KEYWORD: Guideline F
DIGEST: Applicant has numerous delinquent debts arising from a relationship with a man she
never married.  Given the on going nature of the debts the Judge’s application of Mitigating
Condition (MC) 20(a) was misplaced.  The application of MC 20(b) is also not justified given
Applicant’s demonstrated capacity pay debt.  There is no record evidence that supports the
application of MC 20(c).  MC20 (e) only applies to two debts.  Favorable decision remanded. 
CASENO: 07-11814.a1 
DATE: 08/29/2008
DATE: August 29, 2008
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 07-11814
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
Tom Coale, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
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The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On November 26,  2007, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant
of the basis for that decision–security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations)
of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested a hearing.  On May 14, 2008, after the hearing, Administrative Judge Mary E. Henry
granted Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Department Counsel filed a timely appeal
pursuant to Directive ¶¶  E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Department Counsel raised the following issues on appeal: whether the Judge erred in her
application of the Financial Considerations Mitigating Conditions (FCMC); and whether the Judge
erred in her whole-person analysis.  Finding error, we remand the case to the Judge.
Whether the Record Supports the Judge’s Factual Findings
A.  Facts
The Judge made the following pertinent findings of fact: Applicant works as a trainer for a
federal contractor.  In 1982 Applicant entered into a long-term relationship with a man whom she
never married.  She ended the relationship in 2000.  She has three children from this relationship,
ranging in age from 11 to 23.  
Applicant has numerous delinquent debts arising from her relationship with her partner.
Although she attempted to pay the debts, she defaulted on some of them, receiving no assistance
from her partner, “who had created much of the debt problem.”  Decision at 4.  Although Applicant
acknowledges some of the debts, she disagrees with others.  She completed an Associates Degree
in Applied Science in 2005 and “incurred no unpaid debts for her education.”  Id at 3.  She has
purchased a modular home for herself and her children and is current on her mortgage payments.
She has paid off a recent automobile loan and has opened credit card accounts in the three years
preceding the decision, for which she makes timely payments.      
B.  Discussion
The Appeal Board’s review of the Judge’s findings of facts is limited to determining if they
are supported by substantial evidence–“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion in light of all the contrary evidence in the same record.”
Directive  ¶ E3.1.32.1.  “This is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility
of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative
agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.”  Consolo v. Federal Maritime
Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620-21 (1966).  In evaluating the Judge’s findings, we are required to give
deference to the Judge’s credibility determinations.  Directive ¶ E3.1.32.1.  
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Department Counsel has not expressly challenged the Judge’s findings of fact.  However, in
the course of arguing the assigned errors, Department Counsel asserts that the Judge did not give
sufficient weight to contrary record evidence.  The Board will address this matter below.  
Whether the Record Supports the Judge’s Ultimate Conclusions
 A Judge is required to “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation
for” the decision, “including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choices made.’”
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983)(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  “The
general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests
of the national security.’” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  The Appeal
Board may reverse the Judge’s decision to grant, deny, or revoke a security clearance if it is arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to law.  Directive ¶¶ E3.1.32.3 and E3.1.33.3.  
Once a concern arises regarding an Applicant’s security clearance eligibility, there is a strong
presumption against the grant or maintenance of a security clearance.  See Dorfmont v. Brown, 913
F. 2d 1399, 1401 (9  Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991).  After the Government presentsth
evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut or mitigate those
concerns.  See Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  “The application of disqualifying and mitigating conditions and
whole person factors does not turn simply on a finding that one or more of them apply to the
particular facts of a case.  Rather, their application requires the exercise of sound discretion in light
of the record evidence as a whole.”  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 05-03635 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 20,
2006).
In deciding whether the Judge's rulings or conclusions are arbitrary or capricious, the Board
will review the Judge's decision to determine whether:  it does not examine relevant evidence; it fails
to articulate a satisfactory explanation for its conclusions, including a rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made; it does not consider relevant factors; it reflects a clear error of
judgment; it fails to consider an important aspect of the case; it offers an explanation for the decision
that runs contrary to the record evidence; or it is so implausible that it cannot be ascribed to a mere
difference of opinion.  In deciding whether the Judge's rulings or conclusions are contrary to law,
the Board will consider whether they are contrary to provisions of Executive Order 10865, the
Directive, or other applicable federal law.  See ISCR Case No. 03-22861 at 2-3 (App. Bd. Jun. 2,
2006).
The Judge concluded that FCMC 20(a) mitigated the security concerns in Applicant’s case,
in that they were not likely to recur and that they do not raise concerns about Applicant’s “current
reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgement.”  Decision at 6.  (See Directive ¶ E2.20(a): “[T]he
behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it is
unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt upon the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness,
or good judgment . . .”) Department Counsel persuasively argues, however, that the ongoing nature
of the debts vitiates the Judge’s conclusion.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 01-03695 at (App. Bd. Oct.
16, 2002) (Failure to discharge debts is “a continuing course of conduct . . . ”) Given the number of
“In light of how Applicant conducted herself during this relationship, the debts that arose . . . should be viewed1
as the equivalent of marital debts . . .”  Department Counsel Brief at 11.   
Loss of employment, business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, death, divorce or separation.  2
 “. . . Applicant played a significant role in overextending [her and her partner’s] finances, and . . . Applicant3
compounded her debts problems by making financial decisions preventing her from resolving these debts in a timely,
reasonable, and good faith manner.”  Id. at 13.  
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these ongoing debts, and the lack of record evidence as to Applicant’s efforts to address them,
Applicant has failed to meet her burden of persuasion as to this mitigating condition.    
 Additionally, Department Counsel challenges the Judge’s favorable application of  FCMC
20(b) (Directive ¶ E2.29(b): “[T]he conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely
beyond the person’s control . . . and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances . . .”)
Department Counsel points to record evidence that Applicant took her partner’s name and submitted
federal tax returns as married filing jointly.  Such evidence raises the reasonable implication that
Applicant and her partner held themselves out as married, which would have facilitated her partner’s
having obtained credit in both their names.   This evidence is contrary to the Judge’s conclusion that1
Applicant’s bad debts arose from matters outside her control.  The Judge’s decision does not explain
how, under the facts of this case, Applicant’s circumstances are equivalent to those examples listed
in FCMC 20(b).     Furthermore, the fact that Applicant has apparently established a current good2
credit rating, as evidenced by her housing, college tuition, and car payments, and her currency on
credit card debts, demonstrates a capacity to pay debt.  Department Counsel persuasively argues that
this capacity contrasts with Applicant’s failure to address her delinquent debt and casts serious doubt
as to the extent to which she has acted responsibly in regard to that debt.  The weight of the record
evidence does not support a conclusion that Applicant has met her burden of persuasion under
FCMC 20(b).3
For similar reasons, Department Counsel argues that Applicant has failed to meet her burden
of persuasion under FCMC 20(c)  (Directive ¶ E2.20(c): “[T]he person has received or is receiving
counseling for the problem and/or there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or
is under control . . .”)   There is no record evidence that Applicant has sought credit counseling.
While Applicant has established a satisfactory record as to her current expenses, the record does not
support a conclusion that she has made a reasonable attempt to resolve these debts alleged in the
SOR.  Making allowances for Applicant’s contention that some of the debts are not hers, those that
remain are numerous and of considerable amounts.  Under the facts of this case, these ongoing and
substantial debts raise security concerns which Applicant’s evidence does not reasonably mitigate
under the mitigating conditions.  Additionally, Department Counsel persuasively challenges the
Judge’s analysis of FCMC 20(e) (Directive ¶ E2.20(e): “[T]he individual has a reasonable basis to
dispute the legitimacy of the past-due debts which is the cause of the problem and provides
documented proof to substantiate the basis of the dispute or provides evidence of actions to resolve
the issue . . .”) on the ground that it applies only to two of the many debts alleged in the SOR.  In any
event, Department Counsel correctly notes that Applicant has provided little by way of documented
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proof of her basis for disputing the debts.  The weight of the record evidence does not support a
conclusion that Applicant has met her burden of persuasion under the Financial Considerations
Mitigating Conditions.  
In light of the errors noted above the Board remands the case to the Judge.  The Judge is
instructed to issue a new decision that does not rely upon the application of the aforesaid mitigating
conditions.  As a result of the foregoing, it is premature to address the remaining issue raised on
appeal.
Order
The Judge’s favorable security clearance decision is REMANDED.
Signed: Michael Y. Ra’anan               
Michael Y. Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairman, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields                  
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody                   
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board