KEYWORD: Guideline F
DIGEST: Applicant’s efforts to repay debts were insufficient when viewed of the extent of his
delinquent debt.  Adverse decision affirmed.  
CASENO: 07-05352a1
DATE: 07/16/2008
DATE: July 16, 2008
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 07-05352
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On December 6, 2007, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant
of the basis for that decision–security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations)
of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested that the case be decided on the written record.  On April 10, 2008, after considering the
record, Administrative Judge Mark W. Harvey denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.
Applicant filed a timely appeal pursuant to Directive ¶¶  E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse decision is
arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  Finding no error, we affirm.
Applicant argues that the Judge’s adverse decision should be reversed because the Judge did
not give sufficient weight to Applicant’s mitigating evidence which established that he had entered
into a repayment plan for his outstanding debts.  Applicant’s argument does not demonstrate that the
Judge erred.
Once a concern arises regarding an Applicant’s security clearance eligibility, there is a strong
presumption against the grant or maintenance of a security clearance.  See Dorfmont v. Brown, 913
F. 2d 1399, 1401 (9  Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991).  After the government presentsth
evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut or mitigate those
concerns.  See Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  “The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only
when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’” Department of the Navy v.
Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  The presence of some mitigating evidence does not alone compel
the Judge to make a favorable security clearance decision.  As the trier of fact, the Judge has to
weigh the evidence as a whole and decide whether the favorable evidence outweighs the unfavorable
evidence, or vice versa.  An applicant’s disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of the evidence, or
an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the evidence, is not sufficient to demonstrate the
Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or
contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-11172 at 2 (App. Bd. Sep. 4, 2007).
In this case, the Judge found that Applicant had a lengthy and serious history of not meeting
financial obligations.  The SOR alleged eight delinquent debts totaling approximately $24,000.  The
Judge found in favor of Applicant as to two of the debts, because one was unsubstantiated and the
other could be readily enforced, if necessary.  As for the other six debts, the Judge found that,
subsequent to the issuance of the SOR and just prior to the submission of the case for decision,
Applicant had entered into a repay agreement with each of the creditors, and made a small payment
on each debt in furtherance thereof.  However, the Judge found against Applicant with respect to
those debts, concluding that Applicant’s efforts to repay or resolve them had been “. . . insufficient
when compared to available income that he could have used to address his delinquent debts.”
Decision at 8.  In support of that adverse conclusion, the Judge noted that “Applicant became aware
of the security significance of his financial problems almost two years ago when an OPM
investigator interviewed him concerning his delinquent debts.”  Id.
After reviewing the record, the Board concludes that the Judge examined the relevant data
and articulated a satisfactory explanation for his decision, “including a ‘rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States,
371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962).  The Board does not review cases de novo.  Accordingly, the Judge’s
ultimate unfavorable security clearance decision under Guideline F is sustainable.
Order
The Judge’s adverse security clearance decision is AFFIRMED.  
Signed: Jean E. Smallin           
Jean E. Smallin
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields          
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody              
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board