1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)         ISCR Case No. 07-15696
SSN: )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government, Richard Stevens, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Ronald C. Sykstus, Esquire
______________
Decision
______________
MASON, Paul J., Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted his Security Clearance Application (SCA) on September 23,
2005. On March 16, 2008, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued
a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns under foreign influence
(Guideline B). The action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the revised adjudicative
guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and made
effective within the Department of Defense for SORs issued on or after September 1,
2006. 
Applicant’s answer to the SOR is dated March 31, 2008. Based on a careful
evaluation of all the evidence in the record, Applicant’s eligibility for security clearance
access is granted. At the hearing, the government submitted two exhibits (GE 1-2). I
took administrative notice of several publications from United States Government
agencies that describe the Taiwanese government, its human rights record internally,
and its practice collecting intelligence from other countries. At the hearing, testimony
2
was taken from Applicant. He also submitted three exhibits (AE A through AE D). DOHA
received the transcript on August 14, 2008.
Rulings on Procedure
During the preliminary segment of the hearing, Applicant contended that
administrative notice not be taken of Exhibits 5, 6, and 7 because the documents were
irrelevant, in that the underlying information in the exhibits failed to contain any
significant evidence concerning Applicant’s predilection for foreign influence. I overruled
the objection because the exhibits show that there have been recent events where
Americans have been targeted for information. These events have led to successful
prosecution of the parties involved.
Findings of Fact
Applicant admitted all five factual allegations listed under the foreign influence
guideline of the SOR, but denied that his immediate family members make him
vulnerable to foreign influence. Applicant is 48 years old and married with two children.
He has been employed by the same employer (a defense contractor) since 1992. He
seeks a secret security clearance. This is the first time Applicant has applied for a
security clearance. 
Applicant was born in Taiwan in April 1960. In 1982, he received his Bachelor of
Science degree in Engineering from a Taiwanese university. He served in the
Taiwanese Army from 1982 to 1984. Every male 18 years of age or older has to serve
in the military. From 1984 to 1986, he was employed at a computer software business.
He met his future wife during this employment. 
After marrying his wife in Taiwan in June 1986, Applicant came to the United
States (U.S.) for additional education. He enrolled at a postgraduate program at an
middle eastern U.S. university for two years, then transferred to a local university in
1988, and was awarded his Master of Science degree in Engineering in May 1992. In
June 1992, Applicant began working permanently for his current employer as an
engineer. 
Applicant’s first child, a boy, born in the U.S. in 1989, is 19 years old. His
daughter was born in the U.S. in August 1993. Applicant has lived at the same address
in the local area since 1997. Applicant purchased the plot, and a builder constructed the
house. 
The SOR indicates that Applicant traveled to Taiwan three times since coming to
the U.S. in 1986. In 1999, Applicant traveled to Taiwan for his father-in-law’s funeral
during a three-day stay. He went back for his grandmother’s funeral in 2000. When he
 Applicant traveled to Taiwan in June and not January 2006, as alleged in the SOR. See,1
AE D.
3
traveled to Taiwan in June 2006  for his father’s 70  birthday, he used his United States1 th
(U.S.) passport that he received in June 2005. 
Applicant became a naturalized citizen in May 2005, and received his U.S.
passport one month later. Applicant’s wife received her American citizenship in April
2003, two years earlier than Applicant because some of his naturalization paperwork
was lost and he had to resubmit additional information. 
Applicant has been employed by his employer since 1992, and enjoys his work.
(Tr. 32) He wants to remain with his employer as he makes his American dream come
true. (Tr. 36) If any effort is made to try to pressure or threaten him, Applicant will inform
his security officer and the government if the circumstances warrant. (Tr. 37)
Applicant’s father was born in Taiwan in August 1937, and is 71 years old;
Applicant’s mother is deceased. The father was a carpenter in the country’s Air Force
from 1958 to 1961. The record does not reveal the occupation of his father after his
military obligation ended, but Applicant’s notarized answers reflect that he was never
employed by the Taiwanese government. (GE 2) Applicant’s father has visited him
about five times in the last 12 years, with the most recent visit occurring in June 2008.
Sometimes, his father has traveled to the U.S. and returned home without visiting
Applicant. Applicant’s contact with his father is by phone only because his father does
not use e-mail. The contacts range from weekly to monthly. Since his father lives in the
same apartment building as his sisters, some of the phone contacts are made by
Applicant’s sisters to advise him on his father’s condition. Applicant’s contact with his
sisters is less, and is triggered by changes in his father’s health.  
Applicant’s younger brother and two sisters were born in Taiwan. His brother was
born in January 1962. He became a helicopter flight instructor in the Taiwan Army in
1983. He retired from that position in 2006, then in October 2006, found employment
with a Taiwanese defense contractor in engineering maintenance. (Tr. 25)
Applicant’s contacts with his brother are less than with his sisters. The telephone
contacts are sporadic, (Tr. 44) with the last physical contact occurring at their father’s
birthday in June 2006. Applicant’s brother receives a pension through the government’s
military pension system.
Applicant has never talked to his brother about what the brother does in his
employment as a contractor. Applicant has only a general idea about what his brother
does (Tr. 28), and he received that information from his sister. (Tr. 63, 64) 
Applicant’s older sister was born in Taiwan in March 1957. According to GE 2,
she is not employed by the government. She is divorced from her husband who works
in a furniture manufacturing plant. Applicant’s younger sister was born in Taiwan in
4
December 1963. She has never been employed by the government. Her husband was a
manufacturer of connectors that lock little resistors into computer boards. He lost his
business and is now working for a machine tool company. (Tr. 46-49)
Applicant’s mother-in-law was born in Taiwan in November 1940. She has never
been employed by the government. Applicant’s father-in-law is deceased. 
Applicant, his father and brother have served in the Taiwanese military. (GE 2,
section 3) None of his other immediate family members have ever been employed by,
or been a member of any foreign government, an agency or part of a foreign
government, foreign military, a municipal government in a foreign country, or
business/educational institution, or other organization that is wholly or partially owned by
a foreign government, or a smaller governmental structure in Taiwan. (Id. at section 3
and 4) Applicant has no financial interests in any foreign country; he estimates his net
worth in the U.S. to be approximately $600,000.00. (Id. at sections 21 and 22)
Character Evidence
The Director of Engineering services began working for Applicant’s employer in
1996, after 30 years of service in the U.S. Air Force. From his daily professional contact
with Applicant over the past 12 years, where the Director may see Applicant up to a
dozen times a day (Tr. 74), and traveling with Applicant on projects around the U.S.,
and having continually observed Applicant’s quality work, the Director has no
reservations about recommending him for a position of trust with the government, even
with the director’s knowledge that Applicant’s brother is a retired officer in the
Taiwanese Army. (Tr. 80-83)
The President of Applicant’s employer hired Applicant on a part-time basis in the
early 1990s while Applicant was still in graduate school. When Applicant graduated in
May 1992, the President hired him full time. From her daily observations of him since
1992, the President considers him a diligent, trustworthy worker who is conscientious
about security issues. (Tr. 108) Since December 2000, the President has rewarded
Applicant’s quality work on a yearly basis with a letter of congratulations and a cash
bonus. (AE C) 
Applicant’s wife testified she has been married to Applicant for the past 22 years.
They have two children, ages 19 and 15. His wife became a citizen in 2003, and
received her security clearance in May 2007. Applicant’s wife received her Master’s
degree in Computer Science and for the last five years, has been employed by a
computer software business. 
Applicant and his wife have been members of their church for the last five years.
Applicant operates the media group sound control duties for church services or special
events, while his wife operates the power point apparatus for lyrics and videos. (Tr. 61)
In addition, they lead a weekly religious study group for new immigrants of the church.
They pass along their own experiences so the new immigrants can make swifter
5
adjustments to life in the U.S. With their involvement in church activities including the
children’s program, Applicant and his wife enjoy a good reputation among church
members. (Tr. 117) Applicant’s son participated in the children’s program until he
enrolled in college. Applicant’s daughter still takes part along with twenty college
students, who currently volunteer their time for the children’s program. (Tr. 96) Applicant
and his wife also participate in the Parents/Teachers Association (PTA) by collecting
fees for sport and recreational events. (Tr. 54, 97)
Administrative Notice
Taiwan, a country with a democratic system of government, was established by
refugees from mainland China (PRC) in 1949. While the U.S. has recognized only the
PRC as the sole government of China since January 1979, under the Taiwan Relations
Act of 1979, the U.S. still conducts unofficial relations with Taiwan. The country is a
major trading partner with the U.S., as well as other countries around the world. Taiwan
belongs to the World Trade Association. and has a lengthy history of cooperation with
the U.S. military in intelligence missions in previous regional military conflicts. Taiwan
receives most of its defensive weapons from the U.S. to ensure the country’s defensive
capability. The country is an active collector of U.S. economic intelligence information.
Since ending martial law in 1987, the government has taken dramatic measures to
increase respect for human rights and to improve the Taiwanese democratic system of
government.
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
Administrative Judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in
evaluating an Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are flexible rules of law that recognize the complexities of
human behavior, and are to be applied in conjunction with the factors listed in the
adjudicative process. The Administrative Judge’s ultimate adjudicative goal is a fair,
impartial and common sense decision. According to the AG, the entire process is a
careful, thorough evaluation of a number of variables known as the “whole person
concept.” The Administrative Judge must consider all available, reliable information
about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration.
Reasonable doubt  concerning personnel being considered for access to classified
information will be resolved in favor of the national interest. In reaching this decision, I
have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on the
evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
6
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The
applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security
decision. 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship
is not restricted to normal duty hours. Rather, the relationship is an-around-the-clock
responsibility between an applicant and the federal government. The government
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk
the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation
as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
Analysis
6. The Concern. “Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the
individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not
in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest.
Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign
country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not
limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target U.S.
citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with the risk of terrorism.” ¶
6.
The mere possession of family ties in a foreign country is not automatically
disqualifying under the FI guideline. ISCR Case No. 98-0507 (App. Bd. Dec. and Rem.
Ord., May 17, 1999) at 10. However, the citizenship/residence status of Applicant’s
father, brother and sisters in Taiwan, and Applicant’s three trips to Taiwan since 1999,
create the potential for foreign influence under Foreign Influence (FI) disqualifying
condition (DC) 7.a. (contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or a resident in a foreign country if
that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation,
pressure, or coercion). 
Regarding Applicant’s mother-in-law, the DOHA Appeal Board has held that
there is a rebuttable presumption that an applicant has close ties of affection, or at least
obligation, to members of his wife’s family. ISCR Case No. 01-03120 at 8 (App. Bd.
Feb. 20, 2002). Therefore, a potential for foreign influence extends to Applicant’s
mother-in-law who is a resident citizen of Taiwan.
7
To determine whether Applicant faces a heightened risk of foreign influence due
to the citizenship/residence of his foreign family members depends a number of factors
other than the citizenship and residence of members, including the political character of
the foreign country in question, its relationship to the U.S., and the prospects an
applicant’s family members may be subject to pressure or coercion. If the foreign family
member is associated/employed or dependent on the government, or the government is
authoritarian, then the chances for foreign influence directed to and through the foreign
family member are more likely. Even friendly nations like Taiwan, i.e., those that may
have the same type of democratically elected government as the U.S., with a history of
good relations, do not always have the same interests. Taiwan has targeted the U.S. for
economic information. But, Taiwan has also become a strategic partner with the U.S. on
defensive issues, and has significantly improved its human rights record with its
citizens. Given the defensive and commercial interests Taiwan has in common with the
U.S., the country is not likely to jeopardize that relationship by applying coercive or non-
coercive pressure on its citizens to reach naturalized American citizens.
None of Applicant’s family members work for the Taiwanese government or any
foreign government. Applicant’s father, 71 years old, has visited Applicant five times in
the last eleven years. The former husband of Applicant’s older sister works in a furniture
manufacturing plant. The husband of Applicant’s younger sister works in a machine tool
company. Applicant’s relations with his father and siblings appear to be grounded upon
family rather than commercial relationships. His three  trips to Taiwan were either to visit
or bury his family members. Applicant’s brother is currently employed as a defense
contractor in engineering maintenance, after a long career as a helicopter pilot. There is
no evidence in the record that his brother has been involved in gathering intelligence,
either as a pilot or in his current contractor position. There is very little information in the
record concerning Applicant’s mother-in-law. Viewing the record in its entirety, it is
unlikely Applicant will be pressured into a position of having to choose between his
family members in Taiwan and interests of the U.S. FC MC 8.a. (the nature of the
relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or
the position or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the
individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a
foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.)
applies. 
FI MC 8.b. (there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense
of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is minimal,
or the individual has such deep and long lasting relationships and loyalties in the U.S.,
that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S.
interest) also applies to show there is no conflict of interest between Applicant, his
foreign family members and the U.S. Applicant has a net worth in the U.S. of about
$600,000.00. He and his family have lived in the local area since 1993. He and his
family have been living at the same address since 1997. In sum, Applicant’s
accomplishments as a U.S. citizen in his professional career and family life provide
ample evidence to conclude he will resolve even a potential conflict of interest in favor
of the U.S. Though FI MC 8.c. (contact or communication with foreign citizens is so
8
casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation) is inapplicable because of Applicant’s regular contacts with his
father, the level of contact does not disqualify Applicant’s security clearance application.
Applicant’s trips to Taiwan have no independent security significance under the FI
guideline. Accordingly, Subparagraphs 1.a. through 1.d. are found for Applicant. 
Whole Person Concept (WPC)
I have examined the evidence with the disqualifying and mitigating conditions in
my ultimate finding for Applicant under the FI guideline. I have also weighed the
circumstances within the context of nine variables known as the whole person concept.
In evaluating the relevance of an individual’s conduct, the administrative judge should
consider the following factors: (1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2)
the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3)
the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the
time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which the participation was voluntary; (6) the
presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the
motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and, (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
After marrying his wife in June 1986, Applicant immigrated to the U.S. to advance
his education. After spending two years at a school in the middle eastern part of the
U.S., he transferred to a local university in 1988 to continue his graduate studies, and
began working part-time for his current employer. After he was awarded his Master’s
degree in Mechanical Engineering in May 1992, his current employer hired him
permanently in June 1992. For 16 years, Applicant has provided a quality work product
and dedication to security issues that the Director of engineering and the President of
the company find very commendable. The President has acknowledged Applicant eight
times since 2000 for his outstanding job performance. 
The commitment that is found in Applicant’s 16-year professional career can
readily be found in his family life. He has been married to his wife for 22 years, and they
have two children, 19 and 15. His wife has been working at a computer software
business for the past five years, and obtained her security clearance in May 2007.
Applicant and his wife have become very active in all facets of their church, and have
watched their children provide meaningful contributions to the religious study program
and the children’s program of the church. Given Applicant’s strong professional, family
and economic roots (approximately $600,000.00 net worth) in the U.S., and his credible
testimony at the hearing, his potential for foreign influence is very improbable. The
foreign influence guideline is resolved in Applicant’s favor. 
9
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1 (Foreign Influence, Guideline B): FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a. For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b. For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c. For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d. For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e. For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.  
                       
Paul J. Mason
Administrative Judge