KEYWORD: Guideline B; Guideline C
DIGEST: The Judge articulated a reasonable concern based on Applicant’s close ties to his in-
oaws in Lebanon and his repeated visits to Lebanon with his spouse and children, considered in
the context of the overall political/security profile of that country vis-a-vis the United States. 
Adverse decision affirmed.  
CASENO: 07-05795a1
DATE: 07/15/2008
DATE: July 15, 2008
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 07-05795
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Alexander J. Brittin, Esq.
Applicant also argues that it was error for the Judge to ask Applicant a leading question at the hearing.1
However, this issue is raised for the first time on appeal, Applicant having made no objection to the question at the
hearing. Tr. at 90.  Accordingly, the Board need not address it.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 02-24875 at 2, n.2 (App. Bd.
Oct. 12, 2006).  See generally ISCR Case No. 96-0869 at 2-3  (App. Bd. Sep. 11, 1997) and ISCR Case No. 94-1055
at 2 (App. Bd. May 8, 1996).
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The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On October 17, 2007, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant
of the basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline B (Foreign Influence) and
Guideline C (Foreign Preference) of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as
amended) (Directive).  Applicant requested a hearing.  On April 15, 2008, after the hearing,
Administrative Judge LeRoy F. Foreman denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.
Applicant timely appealed pursuant to the Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse security
clearance decision under Guideline B is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.
Applicant argues that the Judge’s adverse clearance decision should be reversed because the
Judge did not articulate a nexus between the circumstances alleged in the SOR and Applicant’s
security eligibility.  He also argues that the Judge gave insufficient weight to the evidence as to
Applicant’s strong ties to the United States, his testimony that his allegiances lie exclusively with
the United States and protecting classified information, and the fact that his in-laws in Lebanon have
no contact with their government.  Finally, Applicant argues that the Judge’s overall unfavorable
conclusion is inconsistent with other hearing-level decisions in which applicants in ostensibly similar
circumstances have been granted clearances.    Applicant’s arguments do not demonstrate error on1
the part of the Judge.
The Directive presumes there is a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under
any of its Guidelines and an applicant’s security eligibility.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 03-22643 at
7 (App. Bd. Jun. 24, 2005).  Direct or objective evidence of nexus is not required.  See, e.g., ISCR
Case No. 03-18218 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct. 7, 2005).
The Board gives due consideration to the cases cited by Applicant. See, e.g., ISCR Case No.
06-05903 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct. 15, 2007).  However, the Board has previously noted that decisions
in other hearing-level cases are not legally binding precedent, even if an applicant can establish close
factual similarities between those cases and his case.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 04-04004 at 2 (App.
Bd. Jul. 31, 2006).  Accordingly, the Judge was not legally obligated to reconcile his decision in this
case with decisions in other ostensibly similar cases.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 02-24752 at 3 (App.
Bd. Jul. 31, 2006).  “The adjudicative process is the careful weighing of a number of variables
known as the whole-person concept.”  Directive at ¶ E2.2(a).  “Each case must be judged on its own
merits . . .” Id at ¶ E2.2(b).
Once the government presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the
applicant to establish mitigation.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  The presence of some mitigating evidence
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does not alone compel the Judge to make a favorable clearance decision.  As the trier of fact, the
Judge has to weigh the evidence as a whole and decide whether the favorable evidence outweighs
the unfavorable evidence, or vice versa.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-09542 at 2 (App. Bd. Sep. 4,
2007).  An applicant’s disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue
for a different interpretation of the evidence, is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the
evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See,
e.g., ISCR Case No. 04-08116 at 2 (App. Bd. Jul. 2, 2007). 
A review of the Judge’s decision indicates that the Judge weighed the mitigating evidence
offered by Applicant against the seriousness of the disqualifying circumstances, and considered the
possible application of relevant mitigating conditions and whole-person factors.  The Judge found
in favor of Applicant under Guideline C and with respect to some of the factual allegations under
Guideline B.  However, he reasonably explained why the evidence which the Applicant had
presented in mitigation was insufficient to overcome all the government’s security concerns.  The
Judge’s decision exhibits a discerning weighing of a number of variables to reach a common sense
determination. Directive ¶ E2.2(c).  In some instances, this process led to favorable findings for
Applicant.  However, the Judge also articulated a reasonable concern that Applicant's circumstances
could make him vulnerable to pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress.  Decision at 10.  That
concern is based on close ties to his in-laws in Lebanon and his repeated visits to Lebanon with his
spouse and children, considered in the context of the overall political/security profile of that country
vis-a-vis the United States.  Applicant offers an alternative interpretation of the record evidence.
However, that alternative interpretation of the record evidence is insufficient to render the Judge’s
interpretation arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 03-19101 at 2 (App.
Bd. Oct. 13, 2006).  The Judge has articulated a rational explanation for his unfavorable
determination under the disqualifying and mitigating factors and the whole-person concept, and there
is sufficient record evidence to support that determination—given the standard that required the
Judge to err on the side of national security.  Directive ¶ E2.2(b).
Order
The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Michael D. Hipple      
Michael D. Hipple
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: Jean E. Smallin          
Jean E. Smallin
Administrative Judge
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Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields        
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board