1
                                                             
                           
                        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ADP Case No. 07-13041
SSN: )
)
Applicant for Public Trust Position )
Appearances
For Government: Gina Marine, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
                                                                            
______________
Decision
______________
HENRY, Mary E., Administrative Judge:
Based upon a review of the case file, pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, I
conclude that Applicant’s eligibility for access to sensitive information is granted.
Applicant submitted his Questionnaires for Public Trust Position (SF 85P), on
April 29, 2004 and re-signed it on March 14, 2005. On January 3, 2008, the Defense
Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR)
detailing the trustworthiness concerns under Guidelines F and E for Applicant. The
action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information
within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive
5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2,
1992), as amended (Directive); Department of Defense (DoD) Regulation 5200.2-R,
Personnel Security Program, dated Jan. 1987, as amended (Regulation), and the
revised adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29,
2005, and effective within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September
1, 2006. 
2
Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on January 10, 2008.  He answered
the SOR in writing on January 31, 2008, and requested a hearing before an
administrative judge. DOHA received the request on February 5, 2008. Department
Counsel was prepared to proceed on February 27, 2008. The case was assigned to
another administrative judge on February 28, 2008, who transferred the case to me
because of workload adjustments on March 4, 2008. DOHA issued a notice of hearing
on March 19, 2008, and I convened the hearing as scheduled on April 9, 2008. The
government offered Exhibits (Ex.) 1 through 5, which were admitted without objection.
Applicant testified on his own behalf and submitted Exhibits A through F, which were
admitted without objection. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on April
17, 2008. I held the record open until April 30, 2008, for Applicant to submit additional
matters.  He timely submitted Exhibits G and H. The Department Counsel responded
with no objections on May 8, 2008. The record closed on May 8, 2008.
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings
Notice
At the hearing, Applicant indicated he received the hearing notice more than 15
days before the hearing (The notice needed to be received prior to March 25, 2008.)
(Tr. at 9.)
Motion to Amend SOR
Department Counsel moved to amend the SOR ¶ 1.a to reflect the correct state
to which the debt is owed, ¶ 1.c. by changing the amount owed from $17,095 to $7,095,
and ¶ 1.i to reflect the correct name of the debtor. Applicant agreed to the
amendments. (Tr. at 9-12.) At the close of the hearing, Department Counsel moved to
again amend the SOR to add two additional allegations based on the hearing
testimony:
1.l, “You are indebted to the State of [ ] for child support in the
approximate amount of $6,000. As of April 9, 2007, this debt has not been
satisfied.” 
and 
1.m, “You are indebted to the Internal Revenue Service for federal taxes
for the tax year 2003 in the approximate amount of $330. As of April 9,
2007 this debt has not been paid.”
Applicant did not object to the amendment and I granted it. (Tr. at 108-109.)
Response to SOR, dated January 31, 2008.1
GE 1 (Application for Position of Public Trust (SF-85P)); Tr. 21-22.2
GE 1, supra note 2, at 2, 8; Tr. 33-34.3
Tr. 67-70.4
Id. 28-32, 73-80.5
3
Findings of Fact
In his Answer to the SOR, dated January 31, 2008, Applicant admitted the
factual allegations in ¶¶ 1.a-1.c, and 1.e-1.k of the SOR. He denied the factual
allegations in ¶¶ 1.d and 2.a of the SOR.  His discussions regarding allegations 1.l and1
1.m at the hearing are treated as admissions of the debts. (Tr. 26-27.)
Applicant, a 44-year-old man seeking a position of public trust, works as a
patient care advocate for a Department of Defense contractor. He began this
employment four years ago. He completed his SF-85P in April 2004, and re-signed the
application in March 2005.2
Applicant married twice and divorced twice. He currently lives with his niece and
her family, where he shares a room, because he cannot afford to live on his own. He
has a son, age 24, and a daughter, age 21, from his first marriage. He also has a
daughter, age 21, from a relationship. He graduated from high school and attended
college periodically, but did not graduate.3
When his first marriage ended, the court determined, in June 1986, he should
pay his former wife child support for both children, in the amount of $35 a month per
child. When school ended in 1988, this amount increased to $125 a month per child
until age 18.  In addition, the court in another state also determined that he should pay
child support for his other daughter, amount unknown. Because of limited income and
sporadic work while a student and later, he fell into arrears on his child support. For his
two children from his marriage, his arrearage reached about $30,000. His arrearage for
his other daughter totaled more than $12,000.4
In 1997, during his second marriage, he and his wife purchased a used car (a
Dodge Neon) for her use and a 1995 Chevrolet Cavalier for his use. Both signed the car
notes. When they separated and divorced in 1998, his wife stopped making her car
payment. He called the note holder to find out what he could do, as he could not pay
two car payments. The note holder suggested a voluntary repossession, indicating that
it would sell the car. He believed that his outstanding debt would be resolved with the
sale. The note holder did not tell him he would still owe money on the loan after the car
was sold. Had he been told this, he would have developed a different plan for selling
the car.5
Id.6
GE 2 (Interrogatories and answers with attachments) at 11; AE B (Copy of pay stub); Tr. 22, 25-27, 41.7
GE 2, supra note 7, at 7-9; GE 4 (Credit report, dated April 6, 2007); Tr. 24-25. 8
GE 2, supra note 7 at 3, 7-10; AE B, supra note 7; AE H (Earnings statements) at 1-3.9
4
In 1999, even though he was current on his loan payment, he decided it was
cheaper for him to use public transportation than to continue operating his car. He
spoke with the note holder on his car about a voluntary repossession. He received the
same information as previously told. He did not obtain a copy of his credit report before
voluntarily returning his car to the note holder; thus, he did not know about the unpaid
debt from the voluntary repossession of his wife’s car. He did not learn of this debt until
he started receiving letters from the creditors much later. He did not have any money to
pay the loans.6
Applicant currently earns $12.82 an hour. His monthly income also includes
some pay differential hours, pay for performance awards, some overtime, and $900
bonus. His gross income for 2007 totaled slightly over $38,000 and his net income for
the year totaled $18,750.  His total gross income through April 18, 2008 total $11,257,
including another $900 bonus. His net income through April 18, totaled $5,454. His
monthly net income averages $1,050. His monthly expenses include $400 for rent,
$301 for a car payment, $97 for car insurance, $120 for gas and $100 for food and
miscellaneous items. He can not afford much else, and does not have a healthy diet.7
For many years, Applicant’s salary has been garnished for child support
arrearage. He currently has three garnishments against his salary, which total $627 a
month. Applicant’s girlfriend obtained a judgment for more than $12,000 for unpaid
child support in 2001. He paid this judgment in full in August 2007. (SOR ¶ 1.d.) He
received a $1,263 payment refund.  8
In November 2007, his received notice of additional garnishments for payment of
child support arrearage. He owed his former wife $2,329 and $3,536 respectively. In
2007, he paid $776 on the first garnishment and in 2008, he has paid $1250 (through
May 15), leaving a current balance of $303. This debt will be paid by the end of June
2008. Regarding the second garnishment for child support, he paid $554 in 2007 and
$2,246 through May 15, 2008, leaving a current balance of $1,290. This debt will be
paid by September 2008.9
In 2003, Applicant earned additional income from his then employer by
performing extra work outside work hours for which his employer issued a 1099 and did
not withhold any taxes. He timely filed his 2003 tax return, but did not have any funds to
pay the additional taxes he owed for these earnings. He estimates he owed between
$2,000 and $3,000. He entered into a voluntary garnishment with the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) to pay his outstanding taxes. As of the hearing date, he still owed IRS
AE B, supra note 7; AE F (IRS monthly statement, dated March 19, 2008); AE G (Copy of state tax release,10
dated June 4, 1998); Tr. 27, 50-53.
GE 3 (Credit report, dated March 23, 2005); GE 4, supra note 8; GE 5 (Credit report, dated December 7,11
2007).
GE 1, supra note 2, at 1, 11.12
GE 1, supra note 2, at 1, 11; Tr. 42-46.13
5
$190, including penalties. Based on the record evidence, this debt would be paid in full
as of April 30, 2008. Finally, Applicant paid the back state tax bill in 1998.10
Applicant’s remaining debts listed in the SOR have not been paid. The two
largest debts relate to two car repossessions, which are over nine years old and barred
from collection under the State Statute of Limitations. His next largest debt is for
education loans, which he will not be able to pay until he completes his child support
payments. The remaining debts relate to unpaid state taxes, rent, utilities, a jay walking
ticket, and a book club. In his answers to interrogatories, Applicant stated he would pay
the book club debt at the end of November after paying his bills. He did not because he
had to buy a new tire for his car. He has no credit cards.11
When Applicant completed his public trust questionnaire, he answered “yes” to
the following question:12
Question 22. Your Financial Record b. 
Are you now over 180 days delinquent on any loan or
financial obligation? (Include loans or obligations funded or
guaranteed by the Federal Government)
Applicant listed his student loan debt, but not his car repossessions and child
support arrearage. His SF-85P shows an arrow pointing left and a circle next to the
answer, but does not contain any additional information or attachments. He did not list
his child support because he had been paying this debt through garnishment for 12 to
13 years and did not think of it as a loan or financial obligation. He could not explain
why he did not list the car repossessions, noting that he did not obtain a copy of his
credit report before completing his questionnaire. He explains his failure to list all his
debts as a simple misunderstanding of the information on his part.13
Applicant enjoys his job, which he describes as the best job he has had. His
income is also the best he has earned. His job requires him to work on the telephone
much of the day. He is able to perform his duties, despite a hearing loss. He cannot
afford to live on his own and will not be able to do so for some time. He recently
received two performance awards and commentary about his excellent performance.
AE D (Performance record); Tr. 47, 93-96.14
6
He and friends are forming a charity and he serves on the Board of Directors. He
recently took a trip to Florida related to this charity. His friends helped pay his costs.14
Policies
Positions designated as ADP I and ADP II are classified as “sensitive positions.”
(See Regulation ¶¶ C3.1.2.1.1.7 and C3.1.2.1.2.3.)  “The standard that must be met for
. . . assignment to sensitive duties is that, based on all available information, the
person’s loyalty, reliability, and trustworthiness are such that . . . assigning the person to
sensitive duties is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.” (See
Regulation ¶ C6.1.1.1.) The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Counterintelligence
and Security) Memorandum, dated November 19, 2004, indicates trustworthiness
adjudications will apply to cases forwarded to DOHA by the Defense Security Service
and Office of Personnel Management.  Department of Defense contractor personnel
are afforded the right to the procedures contained in the Directive before any final
unfavorable access determination may be made. (See Regulation ¶ C8.2.1.)  
When evaluating an Applicant’s suitability for a public trust position, the
administrative judge must consider the disqualifying and mitigating conditions in the AG.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of
human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in
the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s over-arching adjudicative goal is a
fair, impartial and common sense decision. According to AG ¶ 2(c), the entire process is
a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as the “whole person concept.”
The administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the
person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
[sensitive] information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable
trustworthiness decision. 
A person who seeks access to sensitive information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
7
grants access to sensitive information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard sensitive information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
sensitive information.
 Section 7 of Executive Order (EO) 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in
terms of the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty
of the applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple
prerequisites for access to classified or sensitive information).  
Analysis
Guideline F, Financial Considerations
The trustworthiness concern relating to the guideline for Financial Considerations
is set out in AG & 18:  
Failure or inability to live within one=s means, satisfy debts, and meet
financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or
unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise
questions about an individual=s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to
protect [sensitive] information. An individual who is financially
overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate
funds. 
The guideline notes several conditions that could raise trustworthiness concerns.
Under AG & 19(a), an Ainability or unwillingness to satisfy debts@ is potentially
disqualifying. Similarly under AG & 19(c), Aa history of not meeting financial obligations@
may raise security concerns. Applicant accumulated significant delinquent debt over the
last 15 years. He has been unable to pay some obligations for a long period of time.
The evidence is sufficient to raise these potentially disqualifying conditions, requiring a
closer examination.
The guideline also includes examples of conditions that could mitigate
trustworthiness concerns arising from financial difficulties. Under AG ¶ 20(a), the
disqualifying condition may be mitigated where Athe behavior happened so long ago,
was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and
does not cast doubt on the individual=s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good
judgment.@ Applicant=s financial worries have been an ongoing problem for many years,
primarily due to low income. This mitigating condition does not apply.
Under AG & 20(b), it may be mitigating where Athe conditions that resulted in the
financial problem were largely beyond the person=s control (e.g., loss of employment, a
business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or separation),
and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances.@ Two of Applicant’s major
debts are for unpaid car loans after voluntary repossession. He and his second wife
See ISCR Case No. 04-07360 at 2 (App. Bd. Sept. 26, 2006) (stating partial credit was available under15
FCMC 6 for debts being resolved through garnishment). 
A  State Court of Appeals succinctly explained the societal and judicial value of application of the statute of16
lim itations:
Statutes of limitations embody important public policy considerations in that they stimulate
activity, punish negligence and promote repose by giving security and stability to human
affairs. The cornerstone policy consideration underlying statutes of limitations is the laudable
goal of law to promote and achieve finality in litigation. Significantly, statutes of limitations
provide potential defendants with certainty that after a set period of time, they will not be
ha[led] into court to defend time-barred claims. Moreover, limitations periods discourage
plaintiffs from sitting on their rights.  Statutes of limitations are, indeed, fundamental to our
judicial system.
Carolina Marine Handling, Inc. v. Lasch, 609 S.E.2d 548, 552 (Ct. App. 2005) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
8
obtained the loans during their marriage. When the marriage ended, she refused to pay
her car loan and he could not afford to pay two car loans on his income alone. He made
a decision to return the car to the note holder after being advised that it would sell the
car for him. The note holder did not tell him that he would have an unpaid balance for
which he would be responsible. The end of this marriage also made it difficult for him to
pay for housing on his own, which caused other unpaid debt. I find this potentially
mitigating condition is applies to partially mitigate security concerns.
Evidence that Athe person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem
and/or there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control@
is potentially mitigating under AG & 20(c). Applicant has not received any financial
counseling. Much of his debt problem remains outstanding. However, there are clear
indications that his finances are improving. I conclude this mitigating conditions does
not fully apply.
Similarly, AG & 20(d) applies where the evidence shows Athe individual initiated a
good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts.” Applicant’s
child support arrearage has been a long standing and substantial debt, totaling more
than $42,000. For the last approximately 13 years, he has paid monthly on this debt. At
this time, his unpaid debt totals less than $2,000. He took the initiative with the IRS to
pay the additional taxes he owed for 2003 by developing a voluntary garnishment of his
salary.  This debt is paid as is the 1996 state tax lien.15
He also receives some credit in the whole person analysis, infra, for the
application of the State’s 6-year statute of limitations, which applies to the two unpaid
debts following the voluntary repossession of two cars in 1998 and 1999 and listed in as
SOR debts 1.c. and 1.d, the creditors were time barred from collecting these debts See
State Code. Ann. §44-501.  Elimination of these two delinquent debts through the16
statute of limitations has ended his potential vulnerability to improper financial
inducements related to these debts as he no longer has any legal responsibility for
these debts. The fact that this debt is very old and not collectible under state law is a
Mitigating conditions in AG ¶¶ 20(e) and 20(f) are not applicable in this case.17
The remaining disqualifying conditions, AG ¶¶ 16(b)-16(g) are not raised in this case.18
9
factor I must consider. In addition, Applicant did not fail to make his monthly car
payment on the Cavalier or his wife’s car. Rather, when his second wife refused to pay
her car loan, he contacted the car loan note holder about returning the car, a
reasonable action by him. He reasonably relied upon the advice given to him by the
note holder and reasonably believed that his remaining debt would be resolved with the
sale of the car. Because he received no notice of deficiency from the note holder, he
had no basis to know that the first voluntary repossession had left him with unpaid debt.
Thus, in 1998, he determined that he could not afford to operate his car and decided to
follow the note holder’s advice about voluntary repossession a second time. He acted
reasonably under the circumstances. Had he known he would still owe money on the
cars, he would have developed a different plan to eliminate the debt. Given his income
of $20,000 a year or less at this time, he acted rationally in managing his finances. This
mitigating condition applies.17
Guideline E, Personal Conduct
AG ¶ 15 expresses the security concern pertaining to personal conduct:
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect
classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful
and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.
Although the following conduct will normally result in an unfavorable
clearance action or administrative termination of further processing for
clearance eligibility, this conduct is not at issue in this case:
(a) refusal, or failure without reasonable cause, to undergo or cooperate
with security processing, including but not limited to meeting with a
security investigator for subject interview, completing security forms or
releases, and cooperation with medical or psychological evaluation; and,
(b) refusal to provide full, frank and truthful answers to lawful questions of
investigators, security officials, or other official representatives in
connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination.
AG ¶ 16 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and the
following condition may be disqualifying in this case:18
(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from
any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or
See ISCR Case No. 03-09483 at 4 (App. Bd. Nov.17, 2004)(explaining holding in ISCR Case No. 02-2313319
at 5 (App. Bd. Jun. 9, 2004)).
10
similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment
qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance
eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities.
The government established that Applicant omitted material facts from his SF-
85P when he failed tp provide a complete listing of his outstanding debts. This
information is material to the evaluation of Applicant’s trustworthiness to hold a security
clearance and to his honesty. For this guideline to apply, Applicant’s omission must be
deliberate. He denies, however, that he deliberately falsified his answer to these
questions. When a falsification allegation is controverted, the government has the
burden of proving it. Proof of an omission, standing alone, does not establish or prove
an applicant’s intent or state of mind when the omission occurred. An administrative
judge must consider the record evidence as a whole to determine whether there is
direct or circumstantial evidence concerning an applicant’s intent or state of mind at the
time the omission occurred.  For DC ¶ 16 (a) to apply, the government must establish19
that Applicant’s omission, concealment or falsification in his answer was deliberate.
Applicant did not list his back due child support payments because in his view,
he was paying these regularly and had been for years. He reasonably concluded that
his child support payments were not past due.  Because he listed his education loans,
which are a federal loan, his statement that he missed read the question is credible. His
answer reflects that he read the question as asking for any outstanding federal loans,
not all outstanding loans. When he read the question at the hearing, he recognized that
it was clear in its request. He, however, could not provide further explanation for his
failure to list his other debts. His failure to provide an explanation for his answer is not
enough to establish that he deliberately falsified his SF-85P despite his apparent
knowledge of some other unpaid debts. Guideline E is found in favor of Applicant.
Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
Applicant’s eligibility for a public trust position by considering the totality of the
Applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should
consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) extent to which
participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and
other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct;
(8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the
likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
11
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a public
trust position must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept.       
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case.  Applicant has significant and
longstanding overdue debts. (See AG ¶ 2(a)(1). His problems first began as a young
man, still in college and recently divorced. (See AG ¶ 2(a)(4).) He accumulated debt
because he worked at low income jobs, leaving him with an inability to meet his normal
living expenses and pay his child support and education costs. (See AG ¶ 2(a)(2).)
When he married a second time, Applicant’s income combined with his wife’s income
provided sufficient income to pay housing and two car payments. When the marriage
ended, he lacked funds to pay two car payments and eventually lacked income to pay
even low housing costs. He made a decision twice to return cars to the note holder for
sale and payment of his debt. Under his financial circumstances, his decision to return
the cars for sale to pay off his loans was reasonable. He made this decision without
realizing that he would still owe a substantial debt on cars he no longer possessed. He
did not purposely incur this unpaid debt. Rather, he relied upon advice from the note
holder to his detriment. (See AG ¶ 2(a)(6).) 
Applicant has assumed responsibility for his overdue child support. Despite his
low income, he has paid almost $40,000 of this debt and his nearly $3,000 tax debt. He
still owes his education loans and other small debts, which he will be able to begin
paying in the future. I recognize a promise to pay in the future does not establish
resolution. But such a promise does show he accepts his moral and legal responsibility
to pay his creditors. I found his promise credible. His track record of paying his other
debts provides some corroborating evidence of his good intentions. Under the facts of
this case, Applicant cannot resolve these debts until his current garnishments end,
which will be shortly. He has acted responsibly to his primary debts, particularly given
his very limited income. (See AG ¶ 2(a)(8).) His unpaid debts are not be a source of
improper pressure or duress because he is a responsible individual and a man who
lives very simply. Of course, the issue is not simply whether all his debts are paid Bit is
whether his financial circumstances raise concerns about his fitness to hold a position
of public trust. While some debts remain unpaid, they are insufficient to raise
trustworthiness concerns. Over the years, he has made adjustments in his life because
he lacked the resources to pay his usual and customary bills. He returned two cars
erroneously believing this step would eliminate his debt. He now lives with family
members because he does not have sufficient income to pay the rent for his own
apartment. He has made what changes he can in his lifestyle, which has resulted in
payment of some of his debts. His income prevents him from making any more
payments on his debts. During the last years he has acted responsibly in the
management of his finances given his very limited income. (See AG ¶ 2(a)(1).)  
Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts as to
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a public trust position. He is a good employee,
who has earned several awards. The majority of his debt problems occurred more than
10 years ago. Over the years, he has diligently paid his overdue child support, despite
12
limited income. He has not accumulated significant unpaid debt in recent years and
actively developed a repayment plan with the IRS. His current income leaves little
money to repay additional debt. However, because his garnishments will end shortly, he
will have additional resources to comply with his promise to pay the debts he owes. For
all these reasons, I conclude Applicant mitigated the trustworthiness concerns arising
from his financial considerations. 
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline F: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.g: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.h: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.i: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.j: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.k: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.l: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.m: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline E: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a public trust
position. Eligibility for access to sensitive information is granted.
__________________________________
MARY E. HENRY
Administrative Judge