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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
         
            
In the matter of: )
)
------------------------ )       ISCR Case No. 07-08790
SSN: ---------------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Gregg Cervi, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: David Price, Esquire
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Decision
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LYNCH, Noreen A., Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted his Security Clearance Application (SF 86) on February 13,
2006. On March 24, 2008, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the basis for its preliminary decision to deny his
application, citing security concerns under Guideline B (Foreign Influence). The action
was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within
Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6,
Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as
amended (Directive); and the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the
President on December 29, 2005, and effective within the Department of Defense for
SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on April 1, 2008. He answered it on
April 14, 2008 through his Counsel and requested a hearing before an administrative
judge. The case was assigned to me on July 2, 2008. DOHA issued a notice of hearing
on July 16, 2008. I convened the hearing as scheduled on August 14, 2008. Government
Exhibits (GX) 1 and 2 were admitted in evidence without objection. Applicant testified on
Counsel did not present a request for administrative notice for either France or Cameroon. Thus, I do not find or1
address any issues for those countries.
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his own behalf, and presented the testimony of two witnesses. Counsel submitted
Applicant’s Exhibit (A-E), which were admitted without objection. DOHA received the
transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on August 25, 2008. Eligibility for access to classified
information is granted.
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice
of certain facts relating to the Republic of Lebanon (Tr. 12). The request and the
attached documents are included in the record as Hearing Exhibit I. Hence, the facts
administratively noticed are limited to matters of general knowledge and matters not
subject to reasonable dispute. The facts administratively noticed are set out in the
Findings of Fact, below.1
Findings of Fact
In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the factual allegations in SOR ¶¶
1.a-1.l. His admissions in his answer to the SOR and at the hearing are incorporated in
my findings of fact. I make the following findings:
Applicant is a 46-year-old business man who owns a consulting firm working for a
defense contractor. He has worked on information management systems and
engineering applications as a consultant on state government projects for 20 years. His
work involved sensitive but not classified information. He had an interim clearance for
one year in 2007 (Tr. 9). 
Applicant was born in and educated in Lebanon. He attended the American
University in Beirut, earning a B.S. in geology (Tr. 68). He was accepted into graduate
school in the United States in 1984. He received his PhD in 1994 from an American
university. He has resided in the U.S. for 24 years. Applicant has been a naturalized
citizen for 17 years (Tr. 73).   
Applicant’s last visit to Lebanon was in August 1999 and contrary to his family’s
wishes. His father was very ill and he wanted to visit him before he died. He experienced
the danger in Lebanon when a passenger on his plane was taken hostage. Applicant cut
his visit short and has never returned to Lebanon (Tr.). He uses his U.S. passport when
he travels. His Lebanese passport expired in 1997 and was surrendered to the Lebanese
government (AE A). He wishes to formally renounce his Lebanese citizenship. He has
obtained the information concerning this formal process. A letter from the Secretary of
State is required.
 
Applicant’s parents were born in Lebanon. His father is deceased. His mother,
who is 73, lives with him in the U.S. She is a dual citizen of Lebanon and the U.S. She
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rarely visits Lebanon (Tr. 77). She receives a social security check from Lebanon and a
social security from the U.S. Applicant provides for all of her daily living expenses.
Applicant’s mother inherited property in Lebanon when her husband died.
Applicant is her only son and will inherit the home upon his mother’s death. The value of
the property is approximately $180,000 (Tr. 77). Applicant believes he will dispose of the
property when his mother dies. He has no interest in keeping it and considers it a burden
rather than an asset (Tr. 75).
Applicant’s sister and her husband live in Lebanon and visit the U.S. annually.
They are dual citizens of Lebanon and France. They have three adult children who are
U.S. permanent residents. They plan to retire in the U.S. (Tr. 79). His sister has applied
for permanent residency and wishes to become a U.S. citizen (Tr. 80). She visits her
mother and her grown children in the U.S. about once a year (Tr. 81). Applicant
sometimes speaks to his sister on the phone if she calls their mother. He has never
visited her in Lebanon (Tr. 96). His sister does not work and her husband is a doctor.
Applicant has another sister who is divorced and lives in Cameroon. She owns a
small business in that country. When his sister was in the process of obtaining a divorce
many years ago, Applicant provided some financial help (Tr.82). She left Lebanon about
ten years ago. He had not been in contact with her for many years but did visit her last
year in Cameroon. 
Applicant is divorced with two grown children. Since 2003, he has lived with his
significant other who is a citizen of France and Lebanon. His partner was educated in
France and is now a permanent resident of the U.S. (Tr. 44). He intends to apply for
citizenship in five years (Tr. 46). His partner also works for Applicant’s company.
Applicant’s partner (P) has relatives in Lebanon. P’s mother and three sisters live
in Lebanon and are citizens of the country. P’s mother is retired and lives at home and
his father is deceased (Tr. 48). P provides some financial support for his mother of
approximately $5,000 a year. P’s family members are aware of his work with Applicant
(Tr. 51). Applicant’s partner credibly testified that Applicant has a great pride in his U.S.
citizenship and desires to help the government with his projects. P does not believe that
Applicant could be coerced or influenced into doing something that would harm the U.S.
interests because his loyalties are with his children and his mother in the U.S. P also
owns property in France. Applicant met P’s two sisters when they visited the U.S.
Applicant met P’s mother on three occasions in France on vacation. 
 
Applicant purchased a vacation home in France in 2003 (Tr. 84). He has a
mortgage for the house and he has a bank account in France. He travels there every
year for vacation with P. The property is rented during the rest of the year. He has
traveled to France every summer from the last 1990's to the present. His adult children
visit with him there and they have a family vacation for a few weeks (Tr. 87). However,
one trip to France was with representatives from a U.S. geological survey team for work
purposes. 
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Applicant has substantial real estate in the U.S. The value is in the range from $6
million to $8 million. He has acquired many properties (AE B). He buys the properties for
investment purposes. He remodels them and then rents them. He has approximately 50
units. He estimates the gross income from the real estate is about $250,000 a year. His
consulting firm is ten years old and has two principal offices. His net profit in 2007 was
close to a million dollars (Tr. 92).
Applicant’s academic advisor for his PhD testified at the hearing that Applicant
has worked hard on a number of state and county projects over the past years. Applicant
advanced in his field and is reliable and very trustworthy, according to this professor who
has known him for 24 years. He knows that Applicant has been involved with confidential
information and has never had any problems with handling security matters (Tr. 27-34). 
Applicant is described by his former colleagues as possessing a high degree of
responsibility. He is objective in situations and evaluates the multiple facets of any issue.
He is committed to his profession and his business. He conducts himself with
professionalism. He operates his business with honesty, decency and humanity (AE D).
Applicant’s judgment, knowledge, integrity and credibility is highly valued by his peers in
the private sector as well as the government sector. He is an expert in the field of
information technology. A fellow researcher and businessman who has known him since
his graduate school days commends Applicant for his reliability and hard work in the field
of research and development for the environment in the U.S. (AE D). Applicant is highly
recommended for a security clearance from his government clients and professional
peers. No one questioned his loyalty to the U.S. 
Applicant was candid and straightforward at the hearing. He expressed disdain for
his home country and has no desire to have any connection with it. He does not consider
himself a citizen of Lebanon. In fact, he stated it is an insult for him to be considered a
dual citizen. He is a U.S. citizen and states his roots are now in the U.S. He explained it
was a very serious consideration for him to become a U.S. citizen (Tr. 98). His children
are U.S. citizens and they are his closest family (Tr. 99). When he learned about the
procedures for renunciation of his Lebanese citizenship, he contacted an attorney and
learned more about the process (Tr. 101). There are many steps and hurdles to obtain
the necessary documentation to satisfy the Lebanese government
Applicant credibly testified that he has no plans to return to Lebanon. He has
never voted in Lebanese elections, joined any political party, or worked for the Lebanese
government. To his knowledge no one in his family has been contacted by any
government agents or terrorist groups (Tr. 95). 
Applicant explained that it is his personal responsibility to safeguard classified
information and if there was any threat to national security based on pressure to him or
his family, he would take appropriate measures to contact his assigned agent. He
described a situation in France where he was approached by two strangers and asked to
convert some Swiss money into dollars. He believed it was a scam to obtain money. He
reported it to his security agent immediately. He then called the U.S. Embassy in France.
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He spoke to a security investigator and was thanked for bringing this incident to their
attention.
I take administrative notice of the following facts about Lebanon. Lebanon’s
government is a parliamentary democracy. Lebanon and the United States have a long-
standing friendly relationship. It has been the policy of the United States to help Lebanon
preserve its independence, sovereignty, national unity, and territorial integrity.
Lebanon is 95% ethnic Arab. Its population is comprised of various Muslim sects,
Christian groups, and Druze. The three largest population groups are Shi’a and Sunni
Muslims and Maronite Christians. Lebanon became the situs of several terrorist
organizations over the past 30 years that have engaged in armed conflict with Israel and
Western countries. The Lebanese government recognizes those organizations as
legitimate resistance groups. Lebanon exempts “legal resistance” groups from money
laundering and terrorism financing laws. The Lebanese government recognizes
Hezbollah, a terrorist group, as “a legitimate resistance group.” Hezbollah derives its
power and influence from Lebanon’s Shi’a community, which makes up about one-third
of Lebanon’s population. Hezbollah maintains offices in Beirut and elsewhere in the
country and has elected deputies in Lebanon’s Parliament. It also operates a
comprehensive system of health and education services in several parts of the country.
Even though Syria withdrew its military forces from Lebanon in April 2006, it
maintains a covert intelligence presence in Lebanon and offers support for and smuggles
arms to Hezbollah and Palestinian terrorist groups operating in Lebanon. The Lebanese
government’s inability to exercise authoritative control in the Hezbollah-dominated south
of Lebanon and inside Palestinian-controlled refugee camps enables terrorists to operate
freely in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s continued attacks on Israel continue to create instability in
the region.
Policies
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”  Department of the Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to . .
. control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person
access to such information.”  Id. at 527.  The President has authorized the Secretary of
Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information
“only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.”  Exec.
Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as
amended and modified.  
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the
criteria contained in the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG).  These guidelines are not
inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these
guidelines are applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An
administrative judge’s over-arching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common
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sense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information
about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable.
The government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with
access to classified information.  This relationship transcends normal duty hours and
endures throughout off-duty hours.  Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the
possible risk the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible
extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified
information.
Clearance decisions must be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no
sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”  See Exec. Or.
10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is not necessarily a
determination as to the loyalty of the applicant.  It is merely an indication the applicant
has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have
established for issuing a clearance
Initially, the government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the
personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from
being eligible for access to classified information.  The government has the burden of
establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR.  See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.”  See v.
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994).  The guidelines
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the
criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability.  See ISCR Case No. 95-0611
at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996).  
Once the government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial
evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the
facts.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it
is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.”
ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).  “[S]ecurity clearance
determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.”  Egan, 484 U.S. at 531;
see AG ¶ 2(b). 
Analysis
Guideline B (Foreign Influence)
The security concern relating to Guideline B is set out in AG ¶ 6 as follows: 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
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any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
A disqualifying condition may be raised by “contact with a foreign family member,
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident
in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation,
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.”  AG ¶ 7(a).  A disqualifying condition
also may be raised by “connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country
that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect
sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person,
group, or country by providing that information.”  AG ¶ 7(b).  Finally, a security concern
may be raised if an applicant is “sharing living quarters with a person or persons,
regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion”  AG ¶ 7(d). 
Applicant’s mother is a dual citizen of Lebanon and the U.S. and lives with him.
His sister and her husband live in Lebanon and are citizens of Lebanon and France. His
partner has lived with him since 2003 and has relatives in Lebanon. Applicant sees his
sister when she visits the U.S. and speaks to her on the phone when she calls her
mother. His other sister was born in Lebanon but has not lived there for over ten years.
She lives in Cameroon. These relationships are not per se a reason to deny Applicant a
security clearance. The government must establish that these family relationships create
a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure or coercion
or would create a potential conflict of interest between his obligations to protect sensitive
information and his desire to help his family members.
In determining if a heightened risk exists, I must look at Applicant’s relationship
and contacts with family members as well as the activities of the government of Lebanon
and other aspects of life in Lebanon such as crime and terrorism. See ISCR Case No.
07-05809 (App. Bd. May 27, 2008). Applicant’s mother lives with him in the U.S. and is a
U.S. citizen. She receives a social security check from the government of Lebanon. One
sister lives in Lebanon with her husband. He sees his sister when she visits the U.S. He
sometimes talks to her on the phone when she calls their mother. P is a permanent
resident in the U.S. but was born in Lebanon and has his family in Lebanon. Applicant
has met P’s family on one or two occasions in the U.S. or France. This contact creates a
risk of foreign pressure or attempted exploitation because there is always the possibility
that Lebanese agents or terrorists may exploit the opportunity to obtain information about
the U.S. His connection to his sister in Lebanon and P also creates a potential conflict of
interest because his relationships are sufficiently close to raise a security concern about
his desire to help them by providing sensitive or classified information.
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Since the government produced evidence to raise the disqualifying conditions in
AG ¶¶ 7(a), (b), and (d), the burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence to rebut,
explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15. An applicant has the
burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to
the government. See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).  
Security concerns under this guideline can be mitigated by showing that “the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of
the U.S.”  AG ¶ 8(a). The totality of an applicant’s family ties to a foreign country as well
as each individual family tie must be considered.  ISCR Case No. 01-22693 at 7 (App.
Bd. Sep. 22, 2003). Similarly, AG 8© “contact or communication with foreign citizens is
so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation.”
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States.  “The United
States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information
from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it,
regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to those
of the United States.”  ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). 
Furthermore, friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United
States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security.
Finally, we know friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States,
especially in the economic, scientific, and technical fields.  See ISCR Case No. 00-0317,
2002 DOHA LEXIS 83 at **15-16 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002).  Nevertheless, the nature of
a nation’s government, its relationship with the U.S., and its human rights record are
relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are vulnerable to
government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater
if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family member is associated
with or dependent upon the government, or the country is known to conduct intelligence
operations against the U.S.
Security concerns under this guideline also can be mitigated by showing “there is
no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the
foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such
deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be
expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.” AG ¶ 8(b).
Applicant’s testimony at the hearing showed his willingness to sever ties with Lebanon.
He has no plan to visit the country. He has no Lebanese passport. He is renouncing his
Lebanese citizenship. He has lived in the U.S. for 24 years. He has substantial personal,
professional and financial ties to the U.S. His sister who lives in Lebanon is planning to
retire to the U.S. His partner of recent years has relatives in Lebanon but Applicant has
no ties with them. Applicant has substantial investments in the U.S. He desires to
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continue his work with county and government projects. His two children live in the U.S.
He is closest to them. As such, his testimony supported this mitigating condition, which
mitigates all disqualifying conditions.
Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility
for a security clearance must be an overall common sense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept. 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the
facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant is a mature, well-educated,
professional. He has lived in the U.S. for 24 years. He became a naturalized citizen 17
years ago. He received his master’s and PhD in the U.S. He has consulted on many
state government projects. He has substantial personal and professional ties with the
U.S. He has substantial financial interests in the U.S. He has been involved with
proprietary information. He has his own business and has established strong
professional ties. He is recommended highly by professional peers and clients, an
indication of their trust in him. He clearly has established strong connections to the U.S.  
Applicant’s mother lives with him in the U.S. and is a U.S. citizen. His father is
deceased. He will inherit property in Lebanon when his mother dies but he is not
interested in keeping the property. The value of the property is minuscule compared to
Applicant’s multi-million dollar financial resources in the U.S.
His sister who lives in Lebanon has three children who are permanent residents of
the U.S. Applicant sees his sister when she visits the U.S. He does not visit her in
Lebanon. She plans to retire to the U.S. with her husband. She is not involved with the
government or military in Lebanon. Her children are living in the U.S. and are citizens. 
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Applicant’s partner P is a permanent resident in the U.S. P does not travel to
Lebanon. P provides financial help to his family living in Lebanon. Applicant has only
casual and infrequent contact with P’s family in Lebanon. 
After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guideline B
and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude Applicant
has mitigated the security concerns based on foreign influence. Accordingly, I conclude
he has carried his burden of showing that it is clearly consistent with the national interest
to grant him eligibility for access to classified information.
Formal Findings
I make the following formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set
forth in the SOR, as required by Directive ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3:
Paragraph 1, Foreign Influence: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e; For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.g: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.h: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.I: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.j: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.k: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.l: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                              
_________________
Noreen A. Lynch
Administrative Judge