1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
------------------------- )     ISCR Case No. 07-12973
SSN: ----------------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Gina Marine, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Thomas Albin, Esquire
______________
Decision
______________
MATCHINSKI, Elizabeth M., Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted his security clearance application (SF 86) on February 2,
2006. On June 3, 2008, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) to Applicant detailing the security concerns under
Guideline G, Guideline H, and Guideline E, that provided the basis for its decision to
deny him a security clearance. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865,
Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended;
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the revised
adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and
effective within the Department of Defense as of September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant answered the SOR in writing on June 20, 2008, and requested a
hearing before an administrative judge. The case was assigned to me on August 1,
2008, to consider whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or
continue a security clearance for him. On September 4, 2008, I scheduled a hearing for
September 30, 2008.
2
The parties appeared as scheduled. The government submitted five exhibits (Ex.
1-5) that were admitted without any objections. Applicant testified and submitted one
exhibit (Ex. A) to which the government did not object. A transcript (Tr.) of the hearing
was received on October 9, 2008. Based on review of the pleadings, exhibits, and
testimony, eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
Findings of Fact
DOHA alleged under Guideline G, alcohol consumption, that Applicant consumed
alcohol at times to excess and intoxication from about 1995 to at least April 2006 (SOR
¶ 1.a); that he was arrested in 1999 (SOR ¶ 1.b), January 2005 (SOR ¶ 1.c), and April
2006 (SOR ¶ 1.d) for driving under the influence (DUI); and that he received 30 days of
inpatient treatment beginning in April 2006 for alcohol dependence (SOR ¶ 1.e). Under
Guideline H, drug involvement, Applicant was alleged to have used methadone without
a prescription, with varying frequency up to daily, to at least April 2006 (SOR ¶ 2.a) to
deal with a dependence on OxyContin (SOR ¶ 2.b); to have purchased methadone from
street dealers (SOR ¶ 2.c); to have been arrested for possession of narcotics
(unprescribed methadone) as well as DUI in April 2006 (SOR ¶ 2.d), and to have been
treated for pain medication dependency during the 30 days inpatient program (SOR ¶
2.e). DOHA alleged under Guideline E, personal conduct, that Applicant deliberately
failed to disclose his use of unprescribed methadone on his security clearance
application (SOR ¶ 3.a).
Applicant admitted the alcohol consumption and drug involvement allegations. He
initially denied that he had intentionally falsified his security clearance application, but
on redirect admitted that he had not disclosed his drug involvement. After considering
the record evidence, I make the following additional findings.
Applicant is a 28-year-old second class rigger who has been employed by a
defense contractor since June 2005 (Ex. 1, Tr. 18-20), with the exception of a five-
month layoff from September 2006 (Tr. 54-55). There is no indication that the
Department of Defense has previously granted him a security clearance (Tr. 117-18). 
Applicant started drinking alcohol (primarily beer) in about 1995 when he was a
freshman in high school. He was depressed following the death of his father and began
drinking about 12 beers once weekly on the weekends at parties with friends and
acquaintances (Ex. 3, Tr. 27, 82). He also smoked marijuana on occasion (Tr. 69-70).
After graduating from high school in June 1998, he attended a community college for
one year (Ex. 2, Tr. 22-23). In about May 1999, he was arrested for DUI. His license
was suspended for six months (Ex. 1, 2).
In June 1999, he began working on a road crew for the town’s highway
department (Ex. 1, 2, Tr. 22). His coworkers drank and used illegal drugs, and Applicant
began using the substances with them (Tr. 74). He continued to drink alcohol at a
frequency of two to three times per week (Ex. 3). He used cocaine about 20 times at
parties between 2000 and April 2006 (Tr. 70-72), usually in combination with alcohol,
3
and tried hallucinogenic mushrooms three times during the 2000/01 time frame (Tr. 73).
He also continued to smoke marijuana “a couple times a week maybe” (Tr. 74) until
about 2003/04.
On one occasion in January 2005, Applicant consumed four beers at the town
garage after he ended his work shift. En route home, he was involved in a minor traffic
accident in which the other driver sustained a wrist injury. He was arrested for DUI after
he failed to complete field sobriety tests. At the station, he was administered a
breathalyser that showed a breath alcohol level over the legal limit (Ex. 3).
Applicant managed to remain alcohol free for about a month after his arrest.
Then in February/March 2005, he was offered some OxyContin by his cousin. He used
them recreationally at parties on the weekends (“It was maybe twice a week, and then
some weeks I wouldn’t do it.” Tr. 64-65). By Spring 2006, he was addicted to
OxyContin, ingesting the drug at times daily and becoming sick when he did not use it.
He purchased the drug from street dealers (Tr. 65) and did not obtain a prescription.
 
In application for a job with his present employer, Applicant completed a SF 86
on May 19, 2005, on which he disclosed the 1999 DUI and the pending January 2005
DUI charge, adding in part, “DMV STATES NOT GUILTY/PENDING COURT DATE.”
Applicant responded “NO” to question 27 concerning any illegal use of drugs since the
age of 16 or in the last 7 years, whichever is shorter (Ex. 1) because he didn’t think he
would get the job if he listed his drug use (Tr. 81-82).
In June 1995, Applicant began working for the defense contractor (Tr.  23). He
stayed away from drugs long enough to pass a drug test required of new hires (Tr. 75).
In February 2006, he was asked to review and update the SF 86 that he had completed
in May 2005. In the presence of an employee in the company’s security department (Tr.
80), he corrected information about his schooling and employment with the town, but did
not change his negative response to question 27, even though he was regularly abusing
OxyContin. On February 2, 2006, Applicant certified by signature that his statements on
the SF 86 were “true, complete, and correct to the best of [his] knowledge and belief
and [were] made in good faith.” (Ex. 2).
In about early April 2006, Applicant began taking unprescribed methadone (a
synthetic narcotic) in lieu of OxyContin in an effort to deal with his addiction. He
obtained the methadone from a street dealer (Tr. 66-67). About one week later, he was
stopped by the state police for failing to drive in marked lanes. He failed field sobriety
tests and was taken into custody for DUI. While being processed at the state police
facility, he was found to be in possession of methadone tablets not prescribed for him
and he allegedly made threats to the arresting officer. Charges of DUI, possession of
narcotics, and second degree threatening were filed against him. Under a plea bargain,
Applicant was convicted of reckless driving on the January 2005 charge and DUI for the
April 2006 offense. The drug possession and threatening charges were dismissed. He
was fined $550 for reckless driving. For the April 2006 DUI, he was sentenced to one
year probation, to one year license suspension, 100 hours of community service or 48
Applicant testified, with no rebuttal from the government, that he began his aftercare “basically right1
after” he completed the inpatient program (Tr. 41). The available progress notes date only from December 10,
2007 (Ex. A), but the physician’s notes of that session do not indicate that it was an intake or initial session.
Suboxone (buprenorphine hydrochloride and naloxone hydrochloride) has been approved by the2
Food and Drug Administration for treatment of opiate dependence. Suboxone prevents symptoms of
withdrawal from heroin and other opiates (Ex. 5).
4
hours in jail, and a $1,200 fine. Applicant served jail time in lieu of the community
service and his fines were paid by mid-September 2006 (Ex. 3).
Realizing that he needed help with “a problem with pills in general” (Tr. 32),
Applicant voluntarily admitted himself to a 29-day substance abuse treatment program
on or about April 13, 2006 (Ex. 3, Tr. 28-31). Following group sessions, individual
counseling, video presentations, and lectures in treatment of dependency on alcohol
and narcotic pain medications, he was discharged on May 12, 2006, having
successfully completed the program (Ex. 3). It was recommended that he attend
Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and aftercare counseling (Tr. 58). He attended only a
couple of AA meetings, but began a monthly therapeutic relationship with a physician
associated with the inpatient facility, who has continued to prescribe Suboxone
medication to reduce Applicant’s cravings for OxyContin (Tr. 38, 41, 56).  Applicant had1
been on antidepressants during his inpatient stay, but chose not to take them after his
discharge because he did not like the way they made him feel (Tr. 85).
On September 13, 2006, Applicant was interviewed by a government investigator
about his January 2005 and April 2006 arrests. Applicant admitted that a breathalyser
test administered to him after his arrest in January 2005 showed a blood alcohol content
greater than .08%. He refused to submit to a breathalyser after the April 2006 arrest, but
failed field sobriety tests, and subsequently pled guilty to that DUI. Applicant
acknowledged he had problems with alcohol and with addiction to pain medication
(OxyContin), and that he had taken methadone daily before he entered rehabilitation in
an effort to deal with his OxyContin dependence. He had since completed inpatient
rehabilitation and was currently in outpatient aftercare with a physician, who had placed
him on Suboxone.  Applicant denied any use of alcohol or unprescribed drugs since he2
entered the inpatient program or any intent to use alcohol or drugs in the future.
Applicant denied any intentional falsification of his February 2006 SF 86 and stated that
he did not think of updating his security form because he was focused on getting help
for his alcohol/drug problem (Ex. 3).
During his inpatient treatment and in aftercare, Applicant has been told to abstain
from alcohol, although his physician’s focus has been to wean him off the pills (Tr. 57).
Applicant relapsed on about five occasions between September 2006 and September
2007, drinking to intoxication when out socializing, including once with a neighbor.
Applicant continues to socialize with coworkers, playing pool at “steak nights” the last
Thursday of the month. Applicant does not attend these outings as often as in the past.
When he attends, he always plays pool but has refrained from drinking for the past year
5
(Tr. 36-37, 94-95). He continues to “have cravings to drink–big time.” (Tr. 97). Applicant
did not inform his physician of any of his alcohol relapses (Tr. 57).
Applicant considers his abuse of narcotics to be his worst problem (“The pills
took a hold [of] me and I’m fighting them.” Tr. 58), even though he cannot stop drinking
once he starts (Tr. 61). With the help of Suboxone, he had not used any OxyContin,
methadone, or cocaine since April 2006 (Tr. 38). His coworkers are aware that he is not
abusing drugs any longer (Tr. 99). As of August/September 2008, Applicant continued
to report to his physician that he was “clean and sober” but that he was not ready for a
decrease in the dosage of Suboxone (Ex. A). He told his physician that he was
experiencing an increase in anxiety during his office visits in August and September
2008 (Ex. A). His physician is not treating him specifically for the anxiety and depression
that led him to drink and abuse drugs (Tr. 38), but Applicant finds the Suboxone helpful.
On a few occasions, Applicant ingested more than the prescribed dosage (“if I’m on
one, I’ll take one and a half cause I get sick feelings, or anxiety.” Tr. 93), but he
managed to stretch out his medication until his next appointment (Tr. 94). Applicant has
not told the physician that he has taken more than the prescribed dosage of Suboxone.
He does not intend to continue to see the physician once he is off the pills (Tr. 103-04).
Applicant continues to associate with his old friends with whom he abused drugs
in the past but he has not found himself in a situation where others are using drugs in
his presence. These friends come over to his house, although he does not go out with
them (Tr. 106-07).
Applicant loves his job as a rigger (Tr. 53). He works as many weekends as he is
allowed (Tr. 95-96) and has a good attendance record (Ex. 3). He was promoted
through the ranks early (“I pretty much have gotten [an] early jump right through.” Tr.
54). 
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in
evaluating an Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s over-arching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common sense decision. According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
6
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on
the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security
decision. 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The government
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk
that the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation
as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
Analysis
Guideline G, Alcohol Consumption
The security concern for alcohol consumption is set out in AG & 21: “Excessive
alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment or the failure
to control impulses, and can raise questions about an individual’s reliability and
untrustworthiness.” Applicant had his first drink when he was a freshman in high school.
He drank to excess on weekends in high school, and eventually over the years
developed a problem to the point where he cannot stop drinking once he starts. His
abuse of alcohol led to three arrests for DUI, in 1999, January 2005, and April 2006.
Although he pled guilty to reckless driving in the January 2005 incident, he admits that
his blood alcohol content was over the legal limit. AG ¶ 22(a) (“alcohol-related incidents
away from work, such as driving while under the influence, fighting, child or spouse
abuse, disturbing the peace, or other incidents of concern, regardless of whether the
individual is diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent”), applies to all three
offenses. His record of drunk driving and of drinking to intoxication after he completed
the inpatient program implicate AG ¶ 22(c) (“habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to
7
the point of impaired judgment, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an
alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent”).
The government’s case for consideration of AG ¶ 22(f) (“relapse after diagnosis
of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence and completion of an alcohol rehabilitation
program”) is less compelling. Applicant’s admission to a problem with alcohol, to being
unable to drink in moderation, suggests a dependency problem, but it falls short of
proving the diagnosis of alcohol abuse or dependence required under AG ¶ 22(f). The
adjudicative conditions, be they disqualifying or mitigating, cannot be viewed in isolation
or applied inconsistently. Under Guideline G, those persons duly qualified to make a
diagnosis of alcohol dependence or abuse are medical professionals (physician, clinical
psychologist, or psychiatrist) (see AG ¶ 22(d)), or licensed clinical social workers on
staff of a recognized alcohol treatment program (see AG ¶ 22(e)). The progress notes
from Applicant’s current medical provider are cursory and do not contain a diagnosis.
The treatment records from the inpatient program were not made available for review.
However, Applicant still has a substantial burden to mitigate his abusive drinking, given
the repeated DUI offenses and his recent relapses following treatment.
AG ¶ 23(a) (“so much time has passed, or the behavior was so infrequent, or it
happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast
doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment”) cannot
reasonably be applied in mitigation. Assuming Applicant was candid when he told a
government investigator in September 2006 that he had last consumed alcohol in April
2006, and that he has been free from alcohol for a year as of September 2008, then the
five instances of intoxication were between September 2006 and September 2007. 
Although it took a third DUI arrest for him to realize that he had a problem with
alcohol, Applicant deserves credit for pursuing inpatient treatment voluntarily and for
successfully completing the program (see AG ¶ 23(b) (“the individual acknowledges his
or her alcoholism or issues of alcohol abuse, provides evidence of actions taken to
overcome this problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence (if alcohol
dependent) or responsible use (if an alcohol abuser”)). Yet although he has been
abstinent for one year, I am unable to conclude that his abusive drinking is safely in the
past. He continues to socialize in settings where he abused alcohol after his inpatient
treatment program, and he still has cravings to drink. He has not complied with
treatment recommendations to attend AA meetings, and he has not informed his
treating physician of his relapses. It is unclear whether he has the insight and/or support
network to maintain sobriety in the long term, especially given his admitted inability to
drink in moderation once he starts drinking. He fulfills the initial treatment component  of
AG ¶ 23(d) (“the individual has successfully completed inpatient or outpatient
counseling or rehabilitation along with any required aftercare, has demonstrated a clear
and established pattern of modified consumption or abstinence in accordance with
treatment recommendations, such as participation in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous
or a similar organization and has received a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified
medical professional or a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a
8
recognized treatment program”), but lacks the favorable prognosis and full compliance
with aftercare required for mitigation under AG ¶ 23(d).
Guideline H, Drug Involvement
The security concern for drug involvement is set out in AG ¶ 24: “Use of an illegal
drug or misuse of a prescription drug can raise questions about an individual’s reliability
and trustworthiness, both because it may impair judgment and because it raises
questions about a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and
regulations.”  Applicant, who used marijuana in high school, was introduced to more
dangerous drugs such as cocaine by coworkers when he was part of the town’s road
crew. In about February or March 2005, he was introduced to OxyContin by his cousin,
and he began abusing the drug on weekends within his social circle. By early 2006, he
was abusing the drug on a daily basis and purchasing it from street dealers. In late
March/early April 2006, he turned to methadone in lieu of the OxyContin and used that
drug, which also was not prescribed for him, on a daily basis for about a week or so
until he was arrested, in part, for illegal possession of the synthetic narcotic.
Disqualifying conditions AG ¶ 25(a) (“any drug abuse”) and AG ¶ 25(c) (“illegal drug
possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale or
distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia”) are clearly pertinent to an
assessment of his security suitability.
Although Applicant has admitted an addiction to OxyContin, and treatment for his
dependency on pain medication in April 2006, the government did not present medical
records confirming a formal diagnosis of dependency rendered by a duly qualified
medical professional or by a licensed clinical social worker affiliated with a recognized
drug treatment program, so neither AG ¶ 25(d) nor AG ¶ 25(f) are pertinent. The
evidentiary record also falls short of AG ¶ 25(g) (“any illegal drug use after being
granted a security clearance”). It is undisputed that Applicant abused drugs after he
started working for the defense contractor. During closing argument, it was revealed
that Applicant had been granted a “company confidential” by his employer (Tr. 117-18),
but there was no indication that Applicant had been granted a Department of Defense
clearance.
Applicant bears a substantial burden to overcome the judgment and reliability
concerns raised by his illegal abuse of addictive opiates like OxyContin and methadone.
He has abstained from methadone, OxyContin, and illicit drugs such as cocaine since
he entered inpatient treatment in April 2006. But he is managing to deal with his
narcotics’ problem only because of Suboxone. While this drug is legally prescribed and
he remains under the care of the prescribing physician, Applicant has on occasion taken
in excess of the prescribed dosage:
Really, certain days, you just–if–you either get–sumpin’ [sic] bad happens
so you get anxiety. Or even if, you know, you get–your tolerance for it
get–grows, you know, and you can start feeling lousy, so certain days, I
have to–I do take more than the one pill, but I just fight to make sure I
9
make it to the next, cause I don’t wanna be without nothing, you know. But
I have abu–you know, gone over the dosage. (Tr. 104)
He has not mentioned to his physician that he has exceeded the prescribed dosage. His
tendency to self-medicate, which was exhibited in the past by his effort to wean himself
off OxyContin by resorting to methadone, is itself drug abuse under Guideline H (see
AG ¶ 24(b) (“drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in a manner
that deviates from approved medical direction”)). It shows that Applicant is continuing to
struggle to overcome his drug problem. As of September 2008, he told his physician
that he was not ready to decrease the dosage of his Suboxone after more than two
years of taking the drug. His friends with whom he illegally used drugs in the past know
that he is not using, but I am unable to apply AG ¶ 26(b) (“a demonstrated intent not to
abuse any drugs in the future”), despite his abstinence from OxyContin, methadone,
and cocaine since April 2006.
Guideline E, Personal Conduct
The security concern for personal conduct is set out in AG ¶ 15:
Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions
about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect
classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful
and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other
failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.
Applicant had used marijuana off and on from high school until 2003/04 and
cocaine about 20 times between 1999 and April 2006. In about February or March
2005, he began using OxyContin on weekends. He concealed this drug involvement
when he completed his initial security clearance application in May 2005  because he
feared he would not be hired if he disclosed it. When asked to update his SF 86 in
February 2006, he made no effort to correct his knowingly false answer to question 27.
AG ¶ 16(a) (“deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any
personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to
conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status,
determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary
responsibilities”) applies.
Applicant is credited with candor about the extent of his drug involvement at his
hearing. He even admitted abusing his Suboxone medication by taking more than the
prescribed dosage on occasion, and to using cocaine on about 20 occasions before he
entered the inpatient rehabilitation program in April 2006. However, his rectification is
not sufficiently prompt to qualify for mitigation under AG ¶ 17(a) (“the individual made
prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification before
being confronted with the facts”). When presented an opportunity to be forthcoming
about his drug abuse in a September 2006 subject interview, Applicant averred he was
10
addicted to pain medication, but there is no indication in the record that he told the
investigator about his involvement with cocaine or marijuana. When initially asked on
direct examination about his negative response to question 27 concerning any illegal
drug use, Applicant was not candid, as the following exchange shows.
Q You denied intentional falsification. Your answer was in fact wrong. Is
that right?
A Was wrong, yes.
Q Because you did use prescription drugs.
A Yes. But when I went up to Security, I don’t how I missed that one up,
but they kept calling me up to update my clearance information cause I
had the new arrest, and everything, and I don’t know when I answered
that. But I’m really unsure when I did that, cause I put down all my, usually
put down all my stuff. But that’s really all I can say for that. I don’t know
what I did there.
(Tr. 49-50). When asked on cross examination to explain his negative responses to
question 27 on both the May 2005 (Ex. 1) and February 2006 (Ex. 2) security clearance
applications, Applicant admitted that he had lied (“I’m pretty sure I didn’t wanna put
down that I used all sorts a [sic] drugs, and you know, knowing that I wouldn’t get hired.
I mean, I’m sure a lotta people do that, you know.” Tr. 81-82). When his attorney later
sought to amend the Answer to the SOR based on his admission to the falsification,
Applicant responded, “Well, on the first one I guess, yes. But as far as when I updated
it, I just filled out the arrest thing. So I don’t know which form–I guess yes–basically yes.
I guess I did leave stuff out, or answer ‘no’.” (Tr. 88-89). Any knowing equivocation or
false statement is inconsistent with the good judgment and full candor that must be
demanded of those persons granted access to classified information. Under the
circumstances, none of the mitigating conditions apply, including AG ¶ 17(d) (“the
individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the
behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or
factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such
behavior is unlikely to recur”).
Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the conduct
and all the circumstances in light of the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶
2(a):
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
Treatment is viewed favorably, but the allegation is resolved against him because of the excessive3
drinking that led to treatment, and that occurred after he completed the inpatient program.
11
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall common sense judgment based upon careful consideration
of the guidelines and the whole person concept. 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all the
facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant’s abusive drinking with three
drunk driving incidents, and his extensive illegal use of controlled substances, to as
recently as April 2006, raise very serious doubts for his judgment and ability to comply
with rules and regulations (see AG ¶¶ 2(a)(1) and 2(a)(3)). His inpatient treatment with
aftercare consisting largely of Suboxone medication to control any cravings for narcotics
is a credible step in reform (see AG ¶ 2(a)(6)), but it is too soon to conclude that there is
little likelihood of recurrence (see AG ¶ 2(a)(9)). He relapsed by drinking to excess about
five times, and he self-medicated by taking more than his prescribed dosage of
Suboxone while in aftercare. Even though his intent was not to “get high” (Tr. 103), he
exhibited poor judgment in not informing his physician that the prescribed dosage was
insufficient to deal with his symptoms. Despite his struggles with alcohol and narcotics,
he managed to perform his work duties in a clearly acceptable manner, as evidenced by
his early step promotions. Yet the government can ill afford to take the risk of a future
relapse, or of Applicant again putting his personal interest ahead of his obligations, as he
did when he falsely denied any illegal drug involvement on his security clearance
applications. Applicant may eventually succeed in becoming “completely clean,” but
based on present circumstances, I am unable to conclude that it is clearly consistent with
the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for him.
Formal Findings
Formal findings on the allegations set forth in the SOR, as required by section
E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline G: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: Against Applicant3
12
Paragraph 2, Guideline H: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.d: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.e: Against Applicant
Paragraph 3, Guideline E: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 3.a: Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented in this case, it is not clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance.
Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                              
ELIZABETH M. MATCHINSKI
Administrative Judge