DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 07-02637 
 SSN: ) 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: John B. Glendon, Esquire, Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro Se 
      Mary Lou Taylor, Personal Representative 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
CREAN, Thomas M., Administrative Judge: 
 
Applicant submitted her Security Clearance Application on January 17, 2006.  On 
November 8, 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a 
Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns for Applicant under Guideline 
B, Foreign Influence, and Guideline C, Foreign Preference.  The action was taken under 
Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 
20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial 
Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended 
(Directive), and the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President 
on December 29, 2005, and effective within the Department of Defense for SORs 
issued after September 1, 2006.  
  
 Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on November 15, 2007. She 
answered the SOR in writing on December 17, 2007, admitting the factual allegations 
with explanation except for the allegation that she is a dual citizen of both the United 
States and Iran.  She denied the admitted facts created a security concern.  She 
requested a hearing before an administrative judge.  Department counsel was prepared 
 
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to proceed on January 31, 2008.  The case was assigned to another administrative 
judge on February 1, 2008, and reassigned to me on March 20, 2008.  DOHA had 
issued a notice of hearing on February 26, 2008, for a hearing on March 25, 2008.  I 
convened the hearing as scheduled on March 25, 2008.  The government offered five 
exhibits, marked government exhibits (Gov. Ex.) 1 through 5, which were received 
without objection.  Applicant submitted 11 exhibits, marked Applicant Exhibits (App. Ex.) 
A through K, which were received without objection.  Applicant and nine other witnesses 
testified on Applicant’s behalf.  DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on 
April 2, 2008.  Based upon a review of the case file, pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, 
eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings 
 
Request for Administrative Notice 
 
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice 
of certain facts relating to Iran. (Tr. 23-26, Court Exhibit I)  The request and the attached 
supporting documents were not admitted into evidence but were included in the record 
as Court Exhibits.  Applicant had no objection to the request for administrative notice or 
the attached documents.  The facts administratively noticed are set out in the Findings 
of Fact, below.  
 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 After a thorough review of the pleadings, transcript, and exhibits, I make the 
following essential findings of fact.  Applicant admitted all the factual allegations in the 
SOR, except the allegation pertaining to dual citizenship with Iran and the United 
States, with explanation. She also provided additional information to support her request 
for eligibility for a security clearance.   
 
Applicant is 47 years old and an aerospace and systems engineer for a defense 
contractor.  Applicant was born in Iran and received her elementary education in Iran.  
She received her high school education in Switzerland.  She then attended school in 
Great Britain for one year before coming to the United States on a student visa in 1979.  
She received her bachelor’s degree in aerospace engineering from a United States 
university in 1984.  She received a Master’s degree in systems engineering from a 
United States university in 2000.  Applicant became a United States citizen in 1991. (Tr. 
91-93; Gov Ex 1, Security Clearance Application, e-QIP, dated January 17, 2006)   
 
Applicant is presently single but has been married twice.  She married a United 
States citizen in 1984 shortly after receiving her bachelor’s degree.  Shortly after her 
marriage, she applied for and received her permanent resident status in the United 
States.  She was divorced in 1987.  She married another United States citizen in 1989, 
and that marriage was dissolved by divorce in 1997.  She has lived continuously in the 
 
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United States since her arrival in 1979. (Tr. 93-97; Gov Ex 1, Security Clearance 
Application, E-QIP, dated January 17, 2006)   
 
Applicant has worked for her present defense contractor employer since 1999.  
Prior to that, she worked for other defense contractors.  She applied for a security 
clearance in 1992 and it was granted in 1993.  She has continuously held a security 
clearance since it was first granted in 1993.  She has received periodic investigations 
and reviews since the initial grant of a security clearance.  She presently has a security 
clearance. (Tr. 39, 96-97) 
 
Applicant’s father was a wealthy business man in Iran before the overthrow of the 
Shah in 1979.  He was the owner and managing partner with his brothers of the 
American car dealership in Iran.  At the time of the overthrow of the Shah, her father 
was in France.  He never returned to Iran after the overthrow and lived in France until 
he died in 1988.  Her father and mother divorced in 1980 but remained amicable.  There 
is no indication that her mother remarried.  Her father’s business was confiscated and 
sold but he never received any proceeds from the sale of the dealership.  While he was 
a business man, he did not have any arrangements or contacts with the Shah or the 
government. (Tr. 98-101) 
 
Applicant’s mother is 78 years old and a resident and citizen of Iran.  She also is 
a permanent resident (green card) of the United States.  Applicant visits her mother in 
Iran frequently.  Applicant visited her mother in Iran in May and June 1997, October and 
November 2000, December 2003 to January 2004, and March 2005. Her last visit to 
Iran was in early 2007 to see her mother.  Applicant and her mother are trying to 
arrange their next visit at a neutral site since both she and her mother are concerned 
about Applicant coming to Iran.  She and her mother agree it is too difficult and 
dangerous for Applicant to travel to Iran.  Applicant’s mother also visited her in the 
United States.  She visited numerous times since 1996 and her last visit was in 
September 2002.  Applicant’s mother has not traveled to see her since 2002 because of 
the physical difficulties in traveling, her advanced age, and her deteriorating health. (Tr. 
107-109, 117-121) 
 
Applicant also talks to her mother at least weekly by telephone.  She has tried to 
get her mother to move to the United States and live with her.  Applicant purchased a 
house so her mother could live with her.  Her mother did come to the United States for a 
time and tried to live here.  However, the lifestyle was different and her mother did not 
like it and returned to Iran.  Applicant considers her relationship with her mother as a 
close mother-daughter relationship.  When her mother passes away, she will be buried 
in Iran.  Applicant fully intends to travel to Iran for her burial.  Her mother does not know 
she has a security clearance, that she works for a defense contractor, or her type of 
work.  Her mother knows only that she is an engineer for a good company. (Tr. 124-
126, 138, 146-147) 
 
Her father owned property in Iran prior to the 1979 revolution.  He owned 
condominiums in Tehran which he purchased in the name of Applicant and her brother 
 
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when they were about six years old.  Her mother lives in one of the condominiums.  Her 
father also owned two condominiums near the Caspian Sea which her mother still uses.  
Applicant tried to turn over her rights to the condominium to her mother in 1994.  
However, her mother was unable to make the transfer because of the legal and political 
situation in Iran.  Applicant executed a power of attorney to her mother permitting her to 
do anything with the properties that she thinks is appropriate. (Tr. 107-108)  Applicant 
and her brother inherited her father’s house in France which they sold and split the 
proceeds. (Tr. 102-106) 
 
Applicant does not expect to receive any proceeds from the sale of the properties 
in Iran.  Applicant’s father died without a will.  By Iranian law, her brother gets two-thirds 
of the estate and she gets one third.  She does not believe the properties will be sold 
because the family has been unable to sell them for many years.  She believes they will 
remain unused after her mother passes away.  Her father also owned undeveloped land 
in Tehran and Tabriz with his brothers.  Applicant is unsure of the ownership and value 
of the properties.  However, she has turned over her rights to the properties by power of 
attorney to her mother. (Tr. 110-112, 145-146) 
 
Applicant has a full brother and two half brothers through her mother.  Her full 
brother is a citizen and resident of the United Kingdom but also has a United States 
permanent resident certificate.  One half-brother is a resident and citizen of the United 
Kingdom.  Her other half brother is a citizen of France but resides in the United States 
as a permanent resident. (Tr. 112-113) 
 
Applicant has an uncle from her paternal side of the family that is a resident and 
citizen of Iran.  Her father’s other brothers are deceased. Applicant has an aunt from her 
maternal side of the family that is also a resident and citizen of Iran.  She also has some 
cousins who are citizens and residents of Iran.  The last time she saw any of these 
relatives was in early 2007 for the Persian New Year when she visited her aunt and 
uncle in Iran.  Her relationship with her aunt and uncle are cordial.  She has had no 
contact with them since early 2007.  She also has two maternal aunts who are residents 
and citizens of the United States. (Tr. 114-116, 1124-126) 
 
Applicant has, in addition to her United States passport, a current Iranian 
passport.  She obtained her first United States passport in 1991 shortly after becoming 
a citizen.  She renewed her original Iranian passport in 1993 or 1994 following the 
guidance from the United States State Department to travel to Iran on an Iranian 
passport and not a United States passport.  She last renewed her Iranian passport in 
2007.  She turned her Iranian passport to her employer’s facility security officer. 
(Applicant Exhibit B, FSO Letter, dated February 26, 2008)  She is trying to make some 
arrangement to use the Iranian passport if needed to travel to Iran to see her mother.  
She believes if she asks for the passport back to use for travel to Iran she will lose her 
security clearance. (Tr. 121-124) 
 
On one of her trips to Iran in 1979, Applicant was questioned by Iranian 
authorities at the airport.  The authorities knew she was a United States citizen and 
 
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asked her to wait with other United States citizens of Iranian ancestry.  They copied her 
United States passport and let her enter the country.  She has not had any other 
incidents entering or leaving Iran.  Her mother is careful about Applicant coming to Iran.  
She will not let Applicant visit if the political situation is not right.  Applicant is mindful of 
all of the State Department travel warnings and follows them. (Tr. 129-137)  Applicant is 
not aware of any procedure recognized by Iran to renounce Iranian citizenship.  Her 
Iranian passport does have a stamp from Iran indicating that she is a United States 
citizen.  She would renounce her Iranian citizenship if she could and if it would not 
cause harm to her mother.  She maintained an Iranian passport because of the State 
Department guidance that such a passport is needed to enter or exit Iran.  She felt that 
her possession of the passport was keeping with the State Department guidance. She 
has no reason to visit Iran except to see her mother. (Tr. 139-142, See, Gov Exs 2 and 
3, Interrogatories, dated July 12, 2007, and August 16, 2007). 
 
Applicant presented a number of witnesses to testify to her reliability and 
trustworthiness.  A long term friend who is an Army employee testified that she has 
known Applicant for over 20 years and they have a close relationship.  She considers 
Applicant to be a loyal United States citizen who is proud of her citizenship.  When 
Applicant became a citizen, she had a party for her. (Tr. 43-47) 
 
A retired Navy officer testified he has known Applicant for over 10 years.  She is 
a close friend of his family and they spend time together.  He considers her a loyal 
United States citizen who is dedicated and devoted to the United States.  He believes 
her trustworthiness and character are beyond reproach.  She is energized to be a 
United States citizen. (Tr. 47-53)  
 
A senior supervisor for Applicant’s employer testified he hired her in the early 
1990s and worked with her directly for a number of years.  They have also worked 
together on professional committees.  Her work performance was excellent and she 
was a good conscientious employee.  Applicant was always professional and 
trustworthy in her personal and professional dealings.  She always spoke highly of the 
United States.  He has held a security clearance for over 30 years and has 
recommended others for access to classified information.  He would fully recommend 
Applicant for access to classified information.  In fact, he had recommended her for her 
first security clearance. (Tr. 53-58) 
 
A retired Navy officer and former ship commander testified who has worked as a 
colleague with Applicant for over six years in support of Navy contracts.  He considers 
Applicant’s work to be very professional and she cares about her work product in 
support of the Navy.  He considers Applicant caring and eager to work in support of the 
United States Navy.  He considers Applicant trustworthy, open, honest, and above-
board.  He discussed with Applicant her trips to Iran to see her mother and Applicant 
was very open with her discussions. (Tr. 60-65) 
 
Another retired Navy officer who commanded three ships has worked with 
Applicant for over eight years in support of Navy shipbuilding contracts.  He found 
 
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Applicant to be one of the top ten employees working on his projects.  Applicant was 
one of the most trustworthy and reliable people who could solve problems.  He 
discussed with her issues about the concern she had for her mother and found her to be 
proud of her role as a daughter.  She was also proud of her service and work.  Applicant 
has earned the trust of everyone at work. (Tr. 65-71) 
 
Another witness testified that he has a background in engineering and national 
defense industry but presently works for a congressional intelligence committee.  He 
considers Applicant to be the model immigrant who came to the United States and 
immersed herself into the culture.  He considers Applicant to be a caring and 
trustworthy person.  (Tr. 72-77) 
 
Another witness testified that he worked with Applicant as a defense contractor.  
He considers Applicant to be a trustworthy person of excellent character. (Tr. 77-81) 
 
A personal friend testified she has known Applicant for over 12 years and 
considers Applicant to be a wonderful patriotic American citizen who fully participates in 
patriotic events.  She considers Applicant to be trustworthy.  She traveled out of the 
country with Applicant and observed her conduct to be appropriate and above board. (T. 
81-86) 
 
A Navy reserve officer testified that he has known and worked with Applicant for 
over 12 years.  He views Applicant as a fine outstanding citizen.  Applicant is 
trustworthy who is a valuable asset to Navy contracts. (Tr. 86-90) 
 
Applicant presented six letters of recommendation.  The letters were from 
supervisors and co-workers.  They include retired Navy officers and an astronaut.  All of 
these letters attested to Applicants excellent work performance.  They all noted that she 
is a proud and valued United States citizen.  They considered her trustworthy and 
reliable.  (Applicant Exhibits C, D, E, F, G, and K, Letters dated March 4, March 10, 
March 17, March 18, and March 21, 2008) 
 
Iran is a country that has been hostile to the United States since the 1979 
revolution that overthrew the former pro-western government.  Iran’s support for terrorist 
groups has long concerned the United States.  Iran’s human rights practices are also a 
concern for the United States.  The Iranian theocratic government has repressed its 
people, pursued weapons of mass destruction, initiated a nuclear program that may 
include nuclear weapons, and continues to support terrorism in Iraq and around the 
world.  Iran is known to conduct intelligence operations and economic espionage 
against the United States.  There is no direct evidence in the record concerning Iranian 
espionage activity towards or within the United States, but this hostile relationship 
supports the inference that Iran would seek to damage or counter United States military 
capabilities by seeking to obtain classified or sensitive information when possible.  The 
United States Department of State warns United States citizens, particularly United 
States citizens of Iranian origin, to consider carefully the risks of travel to Iran.  Iran 
does not recognize renunciation of citizenship by those born there, and has detained 
 
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and harassed naturalized United States citizens traveling there.  Applicant and her 
mother are aware of the dangerous nature of the regime and intentionally minimize her 
trips to Iran.  The continued support for terrorism and human rights violations 
contributed to President Bush’s strong criticism of Iran in his 2002 State of the Union 
message and his designation of Iran as one of the “Axis of Evil.”  Iran is a nation whose 
interests are inimical to the United States.  
 
Policies 
 
 When evaluating an Applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
Administrative Judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition 
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list 
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in 
evaluating an Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The Administrative Judge’s over-arching 
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common sense decision. According to AG ¶ 
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as 
the “whole person concept.” The Administrative Judge must consider all available, 
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in 
making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on 
the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences 
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. 
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security 
decision.  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or 
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally 
 
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permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
  
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of 
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information).   
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline B: Foreign Influence 
 
 There is a security concern because foreign contacts and interests may be a 
security concern if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may 
be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government 
in a way that is not in the U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any 
foreign interests.  Adjudication under this guideline can and should consider the identity 
of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is location, 
including but not limited to, such consideration as whether the foreign country is known 
to target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with 
a risk of terrorism. (AG ¶ 6) 
 
 Applicant has frequent and close contact with her mother who is a citizen and 
resident of Iran.  She visited her mother a number of times in Iran and her mother visits 
Applicant in the United States.  Applicant’s last trip to Iran to see her mother was about 
a year ago.  This type of contact raises security concerns under Foreign Influence 
Disqualifying Conditions (FI DC) AG ¶ 79(a) (Contact with a foreign family member, 
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident 
in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, 
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion); and FI DC AG ¶ 7(b) (Connections to 
a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of 
interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology 
and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that 
information).  The mere existence of a foreign family member is not sufficient.  The 
nature of Applicant’s contact with the family member must be examined to determine 
whether it creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, 
pressure, or coercion.  “Heightened” is a relative term denoting increased risk over 
some normally existing risk that can be said to be inherent anytime a family member 
lives subject to a foreign government.  One factor that heightens the risk in Applicant’s 
case is the nature of the Iranian government and its hostility towards the United States. 
 
 Applicant also has some property interests in Iran that she inherited from her 
father and holds with her mother and brother.  These property interests raise FI DC AG 
¶ 7(e) (A substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign country, or in 
any foreign-owned or foreign operated business, which could subject the individual to 
heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation).  I do not find that Applicant being 
 
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detained for a short time by Iranian authorities in 1997 was a security concern.  
Applicant was not singled out for attention but was retained for a short time with other 
United States citizens of Iranian birth for their passports to be copied.  This was a 
routine action by Iranian authorities. 
 
 I have considered Foreign Influence Mitigating Conditions (FI MC) AG ¶ 8(a) (the 
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are 
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is 
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the 
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interest of 
the U.S.); FI MC AG ¶ 8(b) (there is no conflict of interest, either because the 
individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or 
country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships 
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of 
interest in favor of the U.S. interest; FI MC AG ¶ 8(c) (Contact or communication with 
foreign citizens is so casual or infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could 
created a risk for foreign influence or exploitation); and FI MC AG ¶ 8(f) (The value or 
routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property interest is such that they are 
unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate 
or pressure the individual).  
 
 Under the old adjudicative guidelines, a disqualifying condition based on foreign 
family members could not be mitigated unless an applicant could establish that the 
family members were not “in a position to be exploited.”  The Appeal Board consistently 
applied this mitigating condition narrowly, holding that its underlying premise was that 
an applicant should not be placed in a position where he or she is forced to make a 
choice between the interest of the family member and the interest of the United States.  
(See, ISCR Case No. 03-17620, App. Bd, Apr. 17, 2006; ISCR Case No. 03-24933, 
App. Bd. Jul. 28, 2005; ISCR Case No. 03-02382, App. Bd. Feb. 15, 2005; and ISCR 
Case No. 03-15205, App. Bd. Jan. 21. 2005).  Thus, an administrative judge was not 
permitted to apply a balancing test to assess the extent of the security risk.  Under the 
new guidelines, however, the potentially conflicting loyalties may be weighed to 
determine if an applicant can be expected to resolve any conflict in favor of the U.S. 
interest. 
 
 The nature of the government of Iran, its disregard for human rights, and its 
intent to seek information on United States technology place a heavy burden on 
Applicant in mitigating the disqualifying conditions and the security concerns.  Applicant 
has a close relationship with her mother.  Her mother is a 78 year old widow who has no 
contact or relationship with the Iranian government.  However, there could be a 
circumstance where Applicant is placed in a position of having to choose between the 
interests of her mother and the government or interests of the United States because of 
the nature of the Iranian government.  Accordingly, FI MC Ag ¶ 8(a) does not apply.  
 
 It is clear from Applicant’s testimony as well as the discussions regarding her 
mother she had with her co-workers that the relationship with her mother is not casual 
 
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or infrequent.  Applicant herself describes it as very close.  Applicant and her mother 
realize that there is a risk for Applicant to go to Iran, and they try to meet in an area 
outside Iran.  Applicant tried to have her mother live with her in the United States but the 
arrangement did not work.  Since Applicant and her mother are concerned about her 
trips to Iran, there must be likelihood that their contact could create the risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation.  Since the relationship with her mother was not casual and 
infrequent, FI DC AG ¶ 8 (c) does not apply to her relationship with her mother.   
 
 On the contrary, while not listed as a security concern, I note that her relationship 
with her aunt and uncle in Iran are casual and infrequent.  She sees them only when 
she visits Iran and talks to them only if they are at her mother’s house when she calls.  
She last saw her aunt and uncle over a year ago.  Her relationship with them is casual 
and infrequent.  Applicant’s trips to Iran do not show an interest in Iran or its 
government, but were taken for the sole purpose of visiting her mother.  The trips were 
not made because of her desire to see Iran or for government purposes.  The trips to 
Iran do not create a security concern. 
 
 Applicant has some claim to her father’s property in Iran.  Her father purchased a 
condominium in her name when she was a child.  She also has a claim to some 
properties her father owned with his brothers and two other condominiums that her 
family owns and uses on the Caspian Sea.  However, she turned over her rights to the 
property by giving her mother a power of attorney to do whatever she can with the 
properties so that her interests are minimal.  She does not expect to receive any 
proceeds from these properties.  Since her interests in the properties are minimal and 
granted to and controlled by her mother, it is unlikely that her interests will result in a 
conflict and could not be used to influence, manipulate or pressure her.  She has 
established FI MC AG ¶ 8(f) as to the property interests. 
 
 Applicant has little if any sense of loyalty to Iran.  She spent only her early years 
in Iran.  The revolutionary government of Iran caused her family to lose a lot of their 
wealth, so that her father never returned to the country.  She has established by 
testimony of those that have known her for many years that she has a deep sense of 
loyalty and admiration for the United States and its way of life.  There was testimony 
from many retired and former military officers who understand a sense of loyalty and 
obligation.  There was testimony from colleagues and friends who work in the defense 
industry who hold security clearances and understand the requirements to receive 
access to classified information.  Applicant came to the United States as a teenager and 
received her professional education here.  She became a United States citizen as soon 
as she could, married United States citizens, and has been successful working in the 
defense industries.  She sees the United States as offering her freedom, justice, and 
tolerance with an opportunity to reach her potential.  Her sense of loyalty or obligation is 
not to Iran but to the United States.  A conflict of interest in this case is extremely 
unlikely.  In balancing all of the factors mentioned and considered above, I am satisfied 
Applicant’s loyalty to the United States is such that she can be expected to resolve any 
conflict of interest in favor of the United States interest.  Accordingly, Applicant has met 
her heavy burden to show that her contacts with her mother in Iran and her trips to Iran 
 
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do not cause a security concern.  I conclude Applicant has mitigated security concerns 
rising from her contact with her mother in Iran, her minimal property interest in Iran, and 
her trips to Iran.  
 
Guideline B, Foreign Preference 
 
 When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign 
country over the United States, then he may be prone to provide information or make 
decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States. (AG ¶ 9)  Applicant 
applied for an Iranian passport after obtaining United States citizenship.  Iran considers 
her an Iranian citizen because she was born in Iran.  She applied for the passport 
because of United States State Department guidance that suggests United States 
citizens of Iranian birth considered dual United States and Iranian citizenship use such a 
passport to enter or leave Iran.  She possessed and used that passport to enter Iran as 
late as 2007.  Even though there is State Department guidance to have an Iranian 
passport, her possession of the Iranian passport raises Foreign Preference 
Disqualifying Condition (FP DC) AG ¶ 10(a) (Exercise of any right, privilege, or 
obligation of foreign citizenship after becoming a United States citizen or through the 
foreign citizenship of a family member.  This includes but is not limited to: (1) 
possession of a current foreign passport.)   
 
Applicant raised Foreign Preference Mitigating Conditions (FP MC) AG ¶ 11(b) 
(The individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship), and FP MC 
AG ¶ 11(e) (The passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security 
authority, or otherwise invalidated.)  Applicant does not know of any procedure 
accepted by the Iranian government to renounce her Iranian citizenship.  She 
expressed a willingness to renounce any claim to Iranian citizenship provided it did not 
adversely affect her mother.  The Iranian passport is a current passport but has been 
turned over to her facility security officer, a cognizant security official.  She knows if she 
asks for the passport back and uses it, she will also lose her security clearance and 
access to classified information.  Applicant has mitigated security concerns for foreign 
preference raised by her current Iranian passport. 
 
Whole Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole person concept, the Administrative Judge must evaluate an 
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s 
conduct and all the circumstances. The Administrative Judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): “(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness 
of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include 
knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) extent to which participation 
is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent 
behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, 
coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.” 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security 
 
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clearance must be an overall common sense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept. 
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case.  I carefully considered all of the 
circumstances discussed above in regard to disqualifying and mitigating conditions as 
well as the following factors in light of the “whole person” concept.  The “whole person” 
concept requires consideration of all available information about Applicant, not a single 
item in isolation, to reach a common sense determination concerning Applicant’s 
security worthiness.  Applicant has a close relationship with her mother in Iran.  These 
simple facts alone might be sufficient to raise security concerns over Applicant’s 
vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.  However, mere family ties with 
people in a foreign country are not, as a matter of law, disqualifying under Guideline B.  
Whether an applicant’s family ties in a foreign country pose a security risk depends on a 
common sense evaluation of the overall facts and circumstances of the family ties.   
 
Applicant has strong loyalties to the United States and a strong lack of loyalty for 
Iran.  She has successfully held a security clearance for over 15 years even though her 
relationship with her mother was a known factor.  She is regarded as loyal, trustworthy, 
and reliable by those that work and know her.  Many of them are former Navy officers, 
government, or contractor officials.  They know and understand the qualifications for 
access to classified information and have themselves made judgments on people for 
access to classified information.  Applicant has established her deep loyalty to the 
United States.  She established that she has no loyalty to Iran or its government.  Her 
loyalty is to her mother who happens to reside in Iran.  Overall, on balance the record 
evidence leaves me without questions or doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and 
suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I conclude Applicant has met 
the particularly heavy burden of mitigating all potential security concerns arising from 
her family member and property interest in Iran as well as her current Iranian passport.  
Accordingly I find that Applicant has mitigated the security concerns arising from foreign 
influence and foreign preference.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline C:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 1.a:    For Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.b:    For Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.c:    For Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.d:    For Applicant 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
 Paragraph 2, Guideline B:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 2.a:    For Applicant 
Subparagraph 2.b:    For Applicant 
Subparagraph 2.c:    For Applicant 
Subparagraph 2.d:    For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is 
clearly consistent with national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
 
 
 
_________________ 
THOMAS M. CREAN 
Administrative Judge