KEYWORD: Guideline F
DIGEST: The Judge found that Applicant had a serious history of not meeting financial
obligations.  At the time the case was submitted for decision, Applicant still had significant
outstanding debts and was still in the process of trying to resolve his financial problems. 
Therefore, the Judge could reasonably conclude that Applicant’s financial problems were recent
and still ongoing.  Adverse decision affirmed.
CASENO: 07-02123.a1
DATE: 08/13/2008
DATE: August 13, 2008
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 07-02123
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Alan V. Edmunds, Esq.
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On June 27, 2007, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of the
basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations) of
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested a hearing.  On April 28, 2008, after the hearing, Administrative Judge Darlene D. Lokey-
Anderson denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Applicant timely appealed pursuant
to the Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s unfavorable clearance
decision under Guideline F is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.
Applicant argues that the Judge’s adverse decision should be reversed because Applicant has
paid off or otherwise resolved most of the debts alleged in the SOR, and there is a “reasonable
possibility” that Applicant’s remaining unpaid debts were incurred by his deceased wife from whom
he was separated.  He further argues that he acted reasonably in waiting to pay off those remaining
debts until such time as they can be verified.  Given the totality of the record evidence, Applicant’s
arguments do not demonstrate that the Judge’s decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.
Once there has been a concern articulated regarding an applicant’s security eligibility, there
is a strong presumption against the grant or maintenance of a security clearance.  Dorfmont v. Brown,
913 F. 2d 1399, 1401 (9  Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991).  After the governmentth
presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the applicant to establish mitigation.
Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  The application of disqualifying and mitigating conditions does not turn simply
on a finding that one or more of them apply to the particular facts of a case.  Rather, their application
requires the exercise of sound discretion in light of the record evidence as a whole.  See, e.g., ISCR
Case No. 01-14740 at 7 (App. Bd. Jan. 15, 2003).  “Thus, the presence of some mitigating evidence
does not alone compel the Judge to make a favorable security clearance decision.”  See, e.g.,  ISCR
Case No. 05-02833 at 2 (App. Bd. Mar.19, 2007).  “As the trier of fact, the Judge has to weigh the
evidence as a whole and decide whether the favorable evidence outweighs the unfavorable evidence,
or vice versa.  An applicant’s disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of the evidence, or an ability
to argue for a different interpretation of the evidence, is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge
weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary
to law.”  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 05-03143 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 20, 2006).
The Applicant has not met his burden of demonstrating that the Judge erred in concluding
that the Guideline F allegations had not been mitigated.  Although the Applicant strongly disagrees
with the Judge’s conclusions, he has not established that those conclusions are arbitrary, capricious,
or contrary to law.  See Directive ¶ E3.1.32.3.  
In this case, the Judge found that Applicant had a serious history of not meeting financial
obligations.  At the time the case was submitted for decision he still had significant outstanding debts
and was still in the process of trying to resolve his financial problems.  In light of the foregoing, the
Judge could reasonably conclude that Applicant’s financial problems were recent and still ongoing.
The favorable record evidence cited by Applicant is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge’s
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 02-28041 at 4 (App.
Bd. Jun. 29, 2005).  The Board does not review a case de novo.  After reviewing the record, the
Board concludes that the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation
for her decision, “including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962).  Therefore,
the Judge’s ultimate unfavorable security clearance decision under Guideline F is sustainable.
Order
The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Michael D. Hipple        
Michael D. Hipple
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: Jean E. Smallin            
Jean E. Smallin
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields             
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board