KEYWORD: Guideline G
DIGEST: The Judge made sustainable findings concerning Applicant’s lengthy history of alcohol
abuse, including continued drinking following a diagnosis of alcohol dependence as well as the
commission of alcohol-related offenses.  Applicant failed to mitigate the security concerns
arising from these findings.  Adverse decision affirmed.  
CASENO: 07-04108.a1
DATE: 10/20/2008
DATE: October 20, 2008
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 07-04108
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
R. Wayne Bromwell, Personal Representative
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On March 25, 2008, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of
the basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline G (Alcohol Consumption) of
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested a hearing.  On August 11, 2008, after the hearing, Administrative Judge Noreen A. Lynch
denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Applicant timely appealed pursuant to the
Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issues on appeal: whether the Judge’s findings are based on
substantial evidence; and whether the Judge’s adverse clearance decision under Guideline G is
sustainable.
The Judge made the following relevant findings: Applicant is a 37-year-old employee of a
defense contractor.  He graduated from high school in 1989 and attended college for several years.
Applicant is divorced with two children.  He served in the U.S. Navy from 1993 until 1997, and has
held a security clearance from 1997 until the present.
Applicant started drinking alcohol while in high school, drinking beer on the weekends. He
continued his drinking while in the Navy, on weekends and during shore leave.
 
In 1996, Applicant received a Captain’s Mast under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) for fighting and drunkenness after returning from shore leave.  He received
a restriction for 30 days.  Applicant claimed he did not realize that the 12-ounce can that held his
drink was straight vodka.  In 1997, Applicant received a Captain’s Mast for the offense of
drunkenness, suspended for six months, and restriction for 30 days.  
In 1998, Applicant completed a sworn statement expressing remorse for his drinking and the
trouble that it caused him. He stated that he was mature and learned not to abuse alcohol.  However,
he continued to consume alcohol.
In 1999, Applicant self referred to a 13-week program (outpatient) and attended Alcoholics
Anonymous (AA) twice a week.  He was drinking three or four mixed drinks each weekend evening.
If he was stressed, he drank two drinks on a weekday evening.  His diagnosis by his therapist was
alcohol abuse.  After completion of the program, Applicant abstained from alcohol for approximately
nine months. 
In the early years of his marriage, Applicant drank hard liquor frequently.  He would have
a shot of whiskey.  He became belligerent when he drank according to his own assessment. 
In 2004, Applicant was arrested for Driving Under the Influence (DUI) and failure to take
a breath test.  He had consumed six to eight beers prior to the incident.  Applicant pled guilty to the
charge of DUI and was sentenced to 30 days in jail and a one year restricted driver’s license.  He was
ordered to attend the driver safety program for counseling and to pay court costs and fines of $550.
Applicant completed the alcohol classes in 2006. 
In 2005, Applicant’s court ordered therapist recommended continued abstinence and
involvement with AA.  He was diagnosed as alcohol dependent with a good prognosis.  Applicant
still consumes alcohol, is confident that he has control over alcohol, and does not consider himself
to be alcohol dependent.
Applicant’s manager at work testified to his long time association with Applicant, and to his
good character and professionalism at work, and to his generosity and ability to help others.  He
recommends Applicant for a security clearance. 
Applicant admitted to both of these allegations in his answer to the SOR.1
As part of his brief, Applicant’s Personal Representative offers new evidence in the form of his personal2
observations as to Applicant’s character, loyalty, and excellent job performance.  The Board cannot consider this new
evidence on appeal.  See Directive ¶ E3.1.29.
SOR paragraph 1(f).3
Applicant argues that the Judge’s adverse clearance decision should be reversed because the
Judge erred in finding that the incidents leading to Applicant’s Captain’s Masts in 1996 and 1997
were alcohol-related.   He also argues that the Judge’s adverse decision is not supported by the1
record as a whole.   The Board does not find these arguments persuasive.2
The Board’s review of a Judge’s findings is limited to determining if they are supported by
substantial evidence—such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support such a conclusion in light of all the contrary evidence in the record.  Directive ¶ E3.1.32.1.
“This is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two
inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from
being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620,
(1966).
After reviewing the record, the Board concludes that the Judge’s findings are based on
substantial evidence, or constitute reasonable characterizations or inferences that could be drawn
from the record.  Applicant has not identified any harmful error likely to change the outcome of the
case.  Considering the record evidence as a whole, the Judge’s material findings of security concern
are sustainable.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-21025 at 2 (App. Bd. Oct. 9, 2007).
Once the government presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the
applicant to establish mitigation.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  The presence of some mitigating evidence
does not alone compel the Judge to make a favorable security clearance decision.  As the trier of fact,
the Judge has to weigh the evidence as a whole and decide whether the favorable evidence outweighs
the unfavorable evidence, or vice versa. See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-17691 at 3 (App. Bd. Jul.19,
2007).  An applicant’s disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue
for a different interpretation of the evidence, is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the
evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See,
e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-17409 at 3 (App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2007).
In this case, the Judge weighed the mitigating evidence offered by Applicant against the
length and seriousness of the disqualifying conduct and considered the possible application of
relevant mitigating conditions and whole-person factors.  She found in favor of Applicant as to one
of the SOR factual allegations.   However, she reasonably explained why the evidence which3
Applicant had presented in mitigation was insufficient to overcome the government’s security
concerns.  The Board does not review a case de novo.  The favorable record evidence cited by
Applicant is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge’s decision is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary
to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-11172 at 3 (App. Bd. Sep. 4, 2007).  After reviewing the record,
the Board concludes that the Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory
explanation for her decision, “including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made.’” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168
(1962)). “The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with
the interests of the national security.’” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).
Accordingly, the Judge’s ultimate adverse decision under Guideline G is sustainable.
Order
The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed; Michael Y. Ra’anan        
Michael Y. Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairman, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields          
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody             
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board