DOHA acted under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February1
20, 1990), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program  (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the revised adjudicative
guidelines (RAG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and effective within the Department
of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
                                                          )         ISCR Case No. 07-04496
SSN:                     )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: 
Emilio Jaksetic, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Kathleen E. Voelker, Esquire
______________
Decision
______________
METZ, John Grattan, Jr., Administrative Judge:
On 14 September 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under
Guidelines C , B, and E.  Applicant answered the SOR 15 October 2007, and requested1
a hearing. DOHA assigned the case to me 3 December 2007, and I convened a hearing
10 January  2008. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) 18 January 2008.
 
At hearing, Department Counsel stated his intent to not pursue SOR allegations 1.d. and 3.a., and requested2
that I enter formal findings for Applicant on those two allegations. I have done so.
2
Findings of Fact
Applicant admitted the SOR allegations except for SOR 1.d. and 3.a.  She is a2
34-year-old senior website developer employed by a defense contractor since August
2007. She has not previously held a security clearance.
Applicant was born in Russia, then a part of the U.S.S.R., in September 1973.
She grew up and was educated there, eventually obtaining the equivalent of a master’s
degree in computer science in October 1995. She first married in September 1992, at
age 19, and she and her husband had a son together, born about a year before they
divorced in August 1994. Her ex-husband is now dead.
In September 1996, she immigrated to the U.S. with her son on a fiancé visa,
having accepted an offer of marriage from a native born U.S. citizen. They married in
December 1996 and divorced in June 2000. They had no children together. Applicant
married her third husband, also a native born U.S. citizen, in August 2001. He adopted
her son in October 2002 (A.E. B). Her son acquired U.S. citizenship with the adoption.
Applicant and her husband own their own home—valued at $630,000—and fully paid
for. She has a company retirement account worth $65,000, and a U.S.-made will. She is
active in the main-line- protestant church she attends with her husband. She votes in
U.S. elections. She donates blood. She has no financial or other interests in Russia.
Applicant became a naturalized U.S. citizen in October 2003. At the time of her
naturalization, she possessed the valid foreign passport required of legal permanent
residents (LPR) by U.S. immigration law. That passport was a renewal she obtained in
August 2000. After becoming a U.S. citizen, she explored the requirements for
renouncing her Russian citizenship through the website maintained by the Russian
Embassy, and discovered that the paperwork requirements—including some she could
only obtain by traveling back to Russia—were so onerous that she decided not to
pursue the issue further. Her Russian passport expired in August 2005.    
Applicant fully disclosed her foreign connections in her December 2005 (G.E. 1)
and September 2006 (G.E. 2) clearance applications, as well as during her December
2006 subject interview. Sometime in 2006, Applicant applied for a new Russian
passport, which she received in September 2006. She used the married name that she
used to emigrate from Russia, as that is the only name Russia would recognize her by.
The passport is valid until September 2011. She has never used the passport to travel
(A.E. B). She obtained the passport solely as a required identity document for her to
accomplish certain legal actions under Russian law, including renunciation of her
Russian citizenship.
Under Russian law, its citizens are identified by name to the property where they
resided in Russia, and an annual fee is charged for each name attached to the
3
residence—regardless of whether that person still lives at that address. Applicant’s
brother was paying the fee where Applicant and her parents lived, but the annual fee
kept increasing. Applicant sought to have her name removed from address. In exploring
the requirements for accomplishing that action, she learned that she could give her
brother a power-of-attorney rather than return to Russia, but that she would have to
provide proof of Russian citizenship in order to execute a legally-effective document at
the Russian Embassy. At the same time, her December 2005 clearance application had
suggested to her that her dual citizenship might have adverse clearance implications.
Researching the requirements for renouncing her Russian citizenship on the Russian
Embassy website (A.E. R), she learned that not only would she have to have a valid
Russian passport to renounce her Russian citizenship, she would have to prove her
entitlement to reside in the U.S., either with a passport or permanent residence card.
However, she also learned that many of the documents required to originate in Russia
could now be obtained by her brother with a valid power-or-attorney.
When Applicant obtained her Russian passport in September 2006, she began
the process of renouncing her Russian citizenship and having her named removed from
her former residence in Russia. The process proved every bit as onerous as she
thought it would be in 2003, when she first decided not to pursue it. However, after
several false starts and additional, previously undisclosed, document requirements,
Applicant succeeded in getting her name off the Russian residence, and finally
submitted her renunciation paperwork to the Russian Embassy in December 2007 (A.E.
M). The announced processing time is four months. In the meantime, Applicant’s facility
security officer (FSO) holds her Russian passport because she cannot surrender it to
the Russian Embassy until her renunciation is approved, at which point the embassy will
take possession and destroy it.
Applicant first learned that her clearance concerns were well-founded when she
received interrogatories from DOHA in July 2007 (G.E. 3). In her July 2007 response,
her FSO (at her previous employer) stated that the Russian passport had been
surrendered to him and his office was assuming responsibility for holding it. He also
indicated he was aware of his obligation to notify DOHA if the passport was returned to
Applicant. This FSO retained the passport until it was retrieved by the assistant FSO at
Applicant’s current employer and transferred to the current FSO. The passport has
remained in the FSO’s possession continually except when—acting on instructions
given to her by DOHA—she gave the passport to Applicant for a brief period when
Applicant was required to produce the passport at the Russian Embassy. Applicant later
returned the passport to the FSO.
Applicant’s parents immigrated to the U.S. in 1998, and live about an hour from
Applicant and her husband. She sees them at least monthly. Her father is a newly-
minted U.S. citizen—December 2007 (A.E. O). Her mother is a legal permanent
resident (LRP) of the U.S., applied for her U.S. citizenship in December 2006 (A.E. P),
and is awaiting her interview. Applicant’s aunt, an accountant for a bank, lives in
Ukraine. Applicant last saw her in 2004, but otherwise has no contact with her.
Applicant went to Ukraine in 2004, because she was on a family vacation in Hungary,
4
and took her husband and son to Ukraine to show them where she spent summers with
her grandmother growing up. She used her U.S. passport to travel to Hungary and
Ukraine (A.E. L). Applicant’s brother lives in Russia. He manages a consumer
electronics store for a French company operating in Russia. Ordinarily, Applicant only
has contact with him on special occasions, like his birthday or New Year’s, but contact
has been much more frequent over the last year as he has served as her middleman
obtaining the Russian documents she required to renounce her Russian citizenship. In
2000, when she was not yet a U.S. citizen, she traveled to Russia for his wedding.
Applicant’s character witnesses, who include her FSO, friends, neighbors, and
her husband, extol her honesty and trustworthiness. Her FSO, who is also a co-owner
of the company, corroborates many details of Applicant’s efforts to renounce her
Russian citizenship, including the instructions she received from DOHA to allow
Applicant to take her passport to the Russian Embassy to process her renunciation. She
also notes that the government agency where Applicant works is so pleased with her
work there that they happily provide the escort required because Applicant does not
have a clearance. Applicant’s former supervisor (A.E. A) is similarly laudatory about her
work and trustworthiness. She received excellent evaluations at two former employers
(A.E. H, I).
Russia—a former Soviet Republic—is a nominal democracy with a mixed human
rights record. It has been the target of terrorist activity in recent years. Russian federal
forces pursuing terrorists act with impunity while engaging in torture, summary
executions, disappearances, and arbitrary detentions. Additional problems include
corruption, media suppression, life-threatening prison conditions, and corruption in law
enforcement.
Russia imposes rigid visa requirements on foreign travelers entering, and
traveling within, Russia. U.S. citizens who have at one time held Russian citizenship
may be required to renounce Russian citizenship before applying for a Russian visa in
their U.S. passport. Unless a Russian citizen has formally renounced his or her Russian
citizenship, he or she risks being considered a Russian citizen and not allowed to depart
except on a Russian passport.
Russia has an active, significant, recent, and ongoing collecting program
focusing on the U.S. As of 2005, Russia was one of the two most aggressive collectors
of sensitive and protected U.S. technology and accounted for much of such targeting.
However, Russia is not known to target U.S. citizens to obtain protected information.
Furthermore, the U.S. and Russia cooperate over a broad spectrum of foreign-policy
issues, particularly counter-terrorism efforts.
Policies
The Revised Adjudicative Guidelines (RAG) list factors to be considered in
evaluating an Applicant’s suitability for access to classified information. Administrative
Judges must assess both disqualifying and mitigating conditions under each issue fairly
See, Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).3
Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 10.(a) exercise of any right, privilege, or obligation of foreign citizenship4
after becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family member. This included but is not
limited to: (1) possession of a current foreign passport; (b) action to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign
citizenship by an American citizen;
5
raised by the facts and circumstances presented. Each decision must also reflect a fair
and impartial common sense consideration of the factors listed in RAG ¶ 2(a). The
presence or absence of a disqualifying or mitigating condition is not determinative for or
against Applicant. However, specific adjudicative guidelines should be followed where a
case can be measured against them, as they represent policy guidance governing the
grant or denial of access to classified information. Considering the SOR allegations and
the evidence as a whole, the relevant, applicable, adjudicative guidelines are Guideline
C (Foreign Preference), Guideline B (Foreign Influence), and Guideline E (Personal
Conduct).
Security clearance decisions resolve whether it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue an Applicant’s security clearance. The government
must prove, by something less than a preponderance of the evidence, controverted
facts alleged in the SOR. If it does so, it establishes a prima facie case against access
to classified information. Applicant must then refute, extenuate, or mitigate the
government’s case. Because no one has a right to a security clearance, the Applicant
bears a heavy burden of persuasion.
Persons with access to classified information enter into a fiduciary relationship
with the government based on trust and confidence. Therefore, the government has a
compelling interest in ensuring each Applicant possesses the requisite judgement,
reliability, and trustworthiness of those who must protect national interests as their own.
The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard compels resolution of any
reasonable doubt about an Applicant’s suitability for access in favor of the government.3
Analysis
The government failed to establish a case for disqualification under Guideline C.
First, on the facts of this case, there is no conceivable way Applicant’s using her
married Russian name, the only name known to Russia when she left the country, to
obtain her Russian passport in September 2006, could be an independent
demonstration of foreign preference (SOR 1.c.). Second, the government takes the
position that actions taken to renounce citizenship should be viewed as a disqualifying
exercise of foreign preference. By the plain language of Guideline C, Applicant’s
actions, which meet the nominal requirements of ¶10,  could raise security concerns4
and might be disqualifying. Her actions are not required to be so viewed, and on the
facts of this case clearly cannot reasonably be so viewed. Put another way, if Applicant
had acted on her desire to renounce her Russian citizenship when she first looked into
the issue in October 2003, while her U.S.-required Russian passport was still valid,
Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 11.(a) dual citizenship is based solely on parents’ citizenship or birth in5
a foreign country;
¶ 11.(b) the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship;6
¶ 11.(c) exercise of the rights, privileges, or obligations of foreign citizenship occurred before the individual7
became a U.S. citizen or when the individual was a minor;
¶ 11.(d) use of a foreign passport is approved by the cognizant security authority;8
¶ 11.(e) the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security authority, or otherwise9
invalidated; 
Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 6.10
6
there would be no Guideline C allegations. However, even were I to find that the
government established security concerns, I conclude that she mitigated the Guideline
C security concerns.
 
As posed by the government, I would have to find that her dual citizenship is not
based solely on her parents’ citizenship, but is based on her active exercise of dual
citizenship after becoming a naturalized U.S. citizen.  However, she not only expressed5
a willingness to renounce her foreign citizenship, she took active and difficult steps to
renounce her foreign citizenship, all while avoiding having to return to Russia.  While all6
exercise of dual citizenship occurred after she obtained U.S. citizenship, as an adult,7
the only use to which she put her Russian passport was tacitly sanctioned by DOHA.8
DOHA instructed Applicant’s FSO to let Applicant take the passport to the Russian
Embassy to process her paperwork. Further, she not only stated willingness to
invalidate her passport, she surrender it to her FSO as soon as she was aware it was
an issue, and waits only approval of her renunciation to return it to the embassy for
destruction.  Her actions have been a consistent effort to remove any possible means of9
foreign influence. I resolve Guideline C for Applicant.
Under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), an applicant’s foreign contacts and
interests may raise security concerns if the individual 1) has divided loyalties or foreign
financial interests, 2) may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group,
organization, or government in a way contrary to U.S. interests, or 3) is vulnerable to
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Foreign influence adjudications can and
should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located—including, but not limited to, whether the country is known
to target U.S. citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism.  Evaluation of an individual’s qualifications for access to protected10
information requires careful assessment of both the foreign entity’s willingness and
ability to target protected information, and to target ex-patriots who are U.S. citizens to
obtain that information, and the individual’s susceptibility to influence, whether negative
or positive. More specifically, an individual’s contacts with foreign family members (or
other foreign entities or persons) raise security concerns only if those contacts create a
Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 7.(a).11
7
heightened risk or foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or
coercion.11
In this case, the government failed to establish a case for disqualification under
Guideline B. Considering first the country involved, Russia and the U.S. enjoy
competitive foreign relations, although they cooperate on a wide variety of issues. While
Russia is actively engaged in the collection of U.S. information, or there is no evidence
suggesting that it targets its expatriate citizens such that would make Applicant or her
family members likely targets for coercion, duress, or influence.
Considering Applicant’s circumstances, the government produced no evidence
that there was a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation,
pressure, or coercion because of her family contacts. Applicant’s foreign travel to
Russia in 2000 and Ukraine in 2004 have no independent security significance. Her
parents were effectively a non-issue since 1998, even more so now that her father is a
U.S. citizen and her mother is well on her way to U.S. citizenship. Applicant’s aunt has
no connection to the Ukranian government, and Applicant has virtually no contact with
her. Similarly, Applicant’s brother has no connection to the Russian government.
Department Counsel has articulated no sensible reason I should consider either as a
potential source of influence on Applicant. I conclude that it is unlikely she can be
pressured based on her contacts with her brother. Accordingly, I resolve Guideline B for
Applicant.
The government requested that I find for Applicant under Guideline E. I granted
the request.
Formal Findings
Paragraph 1. Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph a: For Applicant
Subparagraph b: For Applicant
Subparagraph c: For Applicant
Subparagraph d: For Applicant
Paragraph 2. Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph a: For Applicant
Subparagraph b: For Applicant
Subparagraph c: For Applicant
Subparagraph d: For Applicant
Subparagraph e: For Applicant
Paragraph 3. Guideline E: FOR APPLICANT
8
Subparagraph a: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant. Clearance granted.   
                                              
                                             
JOHN GRATTAN METZ, JR
Administrative Judge