DOHA acted under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February1
20, 1990), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program  (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the revised adjudicative
guidelines (RAG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and effective within the Department
of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
 )       ISCR Case No. 07-14461
SSN:                     )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: 
Paul M. DeLaney, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
______________
METZ, John Grattan, Jr., Administrative Judge:
On 13 March 2008, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued
a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under
Guidelines B and C.  Applicant answered the SOR 15 April 2008, and requested a1
hearing. DOHA assigned the case to me 9 May 2008, and I convened a hearing 5 June
2008. DOHA received the transcript (Tr.) 16 June 2008.
 
Applicant eventually obtained a graduate degree in May 2004.2
2
Findings of Fact
Applicant admitted the allegations of the SOR, except for SOR 1.b., 1.e.,
and 1.f., and 2.a. She is a 29-year-old consultant employed by a defense contractor
since April 2007. She has not previously held a clearance.
Applicant was born in the U.S. in June 1978, to Iranian nationals residing in the
U.S. while her father attended school. She obtained U.S. citizenship by birth and
derived Iranian citizenship through her parents. When she was a year old, she returned
to Iran with her parents, and resided continuously there until December 2000.
Applicant was raised and educated in Iran. Her parents opposed the Islamic
fundamentalist government that took power when the Shah was overthrown in January
1979, and were imprisoned when Applicant was five years old for that opposition. Her
father died in prison two years later, and her mother was imprisoned for six years before
being released. During these six years, Applicant lived with her grandmother, with
whom she is understandably close. When Applicant lived in Iran, she voted in one
election. The record evidence is contradictory, but Applicant voted absentee in an
Iranian election at least once, possibly twice.
Applicant graduated from college in Iran in June 2000. She attended college on a
government-funded scholarship awarded when she passed an entrance examination. In
June 2000, she made her pilgrimage to Mecca (Haj), Saudi Arabia, traveling on a
special Haj passport issued by the Iranian government that only permitted her to travel
from Iran to Saudi Arabia and return.
In September 2000, Applicant obtained her first U.S. passport, in anticipation of
traveling to the U.S. to continue her education.  Because Iran does not recognize her2
U.S. citizenship, Applicant obtained her Iranian passport—required for her to leave Iran
—in November 2000. In January 2006, she had its validity extended to November 2010
(G.E. 4). She used her Iranian passport to travel to Iran in December 2004 and
December 2006, because she is unable to enter or exit Iran on her U.S. passport.
Applicant came to the U.S. in December 2000. In November 2000, she married
her fiancé, an Iranian national, after moving up the wedding date because they
concluded it would be easier to get him a spouse visa to immigrate to the U.S. than to
get a fiancé visa. Applicant’s spouse immigrated to the U.S. as a legal permanent
resident in April 2003. Although not legally separated, they began living separately in
October 2006 (G.E. 1), and were subsequently divorced in January 2008 (A.E. A), after
he became a naturalized U.S. citizen. Applicant began living with her current boyfriend
(also an Iranian national) in June 2006; they are now engaged.
Applicant’s mother immigrated to the U.S. in October 2005, lives with Applicant,
and is a legal permanent resident (LPR) of the U.S. eligible to apply for her U.S.
3
citizenship next year. She intends to do so. However, she has returned to Iran since
immigrating to the U.S. to visit her mother and other daughter. Applicant’s sister is a
resident citizen of Iran, employed as a contact accountant for the government-owned
petroleum company (G.E. 4, A.E. B). Applicant speaks to her by telephone every two
weeks, and visits her when she travels to Iran. Applicant’s grandmother is also a
resident citizen of Iran. Applicant speaks to her by telephone every two months, and
visits her when she travels to Iran. Applicant expects to travel to Iran in the future to visit
her sister and grandmother.
In her August 2007 subject interview (G.E. 2), Applicant expressed an
unwillingness to renounce her Iranian citizenship (which she acknowledge having
acquired by birth) or to destroy her Iranian passport. She is unwilling to renounce her
Iranian citizenship because Iran law would not allow her to travel to Iran in the future,
and she wants to be able to visit her sister and grandmother in Iran. In her January
2008 response to DOHA interrogatories (G.E. 3), Applicant restated her unwillingness to
surrender her Iranian passport because it would curtail her ability to travel to Iran.
Except as noted above, Applicant has no ties to Iran even though she lived most
of her life there. Her financial interests are all in the U.S. However, the record contains
no information about her work performance and reliability, or evidence of her
connections to the U.S. aside from her residing here since December 2000. 
Iran is a fundamentalist Islamic republic with a poor human rights record. Its
relations with the U.S. are confrontational and unlikely to improve given Iran’s efforts to
acquire nuclear weapons, its sponsorship of, support for, and involvement in,
international terrorism, and its support for violent opposition to the Middle East peace
process. Nevertheless, Iran is not a known collector of U.S. intelligence or sensitive
economic information, nor is it known to target U.S. citizens to obtain protected
information. 
Travel to Iran remains problematic. The Department of State’s May 2007 Travel
Warning continues to warn U.S. citizens to carefully consider the risks of travel to Iran,
noting that dual national Iranian-American citizens may encounter difficulty in departing
Iran. Some elements of the Iranian government and population remain hostile to the
U.S. Consequently, American citizens may be subject to harassment or arrest while
traveling or residing in Iran. Americans of Iranian origin are urged to consider the risk of
being targeted by authorities before planning travel to Iran. In addition, Iranian
authorities may deny dual nationals access to the U.S. Interests Section in Tehran,
because they are considered to be solely Iranian citizens. Large-scale demonstrations
have taken place in various regions throughout Iran over the past several years as a
result of a sometimes volatile political climate. U.S. citizens who travel to Iran despite
the travel warning are urged to exercise caution.
The U.S. government does not currently have diplomatic or consular relations
with the Islamic Republic of Iran, and, therefore, cannot provide protection or routine
consular services to American citizens in Iran. The Swiss government, acting through its
See, Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).3
4
Embassy in Tehran, serves as protecting power for U.S. interests in Iran. Neither U.S.
passports nor visas to the United States are issued in Tehran. The Iranian government
does not recognize dual citizenship and generally does not permit the Swiss to provide
protective services for U.S. citizens who are also Iranian nationals. In addition, U.S.
citizens of Iranian origin who are considered by Iran to be Iranian citizens have been
detained and harassed by Iranian authorities.
Policies
The Revised Adjudicative Guidelines (RAG) list factors to be considered in
evaluating an Applicant’s suitability for access to classified information. Administrative
Judges must assess both disqualifying and mitigating conditions under each issue fairly
raised by the facts and circumstances presented. Each decision must also reflect a fair
and impartial common sense consideration of the factors listed in RAG ¶ 2(a). The
presence or absence of a disqualifying or mitigating condition is not determinative for or
against Applicant. However, specific adjudicative guidelines should be followed where a
case can be measured against them, as they represent policy guidance governing the
grant or denial of access to classified information. Considering the SOR allegations and
the evidence as a whole, the relevant, applicable, adjudicative guidelines are Guideline
B (Foreign Influence) and Guideline C (Foreign Preference).
Security clearance decisions resolve whether it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue an Applicant’s security clearance. The government
must prove, by something less than a preponderance of the evidence, controverted
facts alleged in the SOR. If it does so, it establishes a prima facie case against access
to classified information. Applicant must then refute, extenuate, or mitigate the
government’s case. Because no one has a right to a security clearance, the Applicant
bears a heavy burden of persuasion.
Persons with access to classified information enter into a fiduciary relationship
with the government based on trust and confidence. Therefore, the government has a
compelling interest in ensuring each Applicant possesses the requisite judgement,
reliability, and trustworthiness of those who must protect national interests as their own.
The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard compels resolution of any
reasonable doubt about an Applicant’s suitability for access in favor of the government.3
Analysis
Under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), an applicant’s foreign contacts and
interests may raise security concerns if the individual 1) has divided loyalties or foreign
financial interests, 2) may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group,
organization, or government in a way contrary to U.S. interests, or 3) is vulnerable to
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Foreign influence adjudications can and
should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 6.4
Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 7.(a).5
The chronology of Applicant’s marriage, her husband’s subsequent immigration to the U.S. and naturalization6
as a U.S. citizen, and their later separation and divorce suggests that his immigration requirements were as
important a consideration for their relationship as any mutual emotional commitment.
Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 7.(a).7
5
financial interest is located—including, but not limited to, whether the country is known
to target U.S. citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism.  Evaluation of an individual’s qualifications for access to protected information4
requires careful assessment of both the foreign entity’s willingness and ability to target
protected information, and to target ex-patriots who are U.S. citizens to obtain that
information, and the individual’s susceptibility to influence, whether negative or positive.
More specifically, an individual’s contacts with foreign family members (or other foreign
entities or persons) raise security concerns only if those contacts create a heightened
risk or foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.5
In this case, the government failed to establish a case for disqualification under
Guideline B as regards her mother, her current fiancé, her sister’s employment, or her
ex-husband and in-laws. Considering first the foreign country involved, Iran and the U.S.
enjoy strained foreign relations at best. However, Iran is not a known collector of U.S.
intelligence or sensitive economic information, or known to target U.S. citizens to obtain
protected information. Her divorce largely renders moot the security concerns raised by
her ex-husband and former in-laws, as those relationships do not appear to have been
particularly close.  Security concerns regarding her mother are mitigated by mother’s6
LPR status in the U.S. and her prospective U.S. citizenship. Similarly, her current
fiance’s LPR status in the U.S. vitiates the potential security concerns raised by their
cohabitation. The security concerns regarding her sister are attenuated because the
sister works for a contractor, not directly for the Iranian government. On balance, the
government’s evidence failed to establish that there was any risk, much less a
heightened risk, of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion
because of these family contacts inside or outside Iran.
Nevertheless, the government established a case for disqualification under
Guideline B because of her close and continuing contacts with her sister and her
grandmother as evidenced by her regular telephone contact, her travel to Iran in
December 2004 and December 2006, and her stated intent to travel to Iran in the
future.  Ordinarily, travel to a foreign country—even a country of origin—has no7
independent security significance, but only serves to demonstrate an Applicant’s ties of
affection to family members residing there. However, in this case Applicant travels to
Iran, and subjects herself to the jurisdiction of a government that is not only hostile to
the U.S., but considers her to be only an Iranian citizen and thus likely to be denied
access to what little assistance is available to U.S. citizens through the U.S. Interests
Section in Tehran. Even though Iran is not an active collector of sensitive U.S.
Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 10.(a) exercise of any right, privilege, or obligation of foreign citizenship8
after becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family member. This included but is not
limited to: (1) possession of a current foreign passport; . .  (3) ((3) accepting educational  . . .  or other such
benefits from a foreign country; . . . (7) voting in a foreign election; b) action to acquire or obtain recognition
of a foreign citizenship by an American citizen;
Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 11.(a) dual citizenship is based solely on parents’ citizenship or birth in9
a foreign country;
¶ 11.(b) the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship;10
¶ 11. © exercise of the rights, privileges, or obligations of foreign citizenship occurred before the individual11
became a U.S. citizen or when the individual was a minor;
¶ 11.(d) use of a foreign passport is approved by the cognizant security authority;12
¶ 11.(e) the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security authority, or otherwise13
invalidated; 
6
information, an applicant in Applicant’s circumstances who travels to Iran presents a
potential target of opportunity that presents an unacceptable risk of being coerced to
provide information. I resolve Guideline B against Applicant.
The government also established a case for disqualification under Guideline C by
showing that Applicant obtained an Iranian passport in November 2000, had it extended
in January 2006, used it to travel to Iran in December 2004 and December 2006, and
intends to use it to travel to Iran in the future, despite being a U.S. citizen since birth. In
addition, she also accepted educational benefits from Iran that were only available to
her as an Iranian citizen and voted in Iranian elections.8
Applicant has not mitigated the Guideline C security concerns. Although she has
been a dual citizen of Iran and the United States since her birth, her Iranian citizenship
would have little security significance if based solely on her parents’ citizenship. For her
conduct to fall within the security concerns of Guideline C, she must have acted in a
way to indicate a preference for a foreign nation over the United States. However,
inimical intent or detrimental impact on the interests of the United States is not required
before the government can seek to deny access under Guideline C. The government
has a compelling interest in ensuring those entrusted with this nation's secrets will make
decisions free of concerns for the foreign country of which they may also be a citizen.
 
Applicant meets none of the mitigating conditions (MC) for foreign preference.
Her dual citizenship is not based solely on her parents’ citizenship, but is based on her
active exercise of dual citizenship after being born a U.S. citizen.  She has not9
expressed a willingness to renounce her foreign citizenship.  All exercise of dual10
citizenship occurred after she obtained U.S. citizenship, while she was an adult.11
Applicant's use of her Iranian passport has not been sanctioned by the U.S.  She is not12
willing to invalidate her passport or refrain from traveling to Iran.  While Applicant has a13
legal right to maintain her dual citizenship with its attendant benefits and responsibilities,
7
she has not demonstrated that she can be counted on to always act in preference to the
United States. Indeed, a common sense reading of the record reveals no compelling
reason to review her attachments to the U.S. as stronger than her attachments to Iran. I
resolve Guideline C against Applicant.
Formal Findings
Paragraph 1. Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph b: For Applicant
Subparagraph c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph d: For Applicant
Subparagraph e: For Applicant
Subparagraph f: For Applicant
Paragraph 2. Guideline C: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph d: Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant. Clearance denied.
                                              
                                             
JOHN GRATTAN METZ, JR
Administrative Judge