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                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
--------------------- )      ISCR Case No. 07-14556
SSN: ------------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: John Bayard Glendon, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
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CURRY, Marc E., Administrative Judge:
On April 28, 2008, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the security concerns under Guidelines B,
foreign influence, and E, personal conduct. The action was taken under Executive Order
10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as
amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel
Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the
revised adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29,
2005, and effective within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September
1, 2006. 
Applicant answered the SOR on May 30, 2008, admitting the allegations and
requesting a hearing. I received the case assignment on July 10, 2008. DOHA issued a
notice of hearing on July 25, 2008, and I convened the hearing as scheduled on August
20, 2008. During the hearing, I received three government exhibits and the testimony of
two Applicant witnesses. DOHA received the transcript on September 2, 2008. Based
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upon a review of the record evidence, eligibility for access to classified information is
granted.
Rulings of Evidence
Department Counsel requested that I take administrative notice of the facts set
forth in 19 source documents marked and identified as government’s exhibits I through
XIX. I did not take administrative notice of Exhibits XVI through XIX. Because Applicant
did not receive copies of any of the source documents before the hearing, I reserved
judgment on the remainder, leaving the record open until August 27, 2008 to afford
Applicant the opportunity to review them. He did not respond, therefore, I will take
administrative notice of Exhibits I through XV.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 31-year-old married man with an infant child. He is a U.S. citizen
who was born in Israel, and has lived there nearly his entire life (Tr. 69). His parents are
Christian missionaries who moved there in the 1960s (Tr. 58-59). They retained their
U.S. citizenship. For the past 15 years, his father has been the senior pastor at an
interdenominational church in West Jerusalem. He talks to his parents approximately
once per month (Exhibit 2 at 3).
During Applicant’s childhood, he lived in several communities in Jerusalem with
people from a variety of ethnic backgrounds. The neighborhoods ranged from majority
Israeli to majority Arab. Sometimes he lived in neighborhoods with a combination of
both ethnic groups (Tr. 105). Applicant spent the majority of his childhood living in West
Jerusalem, a majority Jewish area (Tr. 105). All of his neighbors at that time were Israeli
Jews (Tr. 106). From fourth to sixth grade, he went to an Israeli school and was the only
non-Israeli who attended (Tr. 106). From grades seven through twelve, he attended a
Christian school. His classmates were “kids from all over” including diplomats’ children,
Palestinians, and some Israeli Jews (Tr. 106).
Throughout Applicant’s childhood, his family visited the U.S. for extended visits
approximately every other year (Tr. 68). Through 2005, none of his trips to the U.S. had
exceeded three months (Tr. 69).
After graduating from high school in 1995, Applicant attended an elite, American
school located in Jordan to study the Arabic language (Tr. 65). He earned a certificate in
1997 (Exhibit 1 at 7). He then returned to Jerusalem to attend college at a Jewish
university (Tr. 63; Answer, SOR ¶1.h). He majored in middle eastern studies, Islamic
studies, and Biblical studies (Tr. 100-101). While attending college, he worked for a
United Kingdom-based newspaper as a correspondent and a translator (Tr. 64). By
then, he was fluent in English, Hebrew, and Arabic (Tr. 65).
While in college, Applicant met his wife, who was also studying there at the time
(Tr. 67). They married in 2001.
Between May 2005 and November 2006, Applicant was unemployed. He supported himself through a1
combination of savings and the help of his wife, who obtained a job (Tr. 70).
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Applicant graduated from college in June 2004 (Exhibit 1 at 6). He continued to
work for a foreign-owned newspaper in Jerusalem from 1998 until 2005 (Answer, SOR ¶
1.i). During this time, he “would periodically read about how after 9/11, there was a dire
need for people with skills in the Arabic language, and specifically with regional
experience” (Tr. 102). In May 2005, he decided to leave his job at the newspaper, move
to the U.S., and seek work as a translator and/or an analyst.
Applicant began working for his current employer in November 2006 as an Arabic
media analyst (Exhibit 1 at 8; Tr. 85).  He provides analysis to the U.S. military of how1
its daily activities are being covered in the Arab media (Tr. 85). Also, before a U.S.
general is interviewed by an Arab media outlet, he prepares an analysis brief of the
media outlet and reviews it with the general (Tr. 110). His goal is to help the officers
gain “some idea of what they [are] getting into when being interviewed by [the
respective Arabic media outlet],” and to minimize the possibility of any cultural faux pas
(Tr. 110). Recently, he translated the U.S. Central Command’s website into Arabic (Tr.
109). 
Applicant’s wife is a Jordanian citizen. She has recently applied for U.S.
citizenship (Tr. 53). She was born in East Jerusalem, and spent most of her childhood in
the United Arab Emirates (Tr. 78; 107). From Israel’s founding in 1948 through 1967,
East Jerusalem was part of Jordan (Exhibit VII at 10) After the Six-Day War, Israel
annexed it, but did not extend Israeli citizenship to its residents (Tr. 51). Currently, it
remains under Israeli jurisdiction (Id.; Exhibit VII at 10). The majority of its residents are
ethnic Palestinians with Jordanian citizenship.
Applicant’s father-in-law is a Palestinian with Jordanian citizenship (Tr. 97). He
works for a private, multinational bank (Tr. 98). Applicant’s mother-in-law is originally
from South Korea. She is a Jordanian citizen by virtue of her marriage to Applicant’s
father-in-law (Tr. 99). She is a retired nurse (Id.). Applicant’s wife and in-laws are all
Christians (Tr. 68). Applicant talks to his in-laws once every few months (Tr. 98).
Recently, they visited him and his wife in the U.S. after their baby was born, staying for
five weeks (Tr. 98).
Applicant has four sisters and two brothers. All are U.S. citizens. His oldest sister
is a homemaker who lives in Israel (Tr. 81; 89). She is married to an American. He talks
with her a few times per month. She and her family spend each summer in the U.S.
While here, they live in a summer home that they own, and usually visit Applicant’s
family before returning to Israel.
There is no record of her husband’s nationality.2
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Another sister is a high school teacher by training who is currently a homemaker.
She lives in Jerusalem with her husband, a professor.  They are in the process of2
moving to Italy (Tr. 81). Applicant talks with her approximately twice a month (Tr. 81).
Applicant’s third sister lives in Jerusalem (Tr. 93). She is a home health care
aide, and is earning a master’s degree in psychology (Tr. 81). He talks with her
approximately once per month. Her husband is a U.S. citizen who works with a
Christian ministry which promotes reconciliation between Jews and Arabs (Tr. 93).
Applicant’s youngest sister is a college student who lives with him (Tr. 82). She is not
married.
Applicant’s younger brother is a first lieutenant in the U.S. Air Force (Tr. 81). He
finished the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) in 2005. He is currently stationed in
the U.S., and is preparing to deploy to a combat theatre (Tr. 82). 
Applicant’s youngest brother is a recent college graduate who lives with their
parents in Jerusalem (Answer, SOR ¶1.d). He is a filmmaker (Tr. 81-82). He is not
married. Generally, Applicant talks with him when he talks with his parents.
Since moving to the U.S., Applicant has traveled to Jerusalem three times to visit
his family (SOR ¶ 1.e). He has visited Jordan several times over the years. The visits
have included weekend leisure trips with family members, and trips to visit friends
(Exhibit 2 at 4; Tr. 107).
Applicant has approximately $30,000 of assets including stocks, and personal
savings. All of it is invested in the U.S. (Tr. 126).
Applicant did not register for the draft as required by 10 U.S.C. § 453 (Answer, ¶
2.a). He knew that he had an obligation to register, and had planned upon doing so
when he moved to the U.S. After moving to the U.S. and applying, he discovered that
he was past the age limit (Tr. 111; 116-117). In 2005, he wrote the Selective Service
informing it of his failure to register (Tr. 113). 
Israeli citizenship is available to Jews living anywhere in the world. Non-Jews are
prohibited from becoming Israeli citizens. Israel and the U.S. are bound closely by
historic and cultural ties as well as mutual strategic interests (Exhibit VII at 10). There
have been, however, some cases of individuals prosecuted and convicted of spying
against the U.S. for Israel (Exhibit VII at 30). The threat of terrorist attacks in Israel is
ongoing, and the U.S. government warns that American interests could be the focus of
such attacks (Exhibit VIII at 4).
Jordan has enjoyed a close relationship with the U.S. for six decades (Exhibit I at
5, 6). It is ruled by a king, has a council of ministers selected by the king, and has a
partially elected national assembly (Id. at 1, 2). The king has repeatedly denounced
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extremists, and promotes a tolerant, moderate brand of Islam (Exhibit IV at 8). Recently
Jordan’s parliament passed new anti-money laundering legislation aimed at individuals
and entities which attempt to bankroll terrorist groups. Also, it has organized a state
security court that specializes in cases involving terrorism.
Despite Jordan’s vigilant efforts to combat terrorism, the threat remains (Exhibit II
at 2). Terrorist groups in Jordan use covert, overt, and clandestine activities to
undermine and exploit U.S. national security interests (Exhibit II at 2).
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
Administrative Judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in
evaluating an Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The Administrative Judge’s overarching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common sense decision. According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole person concept.” The Administrative Judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” 
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security
decision.
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
Under this guideline, “foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if
an individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not
Under this guideline, a security concern may exist if relatives are residing in a foreign country even if they are3
U.S. citizens. The corresponding disqualifying and mitigating conditions reference “foreign persons” but do
not consistently reference U.S. citizens resident in foreign countries. W hen using the word “foreign” in my
analysis, I have construed it to mean both “situated outside a place or country and [especially] one’s own
country,” and “born in, belonging to, or characteristic of some place or country other than the one under
consideration”  Mirriam-W ebster Dictionary, 11  Edition, Mirriam-W ebster, Inc., 2005.th
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in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interests” (AG ¶
6).  3
Applicant’s parents, some of his siblings, and both of his parent-in-laws live in
Jerusalem, a city under Israeli control with a sizeable population of Palestinians who are
Jordanian citizens. It remains a focal point of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Although
Jordan is an ally of the U.S., and has recognized Israel under a peace agreement
approximately 15 years ago, terrorist elements within its borders actively seek to
undermine both the efforts at a long-term, peaceful resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict, and other U.S. strategic and regional interests. The presence of Applicant’s
family members in an area where so many countries, ethnicities, and transnational
groups have competing and sometimes hostile interests generates the application of AG
¶ 7(a), “contact with a foreign family member, business, or professional associate,
friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact
creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or
coercion.”
Applicant’s wife is a Jordanian citizen. Because she lives with him in the U.S.,
their relationship does not create a direct security risk. Nevertheless, Applicant is
potentially subject to coercion through his wife from her parents who are Jordanian
citizens living in East Jerusalem. AG ¶ 7(d), “sharing living quarters with a person or
persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of
foreign inducement manipulation, pressure, or coercion,” applies.
Applicant’s immediate family members are U.S. citizens who are part of a small
community of Americans that live in Israel. Although Israel is a staunch ally of the U.S.,
it has a history of conducting espionage against the U.S. As non-Jews, Applicant’s
family members cannot be Israeli citizens under Israeli law. Consequently, no sense of
ethnic chauvinism or national pride exists which would induce them to coerce Applicant
into providing classified information. Although their unique status makes them
vulnerable targets for exploitation by the Israeli government, it is unlikely that it would
attempt to use overt intimidation to exploit Applicant’s relationship with them considering
its role as the only transparent democracy in the region. 
Jordan is not a democracy; however, its historically strong relationship with the
U.S., and its demonstrated track record of assistance in helping the U.S. achieve its
strategic objectives in the region render it similarly unlikely that it would use overt
intimidation to exploit Applicant’s relationship with his in-laws. Conversely, despite the
best efforts of the Israeli and Jordanian governments, terrorists operate extensively
throughout the region, and retain the capacity to strike both on Jordanian soil and Israeli
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules4
and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, and ability to protect
classified information (AG ¶ 15).
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soil. Such groups would not hesitate to use the threat of overt force to exploit
Applicant’s relationship with his family members in Jerusalem. Moreover, terrorists’
governing philosophies and objectives are completely antithetical to U.S. interests. The
pervasive presence of terrorists in this region renders the potentially mitigating condition
listed in AG ¶ 8(a), “the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in
which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that
country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to
choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or
government, and the interests of the U.S.,” inapplicable.
Applicant has a close relationship with his relatives, visiting them and speaking
with them whenever he gets an opportunity. AG ¶ 8(c), “contact or communication with
foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could
create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation” apply.
Applicant has only lived in the U.S. for three years. Although a friend testified
credibly and persuasively on his behalf at the hearing, he has yet to develop
longstanding relationships in the U.S. necessary to trigger the application of AG ¶ 8(b),
“there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty to the
foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such
deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be
expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.” 
The inapplicability of AG ¶ 8(b) does not compel a conclusion that Applicant
would not resolve a conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest. He is a loyal,
intensely patriotic American who was born a U.S. citizen, as were all of his immediate
family members. His brother is an officer in the U.S. Air Force. AG ¶ 8(b) is inapplicable
because his most significant longstanding relationships with U.S. citizens were
developed abroad, not in the U.S., as the mitigating condition requires.
None of the remaining disqualifying and mitigating conditions are relevant.
Guideline E, Personal Conduct
Applicant’s failure to register for the draft raises a personal conduct security
concern.  He certainly exercised bad judgment when he decided to wait until he moved4
to the U.S. before registering without checking the law beforehand. He did attempt to
register when he moved to the U.S., as planned, but discovered that he was by then too
old. His omission, however, was an honest mistake, rather than an intentional attempt to
evade the draft. Although his explanation mitigated the personal conduct security
concern, his failure to register underscores his disconnection from American society
growing up in a foreign country.
ISCR Case No. 03-12882 (App. Bd., July 20, 2005).5
ISCR Case No. 99-0462 (App. Bd., May 25, 2000) at 5.6
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Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): “(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness
of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include
knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which
participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other
permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for
pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or
recurrence.” The mere presence or absence of a disqualifying or mitigating condition is
not dispositive.  Instead, the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a5
security clearance is an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines within the context of the whole person concept.
The War on Terror is both a military and an ideological war. The adversary
operates across multiple countries, and uses religion and culture as a pretense for its
destructive activities. Consequently, the U.S. military has had to strike a balance
between aggressively fighting terrorists without creating the perception that it is waging
war against the culture and religion of the respective countries where terrorists operate.
The promotion of American values - respect for the rule of law, religious tolerance,
freedom of speech, and the respect for human rights - have been critical to this
endeavor. 
By serving the military as an Arab media analyst who is helping senior military
officers communicate more effectively with the various communities where much of the
War on Terror is being fought, Applicant is making a critical contribution to its long-term
success. None of the foreign influence mitigating conditions apply because Applicant
was born in the Middle East where much of his immediate family remains, and raised
among Jews and Arabs in a city that remains a volatile flashpoint for conflict. However,
his years living as a U.S. citizen in the Middle East are precisely what makes him a
unique and valuable asset to the U.S. military effort in the region.
 I am cognizant of Appeal Board jurisprudence which holds that the issue of an
applicant’s security clearance-worthiness typically does not turn on whether (s)he
possesses unique professional abilities.  However, the Appeal Board has held that the6
invaluable aid of an applicant to the War on Terrorism can overcome foreign influence
ISCR Case No. 04-12363 (App. Bd., July 14, 2006) at 2; ISCR Case No. 07-00034 (App. Bd., February 5,7
2008).
See generraly, U.S. v. DiFransesco, 449 U.S. 117(1980); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155;8
Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
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security concerns.  Moreover, to deny Applicant a clearance when his unique7
professional abilities constitute the same factors which generate a foreign influence
security concern would be to exalt form over substance. The Supreme Court has held
that “the exaltation of form over substance is to be avoided.”  Upon considering all of8
the facts and circumstances together with the disqualifying and mitigating conditions, in
the context of the whole person concept I conclude Applicant has carried the burden.
Clearance is granted.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a - 1.j: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline E: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                             
MARC E. CURRY
Administrative Judge