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                        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
----------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 07-08128
SSN: --------------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Gina L. Marine, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
                                                                            
______________
Decision
______________
MARSHALL, Jr., Arthur E., Administrative Judge:
Applicant completed a Security Clearance Application, Standard Form 86 (SF-
86), signed on November 12, 2003. On October 30, 2007, the Defense Office of
Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security
concerns arising under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The action was taken under
Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February
20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial
Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended
(Directive); and the revised Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President
on December 29, 2005, and effective within the Department of Defense for SORs
issued after September 1, 2006. 
On October 12, 2007, Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR. On
November 20, 2007, he submitted his notarized Answer to the SOR, admitted the five
allegations raised in the SOR, and declined to have a hearing. A March 13, 2008, File
of Relevant Material (FORM), including seven documents, was submitted by the
Government. Applicant declined to respond to the FORM, but submitted one additional
 FORM at 3.    1
 Id.    2
 Id. at 4.    3
 Id. at 5.    4
 Item 3, SOR Answer, dated November 20, 2007, at 3. “. . . America is our beloved country. . . . I always    5
dreamed to do something for our country. So when I graduated (college), I (had) already set my mind and
career path to the defense industry.” 
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document on May 13, 2008. It was admitted into the record without objection. Based
upon a review of the case file, exhibits, and testimony, Applicant met his burden of
mitigating security concerns arising under Guideline B. Security clearance is granted.
Procedural Matters
The Government moved administrative notice be taken with regards to certain
items contained in its FORM regarding Vietnam. Administrative notice is hereby taken:
Vietnam, formally the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, is “an authoritarian state ruled by
the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV).”  It often works with China, its largest trading1
partner. U.S.-Vietnam relations “have gradually been normalizing” since the 1990s,
although tensions remain regarding human rights issues.  Arbitrary detentions,2
particularly with regard to political activities, remain a problem. Three Americans were
arrested in Vietnam in 2005 while visiting relatives and charged with plotting violence
against the Vietnamese government.  Police sometimes mistreat those under arrest or3
in custody and arbitrary detentions remain a problem. Freedom of speech and of the
press is restricted, particularly with regard to the Internet and cyber-dissidents.  It is not4
unusual for Vietnamese citizens to be monitored and visitors may be put under
surveillance. Timely notice to the U.S. of the detention of a U.S. citizen in Vietnam is
rare and access to such detainees can be difficult, particularly if they are former citizens
of Vietnam. 
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 53-year-old engineer currently employed by a defense contractor.
He was born in Vietnam to an upper middle class family. Opposed to the encroaching
Communist presence in the country, his family moved south when Vietnam was divided.
There, his father rose to the rank of Vice-Chief of Police in a major city. His mother ran
a business supporting the United States (U.S.) Forces by providing them with fresh
produce. When Communist forces took Vietnam in 1975, Applicant’s father arranged for
the family to flee the country on a U.S. helicopter. The family arrived in the US., which
they now call their “beloved country.”  Applicant became a naturalized U.S. citizen in5
April 1982. In 1984, he completed his academic studies and received a Bachelor of
Science degree in engineering. He purposefully selected his academic major to prepare
himself for employment within the defense industry. He considers such work as his way
 Id.    6
 Id.    7
 Item 6, W orkplace Correspondence Regarding Travel.    8
 Rather than use the term support, Applicant termed the funds his wife owed under her divorce decree “child    9
alimony.” See SOR Answer, dated November 20, 2007.
 Item 3, SOR Answer, dated November 20, 2007, at 2.    10
 Id.    11
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to help “defend and protect [the U.S.].”  Applicant appreciates“the importa[nce] of our6
national security and how to protect it.”7
In 1989, Applicant married a former colleague. After their 2002 divorce, Applicant
decided to visit Vietnam. He had visited it once before, in 2000, and wished to see more
of the country. He advised his employer of his desire to travel to Vietnam and attended
a briefing.  He solicited travel information from Internet sources in around October8
2002. One of those individuals was a female with whom he became a pen pal. 
During his two week trip to Vietnam in January 2003, Applicant met his pen pal.
She was a physician working for a national entity. Her parents, now in their 70s, were
former high school educators and both citizens and residents of Vietnam. Her siblings
are similarly citizens and residents of Vietnam, each college educated and currently in a
lucrative career. The woman also has a son from a prior marriage, born in 1994. When
she sued her ex-husband for divorce in 2001, she relinquished custody in the boy and
agreed to pay her ex-husband approximately $20 U.S. dollars a month for “child
alimony.”  Their relationship is not overtly close and contact is sporadic, consisting of an9
occasional phone call or holiday gift.  Applicant has never met the son.10
After his trip, Applicant reported his activities to his employer. They continued to
correspond. A return trip was planned and his employer was notified. It was taken in the
summer of 2003. Upon his return, Applicant reported his trip and his engagement to the
woman to his security officer. In 2004, Applicant’s fiancee immigrated to the U.S.,
married Applicant, and applied for U.S. citizenship. On December 28, 2007, she
became a naturalized citizen. Applicant describes his relationship with his in-laws as
“good” without elaboration  They do not discuss his work and are unaware of his11
security clearance. His in-laws are content in Vietnam, but hope to visit the U.S. Neither
Applicant nor his wife has returned to Vietnam or seen her family since her 2004
emigration.
Policies
When evaluating an Applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
Administrative Judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list
 See also ISCR Case No. 94-1075 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Aug. 10, 1995).    12
 Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988).    13
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995).    14
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potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in
evaluating an Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. These guidelines
are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior,
these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative
process. The Administrative Judge’s over-arching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial
and common sense decision. Under AG ¶ 2(c), this process is a conscientious scrutiny
of a number of variables known as the “whole person concept.” The Administrative
Judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and
present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based
on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
The Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged
in the SOR. An applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to
rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by
Department Counsel.  The burden of proof is something less than a preponderance of12
evidence.  The ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable clearance decision13
is on an applicant.  14
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration
of the possible risk the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information). “The clearly consistent standard
indicates that security clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of
 Id.    15
 Id.    16
 Executive Order 10865 § 7.    17
 The Government similarly urges application of AG ¶ 7i (conduct, especially while traveling outside the    18
U.S., which may make individual vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a foreign person, group,
government or country). The facts, however, fail to detail any particular conduct on the part of Applicant which,
based on the Government’s submissions for administrative notice regarding the country at issue,  may have
made him vulnerable. There is no indication, for example, that he was involved in any political activities or anti-
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denials.”  Any reasonable doubt about whether an applicant should be allowed access15
to sensitive information must be resolved in favor of protecting such sensitive
information.   The decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not necessarily16
a determination as to the loyalty of an applicant.  It is merely an indication that the17
applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense
have established for issuing a clearance.
Analysis
Based upon consideration of the evidence, I find that GUIDELINE B - FOREIGN
INFLUENCE is most pertinent to the evaluation of the facts in this case. The concern
under that adjudicative guideline is that foreign contacts and interests may be a security
concern if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be
manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in
a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any
foreign interest. The adjudication can and should consider the identity of the foreign
country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not
limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target U.S.
citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.
Conditions pertaining to this adjudicative guideline that could raise a security concern
and may be disqualifying, as well as those which would mitigate security concerns, are
set forth and discussed in the conclusions below.
When Applicant’s wife immigrated to the U.S., she left behind her son, parents,
and siblings, all of whom are residents and citizens of Vietnam. Personal contact is
impossible due to distance, but other forms of contact have been made. This fact raises
concerns under Foreign Influence Disqualifying Conditions (FI DC) AG ¶ 7a (contact
with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other
person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a
heightened risk of exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion), AG ¶
7b (connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a
potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive
information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or
country by providing that information), and AG ¶ 7d (sharing living quarters with a
person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a
heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion).  With18
CPV activity. They only note he visited Vietnam as a tourist and courted his current wife. 
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disqualifying conditions thus raised, the burden shifts to Applicant to mitigate security
concerns.
As a threshold matter, the issue regarding Applicant’s wife’s Vietnamese
citizenship has been made constructively moot by her intervening oath of U.S.
citizenship. Moreover, his unrebutted testimony regarding his trips to Vietnam depict
pleasure holidays. It does not suggest any of the political activities or motives
associated with those types of conduct depicted as provoking scrutiny or action in the
materials administratively noted, nor is it argued that Applicant was in any way politically
active in his trips. Consequently, central focus is thus aimed at the remaining
allegations.
Although Applicant provided considerable written testimony with regard to his
courtship, his travel, and his family, fewer facts are provided regarding his step-son and
in-laws. With regard to his step-son, however, Applicant established that he has never
met the child. Although the bond between mother and child is generally presumed to be
deep and intimate, the facts here are atypical. His wife petitioned for divorce from her
first husband and voluntarily relinquished custody of the child to her ex-husband, to
whom she pays a negligible amount of money for the child’s welfare. Her own contact
with the child is irregular and nominal. When contact is made through the mail or by
telephone it is fleeting, and apparently lacks intimacy. Consequently, Foreign Influence
Mitigating Condition (FI MC) AG ¶ 8c (contact or communication with foreign citizens is
so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation) applies with regard to the minor step-child.
Few facts are presented regarding Applicant’s in-laws. Although his parents-in-
law are retired, it cannot be determined whether they are retired from a state or a
private high school, nor can it be determined whether they are dependent on a state
pension. Similarly, although it has been shown his wife’s siblings are educated
professionals, it is unclear at to whether they or their professions bare any nexus with
the government of Vietnam or the CPV. No facts are given depicting the relationship
between his wife and her family, although it is known neither Applicant nor his wife has
physically seen her family since she moved to the U.S. Furthermore, the relationship
between Applicant and his in-laws is flatly summarized as being “good,” with no
particular intimation of intimacy. With regard to the relationship between his wife and
her parents, there is no description of whether her relationship with them is any deeper
or more frequently maintained than the relationship she has with her son.
Consequently, neither AG ¶ 8a (the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the
country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group,
organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.) nor AG ¶ 8c (contact or
 FI MC AG ¶ 8d and ¶ 8f are not applicable.    19
 This is particularly true given the FORM’s representation of the types of potential human rights threats    20
Vietnam might pose, which does not include evidence that Vietnam actively seeks to inveigle industrial secrets
from U.S. citizens through their kin remaining in Vietnam or is otherwise linked to terrorism.  See AG ¶ 6.
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communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little
likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation) applies.  19
The facts show, however, that Applicant properly apprised his employer with
facts regarding his travel to Vietnam and his growing relationship with his new wife.
Neither the SOR nor the record indicate he ever failed to comply with any controlling
reporting requirements. Therefore, FI MC AG ¶ 8e (the individual has promptly complied
with existing agency requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or
threats from persons, groups, or organizations from a foreign country). 
Furthermore, the facts squarely demonstrate that Applicant and his immediate
family are predisposed to the American way of life and have both a deeply rooted
allegiance to the U.S. and an antipathy for its enemies that predates their immigration:
The family was relatively affluent and fled to South Vietnam en masse when the country
was divided. There, his father worked to maintain law and order while his mother
worked to support U.S. operations in that region. The family fled Vietnam in 1975
through assistance received from the U.S. The family then immigrated to the U.S. and
settled. In college, Applicant prepared himself for a career that would help him
contribute to U.S. national security. He has worked extensively and successfully in that
area for nearly 25 years. His written testimony reflects that he relishes his U.S.
citizenship, his life in his “beloved country,” and his ability to help protect this country.
Such unwavering devotion is notable. The facts give rise to FI MC AG ¶ 8b (there is no
conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the
foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such
deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be
expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest).20
Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, the Administrative Judge must evaluate an
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the
Applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances. The Administrative Judge should
consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): “(1) the nature,
extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct,
to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct;
(4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) extent to which
participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other
permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for
pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or
recurrence.” Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility
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for a public trust position must be an overall common sense judgment based upon
careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept. 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, as well as the “whole person”
factors noted above. I particularly note that Applicant successfully raised FI MC AG¶ 8b
and ¶ 8e. Applicant is an immigrant who speaks of this country in reverent terms. He is
a mature man who has proven himself to be goal-oriented and devoted to serving this
country as best he can. An engineer/scientist who has devoted his professional life to
the U.S. defense industry and possesses 25 years of experience working with protected
information, there is no question with regard to his affinity for and loyalty to the U.S.
Moreover, while inadequate facts were raised to gauge his wife’s long-distance
relationship with her family or determine whether Applicant has any genuine allegiance
to his in-laws, there are no facts indicating his affinity for these people is as strong as
his demonstrated allegiance to his adopted country. Further, while the Government’s
materials depict unresolved human rights issues in Vietnam, particularly with regard to
active dissidents, there is no evidence that country endeavors to gather or extort secret
information through American kin residing in Vietnam or otherwise targets Americans
on simple pleasure holidays. These facts, taken together with the mitigating conditions
raised, and after consideration of Applicant as a whole, lead me to conclude that the
security concerns raised have been mitigated and that it is in the national interest to
grant or continue Applicant’s security clearance. Security clearance is granted.  
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Clearance is granted.
__________________________
ARTHUR E. MARSHALL, JR.
Administrative Judge