigation concerned the posting of inappropriate adult material to a lab
server and that if he was involved in that activity, he should tell him so. Applicant denied
any involvement or any knowledge of it. After he was shown the titles of the material
posted to the server, Applicant acknowledged that it was material from his home
personal computer (“He showed them to me and I said I couldn’t have done that, I keep
them you know, I keep them all separate, and maybe, I had never saved them on my
hard drive at work or anything else, so I was just in total shock. . . .” Tr. 53). Applicant
surmised he brought it in by mistake with material he had taken home to work on, and
denied he had purposely posted the files to the server. The investigator expressed his
belief that Applicant had meant to save the sexual material on his work computer.
Applicant responded that he would not save it to his personal computer as he did not
view that type of material at work (“I don’t know if it’s more disbelief or I can’t really tell
you the emotional state at that point, but, no, I was not forthright at the interview. . . .”
Tr. 73). After Applicant provided a written statement,  the investigator checked3
Applicant’s work computer in his presence. The investigator found 129 adult images in a
temporary folder that had been created on April 20, 2005, about 15 minutes before the
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sexually explicit images appeared on the server. Twenty-eight MPEG files were found in
a recent folder. The investigator determined the MPEG files had been viewed on the
computer using Windows Media Player but were not presently on the computer. The
titles of the files in the two folders on Applicant’s work computer were then compared to
the titles in the folder loaded on the server. Only two of the 129 JPEG files matched the
names of JPEG images on the server, but one was not the same image and the other
couldn’t be viewed. There were some title matches in the other folder. Applicant was
involuntarily terminated from his employment on May 9, 2005, for misuse of a
government computer and system and attempt to conceal facts during the company’s
investigation, in violation of company policies (Ex. 2, Tr. 61).
Applicant was unemployed for a few months as he was unable to find another job
in a close-knit town in which there were few opportunities outside of farming or the
services industry that supported the national laboratory site. In October 2005, he began
working for his present employer. Applicant regrets that he had to move his children
across the country away from the only home and the friends they had known (Tr. 33,
63).
On November 21, 2005, Applicant completed an e-QIP in application for a secret-
level security clearance. Applicant disclosed his termination from his previous
employment in May 2005, for copying what he thought were work-related files onto the
server but “[o]n that disk was some files of a personnal [sic] nature, including files that
were pornographic.” He explained that he did not realize what he had done until he was
interviewed by an investigator, and that during the interview he was not as open as he
should have been, mainly because of the embarrassment to him and his spouse.
Applicant that he and his spouse no longer take any pictures of themselves, and regrets
not being as forthright as he should have been (Ex. 1).
All but the youngest of Applicant’s children are aware of the reason for his firing,
although they don’t know all the details (Tr. 34). Applicant has not told his present
employer that he had been terminated from his previous job, although he maintains he
would divulge it if he had to (Tr. 64). During the hiring process, he told his employer he
needed a new job (“if you are seeking employment, you don’t say, of, and by the way,
you know, so no, unless you don’t want the job”) (Tr. 65).
Applicant no longer uses any portable media. His computer is located in a public
area of the house (Tr. 34, 65). He also made an effort to educate himself about
business ethics and computer systems in general (Tr. 34, 68). He has read his current
employer’s policies concerning information security, including business ethics,
acceptable uses of the Internet, authorized limited personal use of company assets,
corporate security, and control of company sensitive information (Ex. A). He also
completed training offered by his employer, including introductory business ethics on
December 15, 2005, code of conduct on September 28, 2006, ethical awareness and
decision making on March 29, 2007, and information security awareness on May 31,
2007 (Ex. B).
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Applicant’s work performance over the past two years has been recognized by
his employer (Ex. C, Ex. D, Ex. E, Ex. F, Ex. G). Once in 2006 and twice in 2007, he
was given individual performer achievement awards for outstanding efforts on the
proposals involving the military destroyer program (Ex. C, Ex. D, Ex. G). 
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common sense decision. According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on
the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security
decision.
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The government
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk
the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation
as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
 
Applicant indicated on his e-QIP that his supervisor was well aware that he was taking work home (Ex. 1),4
but this does not mean that his supervisor knew he was using a portable jazz drive that also contained
pornographic images.
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Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).
Analysis
Guideline E—Personal Conduct
The security concern related to the guideline for personal conduct is set out in
AG ¶ 15:
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect
classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful
and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.
Applicant exercised extremely poor judgment by viewing pornographic images on
a government-owned computer at work intermittently in 2005 (SOR ¶ 1.b). Unaware that
the images were cached in the computer’s memory, Applicant yet knew it was a misuse
of a government information resource and against company policy to view sexually
explicit images on his work computer.
In April 2005, he also uploaded sexually explicit images from his personal jazz
drive onto a server at work (SOR ¶ 1.a). This was also a misuse of a government
information system. It is not clear whether he was authorized to process work using his
personal jazz drive.  Under section 1 of the employee handbook, bringing or using4
unauthorized personal computer hardware and/or software to work could subject an
employee to suspension (see Ex. 2), but his use of a jazz drive containing sexually
inappropriate material in a government system was clearly against company policy.
During the government investigation, 129 adult images were found in a temporary file
on Applicant’s workstation computer. However, Applicant credibly testified he did not
knowingly post the sexual images onto the server:
He had asked did you put pornographic files on the server and I was like
no, I didn’t. I mean something like that, intentionally doing, you know, no, I
just, no, I would never do that, that would be, you know, first of all, that
would be stupid because I would know that, pardon the expression, it
wouldn’t be very smart because I know other people have access, that’s
our server that our team uses every single day to push information back
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and forth, so it would be immediately visible to anybody and everyone
within that group (Tr. 73).
Some of the sexually explicit images were of Applicant and his spouse, and he is
unlikely to have knowingly transferred images that could possibly be recognized by a
coworker. Since he did not realize that he had loaded the inappropriate adult images on
the server until he was shown the titles of the material posted to the server, I find
Applicant also did not intentionally fail to disclose to the investigator that the material
was from his personal portable drive and that he had posted it onto the server. Yet,
Applicant lied when he then indicated to the investigator that he had not viewed
pornography on his work computer. Disqualifying condition AG ¶ 16(b) (“deliberately
providing false or misleading information concerning relevant facts to an employer,
investigator, security official, competent medical authority, or other official government
representative”) applies because of that falsification.
Applicant’s use of his work computer to view pornography led to inappropriate
adult images being maintained on the computer. His repeated rule violations involved
significant misuse of government resources. Although this conduct raises judgment
concerns of the type contemplated under AG ¶¶ 16(d)(3) (“a pattern of dishonesty or
rule violations”) and 16(d)(4) (“evidence of significant misuse of Government or other’
employer’s time or resources”), ¶ 16(d) does not apply since the misuse of a
government information system is explicitly covered under ¶ 39, infra.
Personal conduct concerns may also be raised where there is evidence of
“concealment of information about one’s conduct, that creates a vulnerability to
exploitation, manipulation, or duress, such as (1) engaging in activities which, if known,
may affect the person’s personal, professional, or community standing.” (AG ¶ 16(e)).
Applicant maintains, with no evidence to the contrary, that his spouse and all but the
youngest of his children are aware to some degree of the circumstances leading to his
termination from his previous employer. However, he has not volunteered to his current
employer that he was fired from his previous position. While it is understandable that he
would not want to divulge the basis for his employment termination, it raises a risk of
vulnerability, so AG ¶ 16(e) applies.
His failure to be up-front about his knowing misuse of the government-owned
information system is not mitigated under AG ¶ 17(a), which requires that the effort at
rectification be prompt, in good faith, and before confrontation (“the individual made
prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification before
being confronted with the facts”).  The company investigator learned that Applicant had
viewed inappropriate adult images on his work computer by use of an investigative
search tool on the computer itself and not from Applicant. More than two years have
passed since Applicant’s misuse of his work computer was discovered, but his knowing
disregard of his company’s policies prohibiting unauthorized use of a government-
owned asset, and his breach of his obligation to his employer to cooperate with the
investigation, cannot reasonably be characterized as minor offenses mitigated under ¶
17(c) (“the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so
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infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur
and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good
judgment”). 
Applicant has acknowledged that he made bad judgments (“I was maybe in
middle age crisis or whatever, but it happened”), including that he violated the trust of
his spouse by viewing the sexual images at work (Tr. 32-33). Applicant made changes
to prevent recurrence of his misuse of a computer by putting his personal computer in
the open and educating himself about his ethical responsibilities to his current employer.
Concerning his falsification, he disclosed on his e-QIP that he had been fired in May
2005 for inadvertently copying files of a personal nature, “including files that were
considered pornographic,” onto the server at work, and that he had not been as open as
he should have been during the investigation. He expressed regret at not being as
forthright as he should have been. However, AG ¶ 17(d) (“the individual has
acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the behavior or taken
other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused
untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely
to recur”) applies only in part. 
As persuasively argued by the government, Applicant has not adequately
explained what led him to view sexual images at work in the first place. He has not
obtained any counseling, so it is not clear whether the factors that led to the behavior
are not going to recur. More troubling is Applicant’s characterization of his conduct as “a
single issue” and as “a one time mistake.” (See Answer). While the loading of the
improper adult material on the server occurred one time and was unintentional, he
viewed sexual images on his work computer intermittently. In response to SOR ¶ 1.b,
Applicant indicated, “I never intentionally misused the computer and loading the files
was an accident.” Applicant did not realize that previously viewed images remained
automatically cached on his workstation computer, but it is not accurate for him to
maintain that he never intentionally misused the computer since he knew he had viewed
sexual images off his jazz drive at work on the government-owned computer monitor.
The ethics courses Applicant took at work have yet to impress upon him the obligation
of full candor.
Furthermore, AG ¶ 17(e) (“the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or
eliminate vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress”) applies only in part.
Although Applicant claims he would divulge the circumstances surrounding his
termination if he had to, and his spouse would support him in that regard, his employer
is still unaware that he left his previous job under unfavorable circumstances. It is not
clear whether the security office at work viewed his completed e-QIP before or after he
submitted it, which would have gone a long way towards eliminating the vulnerability
concerns raised by his concealment of his job firing from his present employer.
Applicant was asked how many times he had brought the jazz drive containing sexually explicit images to5
work and he testified, “A lot” (Tr. 71), all after his marriage to his current wife.
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Guideline M—Use of Information Technology Systems
The security concern related to the guideline for use of information technology
systems is set out in ¶ 39:
Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations pertaining
to information technology systems may raise security concerns about an
individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, calling into question the
willingness or ability to properly protect sensitive systems, networks, and
information. Information Technology Systems include all related computer
hardware, software, firmware, and data used for the communication,
transmission, processing, manipulation, storage, or protection of
information.
As discussed under Guideline E, supra, Applicant violated his employer’s polices
concerning authorized use of a government-owned information resource asset when he
improperly and repeatedly viewed adult images using his work computer in 2005 if not
before,  and on that occasion in April 2005 when he inadvertently, but negligently5
loaded sexually explicit images onto a national laboratory’s server. AG ¶ 40(e)
(“unauthorized use of a government or other information technology system”) and ¶
40(f) (“introduction, removal, or duplication of hardware, firmware, software, or media to
or from any information technology system without authorization, when prohibited by
rules, procedures, guidelines, or regulations”) apply.
There is no evidence of any misuse of a work computer by Applicant since he
started with his present employer in October 2005. Yet, Applicant has not shown that
“so much time has elapsed since the behavior happened, or it happened under unusual
circumstances, such that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the
individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment.” (AG ¶ 41(a)). His knowing
disregard of policies prohibiting unauthorized use continues to cast doubt about his
personal judgment, notwithstanding the passage of almost three years since his
conduct was discovered in April 2005. He made no showing that his viewing of sexually
explicit images was unusual, even at work.
In the absence of any evidence that Applicant’s posting of sexually explicit
images on the server was other than an isolated mistake, mitigating condition AG ¶
41(c) (“the conduct was unintentional or inadvertent and was followed by a prompt,
good-faith effort to correct the situation and by notification of supervisor”) applies, but
only in part. Once he was informed of the titles of the sexually explicit material on the
server, Applicant acknowledged it was his and that he must have loaded it by mistake.
Not all of the JPEG/MPEG files on his computer matched those loaded onto the server,
and his viewing/maintaining sexually explicit material on the computer is not mitigated
under AG ¶ 41(c). As discussed supra, the steps Applicant has taken to preclude a
Applicant’s employment termination does not represent additional misconduct, but is merely the6
consequences of his knowing violation of company policies and his effort to cover it up.
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recurrence do not completely mitigate this knowing and repeated disregard of company
policy concerning the use of a government-owned information resource.
I have evaluated Applicant’s conduct under the whole person concept, applying
the conclusions set forth previously in this analysis. Applicant’s work performance for
his current employer has been outstanding. Yet, while he claims he learned a “hard
lesson” and paid a high price for his mistakes, including his failure to be “fully straight
out” with the government investigator (Tr. 39-40), I am unable to conclude under the
totality of the facts and circumstances that it is clearly consistent with the national
interest to grant him a security clearance. He has not been fully forthcoming with his
employer about his firing from his previous job, or with the Department of Defense about
the extent of his misuse of the work computer when he answered the SOR. Even at his
hearing, he was reluctant to take responsibility for misuse of the computer to view the
pornography on his personal portable drive. A “mid-life crisis” does not adequately
explain what led him to violate his employer’s policies concerning the use of the work
computer.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: Against Applicant6
Paragraph 2, Guideline M: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
________________________
ELIZABETH M. MATCHINSKI
Administrative Judge