KEYWORD: Guideline G; Guideline E
DIGEST: Two minor discrepancies in the Judge’s findings as to the dates of offenses committed
by Applicant deo not constitute harmful error.  The Judge made sustainable findings and
conclusions regarding Applicant’s alcohol abuse.  Adverse decision affirmed.
CASENO: 07-10953.a1
DATE: 10/29/2008
DATE: October 29, 2008 
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 07-10953
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On March 25, 2008, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of
the basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline G (Alcohol Consumption) and
Guideline E (Personal Conduct) of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as
amended) (Directive).  Applicant requested a hearing.  On July 29, 2008, after the hearing,
Administrative Judge John Grattan Metz, Jr. denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.
Applicant timely appealed pursuant to the Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issues on appeal:  whether the Judge’s findings are based on
substantial evidence; and whether the Judge’s adverse security clearance decision under Guideline
G is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.
 
(1) Applicant contends that the Judge erred as to five of his findings.  Three of the alleged
errors pertain to SOR allegations which the Judge found in favor of Applicant or to conduct not
relevant to the Guideline G allegations.  The other two involve minor discrepancies as to the dates
of several offenses which occurred in the mid-1990s.
The Board’s review of a Judge’s findings is limited to determining if they are supported by
substantial evidence—such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support such a conclusion in light of all the contrary evidence in the same record.  Directive ¶
E3.1.32.1. “This is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing
two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding
from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607,
620, (1966).
After reviewing the record, the Board concludes that the Judge’s material findings of security
concern are based on substantial evidence and are sustainable.  Applicant has not identified any
harmful error likely to change the outcome of the case.   See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-21025 at 2
(App. Bd. Oct. 9, 2007).
(2) Applicant also contends that the favorable evidence in the record was sufficient, as a
matter of law, to overcome any security concerns presented by his history of alcohol abuse.
Applicant’s arguments do not demonstrate that the Judge’s decision is arbitrary, capricious or
contrary to law.
Once the government presents evidence raising security concerns, the burden shifts to the
applicant to establish mitigation.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  The presence of some mitigating evidence
does not alone compel the Judge to make a favorable clearance decision.  As the trier of fact, the
Judge has to weigh the evidence as a whole and decide whether the favorable evidence outweighs
the unfavorable evidence, or vice versa.  An applicant’s disagreement with the Judge’s weighing of
the evidence, or an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the evidence, is not sufficient to
demonstrate the Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in a manner that is arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 07-05632 at 2 (App. Bd. May 13, 2008).
A review of the record indicates that the Judge weighed the mitigating evidence offered by
Applicant against the length and seriousness of the disqualifying conduct and considered the possible
application of relevant conditions and factors.  He found in favor of Applicant under Guideline E
and with respect to several of the factual allegations under Guideline G.  However, he reasonably
explained why the evidence which Applicant had presented in mitigation was insufficient to
overcome the government’s security concerns.  The Board does not review a case de novo.  The
favorable record evidence cited by Applicant is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge’s decision
is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-11172 at 3 (App. Bd. Sep.
4, 2007).  The Judge examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for his
decision, “including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). “The general
standard is that a clearance may be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the
national security.’” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  Accordingly, the
Judge’s adverse decision is sustainable.
Order
The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Michael Y. Ra’anan     
Michael Y. Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairman, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields         
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody          
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board