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                            DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
             DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
--------, -------- -------- )       ISCR Case No. 07-11963
SSN: ------ ---- -------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Melvin A. Howry, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
______________
Decision
______________
WHITE, David M., Administrative Judge:
Applicant was convicted of committing alcohol-related vehicular homicide after a
one-car accident in February 2002 in which his passenger was killed. He served 24
months in prison. He established that this was a one-time incident completely out of
character, and from which he is rehabilitated. The Army mishandled his administrative
separation and erroneously overpaid him more than $35,000. He legitimately disputed
this, and one other reportedly-delinquent debt, and resolved both. Based upon a review
of the case file, pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, eligibility for access to classified
information is granted. 
Applicant submitted his Security Clearance Application (SF 86), on January 16,
2006. On February 29, 2008, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the security concerns under Guidelines
F, G, and J for Applicant. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865,
Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended;
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the revised
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adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and
effective within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on March 11, 2008. He answered
the SOR in writing (Answer) on March 12, 2008, and requested a hearing before an
Administrative Judge. DOHA received that request on March 17, 2008. Department
Counsel was prepared to proceed on April 17, 2008, and the case was assigned to me
on April 25, 2008. DOHA issued a notice of hearing on May 6, 2008, and I convened the
hearing as scheduled on May 29, 2008. The Government offered exhibits (GE) 1
through 7, which were admitted without objection. Applicant testified on his own behalf,
and submitted exhibits (AE) A through H, which were admitted without objection. DOHA
received the transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on June 5, 2008.
Findings of Fact
In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the factual allegations set forth in
SOR ¶¶ 1.a, 1.b, 1.c (in part), 1.e, and 2.a. He denied the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.d, 1.f,
3.a, and 3.b. Applicant’s admissions, including those contained in his response to
DOHA Interrogatories (GE 3), are incorporated in the following findings.
Applicant is a 37-year-old former Army Ranger communications warrant officer
who is employed by a defense contractor. He was selected for promotion to warrant
officer as an E-5 with only seven years of service, well ahead of his peers. He is one of
only two communications warrant officers to ever complete Ranger training. He is
married with four children. His wife does not work outside the home.
The allegation in SOR ¶ 1.c, that Applicant was contacted by the local sheriff’s
office for a liquor law violation in March 1988 but was neither arrested nor charged, is
technically correct. The implication that he committed the violation, however, is not
correct. He was 17 years old at the time, and his older brother and some friends were
drinking underage while their parents were away from home. The sheriff, who lived next
door, came over to investigate the gathering of teenagers and discovered the older, but
still underage, kids drinking. Applicant was not involved in the party, nor had he
consumed any alcohol. Accordingly, he was neither arrested nor charged because he
committed no violation. (Answer at 2; AE E at 2; Tr. at 64-65.)
In 1991, when beginning advanced individual training after competing basic
training, Applicant drank beer in a barracks parking lot with some older soldiers he had
befriended. He was not supposed to drink in that area, and was underage. He received
minor non-judicial punishment under Article 15, UCMJ. (GE 1; Answer at 1; Tr. at 100-
102.)
On February 17, 2002, Applicant and a friend spent the afternoon at Applicant’s
brother’s house. They drank some beer. That evening, Applicant and the friend drove
back to Applicant’s house and took his other car, a new “Bullet Mustang” for a drive. His
wife said she saw him briefly when he arrived home to change cars, and she did not
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consider him to be impaired at that point. Some 20 to 60 minutes after leaving the
house, they had a very severe high-speed one-car accident in which the friend was
killed and Applicant suffered a broken neck. The car was so badly damaged that
responding police had difficulty determining which of the two men had been driving. At
the conclusion of the investigation, on July 13, 2002, Applicant was arrested and
charged with vehicular homicide. Laboratory test results, which he does not question,
revealed that he had a blood-alcohol content (BAC) of .21 shortly after the accident.
Since the accident, he has had no memory of anything that occurred after leaving his
brother’s house, and has no idea how his blood alcohol level got so high. After a
contested trial, he was convicted in March 2003 of vehicular homicide and subsequently
sentenced to serve 36 months confinement. He was actually imprisoned for 24 months
from May 2003 to May 2005, after which he was under Department of Corrections
supervision until January 2007. On January 13, 2007, he received a Certificate and
Order of Discharge, stating that he had met all requirements of his conviction and
sentence, and restoring his civil rights other than those involving possession or
transportation of firearms. (GE 3; GE 4 at 105, 114; Answer at 1; Tr. at 53-62, 102-108,
116.)
Applicant’s sentence also required him to be assessed and appropriately treated
for any alcohol abuse or dependency issues. His initial assessment reflected him to be
low-risk, and therefore ineligible for the prison treatment programs designed for more
serious cases. When he left prison for work-release, he was again assessed and
recommended to attend a six-month outpatient education course of treatment. He
successfully completed that program on January 12, 2006. There is no evidence that he
was ever diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent. Accordingly, on motion
of Department Counsel to conform the SOR to the evidence, I granted that motion and
deleted SOR ¶ 1.f. Both Applicant’s case manager and the clinical director of the state-
licensed treatment facility stated that his prognosis was considered very favorable. He
was not directed to refrain from any future alcohol use. He convincingly testified that he
had very much learned the error of his choice to drink and drive in February 2002, and
has prioritized his activities and interests to prevent recurrence. Applicant first
consumed beer at age 19 and subsequently, when duty and family commitments
permitted, was a light to moderate social drinker of mostly beer until his accident in
2002. Between then and early 2007, he did not drink at all. Between January and June
2007, he drank two to four beers per week, on average. Because he has been busy with
work, school, and family, and he felt no desire to do so, he has not drunk any alcohol
since June 2007. (GE 4 at 103; Answer at 2-3; AE C; AE H; Tr. at 65-69, 72-79.)  
When Applicant went to prison in May 2003, the Army mishandled and misplaced
his administrative separation paperwork. As a result, his pay continued going to his
bank account for about nine months after he used up his leave balance and should
have been transferred into a non-pay status. When his pay was eventually stopped, he
had received $35,668 to which he was not actually entitled. He initiated multiple
attempts to have this indebtedness investigated and waived due to Government error.
After exhausting these attempts to have the debt forgiven without success, he and the
Treasury Department collection agent agreed to a lump-sum $30,000 settlement. He
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refinanced his home and paid the full settlement amount in January 2008. His April 9,
2008 credit bureau report (CBR) reflects this debt as a paid collection with a zero
balance. (GE 6 at 2; Answer at 3, 6, 7; AE B; Tr. at 32-33, 42-46, 50-53, 83-96.)
The other debt reported to be in collection on Applicant’s September 2007 CBR
was an original $560 medical bill. This issue arose when Applicant’s medical provider
erroneously coded a bill to his medical insurance company, resulting in denial of the
claim. Although he was working with the provider and the insurance company to resolve
the confusion, the provider sent the bill to collections in June 2007. Once they did that,
Applicant paid the bill the following month to clear his credit and continued to work to
resolve the dispute. By mid-August, a properly coded bill had been paid by his
insurance. Applicant worked for the next three months to convince all concerned of the
mistake, and the collection agent returned his $560 in November 2007. It no longer
appears on his CBR, the most recent of which reflects no delinquent debts, one auto
loan for about $18,000 and only $158 in credit card debt. Applicant’s budget reflects a
steady monthly surplus of income over expenses, and he remains current on all his
financial obligations despite having served two years in prison from 2003 to 2005. He
received financial counseling to assist with maintaining family solvency despite this
severe income turbulence. (GE 5, GE 6, Answer at 4, 8; AE A; AE E at 2; Tr. at 28-31,
47-50, 80-83, 96-100.)
Applicant submitted many character letters, from current and former colleagues
and supervisors. These letters attest to his outstanding character and integrity, his
superior performance of highly classified work in the special forces, often in combat
settings, and his successful rehabilitation and strong work performance since the 2002
vehicular homicide incident. He is working full time and has been diligently pursuing a
bachelor’s degree since leaving active duty. He testified credibly that he is dedicated to
continuing his service defending the national interests, and to never again risk all he
holds dear through irresponsible behavior like his conduct on February 17, 2002. (AE D;
AE E; AE F; AE G; Tr. at 76-79, 116-118.)
Policies
When evaluating an Applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s over-arching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common sense decision. According to AG ¶¶
2(a) and 2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of applicable guidelines in
the context of a number of variables known as the “whole person concept.” The
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administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person,
past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified
information will be resolved in favor of the national security.” In reaching this decision, I
have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on the
evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, “The applicant is
responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or
mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the
ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.” Section 7
of Executive Order 10865 provides that “Any determination under this order adverse to
an applicant shall be a determination in terms of the national interest and shall in no
sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” 
A person applying for access to classified information seeks to enter into a
fiduciary relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
Procedural Issues
The SOR cited facts that would have brought Applicant’s case under the
prohibitions of the Smith Amendment (10 U.S.C. § 986), because he was convicted and
sentenced to 36 months for vehicular homicide, of which he served 24 months.
However, this section of the United States Code, which applied only to clearances
granted by DoD, was repealed on January 28, 2008, when the President signed the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 into law. It was replaced by
adding Sec. 3002 to 50 U.S.C. § 435b (the Bond Amendment), which applies
throughout the Federal Government. Sec. 3002(c) of this new provision continues the
requirement for disqualification, absent a meritorious waiver, for persons who were
sentenced to and served imprisonment for more than a year. However, this
disqualification only applies to prevent clearances that would provide access to special
access programs (SAP), Restricted Data (RD), or any other information commonly
referred to as “special compartmented information” (SCI). 
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This statutory modification ends the former Smith Amendment requirement for a
meritorious Secretarial waiver to grant or continue a regular, or “collateral,” security
clearance to a person who has served more than a year on a criminal sentence. On
June 20, 2008, subsequent to the issuance of the SOR and the hearing in this case, the
Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) issued a memorandum providing interim
guidance for implementation of the Bond Amendment. This memorandum set forth
guidance for adjudicators to assess the potential application of the Bond Amendment to
security clearance determinations and requirements for “Exception” identification of
persons subject to its limitations in the Joint Adjudication Management System (JAMS)
if a collateral clearance is granted. The granting of access to SAP, RD or SCI to such
individuals requires a meritorious waiver under the terms of that memorandum. Such
access is not at issue in this case, and accordingly the Bond Amendment was not
addressed in either the SOR or at the hearing.
The repeal of the Smith Amendment also nullified the legal authority by which the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence modified the revised Adjudicative
Guidelines (AG) that were approved by the President on December 29, 2005. When the
Under Secretary promulgated the AG for use within DoD, on August 30, 2006, he added
provisions reflecting the Smith Amendment. AG H (Drug Involvement), AG I
(Psychological Conditions), and AG J (Criminal Conduct) were each modified, but only
the latter guideline is involved in this case. It was modified by adding ¶¶ 31(f), 32(e),
and footnotes 1 and 2. Because the President, in Executive Order 12968, intended to
establish “a uniform Federal personnel security program” (Intro.), and required a
“common set of adjudicative guidelines for determining eligibility for access to classified
information” (Sec. 3.1(f).), the authority for these DoD modifications to the guidelines
ended with the repeal of the Smith Amendment. The new statutory requirements are in
effect and must be followed pending formal revision of the AG, but only the prohibition
against granting clearances to unlawful drug users and addicts under AG H applies to
“collateral” security clearances. Accordingly, the Smith Amendment-related provisions
added to AG J have been repealed, and do not apply to the remaining proceedings in
this case.    
Analysis
Guideline G, Alcohol Consumption
AG ¶ 21 expresses the security concern pertaining to alcohol consumption:
“Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment or
the failure to control impulses, and can raise questions about an individual's reliability
and trustworthiness.” AG ¶ 22 describes conditions that could raise a security concern
and may be disqualifying. The disqualifying condition asserted by the Government in
this case is: “(a) alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while under
the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, disturbing the peace, or other incidents of
concern, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or
alcohol dependent.”
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Applicant had one alcohol-related vehicular homicide conviction for an incident in
February 2002. He also received minor non-judicial punishment for prohibited
consumption of beer while underage and in a training status in April 1991. The
Government has established security concerns under this guideline, shifting the burden
of proof to Applicant to mitigate those concerns.
AG ¶ 23 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns:
(a) so much time has passed, or the behavior was so infrequent, or it
happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or
does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness,
or good judgment;
(b) the individual acknowledges his or her alcoholism or issues of alcohol
abuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and
has established a pattern of abstinence (if alcohol dependent) or
responsible use (if an alcohol abuser);
(c) the individual is a current employee who is participating in a counseling
or treatment program, has no history of previous treatment and relapse,
and is making satisfactory progress; and
(d) the individual has successfully completed inpatient or outpatient
counseling or rehabilitation along with any required aftercare, has
demonstrated a clear and established pattern of modified consumption or
abstinence in accordance with treatment recommendations, such as
participation in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar
organization and has received a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified
medical professional or a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff
member of a recognized alcohol treatment program.
Applicant established mitigation under ¶ 23(a) with respect to his two alcohol
incidents, both individually and collectively. The 1991 incident was 17 years ago and
occurred when he was young and not authorized to drink the beer provided to him by
those who were authorized to drink it. Those conditions no longer exist. The tragic 2002
incident, in which Applicant was convicted of driving recklessly with a BAC of .21
resulting in a crash in which his friend died and he suffered a broken neck, occurred six
and a half years ago and was a one-time exercise of terrible judgment. He suffered
severe consequences, and the evidence established that any recurrence of such
conduct is highly unlikely. With the passage of time and Applicant’s conduct in the
interim, this one-time behavior no longer casts doubt on his current reliability,
trustworthiness and good judgment. Although never diagnosed with alcohol dependence
or alcohol abuse, he did acknowledge that the vehicular homicide was an alcohol-
related exercise of terrible judgment, and took responsible steps to prevent recurrence.
He successfully completed his court-ordered outpatient education treatment program,
and completely abstained from alcohol from 2002 to early 2007. Both his case manager
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and the program’s clinical director gave him a very favorable prognosis upon completion
of the program. For about six months in 2007 he engaged in very moderate and
responsible consumption of beer. He has recently abstained from alcohol for more than
a year – not because he was advised to abstain, but because his work, education and
family priorities cause him to choose not to drink. These actions generate further
mitigation of alcohol consumption security concerns under ¶¶ 23(b) and 23(d). 
Guideline J, Criminal Conduct
AG ¶ 30 expresses the security concern pertaining to criminal conduct, “Criminal
activity creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. By its
very nature, it calls into question a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws,
rules and regulations.” AG ¶ 31 describes conditions that could raise a security concern
and may be disqualifying. Disqualifying conditions asserted by the Government were:
“(a) a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses;” and “(c) allegation or admission
of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was formally charged, formally
prosecuted or convicted.” (Tr. at 110.) Applicant admitted both the unauthorized drinking
offense in 1991 and the vehicular homicide in 2002. These offenses do raise security
concerns under the aforementioned disqualifying conditions. Applicant’s conviction and
incarceration for 24 months would also implicate AG ¶ 31(f), “conviction in a Federal or
State court, including a court-martial of a crime, sentenced to imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year and incarceration as a result of that sentence for not less than a
year.” As discussed above, however, this provision was added to the AG for purposes
of DoD adjudications as a result of the now-repealed Smith Amendment. It was added
because this disqualifying condition could not formerly be mitigated except through a
Secretarial meritorious waiver. This is no longer the law, and this disqualifying condition
is now redundant with the “single serious crime,” under AG ¶ 31(a).
AG ¶ 32 provides conditions that could mitigate criminal conduct security
concerns. Applicant’s recent sobriety, completion of an outpatient treatment program,
good work performance, pursuit of higher education and lifestyle changes establish
mitigation under two of them: “(a) so much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior
happened, or it happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur
and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good
judgment;” and “(d) there is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including but not
limited to the passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity, remorse or
restitution, job training or higher education, good employment record, or constructive
community involvement.”
Applicant’s criminal conduct occurred many years ago, but his criminal history
must be evaluated as a whole, not piece by piece. Although both incidents involved
alcohol, they were very different in nature and scope. His 1991 prohibited consumption
of a beer given to him by senior personnel reflected a lapse of discipline and was
treated accordingly by his command. He subsequently proved that he learned his
lesson by superior military performance leading to very early selection for promotion to
chief warrant officer. The 2002 vehicular homicide incident was inexplicably out of
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character and unrepresentative of his otherwise responsible behavior and lifestyle. He
has demonstrated sufficient rehabilitation to establish full confidence that such behavior
is unlikely to recur, and no longer casts doubt on his reliability, trustworthiness and
judgment. 
Guideline F, Financial Considerations
AG ¶ 18 expresses the security concern pertaining to financial considerations:
Failure or inability to live within one's means, satisfy debts, and meet
financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or
unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise
questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to
protect classified information. An individual who is financially over-
extended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds.
Compulsive gambling is a concern as it may lead to financial crimes
including espionage. Affluence that cannot be explained by known sources
of income is also a security concern. It may indicate proceeds from
financially profitable criminal acts.
AG ¶ 19 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying. Of these nine different disqualifying conditions, the Government asserted
that one was raised by Applicant’s financial circumstances (Tr. at 111.): “(c) a history of
not meeting financial obligations.”
The evidence shows that Applicant was reported to owe delinquent debts
resulting from the Government’s overpayment of his salary while he was in prison and
due to a medical billing error. Each debt was reported to be delinquent while he was
actively and legitimately disputing whether he should be required to pay them. One was
not a valid debt and, after he paid it anyway, his money was refunded. The other
dispute was resolved against him, and he promptly settled that debt in full. This
relatively brief history of not meeting two disputed financial obligations supports only
minor, if any, security concerns under AG ¶ 19(c).
AG ¶ 20 provides conditions that could mitigate financial security concerns.
Applicant established substantial mitigation under five of those conditions:
(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred
under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast
doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good
judgment;
(b) the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely
beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a business
downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or
separation), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances;
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(c) the person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem
and/or there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is
under control;
(d) the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or
otherwise resolve debts; and 
(e) the individual has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy of the
past-due debt which is the cause of the problem and provides
documented proof to substantiate the basis of the dispute or provides
evidence of actions to resolve the issue.
Applicant’s debt to the Government arose due to the Army’s mishandling of his
pay while he was in prison, and through no fault of his own. The circumstances were
unique, totally out of his control, and bore no reflection on his trustworthiness or
reliability. After utilizing all legitimate and reasonable means to seek a waiver of this
indebtedness, he paid the debt when these efforts failed. The other debt arose due to
medical billing errors which he took prompt steps to correct. Despite the illegitimacy of
the debt, he paid it pending resolution once it was sent to collections. This payment was
later reimbursed to him. Taken together, Applicant’s actions fully mitigate the minimal
security concerns raised by his brief period of delinquent indebtedness. In fact, his
present solvency and “current” status on his minimal outstanding debt shows
remarkable financial responsibility, given his status as the sole provided for a family of
six who spent two of the last five years in prison.
Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances established by the record evidence. The
administrative judge should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶
2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration
of the guidelines and the whole person concept.  
  
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I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant’s conduct of potential
concern involved one very minor alcohol incident 17 years ago, two debts that he
legitimately disputed and subsequently resolved, and his 2002 vehicular homicide
offense. Only the latter incident provides a basis for any serious security concern. This
incident arose when Applicant, a normally light-to-moderate drinker, became seriously
intoxicated to the point that his BAC was .21. While he must have consciously chosen to
drive on that occasion, his knowledgeable participation was under, for him, the unusual
circumstances that his judgment was severely impaired. Although the consequences
were about as bad as possible, this was Applicant’s only such incident in an otherwise
highly responsible adulthood. In the six and a half years since the incident, he
successfully completed all court-ordered sanctions and has demonstrated full
rehabilitation and unerringly responsible behavior. There is no potential for pressure,
exploitation, coercion, or duress, since this is a matter of public knowledge, and well-
known to his employer and family. Applicant’s dedication to continued service in the
interests of  national defense through private employment, pursuit of higher education,
remorse, and permanent behavioral changes support the conclusion that any
recurrence of this one-time incident of irresponsible behavior is most unlikely.
Overall, the record evidence leaves me with no doubt as to Applicant’s eligibility
and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I conclude Applicant has
fully mitigated the security concerns arising from alcohol consumption, criminal conduct,
and financial considerations. 
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline G: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f: Deleted on DC motion
Paragraph 2, Guideline J: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
Paragraph 3, Guideline E: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 3.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 3.b: For Applicant
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Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the interests of national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a
security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted. This
determination does not include eligibility for access to SAP, RD, or SCI. Any such
access would require Applicant to apply for, and be granted a meritorious waiver by the
DOHA Director or Deputy Director under the Bond Amendment. DOHA administrative
personnel are directed to ensure proper annotation of these limitations in Applicant’s
JAMS file.  
                                             
DAVID M. WHITE
Administrative Judge