DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
------------------ )       ISCR Case No. 07-14699
SSN: ----------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Emilio Jaksetic, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
 October 22, 2008
______________
Decision
______________
TESTAN, Joseph, Administrative Judge:
On May 22, 2008, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) to applicant detailing the security concerns under
Guideline B. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the revised adjudicative
guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and effective
within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
 
On June 4, 2008, applicant answered the SOR in writing, and requested an
Administrative Determination by an Administrative Judge (AJ). Department Counsel
issued a File of Relevant Material (FORM) on June 17, 2008. Applicant did not submit a
response to the FORM. The case was assigned to me on August 15, 2008. Based upon
a review of the case file, pleadings, and exhibits, eligibility for access to classified
information is denied.
Applicant’s security questionnaire identifies one child. However, in his response to the SOR, he referred
1
to his “children.”
2
Findings of Fact
Applicant is a 36 year old employee of a defense contractor.
Applicant was born in South Korea. When he was still a minor, his parents
separated and he moved to the United States with his father. Applicant, his father, and
his sister became United States citizens in 1990 or 1991.
Applicant served in the United States Army for approximately six years. He has
worked for the same defense contractor since he received his honorable discharge in
2002. He has been working in South Korea for an unknown period of time.
Applicant’s wife, to whom he has been married since 2004, was born in South
Korea. She lives in the United States, but is a citizen of Korea. They have at least one
child who was born in the United States.  Applicant’s mother, mother-in-law and father-1
in-law are Korean citizens residing in Korea. In his response to the SOR, applicant
stated he “keep[s] in touch” with his mother.
The Government offered a number of official United States publications with the
FORM that provide relevant facts about South Korea. The Government requested that
these documents be admitted into evidence. I have admitted the documents into
evidence, and I take administrative notice of the following facts found therein:
South Korea is a highly developed, stable, democratic republic with powers
shared between the president and the legislature. Despite the friendly relations between
the two countries, South Korea intelligence agencies are some of the most active
collectors of sensitive U.S. information and technology. In 1997, a civilian employee of
the U.S. Navy pleaded guilty to Conspiracy to Obtain National Defense Information after
he was caught providing U.S. classified information to a South Korean military attache.
Civil penalties have been imposed on numerous U.S. companies for illegal exporting
military-related products to South Korea.
Policies
The President has “the authority to . . . control access to information bearing on
national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to
occupy a position that will give that person access to such information.” (Department of
the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518,527 (1988).) In Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), the President set out
guidelines and procedures for safeguarding classified information within the executive
branch. The President authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant
applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” (Exec. Ord. 10865, Section 2.)
3
To be eligible for a security clearance, an applicant must meet the security
guidelines contained in the Directive. Enclosure 2 of the Directive sets forth personnel
security guidelines, as well as the disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions
under each guideline.
 
Initially, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts in
the SOR that disqualify or may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to
classified information. (Directive, Paragraph E3.1.14.) Thereafter, the applicant is
responsible for presenting evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts.
(Directive, Paragraph E3. 1.15.) An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating
that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security
clearance.” (ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).) “Any doubt as to
whether access to classified information is clearly consistent with national security will
be resolved in favor of the national security.” (Directive, Paragraph E2.2.2.)
A person granted access to classified information enters into a special
relationship with the government. The government must be able to repose a high
degree of trust and confidence in those individuals to whom it grants access to
classified information.
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
The security concern relating to the Foreign Influence guideline is set forth in
Paragraph 6 of the AG, and is as follows: 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
Paragraph 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying. Under Paragraph 7.a., “contact with a foreign family member, business or
professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign
country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement,
manipulation, pressure, or coercion” may be disqualifying. Under Paragraph 7.b.,
“connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential
conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect sensitive information or
technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by
providing that information” may be disqualifying. Lastly, under Paragraph 7.i., “conduct,
4
especially while traveling outside the U.S., which may make the individual vulnerable to
exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a foreign person, group, government, or country”
may be disqualifying.
Applicant’s mother is a citizen and resident of South Korea. There is a rebuttable
presumption that an applicant has ties of affection for, or obligation to, immediate family
members such as a mother. Applicant’s relationship with his mother, and his residence
in South Korea, leaves applicant potentially vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or
coercion by the South Korean government. These facts raise concerns under all three
disqualifying conditions.
Paragraph 8 sets forth conditions that could mitigate security concerns. Under
Paragraph 8.a., it is potentially mitigating if an applicant can demonstrate that “the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of
the U.S.” Under Paragraph 8.b., it is potentially mitigating if an applicant can
demonstrate “there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual*s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal,
or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S.,
that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S.
interest.” Lastly, under Paragraph 8.c., it is potentially mitigating if an applicant can
demonstrate that the “contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or
exploitation.”
None of the foregoing mitigating conditions is applicable. As noted above,
applicant has the burden to provide evidence that supports application of mitigating
factors. In this case, applicant failed to provide sufficient credible evidence that it is
unlikely he would be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of
South Korea and the interests of the United States, or that he is not vulnerable to a
conflict of interest.
“Whole Person” Analysis 
Under the whole person concept, the AJ must evaluate an applicant’s security
eligibility by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances.
An AJ should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG Paragraph 2.a:
“(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances
surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and
recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
(5) extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the
conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the
likelihood of continuation or recurrence.” Under AG Paragraph 2.c., the ultimate
determination of whether to grant a security clearance must be an overall common
5
sense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole
person concept.       
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case.
Applicant was born in South Korea. After his parents separated, he moved to the
United States with his father, becoming a U.S. citizen in 1991. He served honorably in
the United States military and has worked for his defense contractor employer since
2002. These are facts in his favor. Working against applicant are the facts that his
mother, to whom he has ties of affection, is a citizen and resident of South Korea; his
wife is a citizen of South Korea; his mother-in-law and father-in-law are citizens and
residents of South Korea; and he is currently living in South Korea. These facts create a
heightened risk of pressure, coercion, or exploitation.
Applicant may very well have been able to overcome the Government’s evidence
and establish that it is clearly consistent with the national interest for him to retain his
security clearance if he had been able to clear up some basic matters, such as (1) why
his wife did not apply for U.S. citizenship, (2) what is the exact relationship with his
mother, and (3) how long has he been working in South Korea and when is he due to
return, if ever. Unfortunately, by requesting a decision without a hearing, and then failing
to offer documentary evidence that cleared up these and other issues, I have no choice
but to conclude applicant failed to rebut the Government’s case under Guideline B.
There is nothing in the record that suggests applicant is anything but a loyal
American citizen. Applicant*s allegiance, loyalty, and patriotism are not at issue in these
proceedings. Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 specifically provides that industrial
security clearance decisions shall be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no
sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.” Therefore,
nothing in this decision should be construed to suggest I have based this decision, in
whole or in part, on any express or implied concern as to applicant*s allegiance, loyalty,
or patriotism.
Formal Findings     
Formal findings for or against applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Guideline B:AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 1.a. through 1.c: Against applicant
6
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with national interest to grant applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                              
JOSEPH TESTAN
Administrative Judge