KEYWORD: Guideline C; Guideline B; Guideline F; Guideline E
DIGEST: At the time the case was submitted for decision, Applicant’s debts were still
substantially unpaid, and Applicant had offered no proof of any payments in the last two years. 
Applicant’s admission regarding the falsification relieved the government of presenting evidence
to establish the facts alleged therein.  An applicant’s disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of
the evidence, or an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the evidence, is not sufficient
to demonstrate the Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that is
arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  Adverse decision affirmed.
CASENO: 08-00899.a1
DATE: 07/29/2008
DATE: July 29, 2008
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 08-00899
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
Applicant also argues that loss of his clearance will adversely impact his personal and employment status.  The1
adverse impact of a clearance decision on an applicant is not relevant or material to an applicant’s security eligibility.
See ISCR Case No. 03-21012 at 4 (App. Bd. Aug. 31, 2005).
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The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On February 7, 2008, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of
the basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline C (Foreign Preference),
Guideline B (Foreign Influence), Guideline F (Financial Considerations) and Guideline E (Personal
Conduct) of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).
Applicant requested that the case be decided on the written record.  On April 15, 2008, after
considering the record, Administrative Judge Mark W. Harvey denied Applicant’s request for a
security clearance.  Applicant timely appealed pursuant to the Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal:  whether the Judge’s adverse clearance
decision under Guidelines F and E is sustainable.  Finding no error, we affirm the Judge’s adverse
clearance decision.
With respect to the Guideline E allegation, the Judge found that Applicant had deliberately
falsified his security clearance application (SCA) when in response to the questions as to whether
he had been over 90 days delinquent and over 180 days delinquent on any debts, he answered “no.”
In his appeal, Applicant argues that the Judge’s adverse finding is not sustainable because the
government did not produce evidence to establish that the unpaid debts were delinquent for more
than 90 or 180 days.  In the alternative, he argues that the Judge erred, as a matter of law, by not
favorably applying any mitigating conditions and whole-person factors because his falsification was
an isolated incident and he had subsequently provided the correct information.
With respect to the Guideline F allegations, the Judge found Applicant had two debts in the
amount of $6,542 and $4,961 which had been placed for collection.  In 2004, Applicant had made
an agreement with a credit consolidation company (CCC) to resolve the debts, and had made
monthly payments toward the agreement in 2004 and 2005.  However, at the time the case was
submitted for decision, the debts were still substantially unpaid, and Applicant had offered no proof
of any payments to the CCC in the last two years.  Additionally, there was no evidence that the CCC
had negotiated with Applicant’s two creditors in good-faith or had in fact paid the creditors anything.
In his appeal, Applicant argues that the Judge erred, as a matter of law, by not favorably applying
any mitigating conditions and whole-person factors because his indebtedness was an isolated
incident that had resulted from a loss of employment, and he had established a repayment plan
sufficient to show that the problem is under control.  Applicant’s arguments do not demonstrate that
the Judge’s adverse decision under Guidelines F and E is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.1
In his Answer, Applicant admitted without explanation to the falsification of his SCA as
alleged in SOR paragraph 4(b).  That admission relieved the government of presenting evidence to
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establish the facts alleged therein.  See Directive ¶ E3.1.14.  As a result, the burden shifted to
Applicant to present evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts he had admitted, and
he had the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.  See
Directive ¶ E3.1.15.
The presence of some mitigating evidence does not alone compel the Judge to make a
favorable security clearance decision.  As the trier of fact, the Judge has to weigh the evidence as a
whole and decide whether the favorable evidence outweighs the unfavorable evidence, or vice versa.
See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-10320 at 2 (App. Bd. Nov. 7, 2007).  An applicant’s disagreement with
the Judge’s weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the
evidence, is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in
a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-17409 at 3
(App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2007).
Applicant elected to have his case decided on the written administrative record.  As a result,
the Judge did not have an opportunity to question him about the SOR allegations and evaluate his
credibility in the context of a hearing. The Judge weighed the mitigating evidence offered by
Applicant against the length and seriousness of the disqualifying conduct and considered the possible
application of relevant mitigating conditions and whole-person factors.  The Judge found in favor
of Applicant under Guidelines C and B.  However, the Judge reasonably explained why the evidence
which Applicant had presented in mitigation was insufficient to overcome the government’s security
concerns under Guidelines F and E.  The Board does not review a case de novo.  The favorable
record evidence cited by Applicant is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge’s decision is arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-11172 at 2 (App. Bd. Sep. 4, 2007).
After reviewing the record, the Board concludes that the Judge examined the relevant data and
articulated a satisfactory explanation for his decision, “including a ‘rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made.’” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States,
371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962). “The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when
‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484
U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  Accordingly, the Judge’s ultimate adverse decision under Guidelines F and
E is sustainable.
Order
The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Michael D. Hipple     
Michael D. Hipple
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
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Signed: Jean E. Smallin          
Jean E. Smallin
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields          
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board