1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 07-15116
SSN: )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Gina Marine, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
                            
______________
Decision
______________
HENRY, Mary E., Administrative Judge:
Based upon a review of the case file, pleadings, exhibits, and testimony,  I
conclude that Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information must be denied.
Applicant submitted her Security Clearance Application (SF 86), on March 13,
2007. On March 4, 2008, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the security concerns under Guideline B for
Applicant. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified
Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense
Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program
(January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG)
promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and effective within the
Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on March 13, 2008. She answered
the SOR in writing on March 18, 2008, and requested a hearing before an
Tr. 8-9.1
GE 1 (Applicant’s security clearance application, dated March 13, 2007) at 2, 28; Tr. 28.2
GE 1, supra note 2, at 2-4, 6, 10-12, 14-15; AE I (Copy of Applicant’s passport); Tr. 27, 32-35.3
2
administrative judge. DOHA received the request in March 2008. Department Counsel
was prepared to proceed on April 11, 2008, and I received the case assignment on April
16, 2008. DOHA issued a notice of hearing on May 9, 2008, which Applicant
acknowledged receiving more than 15 days before the hearing.  I convened the hearing1
as scheduled on June 5, 2008. The government offered two exhibits (GE) 1 and 2,
which were received and admitted into evidence without objection. Applicant testified on
her own behalf. She submitted 12 exhibits (AE) A through L, which were received and
admitted into evidence without objection. DOHA received the transcript of the hearing
(Tr.) on June 16, 2008. The record closed on June 5, 2008.
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings
Request for Administrative Notice
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice
of certain facts relating to the People’s Republic of China (the PRC). (Tr. 12-14) The
request and the attached documents were not admitted into evidence but were included
in the record as Administrative Exhibits I to VI. The facts administratively noticed are set
out in the Findings of Fact, below. 
Findings of Fact
In her Answer to the SOR, dated March 18, 2008, Applicant admitted the factual
allegations in ¶¶ 1.a through 1.d of the SOR, with explanations. She denied the security
concern set forth in ¶ 1 of the SOR.
Applicant, who is 45 years old, works as an engineer and lead architect for a
defense contractor. She began working for her current employer in 1997. At its request,
she completed and submitted a security clearance application in March 2007.  2
Applicant and her husband were born in the PRC. She received a bachelor’s
degree and a master’s degree in science from major universities in the PRC. She met
her husband while in graduate school. They married in 1987 in China. Her husband
moved to the United States shortly thereafter to begin work on his doctorate degree.
Applicant came to the U..S. in March 1989 to start work on her doctorate degree. Both
received their doctorate degrees from an American university. An American university
awarded Applicant a Masters in Business Administration in 2002. She and her husband
became naturalized U.S. citizens in February 2000 and hold U.S. passports. Applicant’s
husband is a tenured professor at an American university. They have a 16-year-old son
and a 9-year-old daughter, who were born in the U.S. and reside in the U.S.3
AE K (Salary verification); AE L (Financial documents); Tr. 35-36.4
AE A (Applicant’s written statement, dated May 28, 2008) at 5-6; Tr. 42-44, 56-60.5
GE 1, supra note 2, at 15-17; AE A, supra note 5, at 6; Tr. 48-49, 69-70.6
AE A, supra note 5, at 6; Tr. 49-50, 60-66, 70-71.7
Tr. 52, 81-82, 86-91.8
3
Applicant and her husband own their home and several rental properties. She
values these assets at approximately $2.5 million. She and her husband also have
retirement investment accounts valued at nearly $800,000. Their combined yearly
income is approximately $250,000. Their children attend U.S. schools and are active in
sports and other programs after school. They have no economic interests in the PRC.4
Applicant’s 81-year-old mother lives in the PRC. She owns her own residence
and lives alone. She worked in the local government owned-factory and receives a
pension from the government. For the last three or four years, Applicant has sent her
mother $1,000 once a year as a gift. She does not provide regular financial support for
her mother. Her mother has never visited the U.S. She talks with her mother by
telephone about once a month.5
Applicant’s two older brothers and older half-sister are citizens of and reside in
the PRC. Her half-sister is about 19 years older than she. Her sister left home for
college when Applicant was a baby. Her sister is married and has two grown daughters
who are married.  Her sister retired from her job as a site manager of a train station. Her
sister’s husband is also retired. She assumes they are getting a retirement benefit, but
she has no information about this benefit. She may talk with her half-sister once a year.
Her half-sister has not visited her in the U.S. 6
One brother works at a local hospital where he is in charge of hospital supplies.
Her other brother works in product distribution at the local steel company. Both brothers
are married and their wives do not work outside of the home. One brother has two
children and the other brother has one child. These children are adults. She talks by
telephone with her brothers about twice a year, on holidays. Neither brother has visited
her in the U.S.7
Applicant’s mother-in-law and father-in-law are citizens of and reside in the PRC
in a distant area from her family. They own a business. Her husband’s four siblings own
businesses. She has limited contact with her in-laws. Her husband talks with his parents
by telephone every other month. Her husband’s parents visited the U.S. after
Applicant’s son was born, but have not returned as they don’t speak English. She has
had little contact with his parents and siblings since her marriage more than 20 years
ago. Her husband does not send any financial support to his parents or any of his
siblings.8
Id. at 37-39, 72-73.9
Id. at 39-40, 72-74, 78-79.10
AE H (2007 e-mails to employer about trip to the PRC); Tr. 40-41, 73, 75, 78.11
AE A at 2, 4-6; Tr. 29-31, 45-48, 94. 12
4
Since January 1, 2000, Applicant has traveled to the PRC three times. In
December 2000, she traveled alone and on her U.S. passport to the PRC to visit her
ailing father. She stayed with her parents for the entire two weeks of her visit. Her
brothers visited her, but not her half-sister. Her father died in 2003.9
Applicant did not return to the PRC for her father’s funeral. Rather, in 2004, she
and her family traveled to the PRC. They stayed one week with her mother, then spent
a week sightseeing in Beijing. Applicant returned to the U.S. while her husband and
children visited with his parents for a week. During this trip, Applicant visited with her
brothers when they came to their mother’s home.10
Applicant’s last trip to the PRC occurred in 2007. Before she made her
reservations, she notified her employer of her intent to travel to the PRC and inquired if
there would be a problem. Her employer told her there would be no problem with her
taking this trip. She traveled alone to the PRC to celebrate her mother’s 80  birthday.th
She visited with her brothers and her half-sister during this one week trip. Applicant
always traveled on her U.S. passport. Her husband and children traveled on their U.S.
passports. During her trips to the PRC, Applicant did not contact friends or others
outside of her family. She has no future plans to travel to the PRC.11
Applicant states that following the Tiananmen Square occurrence, she began
thinking about her new life in the U.S. She has embraced the freedoms of speech and
religion. She realized she would be able to prosper economically and develop a career
in the U.S. in a way she would not be able to do in the PRC. She made a decision to
remain in this country. She explained the basis for her belief that the government of the
PRC would not likely harm members of her family to force her to divulge classified
information. She does not believe that her mother would tell her if the government of
PRC was placing pressure on her. If the government of the PRC would try to pressure
her mother, she would tell the world about the PRC’s actions because she believes that
by speaking out in public the PRC government would be very concerned about losing
face and would free her family faster. She could not be pressured because of her family
in the PRC.12
Four colleagues, two managers and a professor from her doctorate program
wrote recommendations on behalf of Applicant. All uniformly agree that she is highly
intelligent, hardworking, reliable, trustworthy, and excels at her job. In the performance
of her duties, she works with intellectual property materials and appropriately handles
this sensitive information. She is conscientious about the need to protect sensitive
information of contractors and her employer. All praise her character and integrity, and
AE B (letter, dated May 23, 2008); AE C (Letter, undated); AE D (Letter, dated May 12, 2008); AE E (Letter,13
dated May 10, 2008); AE F (Letter, dated May 29, 2008); AE G(Letter, dated June 2, 2008); AE J
(Performance evaluation 2007).
5
recommend her for a security clearance. Her most recent performance evaluation
praises her skills and work contribution.13
I take administrative notice of the following facts. The PRC is an authoritarian,
communist party-led state. Human rights violations continue to be problematic.
Concerns regarding the PRC’s weapons development, theft of classified technology
information between 1979 and 1999, and industrial espionage activities remain. The
PRC continues to have active intelligence operations in the U.S., which seek to obtain
military and industrial secrets through Americans of Chinese ancestry. On the other
hand, the PRC supports the U.S.’s anti-terrorism position and activities. The U.S. and
the PRC have developed joint trade agreements, resulting in the sale of goods to each
other, and work together on environmental issues. The PCR enjoys a most favored
nation status in trading with the U.S. The PRC has opened its doors to outside
investment.
Policies
When evaluating an Applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in
evaluating an Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s over-arching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common sense decision. According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on
the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
6
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security
decision. 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
The security concern relating to the guideline for Foreign Influence is set out in
AG & 6:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism. 
Under the potential disqualifying conditions described in AG ¶ 7, the following
conditions could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying in this case:
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
7
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information; and
(d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
Applicant’s mother, two brothers and half-sister are citizens of and reside in the
PRC. She maintains a normal familial relationship with her mother and two brothers and
some contact with her half-sister. Her husband maintains a normal familial relationship
with his parents and siblings in the PRC. These relationships are not per se a reason to
deny Applicant a security clearance. The government must establish that these family
relationships create a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation,
pressure, or coercion or would create a potential conflict of interest between her
obligations to protect sensitive information and her desire to help her family members.  
In determining if a heightened risk exists, I must look at Applicant’s relationship
and contacts with family members as well as the activities of the government of the
PRC. See ISCR Case No. 07-05809 (App. Bd. May 27, 2008). Concerning the
intelligence gathering activities of the PRC, in ISCR Case No. 07-02485 (App. Bd. May
9, 2008) the Appeal Board agreed with the government’s argument, concluding that
substantial evidence of a security risk existsand when an Applicant has family members
living in the PRC because the PRC is an active collector of intelligence and sensitive
proprietary information from U.S. defense contractors, considers U.S. citizens of
Chinese ancestry to be “prime intelligence targets”, and monitors its citizens’ telephone,
fax and e-mail communications. This risk that an Applicant could be targeted for
manipulation or induced into compromising classified information is real, not theoretical.
Applicant’s relationship and her contacts with her family in the PRC raise a heightened
risk that the government of the PRC will use her family members to pressure her into
revealing classified information. The same risk exists in regards to Applicant’s husband
because he maintains contacts with his parents and siblings in the PRC. The
government has established its case under AG ¶¶ 7(a) and (b).
In deciding if Applicant has submitted evidence of mitigation, under AG ¶ 8 (a), I
must consider: 
the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which
these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in
that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual,
group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.
8
and under AG ¶ 8(b), I must consider if
 
there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interests.
Applicant’s normal relationship with her family members is not a basis to deny
her a security clearance; however, her burden of proof on mitigation requires more than
statements about the limited scope of her conversations and contacts with family
members. See ISCR Case No. 07-02485 (App. Bd. May 9, 2008). Applicant’s mother is
retired and depends upon the government of the PRC to provide her retirement benefit.
Applicant traveled to the PRC three times in the last eight years to visit her family
members, in particular her parents. See continues to speak with her mother and
brothers on a regular basis. In light of the intelligence activities of the PRC directed to
the U.S. through Americans of Chinese ancestry, Applicant has not mitigated the
government’s security concerns under AG ¶¶ 8 (a) and (b).
 
Finally, under AG ¶ 8(c), I must consider if the “contact or communication with
foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could
create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation.” Applicant’s contacts with her mother
and two brothers are not infrequent and casual, nor are her husband’s contacts with his
family infrequent and casual. I, however, find that Applicant’s relationship with her much
older half-sister is casual and infrequent, given the almost 19 year difference in age and
the minimal efforts she makes to communicate with her half-sister from the U.S. or
when she was visiting the PRC.
None of the remaining mitigating conditions are applicable in this case. Applicant
has not mitigated the government’s security concerns under AG ¶ 6.
Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
9
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall common sense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept.       
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant came to the U.S. 20 years
ago as a student. Following the incident in Tiananmen Square in 1989, she considered
what her life might be in the U.S. as opposed to her life in the PRC. She eventually
decided to remain in the U.S. She has embraced the concepts associated with
democracy and freedom. She and her husband became U.S. citizens. They are living
the American dream. They have a good income, are saving for their retirement, and
raising their children in the American way of life. They abide by the laws and manage
their finances. They are highly respected individuals in their professions and careers.
Applicant’s managers and co-workers praise her worth ethic and character. She is
reliable and trustworthy. The Appeal Board has held that all these highly admirable
qualities are not enough to mitigate the government’s security concerns when an
Applicant has family in the PRC. See ISCR Case No. 07-02485 (App. Bd. May 9, 2008).
Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions or doubts as to Applicant’s
eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I conclude
Applicant has not mitigated the security concerns arising under the foreign influence
guideline. 
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                                              
MARY E. HENRY
Administrative Judge