DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
---------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 07-09867
SSN: ----------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Gina L. Marine, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
August 8, 2008
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Decision
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TESTAN, Joseph, Administrative Judge:
On October 24, 2007, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to applicant detailing the security concerns under
Guidelines B and C. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the revised adjudicative
guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and effective
within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant answered the SOR in writing on December 18, 2007, and requested an
Administrative Determination by an Administrative Judge (AJ). Department Counsel
issued a File of Relevant Material (FORM) on April 17, 2008. Applicant did not file a
response to the FORM. The case was assigned to me on June 24, 2008. Based upon a
review of the case file, pleadings, and exhibits, eligibility for access to classified
information is denied.
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Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 37 year old employee of a defense contractor.
Applicant was born and raised in Romania. In 1988, she moved to the United
States with her parents and two brothers. Applicant, along with her father and brothers,
became United States citizens in 1996. Apparently her mother did not. They all live in
the United States.
Applicant married a Romanian citizen in Romania in 2007. She has filed the
paperwork to sponsor her husband’s admission into the United States, but to date no
action has been taken by United States authorities. Her husband still resides in
Romania.
In addition to her husband, applicant has a mother-in-law, father-in-law, two
sisters-in-law, and a brother-in-law who are citizens and residents of Romania.
Applicant maintains daily contact with her husband and weekly contact with other family
members residing in Romania.
Applicant renewed her Romanian passport in 1998, after she became a United
States citizen. She renewed it again in 2003. When it expires in October 2008, she will
renew it. She was issued a United States passport in 1999.
Applicant traveled to Romania in 2004, 2006, and 2007. She used her Romanian
passport instead of her United States passport on these trips. In her SOR response,
applicant stated that the use of her Romanian passport “year after year is not an
indication of foreign preference over the United States, it is a practical method of
simplifying the planning for a vacation that does not require me to request [from] the
Romanian authorities a visa to enter Romania . . . .”
Applicant has a Romanian bank account with her husband worth $500.00. She
opened the account while in Romania in 2007 and keeps it in case of an emergency
while she is visiting that country. She has over $350,000.00 in assets in the United
States.
In her SOR response, applicant stated that she has been living in the United
States for almost 20 years, and clearly has a preference for the United States over
Romania and every other country.
The Government offered into evidence a 2007 United States Department of State
Report on Romania’s human rights practices (Exhibit 6). This report establishes the
following facts:
Romania, a country with about 21.6 million citizens, is a constitutional
democracy. Although the Romanian government addressed some human rights
problems during the year, abuses continued to occur. There were reports of illegal
wiretapping of citizens, and the public has a widespread perception of corruption and
lack of fairness within the judiciary. 
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 Policies
The President has “the authority to . . . control access to information bearing on
national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to
occupy a position that will give that person access to such information.” (Department of
the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518,527 (1988).) In Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), the President set out
guidelines and procedures for safeguarding classified information within the executive
branch. The President authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant
applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” (Exec. Ord. 10865, Section 2.)
To be eligible for a security clearance, an applicant must meet the security
guidelines contained in the Directive. Enclosure 2 of the Directive sets forth personnel
security guidelines, as well as the disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions
under each guideline.
Initially, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts in
the SOR that disqualify or may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to
classified information. (Directive, Paragraph E3.1.14.) Thereafter, the applicant is
responsible for presenting evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts.
(Directive, Paragraph E3. 1.15.) An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating
that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security
clearance.” (ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).) “Any doubt as to
whether access to classified information is clearly consistent with national security will
be resolved in favor of the national security.” (Directive, Paragraph E2.2.2.)
A person granted access to classified information enters into a special
relationship with the government. The government must be able to repose a high
degree of trust and confidence in those individuals to whom it grants access to
classified information. The decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not a
determination as to the loyalty of the applicant. (Exec. Ord. 10865, Section 7.) It is
merely an indication that the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President
has established for issuing a clearance.
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
The security concern relating to the Foreign Influence guideline is set forth in
Paragraph 6 of the AG, and is as follows: 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion
by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
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financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
Paragraph 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying. Under Paragraph 7.a., “contact with a foreign family member, business or
professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign
country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement,
manipulation, pressure, or coercion” may be disqualifying. Under Paragraph 7.b.,
“connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential
conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect sensitive information or
technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by
providing that information” may be disqualifying. Lastly, under Paragraph 7.i., “conduct,
especially while traveling outside the U.S., which may make the individual vulnerable to
exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a foreign person, group, government, or country”
may be disqualifying.
Applicant has daily contact with her husband, and weekly contact with other
family members living in Romania. In addition, since moving to the United States in
1986, she made at least four trips to Romania. Applicant’s presence in Romania during
these trips made her and her family members potentially vulnerable to exploitation,
pressure, or coercion by the Romanian government. These facts raise concerns under
all three disqualifying conditions.
Paragraph 8 sets forth conditions that could mitigate security concerns. Under
Paragraph 8.a., it is potentially mitigating if an applicant can demonstrate that “the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of
the U.S.” Under Paragraph 8.b., it is potentially mitigating if an applicant can
demonstrate “there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual*s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal,
or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S.,
that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S.
interest.” Lastly, under Paragraph 8.c., it is potentially mitigating if an applicant can
demonstrate that the “contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or
exploitation.”
None of the foregoing mitigating conditions is applicable. Applicant*s close and
loving relationship to her husband, standing alone, creates a risk for foreign influence or
exploitation. Applicant provided insufficient credible evidence that it is unlikely she would
be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign
government and the interests of the United States, or that she is not vulnerable to a
conflict of interest.
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Guideline C, Foreign Preference
The security concern relating to the Foreign Preference guideline is set forth in
Paragraph 9 of the AG, and is as follows:
When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a
foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to
provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of
the United States.
Paragraph 10 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may
be disqualifying. Under Paragraph 10 a.1., exercising any right or privilege of foreign
citizenship after becoming a United States citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a
family member, such as possession of a current foreign passport, may be disqualifying.
Applicant possessed and used a Romanian passport after becoming a United States
citizen. Accordingly, this disqualifying condition applies.
Paragraph 11 describes potentially mitigating conditions. Under Paragraph 11.a.,
it may be mitigating if the “dual citizenship is based solely on parents’ citizenship or birth
in a foreign country.” This mitigating condition is applicable.
“Whole Person” Analysis 
Under the whole person concept, the AJ must evaluate an applicant’s security
eligibility by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances.
An AJ should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG Paragraph
2(a): “(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances
surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and
recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
(5) extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the
conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the
likelihood of continuation or recurrence.” Under AG Paragraph 2c, the ultimate
determination of whether to grant a security clearance must be an overall common
sense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole
person concept.       
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant is a mature woman who
has voluntarily maintained her dual citizenship, renewed and used her foreign passport
after becoming a United States citizen, and recently married a citizen and resident of
Romania. These actions create a heightened risk of pressure, coercion, exploitation and
duress. Although I have considered the fact that Romania and the United States have
friendly relations, this fact is not determinative. “The United States has a compelling
interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information from any person,
organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it, regardless of
whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to those of the
United States.” ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004).
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I have carefully reviewed the administrative record, applicant*s submissions, and
the allegations in the SOR. I have weighed the disqualifying and mitigating conditions of
Guidelines B and C, and I have evaluated applicant*s conduct in light of the whole
person concept identified at Paragraph E2.2. of Enclosure 2 of the Directive. After doing
so, I conclude that applicant failed to rebut the Government’s case under Guidelines B
and C.
There is nothing in the record that suggests applicant is anything but a loyal
American citizen. Applicant*s allegiance, loyalty, and patriotism are not at issue in these
proceedings. Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 specifically provides that industrial
security clearance decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no
sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” Therefore,
nothing in this decision should be construed to suggest I have based this decision, in
whole or in part, on any express or implied concern as to applicant*s allegiance, loyalty,
or patriotism.
Formal Findings     
Formal findings for or against applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Guideline B: AGAINST APPLICANT
Guideline C: AGAINST APPLICANT
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with national security to grant applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                              
_________________
JOSEPH TESTAN
Administrative Judge