DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
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---------------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 08-03424
SSN: -------------------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Jennifer I. Goldstein, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
September 29, 2008
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Decision
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LOKEY-ANDERSON, Darlene, Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted his Electronic Questionnaires for Investigations Processing
(e-QIP), on November 27, 2006.  On April 28, 2008, the Defense Office of Hearings and
Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the security concerns
under Guideline B for Applicant. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865,
Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended;
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the revised
adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and
effective within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
 
The Applicant responded to the SOR on May 13, 2008, and he requested a
hearing before a DOHA Administrative Judge.  This case was assigned to the
undersigned on July 16, 2008.  A notice of hearing was issued on July 16, 2008,
scheduling the hearing for July 24, 2008, at the Applicant’s request.  The Applicant
knowingly waived the 15 days notice required by the Directive in order to expedite the
matter.  At the hearing the Government presented four exhibits, referred to as
Government Exhibits 1 through 4.  The Applicant presented five exhibits, referred to as
Applicant’s Exhibits A through E, and he testified on his own behalf.  The official
transcript (Tr.) was received on July 31, 2008.  Based upon a review of the case file,
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pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, eligibility for access to classified information is
denied.
Request for Administrative Notice
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice
of certain facts concerning the current political conditions in Taiwan.  Applicant had no
objection.  (Tr. p. 15).  The request and the attached documents were not admitted into
evidence but were included in the record. The facts administratively noticed are set out
in the Findings of Fact, below. 
FINDINGS OF FACT
The following Findings of Fact are based on Applicant's Answer to the SOR, the
testimony and the exhibits.  The Applicant is 51 years of age and has a Masters Degree
and a Ph.D. in Optical Sciences.  He is employed as a Senior Principal Systems
Engineer for a defense contractor.  He seeks a security clearance in connection with his
employment in the defense industry.
Paragraph 1 (Guideline B - Foreign Influence).  The Government alleges in this
paragraph that the Applicant is ineligible for clearance because he has foreign contacts
that could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise
of classified information.
The Applicant was born in Taiwan in 1957, and grew up there.  He also obtained
his undergraduate degree from a university in Taiwan.  He first came to the United
States in 1982, on a graduate student visa to attend college.  After several months, his
father fell ill, and he returned to Taiwan to be with his family.  In 1983, the Applicant
returned to the United States to pursue his studies and in 1988, he was awarded a
Masters and Ph.D. in Optical Sciences.  In 1983, the Applicant married a Taiwanese
woman he met in the United States.  In December 1991, he began working for a
defense contractor.  In May 1996, he became a naturalized United States citizen.  That
same year, he applied for and was granted a security clearance.  He later applied for a
Special Compartmentalized Access, but was denied access in June 2004.  
The Applicant’s mother and father are citizens and residents of Taiwan.  His
mother is a 79 year old housewife.  His father, who was born in China, is 89 years old.
He served as a General in the Taiwanese Air Force until he retired in the mid 80's.  He
flew fighter aircraft in World War II against the Japanese.  The Applicant testified that
his father is financially supported by a retirement pension plan, but the Applicant does
not know if it is provided for by the Government of Taiwan.  His father had a seizure in
January, and is currently very ill. 
The Applicant has close emotional ties to his parents in Taiwan.  He calls them
on a weekly basis to, among other things, keep up with their health concerns.  (Tr. p.
54).  On occasion he sends gifts and money when they are in need.  (Tr. pp. 52-53).  He
testified that he will help them in the future if necessary.  He visits them in Taiwan on a
yearly basis and stays with them during his visits.  He traveled to Taiwan in 1999, 2000,
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2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006 and 2008.  On occasion, his wife and son travel to
Taiwan with him.  He plans to spend his yearly vacations in Taiwan to visit his family
there.       
The Applicant’s only financial assets are in the United States.  They are valued at
approximately $400,000.00, which includes a house, a couple of certified savings
accounts, and a 401(k).  
Letters from the Applicant’s Supervisor, a Senior Manager, the Senior Program
Manager, two Directors of programs and other professional colleagues and coworkers
attest to the Applicant’s high performance level and serious and professional approach
to his work efforts.  He is considered to be a person of honesty, integrity, dedication and
competence.  (See Applicant’s Exhibit A).
The Applicant has received numerous awards for his contributions to the
company.  (See Applicant’s Exhibit B).  Performance appraisals for his entire period of
employment beginning in 1992, through the 2007, reflect consistent ratings of
satisfactory or above in every category.  (See Applicant’ Exhibit C).
A copy of the Applicant’s father’s Aviation Training yearbook from his time in the
Taiwanese military was placed into evidence.  (See Applicant’s Exhibit D).
I have taken official notice of the following facts concerning the Taiwan.  Taiwan
is a multi-party democracy with a population of about 23 million. It is one of the most
active collectors of sensitive United States information and technology.  Numerous
individuals and companies have been subjected to civil penalties and or prosecuted for
illegally exporting, or attempting to illegally export, sensitive United States technology to
Taiwan.  One United States official was recently convicted of crimes relating to his
improper relationship with a Taiwanese intelligence official.
POLICIES
Security clearance decisions are not made in a vacuum.  Accordingly, the
Department of Defense, in Enclosure 2 of the 1992  Directive sets forth policy factors
and conditions that could raise or mitigate a security concern; which must be given
binding consideration in making security clearance determinations.  These factors
should be followed in every case according to the pertinent criterion.  However, the
conditions are neither automatically determinative of the decision in any case, nor can
they supersede the Administrative Judge’s reliance on her own common sense.
Because each security clearance case presents its own unique facts and
circumstances, it cannot be assumed that these factors exhaust the realm of human
experience, or apply equally in every  case.  Based on the Findings of Fact set forth
above, the factors most applicable to the evaluation of this case are:
Foreign Influence
6.  The Concern.  Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the
individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
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induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not
in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest.
Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign
country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not
limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of
terrorism. 
Condition that could raise a security concern:
7.  (a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate,
friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident of a foreign country if that contact
creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or
coercion. 
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns:
None.
In addition, as set forth in Enclosure 2 of the Directive at pages 16-17, in
evaluating the relevance of an individual’s conduct, the Administrative Judge should
consider the following general factors:
a.  The nature and seriousness of the conduct and surrounding circumstances
b.  The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation
 c.  The frequency and recency of the conduct
d.  The individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct
e.  The voluntariness of participation
f.  The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent behavior
changes
g.  The motivation for the conduct 
h. The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation or duress
 i.  The likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
The eligibility criteria established in the DoD Directive identify personal
characteristics and conduct which are reasonably related to the ultimate question,
posed in Section 2 of Executive Order 10865, of whether it is “clearly consistent with the
national interest” to grant an Applicant’s request for access to classified information.
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The DoD Directive states, “The adjudicative process is an examination of a
sufficient period of a person’s life to make an affirmative determination that the person is
eligible for a security clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is
predicted upon the individual meeting these personnel security guidelines.  The
adjudicative process is the careful weighing of a number of variables known as the
whole person concept.  Available, reliable information about the person, past and
present, favorable and unfavorable should be considered in reaching a determination. 
The Administrative Judge can draw only those inferences or conclusions that have
reasonable and logical basis in the evidence of record.  The Judge cannot draw
inferences or conclusions based on evidence which is speculative or conjectural in
nature.  Finally, as emphasized by President Eisenhower in Executive Order 10865,
“Any determination under this order . . . shall be a determination in terms of the national
interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the Applicant
concerned.”
The Government must make out a case under Guideline B (foreign influence)
that establishes doubt about a person's judgment, reliability and trustworthiness.  While
a rational connection, or nexus, must be shown between Applicant's adverse conduct
and his ability to effectively safeguard classified information, with respect to sufficiency
of proof of a rational connection, objective or direct evidence is not required.
Then, the Applicant must remove that doubt with substantial evidence in
refutation, explanation, mitigation or extenuation, which demonstrates that the past
adverse conduct, is unlikely to be repeated, and that the Applicant presently qualifies for
a security clearance.
An individual who demonstrates a foreign influence ad has foreign connections
may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests
of the United States.  The mere possession of a foreign passport raises legitimate
questions as to whether the Applicant can be counted upon to place the interests of the
United States paramount to that of another nation. The Government must be able to
place a high degree of confidence in a security clearance holder to abide by all security
rules and regulations, at all times and in all places.
CONCLUSIONS
Having considered the evidence of record in light of the appropriate legal
standards and factors, and having assessed the Applicant's credibility based on the
record, this Administrative Judge concludes that the Government has established its
case as to all allegations in the SOR.   
Under Foreign Influence, Disqualifying Condition 7(a) contact with a foreign
family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a
citizen of or resident of a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion applies. None of
the mitigating conditions are applicable.
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The evidence shows that the Applicant’s has close emotional attachments to his
parents in Taiwan. He telephones them once a week, travels to see them annually, and
sends them gifts and/or money if they need it.  He is devoted to his parents and he is
obviously a good son.  This close bond or strong evidence of affection, however, could
potentially cause the Applicant to become subject to foreign exploitation, inducement,
manipulation, pressure, or coercion.  Furthermore, as a retired General in the
Taiwanese Air Force, it can be presumed that the Applicant’s father receives a
significant pension from the Government of Taiwan.  It is also noted that the current
political situation in Taiwan elevates the cause for concern in this case.  Based upon
this evidence, the possibility of foreign influence exists that could create the potential for
conduct resulting in the compromise of classified information.  Under the particular facts
of this case, I find that the Applicant is vulnerable to foreign influence.  Accordingly, I
find against the Applicant under Guideline B (Foreign Influence).
Considering all the evidence, the Applicant has not met the mitigating conditions
of Guideline B of the adjudicative guidelines set forth in Enclosure 2 of the Directive.
Accordingly, he has not met his ultimate burden of persuasion under Guideline B.  
FORMAL FINDINGS
Formal Findings For or Against the Applicant on the allegations in the SOR, as
required by Paragraph 25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive are:
Paragraph 1: Against the Applicant.
Subpara. 1.a.: Against the Applicant
Subpara. 1.b.: Against the Applicant
Subpara. 1.c.: Against the Applicant
DECISION
In light of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not clearly
consistent with the national interests to grant or continue a security clearance for the
Applicant.
Darlene Lokey Anderson
Administrative Judge