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                            DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
             DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
----------, ----------- )       ISCR Case No. 07-09816
SSN: ------ ---- -------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Melvin A. Howry, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Heidi L. Evatt, Esquire
______________
Decision
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WHITE, David M., Administrative Judge:
Applicant was born in Afghanistan and came to live in the U.S. in 1973. His step-
mother and nine half-siblings are foreign citizens and residents. He volunteered to serve
as an interpreter and cultural expert in support of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. His service
there, with an interim clearance, has been superior and performed at great personal
risk. Based upon thorough review of the case file, pleadings, exhibits, and testimony,
eligibility for access to classified information is granted. 
Applicant submitted his Security Clearance Application (SF 86), on December 10,
2007. On February 8, 2008, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under
Guideline B. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the revised adjudicative
guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and effective
within the Department of Defense (DoD) for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
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Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on February 29, 2008. He answered
the SOR in writing (Answer) on March 16, 2008, and requested a hearing before an
administrative judge. DOHA received the request on March 31, 2008. Department
Counsel was prepared to proceed on April 23, 2008, and DOHA assigned the case to
me on May 2, 2008. 
DOHA issued a Notice of Hearing on May 6, 2008, and I convened the hearing
as scheduled on May 15, 2008. During initial scheduling discussions with Department
Counsel, Applicant requested prompt scheduling of his hearing so he could return to his
duties supporting his Army special forces unit in Afghanistan as soon as possible. He
agreed to waive his right to 15-day notice, and he and his counsel confirmed that waiver
during the hearing. (Tr. at 7-9.) The Government offered exhibits (GE) 1 and 2, which
were admitted without objection. Department Counsel also submitted a request for
administrative notice, with eight exhibits attached in support of the request. The request
was marked Hearing Exhibit (HE) II, and the supporting documents were marked
Administrative Notice (AN) exhibits I through VIII. Applicant testified on his own behalf,
and submitted Applicant’s Exhibits (AE) A through E, which were admitted without
objection. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on May 23, 2008. 
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 57-year-old employee of a defense contractor. He was born and
raised in Afghanistan. (GE 1 at 1.) Applicant’s mother died when he was about 18
months old. He was raised solely by his grandmother until he was four years old, when
the two of them moved back to live with his father. Shortly thereafter, his father married
his step-mother. Over the next 18 years, Applicant’s five half-sisters and four half-
brothers were born. Although Applicant lived in the family home until leaving for college,
he was mainly cared for by his grandmother and was never close with his step-mother
or her children. In his Answer, Applicant admitted the truth of the allegations in SOR ¶¶
1.a through 1.d, concerning his step-mother and half-siblings, but clarified that one of
his two half-brothers living in Germany is a German citizen. During the hearing he also
reported that one of his half-sisters, a married housewife, now lives in Pakistan.
(Answer; GE 1 at 4-5, Tr. at 130, 158.)
After his sophomore year of college,Applicant’s university was shut down due to
student unrest and rioting. Because he spoke English well, he was hired to work in the
U.S. Embassy. After working there for a few years, he was arrested by the Afghan
secret police and charged with spying for the U.S. He was released after a couple of
weeks on condition that he promise to no longer work for the Americans and not to
leave Kabul. He had previously been accepted at an American university to finish his
education, and had sent some money to a bank account in the U.S. in preparation.
When he told people at the U.S. embassy about his arrest and concerns over further
trouble, they accelerated approval of his student visa, and he left to come to the United
States permanently in March 1973. The only people who knew he was leaving for good
were his father and grandmother. (Tr. at 99-111.)
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Applicant finished college in 1976, and married his wife in October of that year.
She is a U.S. citizen by birth. (GE 1 at 2, 3.) He became a naturalized U.S. citizen in
1983. He worked as a banker until losing his job in a reorganization in about 1990. He
then worked for two other companies in the same area until 1996, when he moved to
the New York city metropolitan area in search of employment. During those twenty
years, he was active in several community organizations. While searching for a better
job, a process hampered by his lack of computer skills, he worked as a limousine driver.
He was working, and personally witnessed, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center on September 11, 2001. He was horrified, and promptly called the FBI to offer
any possible assistance he could with his knowledge of Afghanistan. He also called
several days later to report a suspicious passenger he was hired to take to the airport.
Eventually, he was contacted and recruited by his present employer to act as an
interpreter/translator/cultural advisor for U.S. military forces in Afghanistan, starting in
2004. He was granted an interim security clearance and worked with significant
classified information in the performance of his duties. He always handled sensitive and
classified information properly and in the best interest of the United States and U.S.
forces. (Tr. at 33-35, 56-58, 97-98, 123-127.) 
Without including too many details in this opinion, I will summarize that his
performance in Afghanistan, in direct support of numerous major combat operations and
community relations efforts, has been superior. As a result, he has been personally
requested to remain in a very important area supporting sequential rotations of special
forces units. (Tr. at 60-66.) His commander and operations officer from the unit he
supported that most recently returned to the U.S. both testified to his demonstrated
dedication, loyalty, and trustworthiness during intensive combat operations. His
commander testified, “[Applicant] is one of the most loyal and trustworthy Americans
and individuals I have ever worked with before.” This colonel has worked overseas with
interpreters and advisors throughout his 20 year career, and found Applicant to be, “by
far the most effective and loyal of those individuals.” (Tr. at 31-32.) He frequently
accompanied members of his unit into combat operations at great personal risk, and
was injured during one such operation. His importance to the commander was so high
that he eventually limited Applicant’s exposure to combat to minimize the risk of losing
an irreplaceable asset. (Tr. at 44-45, 49-53.) His former operations officer, with whom
he also worked very closely for nine months, described him as “a patriot ... more
American than myself. He loves the United States ... [and] would do nothing that would
... harm this country, harm its efforts in Afghanistan, or absolutely positively put in
harm’s way one of the soldiers in our units.” (Tr. at 58-59.) Both officers said his family
members created no security concerns for them, and expressed full conviction that he
would report any effort to influence or threaten his family members by any non-U.S.
group to his commander immediately rather than respond unilaterally or compromise
sensitive information in response to such acts. (Tr. at 41-46, 58.) He has received
numerous awards and accolades from a succession of commanders he has served, and
provided a substantial number of letters of recommendation commending his service
and character. (Tr. at 66-67, 139-154; AE E.)
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Applicant’s father was apprehended by government forces in the early 1980s,
during the Soviet occupation, and was never heard from again. Applicant presumes he
was killed. He went to Pakistan twice during the early 1980s, and worked with the U.S.
embassy there, to attempt to find what happened to his father and help him emigrate if
possible. Applicant was unable to locate him, nor has his step-mother or any half-sibling
ever seen his father again. He was able to assist one half-brother, who is now a
German citizen and resident, emigrate during the second trip. (Tr. at 115-119.) He made
an undetermined but small number of other trips to Afghanistan and Pakistan between
1983 and 2004. He did see his family members and contact them by telephone
infrequently during those years. After his return to Afghanistan in 2004, he also visited
them on several occasions, including once when the family held a memorial service to
commemorate his father. These visits, since 2004, took place with the knowledge,
permission, and encouragement of his commander, who was able to and did keep track
of his whereabouts as a safety matter. (GE 2 at 4-5; Tr. at 35-39, 119-122.) Applicant
and his family members belong to a minority ethnic group in Afghanistan that live in an
area away from Taliban influence and support the coalition. None of them has any
connection to either the Afghan government or the Taliban. (Tr. at 49, 132-133.) While
they, like everyone in Afghanistan, is at risk of violence or terrorist attack, Applicant’s
commander assessed that any additional risk to his family from his status as an
American fighting with government and coalition forces was marginal, and was never a
concern that Applicant expressed in any way. (Tr. at 48-49.) Applicant owns no property
and has no financial assets in Afghanistan. (Tr. at 136.) He never discusses his work
with his family members. His testimony during the hearing was forthright and credible.
I have taken administrative notice of the facts set forth in HE II, including the
present dangerous nature of Afghanistan and the ongoing fighting there between
Afghan government and coalition forces against the Taliban. There is no evidence of
Afghan government espionage activity directed toward their U.S. or coalition allies in
this fight. That government is working to establish a functional democracy.
Policies
When evaluating an Applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are used to evaluate
an Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s over-arching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common sense decision. According to AG ¶¶
2(a) and 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable guidelines in
the context of a number of variables known as the “whole person concept.” The
administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person,
past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
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The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified
information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I
have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on the
evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “The applicant is
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” Section 7
of Executive Order 10865 provides that “Any determination under this order adverse to
an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no
sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” 
A person applying for access to classified information seeks to enter into a
fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. 
Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk the Applicant
may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified information. Such
decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation as to potential,
rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
AG ¶ 6 expresses the security concern regarding foreign influence:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
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AG ¶ 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying. Department Counsel argued that the evidence in this case established two
of them: 
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.
Applicant has had some contact over the years with his step-mother and half-siblings.
Since he began working for U.S. forces in Afghanistan in 2004, he has seen those who
are presently in Afghanistan (step-mother, two half-brothers, and four half-sisters)
several times, with full command knowledge and permission on each occasion. His
contact with them creates a marginally heightened risk to their potential subjection to
exploitation, pressure or coercion. Because they belong to an ethnic minority that is
strongly opposed to the Taliban, they would not willingly assist in any efforts to hurt U.S.
or coalition interests. Applicant’s connections to his family in Afghanistan could create a
potential conflict of interest between his security obligations and his desire to help them
only in a situation wherein they were taken hostage or otherwise threatened with harm if
he did not cooperate. None of them have any government connection or other position
in which they could otherwise benefit from his provision of sensitive information or
technology. Thus, under either disqualifying condition, security concerns in this case
would arise in connection with the potential that hostile forces might seek protected
information from Applicant by threatening harm to his family members in Afghanistan. 
AG ¶ 8 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns. Those with
potential application in this case are:
(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those
persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be
placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the
U.S.;
(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest;
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(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation;
(d) the foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government business or
are approved by the cognizant security authority; and,
(e) the individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements
regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons,
groups, or organizations from a foreign country.
The positions and activities of Applicant’s family members in Afghanistan involve
no government or military connection and they would have no interest in acquiring
protected information. Only their physical presence creates the potential that their
interests could be threatened to the point that Applicant would confront a choice
between their interests and those of the U.S. Because they and their community are
strongly opposed to forces hostile to U.S. interests in Afghanistan, the likelihood of such
a situation is substantially reduced. The Afghan government is a U.S. ally that does not
pose an intelligence risk through Applicant’s family members, who are supporters of the
Afghan and coalition efforts to defeat the Taliban and establish a working democracy. 
Applicant produced very significant evidence establishing mitigating condition
8(b). He does feel some loyalty to his family members in Afghanistan, but far less than
he would to any full-blooded relatives. By his actions in support of U.S. operations there,
and by the testimonials of many experienced officers with whom he has served,
Applicant’s relationships and loyalties in and toward the U.S. are so deep and
longstanding that he would absolutely resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S.
interest. He moved permanently to the U.S. in 1973, and became a citizen in 1983. He
has willingly and frequently risked his own life in combat and combat support
operations, and testified convincingly that he would resolve any threat to his family
members by immediately reporting it to his military superiors. He knows he could do
nothing by himself that would actually benefit any relative who might be held or
threatened by hostile forces, so the compromise of classified information would not
benefit their interest in any event. 
Applicant and his counsel attempted to establish mitigating condition 8(c) through
description of his contacts and communications with his family members as infrequent.
In addition to the presumption that contact with family members is not casual, I find that
the number of ongoing contacts and communications with his family members over the
35 years since he left Afghanistan do not establish casual and infrequent contacts under
governing Appeal Board case law. However, all of Applicant’s contacts and activities
with his relatives since he returned to Afghanistan and began working with sensitive
information have been approved, and even encouraged, by his unit commander and
security personnel. He has properly reported all unofficial foreign contacts, and there
have been no requests or threats to report. This establishes mitigation under AG ¶¶ 8(d)
and (e).
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Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) extent to which
participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and
other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct;
(8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the
likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall common sense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept.    
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Although this case concerns
Guideline B, and security concerns do not arise from any questionable conduct by
Applicant, several factors bear further analysis. He is a mature and serious individual
whose dedication to supporting U.S. national security interests is evident from his
demeanor and his actions. After personally witnessing the September 11 terrorist
attacks on New York City, Applicant was motivated, by patriotism and a strong desire to
serve U.S. national interests, to volunteer for service as an interpreter and cultural
expert in support of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. He has done so, at great personal risk,
for some four years and is highly sought after by unit after unit based on his expertise
and demonstrated dedication to furthering U.S. interests there. While holding an interim
clearance, he carefully safeguarded sensitive information and complied diligently with all
security procedures. 
The Appeal Board has recognized an exception to the general rule that
administrative judges are not required to assign an applicant’s prior history of
compliance with security procedures and regulations significant probative value in
Guideline B cases. This exception arises, “where the applicant has established by
credible, independent evidence that his compliance with security procedures and
regulations occurred in the context of dangerous, high-risk circumstances in which the
applicant had made a significant contribution to national security.” ISCR Case No. 05-
03846 at 6 (App. Bd. Nov. 14, 2006) citing ISCR Case No. 04-12363 at 2 (App. Bd. July
14, 2006). While not recited in detail in my findings of fact, for reasons of privacy and
security, this record is replete with exactly such credible independent evidence, which
has been considered in reaching my decision.   
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On balance, Applicant presented sufficient evidence to fully mitigate reliability
and trustworthiness security concerns arising from the citizenship status and residence
of his step-mother and half-siblings in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Germany. Overall, the
record evidence leaves no doubt as to Applicant’s present eligibility and suitability for a
security clearance. For all these reasons, I conclude Applicant has mitigated the
security concerns arising under Guideline B. 
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d:                                   For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a
security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.       
                                  
DAVID M. WHITE
Administrative Judge