DOHA acted under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February1
20, 1990), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program  (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the revised adjudicative
guidelines (RAG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and effective within the Department
of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
XXX, Xxxxx Xxx )       ISCR Case No. 07-16064
SSN: XXX-XX-XXXX )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Julie R. Edmunds, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
______________
Decision
______________
METZ, John Grattan, Jr., Administrative Judge:
On 14 February 2008, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)
issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing security concerns under
Guideline B.  Applicant answered the SOR 25 March 2008, and requested a decision1
without hearing. DOHA assigned the case to me 7 July 2008. The record in this case
closed 31 May 2008, the day Applicant’s response to the government’s File of Relevant
Material (FORM) was due. Applicant did not respond to the FORM.
The SOR alleges, and Applicant admits, that the account is worth $100,000. However, the government’s2
evidence contains contradictory information about the account. I find most persuasive evidence to be
Applicant’s calculation of the account balance in Lebanese currency exchanged into U.S. dollars.
2
Findings of Fact
Applicant admitted the SOR allegations. He is a 41-year-old electrician
employed by a defense contractor since February 2002. He has not previously held a
clearance. 
Applicant was born in Lebanon in February 1967. However, because he was
born to Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon, he did not acquire Lebanese citizenship.
Lebanon does not permit Palestinian refugees to assimilate into Lebanese society; the
U.S. Government recognizes such refugees as “stateless persons” [Official Notice
Document (O.N.) XIV]. In August 1996, Applicant obtained a travel document (not
passport) issued by the Lebanese Government to Palestinian refugees (G.E. 5).
Between 1996 and 1999, he used this travel document to travel to the U.S. Embassy in
Syria, where he obtained visas to travel to the U.S. Consequently, his first two children
were born in the U.S. in 1996 and 1998. In 1999, he immigrated to the U.S. as a legal
permanent resident (LPR), and was naturalized as a U.S. citizen in August 2005. His
wife, also a Palestinian, became a naturalized U.S. citizen in September 2000.
Applicant’s sister became a naturalized U.S. citizen in March 2004. Using his Lebanese
travel document, Applicant returned to Lebanon in June 2003 and August 2004, to visit
his sick father. He has not returned to Lebanon since, despite the fact that his father
died in March 2008.  His expired Lebanese travel document was shredded by his facility
security officer (FSO).
Applicant’s mother, brother, and father-in-law are Palestinian refugees residing in
Lebanon, although his father-in-law is a legal permanent resident of the U.S. and
resides some of the year in the U.S.  Both Applicant’s mother and brother have pending
visa applications to immigrate to the U.S. Neither has any direct connection to the
Lebanese government, which would nevertheless be impossible as stateless persons.
Applicant has a savings account in Lebanon worth about $25,000.  As Lebanese law2
currently stands, he cannot get the money without traveling to Lebanon. Applicant
estimates his net worth in the U.S. at $200,000.
Lebanon is a nominal democracy with a less-than-perfect human rights record. It
has both a long history of civil war and of foreign influence by Syria. Lebanon is not a
state sponsor of terrorism, but is a permissive environment for groups recognized by the
U.S. as terrorist organizations, considered by Lebanon as “freedom fighters” against
Israel. The U.S. State Department continues to maintain a travel warning for U.S.
citizens contemplating travel to Lebanon. As a result of the recent fighting between
Israel and Lebanon, Applicant states that his family in Lebanon has basically lost every
thing. He and his family lost homes; his brother lost his business.
See, Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).3
Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 6.4
3
Policies
The Revised Adjudicative Guidelines (RAG) list factors to be considered in
evaluating an Applicant’s suitability for access to classified information. Administrative
Judges must assess both disqualifying and mitigating conditions under each issue fairly
raised by the facts and circumstances presented. Each decision must also reflect a fair
and impartial common sense consideration of the factors listed in RAG ¶ 2(a). The
presence or absence of a disqualifying or mitigating condition is not determinative for or
against Applicant. However, specific adjudicative guidelines should be followed where a
case can be measured against them, as they represent policy guidance governing the
grant or denial of access to classified information. Considering the SOR allegations and
the evidence as a whole, the relevant, applicable, adjudicative guideline is Guideline B. 
Security clearance decisions resolve whether it is clearly consistent with the
national interest to grant or continue an Applicant’s security clearance. The government
must prove, by something less than a preponderance of the evidence, controverted
facts alleged in the SOR. If it does so, it establishes a prima facie case against access
to classified information. Applicant must then refute, extenuate, or mitigate the
government’s case. Because no one has a right to a security clearance, the Applicant
bears a heavy burden of persuasion.
Persons with access to classified information enter into a fiduciary relationship
with the government based on trust and confidence. Therefore, the government has a
compelling interest in ensuring each Applicant possesses the requisite judgement,
reliability, and trustworthiness of those who must protect national interests as their own.
The “clearly consistent with the national interest” standard compels resolution of any
reasonable doubt about an Applicant’s suitability for access in favor of the government.3
Analysis
Under Guideline B (Foreign Influence), an applicant’s foreign contacts and
interests may raise security concerns if the individual 1) has divided loyalties or foreign
financial interests, 2) may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group,
organization, or government in a way contrary to U.S. interests, or 3) is vulnerable to
pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Foreign influence adjudications can and
should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located—including, but not limited to, whether the country is known
to target U.S. citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism.  Evaluation of an individual’s qualifications for access to protected information4
requires careful assessment of both the foreign entity’s willingness and ability to target
protected information, and to target ex-patriots who are U.S. citizens to obtain that
information, and the individual’s susceptibility to influence, whether negative or positive.
Revised Adjudicative Guidelines, ¶ 7.(a).5
4
More specifically, an individual’s contacts with foreign family members (or other foreign
entities or persons) raise security concerns only if those contacts create a heightened
risk or foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.5
In this case, the government’s evidence for disqualification under Guideline B is
mixed. Considering first the country involved, Lebanon and the U.S. enjoy good foreign
relations. It has not been demonstrated that the Lebanese government is actively
engaged in the collection of U.S. intelligence such that would make Applicant or his
family likely targets for coercion, duress, or influence. The government’s evidence
explains the links to terrorism that are on-going in Lebanon and the way that those
terrorist organizations operate, the increase in terrorism, and the increase in
membership in terrorist groups. Several of the groups that are frequently in the news,
for example Hizballah and Hamas, operate in Lebanon and practice terrorist acts
against Israelis and against U.S. citizens as well as indiscriminate violence in order to
draw attention to themselves and increase their membership and their power. There is
no indication they use terrorism to gain access to U.S. information.
Considering Applicant’s circumstances, the government produced insufficient
evidence that there was a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement,
manipulation, pressure, or coercion because of Applicant’s limited family contacts in
Lebanon. None of Applicant’s family members have any direct connection to the
Lebanese government. All are pending visas to come to the U.S. While his Lebanese
savings account cannot be considered insubstantial, it is a fairly insignificant portion of
Applicant’s net worth, the overwhelming majority of which is in the U.S. Both he and his
wife are U.S. citizens, and his children are all native-born U.S. citizens. Applicant’s
emotional ties are overwhelmingly in the U.S. Further, except for his mother and
brother, any property in Lebanon that might hold any emotional sway over him has been
destroyed. Under these circumstances, I conclude that it is unlikely Applicant can be
pressured based on his family members in Lebanon or his small financial interest there.
Accordingly, I resolve Guideline B for Applicant.
Formal Findings
   Paragraph 1. Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT 
Subparagraph a: For Applicant
Subparagraph b: For Applicant
Subparagraph c: For Applicant
Subparagraph d: For Applicant
Subparagraph e: For Applicant
5
Conclusion
In light of all the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for
Applicant. Clearance granted.
                                              
                                             
JOHN GRATTAN METZ, JR
Administrative Judge