DOHA acted under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February1
20, 1990), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program  (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the revised adjudicative
guidelines (RAG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and effective within the Department
of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
                                                          )       ISCR Case No. 06-26561
SSN:                     )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: 
Ray T. Blank, Jr., Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Robert W. Rogalski, Personal Representative
______________
Decision
______________
METZ, John Grattan, Jr., Administrative Judge:
On 2 August 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under Guidelines
C and E.  Applicant answered the SOR 28 September 2007, and requested a hearing.1
DOHA assigned the case to me 3 December 2007, and I convened a hearing 8 January
2008. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) 11 January 2008.
 
2
Findings of Fact
Applicant admitted the Guideline C allegations, but denied the Guideline E
allegations. He is a 35-year-old senior policy analyst employed by a defense contractor
since October 2002. He seeks to retain the security clearance he has held since about
March 1992.
Applicant is a dual citizen of the United States (U.S.) and the United Kingdom
(U.K.), having acquired U.S. citizenship by birth and U.K. citizenship by naturalization in
January 2006  (G.E. 1). In January 2006, he obtained a U.K. passport that is valid until
January 2016. He used the U.K. passport to travel to China in 2006 with a U.K. tour
group. He also uses his U.K. passport to obtain access to U.K. military installations to
work on company contracts with the U.K. He holds a security clearance from the U.K.
Applicant described three reasons for obtaining U.K. citizenship (Tr. 45). First,
the U.S. government allows dual citizenship. Second, he was eligible for U.K. citizenship
through his marriage to a U.K. citizen and his residence in the U.K. Third, he thought
U.K. citizenship would be helpful for performing contract work for the U.K. and other
European governments.
Applicant was born, raised, and educated in the U.S. He attended college at a
U.S. military academy, serving as the brigade commander his senior year, and
graduating at the top of his class in June 1995 (G.E. 2). One perquisite of graduating
first in his class was being sent to graduate school immediately, which he attended from
October 1995 to August 1997 in the U.K. While in graduate school, he met his future
wife, a U.K. citizen. They married in the U.K. in January 2000.
Applicant completed his U.S. military obligation in September 2002, having
served two overseas deployments, and having been awarded the meritorious service
medal, the [service] commendation medal (twice), and paratrooper qualifications. He
and his wife settled in the U.K., and he obtained employment with the U.K. subsidiary
(wholly owned) of a major U.S. defense contractor.  The company has stringent
requirements for the work it will undertake for foreign governments (A.E. A),
requirements that apply both organizationally and individually.
Applicant and his wife own a home in the U.K.—with about $600,000 equity—
and have the necessary financial accounts to pay their mortgage and other living
expenses. Applicant has about $110,000 in retirement accounts in the U.S. He
continues to vote in U.S. elections, but has not voted in U.K. elections. He pays taxes
as appropriate to the U.K., the U.S., and his state of legal residence in the U.S.
Before applying for U.K. citizenship, Applicant took reasonable steps to ensure
that he would not be risking his U.S. citizenship by acquiring U.K. citizenship. He
checked both the U.S. Department of State website and with the consular division of the
U.S. Embassy in London. His research satisfied him that his U.S. citizenship was not at
risk. However, he did not contemplate whether acquiring U.K. citizenship would put his
See, Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).2
3
clearance at risk, and so did not inquire about that issue, either with the state
department or company colleagues.
In becoming a naturalized U.K. citizen, Applicant took and oath of loyalty to
“crown and queen.” After acquiring U.K. citizenship, he reported that fact to his
immediate supervisor, and to the company’s human resources division. He assumed
that the information would be through normal company channels anywhere the
information was needed. He did not report the information to the company security
officer until it became an issue during his subject interview in November 2006.
At this stage in his life, Applicant is unwilling to renounce his U.K. citizenship. He
is similarly unwilling to surrender his U.K. passport, as it certifies his citizenship for
access to U.K. military bases required for him to perform contract work for the U.K.
government. He has not obtained U.S. government approval for possession and use of
his U.K. passport.
Policies
The Revised Adjudicative Guidelines (RAG) list factors to be considered in
evaluating an Applicant’s suitability for access to classified information. Administrative
Judges must assess both disqualifying and mitigating conditions under each issue fairly
raised by the facts and circumstances presented. Each decision must also reflect a fair
and impartial common sense consideration of the factors listed in RAG ¶ 2(a). The
presence or absence of a disqualifying or mitigating condition is not determinative for or
against Applicant. However, specific adjudicative guidelines should be followed where a
case can be measured against them, as they represent policy guidance governing the
grant or denial of access to classified information. Considering the SOR allegations and
the evidence as a whole, the relevant, applicable, adjudicative guidelines are Guideline
C (Foreign Preference) and Guideline E (Personal Conduct).
Security clearance decisions resolve whether it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue an Applicant’s security clearance. The government
must prove, by something less than a preponderance of the evidence, controverted
facts alleged in the SOR. If it does so, it establishes a prima facie case against access
to classified information. Applicant must then refute, extenuate, or mitigate the
government’s case. Because no one has a right to a security clearance, the Applicant
bears a heavy burden of persuasion.
Persons with access to classified information enter into a fiduciary relationship
with the government based on trust and confidence. Therefore, the government has a
compelling interest in ensuring each Applicant possesses the requisite judgement,
reliability, and trustworthiness of those who must protect national interests as their own.
The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard compels resolution of any
reasonable doubt about an Applicant’s suitability for access in favor of the government.2
Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 10(a) exercise of any right, privilege, or obligation of foreign citizenship3
after becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family member. This included but is not
limited to: (1) possession of a current foreign passport; accepting educational, medical, retirement, social
welfare, or other such benefits from a foreign country; residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship
requirements; using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business interests in another country; (b) action
to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign citizenship by an American citizen;
Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 11(a) dual citizenship is based solely on parents’ citizenship or birth in4
a foreign country;
¶ 11(b) the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship;5
4
Analysis
The government established a case for disqualification under Guideline C by
showing that Applicant acquired U.K. citizenship in January 2006, and obtained, used,
and continues to use for business purposes, a U.K. passport that will not expire until
January 2016.  Applicant has not mitigated the Guideline C security concerns. Although3
U.S. law recognizes dual citizenship, it does not encourage it—for a variety of practical
reasons. Furthermore, there are significant differences between cases where dual
citizenship arises by operation of law, as is the case when an individual is born a dual
citizen or becomes a naturalized U.S. citizen from a birth country that does not
automatically terminate the foreign citizenship, and cases where a U.S. born citizen
actively seeks foreign citizenship. Those differences are highlighted by the adjudication
guidelines for foreign preference, perhaps more accurately described as divided
preference. For Applicant’s conduct to fall within the security concerns of Guideline C,
he must have acted in a way to indicate a preference for a foreign nation over the
United States. However, inimical intent or detrimental impact on the interests of the
United States is not required before the government can seek to deny access under
Guideline C.
The government has a compelling interest in ensuring those given public trust
positions will make decisions free of concerns for the foreign country of which they may
also be a citizen. Applicant acquired U.K. citizenship by pledging allegiance to the
British crown and the reigning monarch. That oath is more recent in time than any
Applicant took as a commissioned officer in the U.S. military. He used the fact of his U.K
citizenship to acquire a U.K. clearance, which he uses for base access, and presumably
would use to have access to U.K. information in performance of duties for the U.K.
government. Yet, he assures that he could and would protect U.S. information. He fails
to see how his divided preference puts him in an untenable. The U.S. and the U.K.
share a wide variety of common interests. They do not share a unity of interests.
 
Applicant meets none of the mitigating conditions (MC) for foreign preference.
His dual citizenship is based on his actively seeking U.K. citizenship.  He has not4
expressed a willingness to renounce his foreign citizenship.  All exercise of dual5
¶ 11(c) exercise of the rights, privileges, or obligations of foreign citizenship occurred before the individual6
became a U.S. citizen or when the individual was a minor;
¶ 11(d) use of a foreign passport is approved by the cognizant security authority;7
¶ 11(e) the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security authority, or otherwise8
invalidated; 
¶16(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant and material facts from any personnel9
security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, . . . [or]
determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness. . .;
5
citizenship occurred while he was an adult.  Applicant's use of his U.K. passport has not6
been sanctioned by the U.S.  He stated no willingness to invalidate his passport.  While7 8
Applicant has a legal right to maintain his dual citizenship with its attendant benefits and
responsibilities, those benefits and responsibilities create an irreconcilable conflict with
his responsibilities to the United States. I resolve Guideline C against Applicant.
The government failed to establish a case for disqualification under Guideline E.
The government’s evidence does not establish that Applicant was aware of any specific
requirement to report his U.K. citizenship through his company’s security channels.9
Furthermore, Applicant reported his U.K citizenship to his immediate supervisor and the
company human resources division, and not unreasonably assumed that the
information would be disseminated through regular company channels to any division
with a need for that information. I resolve Guideline E for Applicant.
Formal Findings
Paragraph 1. Guideline C: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph d: Against Applicant
Subparagraph e: Against Applicant
Paragraph 2. Guideline E: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph a: For Applicant
6
Conclusion
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant. Clearance denied.
                                              
                                             
JOHN GRATTAN METZ, JR
Administrative Judge