DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 07-12674 
 SSN: ) 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: Julie R. Edmunds, Esquire, Department Counsel 
For Applicant: Pro Se 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
CREAN, Thomas M., Administrative Judge: 
 
Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for Investigation Processing (E-
QIP) to update his security clearance on May 11, 2007.  On January 30, 2008, the 
Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) 
detailing security concerns for Applicant under Guideline B, Foreign Influence, and 
Guideline L, Outside Activities.  The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, 
Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; 
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security 
Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the revised 
adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and 
effective within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006.  
  
 Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on February 7, 2008. He answered 
the SOR in writing February 8, 2008, admitting all factual allegations in the SOR, but 
denied that the factual allegations create a security concern.  He requested a hearing, 
and DOHA received the request on February 13, 2008.  Department Counsel was 
prepared to proceed on February 26, 2008, and the case was assigned to me on 
February 27, 2008.  DOHA issued a notice of hearing on March 6, 2008, and I 
 
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convened the hearing as scheduled on April 8, 2008.  The government offered three 
exhibits, marked Government Exhibits (Gov. Ex.) 1-3, which were received without 
objection.  Applicant submitted eight exhibits, marked Applicant Exhibits (App.Ex.) A 
through H, which were received without objection.  Applicant and one other witness 
testified on Applicant’s behalf.  DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on 
April 17, 2008.  Based upon a review of the case file, pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, 
eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
 
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings 
 
Request for Administrative Notice 
 
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice 
of certain facts relating to Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and Thailand. (Tr. 11-14)  
The request and the attached supporting documents were not admitted into evidence 
but were included in the record as Hearing Exhibits I-III.  Applicant had no objection to 
the request for administrative notice and the attached documents.  The facts 
administratively noticed are set out in the Findings of Fact, below.  
 
 
Findings of Fact 
 
 After a thorough review of the pleadings, transcript, and exhibits, I make the 
following essential findings of fact.  Applicant admitted all the factual allegations in the 
SOR with explanation but denied the security concerns raised by the factual allegations. 
He also provided additional information to support his request for eligibility for a security 
clearance.   
 
Applicant is 63 years old, and he has been a senior field representative for a 
defense contractor in support of the United States Army for two years.  Applicant 
received a bachelor’s in music and a master’s degree in education from United States 
universities.  He served on active duty in the Army for three years, and then taught 
school in a public high school for ten years.  He subsequently worked for the United 
States Army as a civilian educational specialist for 26 years retiring in 2006. He has 
worked with various Army schools as an adviser for education programs. (Tr. 28-44; 
Government Exhibit 1, Security Clearance Application, E-QIP, dated May 11, 2007; 
Applicant Exhibit A, Background information, undated) Applicant has continuously held 
a security clearance since 1981. (Applicant Exhibit D, Statement of Security Clearance, 
dated January 21, 1982)  Applicant is highly regarded by his present and former 
employers.  He presented Letters of Appreciation and Commendation for his service as 
an Army civilian.  (Applicant Exhibit C, Letters, dated December 15, 1986, June 3, 1988, 
February 16, 1988, May 31, 1994, and December 16, 1986)  He is also highly regarded 
by his defense contractor employer.  Applicant has always informed his supervisors 
about his business activities in and trips to the PRC.  (Applicant Exhibit F, Four Letters, 
dated April 4, 2008, and March 17, 2008)  Applicant has also received training on 
combating terrorism.  (Applicant Exhibit E, Memorandum, dated August 23, 2005)  
 
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Applicant was married three times to United States citizens.  The marriages 
ended in divorce, the last in 1999.  In 1999, Applicant met his present wife, a Chinese 
citizen living in China, over the internet.  After their internet introduction, Applicant 
traveled to China in 1999 to meet his new wife and her family.  He stayed in hotels but 
visited his future wife and her family for social events.  He spent a few hours each day 
with her family.  Applicant returned to the United States and his future wife joined him in 
the United States in August 2000.  They were married in the United States in 
September 2000.  Applicant does not speak Chinese and his wife’s family does not 
speak English.  Applicant communicates with his wife’s family in the PRC through his 
wife.  Applicant admits he traveled to the PRC in March 2002, May 2001, June 2004, 
October 2005, November 2006, and January 2007.  His wife accompanied him on the 
trips he made after they married in September 2000.  Applicant and his wife plan to 
travel to the PRC in August 2008 to visit family and see the Olympics. (Tr. 14-16; 
Government Exhibit 1, Security Clearance Application (e-QIP) dated May 11, 2007) 
 
Applicant’s wife testified that she was born and raised in the PRC.  She received 
a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering from a PRC university and worked for over 
ten years as an electrical engineer for a PRC company.  She then worked for about four 
years for the PRC Trade ministry buying and selling items for use by businesses in the 
PRC.  Just prior to meeting Applicant and coming to the United States, Applicant’s wife 
and a friend opened a restaurant.  She is a citizen of the PRC but now a resident of the 
United States.  When she arrived in the United States with her new husband in 2000, 
she started taking English language and other courses at a local community college.  
She became proficient enough in English that she applied for United States citizenship 
in May 2008.  (Tr. 22-25; Applicant Exhibit H, postal receipt, dated May 4, 2008)  
 
Her father passed away in 2004.  He previously served for over 42 years in the 
PRC Army as a medical officer, retiring about 27 years ago.  He then went to work for a 
hospital.  Applicant met some PRC government officials on his visits to PRC because of 
the military connections of his father-in-law. (Tr. 28-29) 
 
Applicant’s wife’s mother is 76 years old, a retired school teacher, and a resident 
and citizen of the PRC.  Her mother resides with Applicant’s wife’s sister, and receives 
some retirement and medical benefits from the PRC government.  Applicant and his 
wife provide her mother with about $1,200 a year in monetary support.  Applicant’s wife 
talks to her mother by telephone about once a month, and stays with her and her sister 
on her visits to the PRC. (Tr. 26-28)   
 
Applicant’s wife’s sister is 44 years old, an accountant for a lighting supplier, not 
married, and lives with her mother.  Applicant’s wife talks to her sister about once a 
month when she calls her mother.  Applicant’s wife does not e-mail her sister.  Her 
sister has never visited the United States.  (Tr. 29-30)  
 
Applicant’s wife’s brother is 41 years old, married, and a department director for 
licensing for the Beijing city government.  Applicant’s wife does not speak to her brother 
 
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on the telephone and does not e-mail him.  She does see him on her visits to the PRC. 
(Tr. 30-32)   
 
Applicant testified that he formed a business relationship with the United States 
patent holder and manufacturer of a piece of equipment for water treatment.  He 
became one of the manufacturer’s sales representatives for the equipment.  After he 
and his wife married, they saw a lucrative market for the equipment in the PRC.  He 
sought and received some assistance from the United States State Department foreign 
commerce service.  They assisted in arranging visits and appointments.  Applicant and 
his wife entered a business relationship with two individuals in the PRC to assist and 
represent him to sell the water treatment devices.  He made about two or three trips to 
the PRC meeting with his representatives and demonstrating the equipment for them 
and potential customers.  Some of the potential customers could have been government 
representatives.  His wife served as his translator.  Applicant also made some business 
arrangements with a representative to sell the equipment in Thailand.  For each piece of 
equipment sold, Applicant would receive a 5 percent commission and the 
representatives 10 percent.  However, he has not sold any equipment to any entity in 
China or Thailand.  He has not been to Thailand since 2004 for business or any other 
reason.  His business arrangements in the PRC were basically over in 2006.  He is 
willing to travel to Thailand or the PRC if there is an opportunity for a lucrative sale of 
the equipment.  However, Applicant does not foresee any business from his attempts to 
sell the water treatment equipment outside the United States.  He has sold some 
equipment to businesses in the United States. (Tr. 44-50) 
 
Applicant kept his supervisors informed of his travels to the PRC and his 
business activities.  He informed his security manager that he has a foreign born wife.  
When he met his wife and married her in 2000, he was employed by the Army.  He 
informed his Army supervisors of his trips to the PRC.  He also informed them of his 
business activities.  (Tr. 50-52; Applicant Exhibit F, Letters, dated October 29, 2004) 
 
 China, also known as the People's Republic of China, is hostile to the United 
States, and has interests inimical to those of the U.S.  China is ruled by a totalitarian 
government that depends on the suppression of its people. The government has a poor 
record of human rights that features, among other things, repression of political and 
religious dissenters.  There have been some improvements in relations between PRC 
and the United States.  While the United States looks forward to a constructive and 
broad-based relationship with China, a message reiterated by President Bush when he 
met with PRC President Hu in April 2006, there are areas of potential disagreement.   
 
 China is known to engage in espionage against the U.S., both economically, 
militarily, and otherwise.  The United States is a primary intelligence target of PRC 
because of the United States role as a global superpower; its substantial military, 
political, and economic presence in Asia and the Pacific Rim; its role as a developer of 
advanced technology that China requires for economic growth; and the large number of 
Americans of Chinese ancestry who are considered prime intelligence targets by the 
PRC.  The intelligence practice of the PRC is different from the Soviet and western 
 
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concept of the use of recruited agents.  The western approach is to recruit agents for a 
specific intelligence target.  The PRC intelligence philosophy is to try to recruit agents 
before there is a specific need, and recruit as many as possible.  The crux of the PRC 
approach is not to try to exploit a perceived vulnerability but to appeal to an individual’s 
desire to help China out in some ways.  A large portion of the PRC intelligence 
collection efforts against common targets is conducted directly by PRC students, 
delegations, and commercial enterprises.  They also believe if large numbers of PRC 
personnel leave China and settle permanently in the United States, some of them may 
some day find their way into positions of intelligence potential.  When they are in 
position, these individuals will be approached on the basis of loyalty to their ancestral 
land, and some may be persuaded to cooperate, at least on a limited basis.  (Court 
Exhibit 1, Government Request for Administrative Notice, Intelligence Threat Handbook, 
at 17-24) 
 
 Chinese security personnel place foreign visitors under surveillance and subject 
them to search without their knowledge or consent.  However, there is no information in 
intelligence documents that the PRC is targeting relatives of Chinese-Americans to gain 
access to classified, technical, or business information from their relatives in the United 
States.  However in recent years, the PRC has been the subject of approximately half of 
the cases initiated by U.S. law enforcement agencies concerning the illegal diversion of 
technology from the United States.  These cases involve people born and raised in the 
PRC who immigrated to the United States and became United States citizens.  The 
PRC relies on recruitment and exploitation operations.  The PRC attempts to recruit or 
at least “make friends with” as many Chinese-Americans as possible, apparently hoping 
that at least some will perceive an obligation to help China,  (Court Exhibit 1, Request 
for Administrative Notice, attached State Department and Intelligence Service 
documents) 
 
Thailand is a constitutional monarchy.  The democratically elected prime minister 
was overthrown by a peaceful military coup in 2006.  The military regime abolished the 
parliament, declared martial law, and limited civil liberties.  Thailand has an open market 
economy with significant foreign investments.  The United States has significant trade 
with Thailand being its largest export market and second largest supplier.  There had 
been good relations between Thailand and the United States until the coup in 
September 2006.  Since then, the United States has suspended several military 
exercises and operations with Thailand.  The Department of State has criticized the 
Thai human rights record.  The Thai constitution prohibits torture and arbitrary arrest 
and detention.  However, since the September 2006 coup, there are reports of torture, 
and arbitrary arrest, detention, and disappearances.  There is also a concern for 
increased terrorism in Southeast Asia, including Thailand.  There are incidents of 
criminal and political violence by separatist and extremists groups generally focused on 
government interests but increasingly targeting public places and tourist areas. (Court 
Exhibit II) 
 
 
 
 
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Policies 
 
 When evaluating an Applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the 
Administrative Judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition 
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list 
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in 
evaluating an Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. 
 
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the 
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the 
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The Administrative Judge’s over-arching 
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common sense decision. According to AG ¶ 
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as 
the “whole person concept.” The Administrative Judge must consider all available, 
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in 
making a decision. 
 
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b) 
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to 
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this 
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on 
the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences 
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture. 
 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish 
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is 
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, 
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The 
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security 
decision.  
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary 
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This 
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The 
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it 
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of 
the possible risk the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or 
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally 
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of 
classified information. 
  
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of 
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the 
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites 
for access to classified or sensitive information).   
 
 
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Analysis 
 
Guideline B: Foreign Influence 
 
 Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has 
divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a 
foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in the U.S. 
interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interests.  Adjudication 
under this guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which 
the foreign contact or financial interest is location, including but not limited to, such 
consideration as whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to 
obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism. (AG ¶ 6) 
 
 Applicant and his wife reside together in the United States, but his wife is still a 
citizen of the PRC.  Applicant’s wife has contact by telephone and visits with her 
mother, brother, and sister who are all citizens and residents of the PRC.  Applicant 
sees his wife’s family when he visits the PRC but otherwise has minimal contact with 
them because they do not share a common language.  Applicant also has business 
contacts in the PRC and Thailand.  His business interests and his wife’s family contacts 
raise security concerns under Foreign Influence Disqualifying Conditions AG ¶ 7(a) 
(Contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or 
other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a 
heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or 
coercion); AG ¶ 7(b) (Connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country 
that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect 
sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, 
group, or country by providing that information); and AG ¶ 7(d) (sharing living quarters 
with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a 
heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion). 
 
 Under the old adjudicative guidelines, a disqualifying condition based on foreign 
family members could not be mitigated unless an applicant could establish that the 
family members were not “in a position to be exploited.”  The Appeal Board consistently 
applied this mitigating condition narrowly, holding that its underlying premise was that 
an applicant should not be placed in a position where he is forced to make a choice 
between the interest of the family member and the interest of the United States.  (See, 
ISCR Case No. 03-17620, App. Bd, Apr. 17, 2006; ISCR Case No. 03-24933, App. Bd. 
Jul. 28, 2005; ISCR Case No. 03-02382, App. Bd. Feb. 15, 2005; and ISCR Case No. 
03-15205, App. Bd. Jan. 21. 2005).  Thus, an administrative judge was not permitted to 
apply a balancing test to assess the extent of the security risk.  Under the new 
guidelines, however, the potentially conflicting loyalties may be weighed to determine if 
an applicant can be expected to resolve any conflict in favor of the U.S. interest. 
 
 The nature of the country in which persons are located is an issue.  There are 
some indications that China and the United States are working towards more friendly 
relations.  There is no doubt that the PRC targets the United States for scientific, 
 
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intelligence, technical, and military information.  While Thailand has been an ally of the 
United States, the military coup in September 2006 and the resulting government and 
terrorist activities raises concerns about Thai actions against United States citizens to 
gain trade and other protected information from the United States.  Security concerns 
can be raised from countries both friendly and hostile to the United States.  The United 
States has an interest to protect its classified information whether the person, 
organization, or country seeking the information has interests inimical to the United 
States. (ISCR Case No. 02-11570, App. Bd. May 19, 2004 at 5)  Friendly countries can 
have disagreements with the United States over matters that are vital to the national 
security of the United States.  Friendly countries have engaged in espionage against the 
United States while seeking economic, scientific, and technical information.  (ISCR 
Case No. 00-0317, App. Bd. May 29, 2002)  The nature of a nation’s government, its 
relationship with the U.S., its human rights record, and its intelligence collection 
methods are relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are 
vulnerable to government coercion.  The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is 
significantly greater if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family 
member is dependent on or associated with the government, or the country is known to 
conduct intelligence operations against the U.S.  Applicant has a heavy burden to 
establish that PRC and Thailand do not create a security concern. 
 
 I have considered Foreign Influence Mitigating Conditions AG ¶ 8(a) (the nature 
of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are 
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is 
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the 
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interest of 
the U.S.); AG ¶ 8(b) (there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s 
sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so 
minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in 
the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of 
the U.S. interest; and AG ¶ 8(c) (Contact or communication with foreign citizens is so 
casual or infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could created a risk for foreign 
influence or exploitation). 
 
 Applicant’s contacts with the PRC are through his wife and her family.  He does 
not have any relatives or family members in the PRC, but his wife does.  Applicant’s 
direct contacts with his wife’s family are minimal since he does not speak their language 
and they do not speak his language.  There is a rebuttable presumption that an 
applicant has ties of obligation to members of his spouse’s family. (ISCR Case No. 01-
03120 (App. Bd. February 20, 2002 at 8))  His wife’s family in the PRC and her contacts 
with them are attributed to Applicant.  Applicant’s wife’s talks to her mother and sister 
monthly and has visited yearly since she came to the United States with Applicant in 
2000.  Her contacts with them are not casual and are frequent so FI MC ¶ 8(c) does not 
apply. 
 
 Applicant’s wife’s mother is a retired school teacher and her sister an accountant 
for a private company.  Her mother receives a pension through the PRC government.  
 
9 
 
 
The mother and sister are ordinary citizens leading normal lives in the PRC.  Applicant’s 
wife’s brother is a mid-level bureaucrat for the Beijing city government.  Even though 
Applicant’s wife’s father is deceased, he was a member of the PRC army for many 
years and she has contacts with officials because of his service.  She is also a PRC 
citizen even though she resides now in the United States.  The government documents 
used for administrative notice purposes show that the PRC approach to intelligence 
gathering is different than the western approach.  The PRC does not normally target 
people, like Applicant’s wife’s family members, to pressure, or coerce Applicant to 
reveal information not in the United States interests.  In balancing the nature of 
Applicant’s contacts and visits with his wife’s family and her contacts with her relatives 
in the PRC with the intelligence approach of the PRC, I determine that Applicant is not 
vulnerable to pressure or coercion by the PRC, merely because of the location of his 
wife’s family in the PRC. 
 
 The PRC approach to intelligence gathering does seem to target individuals of 
Chinese ancestry in the United States.  The administrative judge must again balance 
the nature of the loyalty of the individual to the United States against his loyalty to family 
in the PRC.  In this case, Applicant has a strong sense of loyalty to the United States.  
He has worked for many years for the United States government and has held a 
security clearance for over 20 years.  His contacts with the PRC are through his wife.  
This is balanced against his wife’s connections to the PRC.  His wife has been in the 
United States for only about eight years, but she has applied to be a United States 
citizen.  In the PRC, she was an engineer and a business owner.  She returns yearly to 
visit her family in the PRC, and talks to them monthly.  Her father was a high ranking 
Army official for many years.  Her brother is a government official of the capital of the 
PRC.  She has strong ties of loyalty to the PRC.  While her loyalty to the United States 
may be growing, her loyalty to the PRC is still strong.  Applicant has not established that 
his wife’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the PRC is outweighed by her growing loyalty 
to the United States.   
 
 A conflict of interest in this case is likely for Applicant through his wife.  
Applicant’s wife could be approached or pressured by the PRC for information from her 
husband based on the PRC approach to intelligence gathering.  I am satisfied of 
Applicant’s loyalty to the United States.  But the nature of his wife’s loyalty is such that a 
conflict with his wife loyalty and obligation to the PRC can be expected which will place 
Applicant in a position to have to choose between his loyalty to his wife and her family 
and his loyalty to the United States.  Applicant has not established that he can be 
expected to resolve any conflict of interest caused by his wife in favor of the United 
States interest.  Accordingly, Applicant has not met his heavy burden to show that his 
wife and her contacts in the PRC are not a security concern for him.  I conclude that FI 
MC AGs, ¶¶ 8(a) and (b), are not established. 
 
 
 
Guideline L, Outside Activities 
 
 
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 Involvement in certain types of outside employment or activities is of security 
concern if it poses a conflict of interest with an individual’s security responsibilities and 
could create an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information.  (AG 
¶ 36)  Applicant’s water treatment equipment business interests in China and Thailand 
raise Outside Activities Disqualifying Conditions (OA DC) ¶ 37(a) any employment or 
service, whether compensated or volunteer, with: (1) the government of a foreign 
country; (2) any foreign national, organization, or other entity; and (3) a representative 
of any foreign interest; and ¶ 37(b) (failure to report or fully disclose an outside activity 
when this is required). 
 
 Applicant’s outside activities are based on his role of serving as a sales or 
manufacturer’s representative in the PRC and Thailand for a United States 
manufacturer of water treatment equipment.  He has engaged the services of 
representatives in the PRC and Thailand to generate business for him and the 
manufacturer.  Applicant has been unsuccessful in generating business during the four 
to six years of his endeavors.  He has, however, generated business in the United 
States.  Applicant kept his supervisors informed of all of his foreign contacts and 
activities.  Applicant has not received compensation from a foreign country or entity.  He 
represents a United States manufacturer and not a foreign business.  He reported all of 
his activities to his supervisors.  I conclude that the Outside Activities disqualifying 
conditions have not been established. 
 
Whole Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole person concept, the Administrative Judge must evaluate an 
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s 
conduct and all the circumstances. The Administrative Judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): “(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness 
of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include 
knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) extent to which participation 
is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent 
behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, 
coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.” 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security 
clearance must be an overall common sense judgment based upon careful 
consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept. 
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case.  Applicant has strong ties to his wife 
who has strong ties to her family in the PRC.  Applicant has strong loyalties to the 
United States, which is offset by his wife’s ties of loyalty to the PRC.  His outside 
business activities in the PRC and Thailand do not cause a security concern because 
they are with a United States manufacturer and have not been successful.  Overall, on 
balance the record evidence leaves me with questions or doubts as to Applicant’s 
 
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eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I conclude 
Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns arising from foreign influence.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline B:   AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 1.a:    Against Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.b:    Against Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.c:    Against Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.d:    For Applicant 
Subparagraph 1.e:     Against Applicant 
 
 Paragraph 2, Guideline L:   FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 2.a:    For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not 
clearly consistent with national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a security 
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is denied. 
 
 
 
_________________ 
THOMAS M. CREAN 
Administrative Judge