1
                                                             
                           
                        DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
--------------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 07-16756
SSN: ----------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Candace Le’i, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
                                                                            
______________
Decision
______________
MARSHALL, Jr., Arthur E., Administrative Judge:
Applicant completed a Questionnaire for National Security Positions (SF-86) on
November 7, 2002, a second SF-86 on June 5, 2006, and an electronic Questionnaire
for Investigations Processing (e-QIP) on April 12, 2007. On April 15, 2008, the Defense
Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR)
detailing security concerns under Guideline E (Personal Conduct), Guideline H (Drug
Involvement), and Guideline J (Criminal Conduct). The action was taken under
Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February
20, 1960), as amended, and Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense
Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as
amended (Directive), and the revised Adjudicative Guidelines (AG) promulgated by the
President on December 29, 2005, and effective within the Department of Defense for
SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
In a response received on May 14, 2008, Applicant admitted two of the four
allegations raised under Guideline E and denied all allegations raised under Guidelines
H and J. Applicant requested a hearing before a DOHA Administrative Judge. I was
 Ex. A was a letter reserved for later submission. It was subsequently replaced by Ex. F, a facsimile copy of1
that letter.
 This question is asked in each application form as Question 27.2
 Tr. 15, 17, 29. See also, FORM, Item 2 (SF-86, dated Nov. 7, 2002) is an unsigned, word-processed version3
of a an SF-86. It states that Applicant previously signed the form on Nov. 4, 2002). 
 Tr. 23-24; Ex. E (Explaining Ex. H and its significance).4
 Id.5
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assigned the case on June 19, 2008. Department Counsel and Applicant proposed a
July 22,  2008, hearing, and a Notice of Hearing was issued on July 1, 2008.
The hearing took place as scheduled. Department Counsel submitted six exhibits
(Exs.) which were accepted into the record as Exs. 1-6 without objection. Applicant
submitted four exhibits, accepted as Exs. A-D without objection.  No witnesses were1
called. Applicant was given until August 6, 2008, to submit any further materials. The
transcript (Tr.) was received on July 30, 2008. Department Counsel received and
reviewed four additional submissions from Applicant on August 6, 2008. Department
Counsel forwarded the package, noting her lack of objection to any of its contents. That
package was received on August 8, 2008, and accepted into the record as Exs. E-H.
The record was then closed. Based upon a review of the case file, exhibits, and
testimony, security clearance is denied.
Findings of Fact
Applicant is an information analyst who has worked for the same defense
contractor for approximately two years. He turned 25-years-old shortly before the
hearing. He received his high school diploma in June 2002 and earned a bachelor of
science degree in information technology in 2006. He is single and has no children.  At
issue are three security clearance applications completed by Applicant: a SF-86 dated
on November 7, 2002, a second SF-86 dated on June 5, 2006, and an e-QIP dated
April 12, 2007. In each of his applications, Applicant denied having used illegal drugs
since the age of 16 or within the past seven years.  2
In the autumn of 2002, Applicant enrolled in college. There, he entered the
Reserve Officer Training Corp (ROTC) program to investigate the option of a future
military career. As part of the program, he was required to complete a significant
amount of paperwork, including what he later understood to be a paper SF-86. That
form was later reformatted and submitted by the ROTC program on or about November
11, 2002.  Applicant passed a required drug test and completed one semester in the3
program.  He then dropped out of ROTC. He would not learn that a security clearance4
was granted in December 2002 until 2006.5
 In signed Responses to Interrogatories, dated Feb. 5, 2008, (Ex. 4) Applicant stated he started using6
marijuana during high school while elsewhere he stated he started using it in the summer of 2002. Applicant
maintains, however, that he meant the year 2003, while he was in college. His credible testimony dispels
concerns that inconsistency implies falsity.
 Tr. 27.7
 Id.8
 Tr. 26.9
 Interrogatories, dated Feb. 5, 2008, at 2.10
 Tr. 25.11
 Tr. 25-26.12
 Tr. 26.13
 Id.14
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During the spring of 2003, Applicant illegally used marijuana with a high school
friend.  This started a pattern of monthly marijuana use that would continue for about6
three years. He used marijuana socially about once or twice a month during this time.  7
During his senior year, from March 2006 through May 2006, Applicant had an
internship with a defense contractor. In June 2006, he completed a SF-86. He denied
recent and past drug use: “I was stupid. I was in college, I probably didn’t take it as
seriously as I should. . . . I have no defense for that. It was basically an immature and
stupid decision.”  He did not initially realize that this form was a form equivalent to one8
he completed for the ROTC program a few years earlier. In completing the form,
however, he read that using marijuana while holding a security clearance was a felony.
As a consequence, he quit using marijuana shortly thereafter.  This decision was an9
attempt to demonstrate compliance with the law, as well as an attempt to act as a
mature, responsible adult.10
Applicant graduated from college in December 2006. After finding his current
position in March 2007, he completed an e-QIP in April 2007. On that application, he
again denied having used marijuana since age 16 or within the past seven years. He
did this because he was afraid that changing his answer and admitting past drug use
would jeopardize his job.  During a July 2007 interview with investigators, however,11
Applicant volunteered the correct information regarding his past drug use: “I came
clean. It was on my own free will. . . . I had been out of college for about six months and
I had begun to recognize the responsibility, not just with the security clearance, but as a
member of society. . . . I needed to tell the truth”  In openly disclosing the true facts,12
which had thus far not been uncovered despite prior investigation, Applicant knew he
risked losing his security clearance.  Despite that risk, he “still chose to come forward13
and to tell the truth.”  14
 Ex.F (Promotion letter, emailed Jul. 21, 2008).15
 Ex. G (W aiver letter, signed Aug. 6, 2008).16
 Tr. 37.17
 Tr. 39.18
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Applicant has proven to be an excellent and reliable employee. His work records
show outstanding performance and superior growth. He was promoted to the next
professional level within 16 months of his hiring, based on his technical performance
and commitment to meeting customer network security requirements.  His employer is15
aware of Applicant’s appeal and assisted him in preparing a document stating that 1)
Applicant is aware of Department of Defense drug policies and 2) Applicant would
waive his right to appeal if he is caught or suspected of using illegal drugs in the
future.  Applicant successfully passed a drug screening when he was first hired in16
2007.  17
Applicant has actively and earnestly attempted to demonstrate a growing level of
maturity since leaving school and joining the workforce. He is genuinely embarrassed
and contrite over his past drug use and misrepresentations. He is committed to not
using illegal drugs again in the future. He no longer associates with those using illegal
drugs. He notes that his collegiate peers with whom he maintains contact and who also
used drugs at school have similarly matured and become drug-free.  Applicant fully18
appreciates the importance of candor in this process, an appreciation which motivated
him to correct his 2007 SF-86 answer regarding past drug use. 
Policies
When evaluating an Applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
Administrative Judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in
evaluating an Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information. These guidelines
are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior,
these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the factors listed in the adjudicative
process. The Administrative Judge’s over-arching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial
and common sense decision. Under AG ¶ 2(c), this process is a conscientious scrutiny
of a number of variables known as the “whole person concept.” The Administrative
Judge must consider all available, reliable information about the person, past and
present, favorable and unfavorable, in making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based
 See also ISCR Case No. 94-1075 at 3-4 (App. Bd. Aug. 10, 1995).19
 Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 531 (1988).20
 ISCR Case No. 93-1390 at 7-8 (App. Bd. Jan. 27, 1995).21
 Id.22
 Id.23
 Executive Order 10865 § 7.24
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on the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
The Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts alleged
in the SOR. An applicant is responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to
rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by
Department Counsel. . . .”  The burden of proof is something less than a19
preponderance of evidence.  The ultimate burden of persuasion to obtain a favorable20
clearance decision is on the applicant.  21
 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration
of the possible risk the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information). “The clearly consistent standard
indicates that security clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of
denials.”  Any reasonable doubt about whether an applicant should be allowed access22
to sensitive information must be resolved in favor of protecting such sensitive
information.   The decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not necessarily23
a determination as to the loyalty of an applicant.  It is merely an indication that the24
applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense
have established for issuing a clearance.
Based upon consideration of the evidence, I find the following adjudicative
guidelines to be the most pertinent to the evaluation of the facts in this case:
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Guideline E - Personal Conduct. The Concern: Conduct involving questionable
judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and
regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and
ability to protect classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide
truthful and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other failure to
cooperate with the security clearance process.
Guideline H - Drug Involvement. The Concern: Use of an illegal drug or misuse
of a prescription drug can raise questions about an individual’s reliability and
trustworthiness, both because it may impair judgment and because it raises questions
about a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations.
“Drugs” are defined as mood and behavior altering substances, and include drugs,
materials, and other chemical compounds identified and listed in the Controlled
Substances Act of 1970, as amended, (e.g., marijuana or cannabis, depressants,
narcotics, stimulants, and hallucinogens) and inhalants and other substances. “Drug
abuse” is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in a manner that deviates from
approved medical direction. 
Guideline J – Criminal Conduct. The Concern: Criminal activity creates doubt
about a person’s judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. By its very nature, it calls
into question a person’s ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and
regulations.  
Conditions pertaining to these adjudicative guidelines that could raise a security
concern and may be disqualifying, as well as those which would mitigate security
concerns, are set forth and discussed in the conclusions below.
Analysis
Guideline E, Personal Conduct 
Under this guideline, examination is made of an Applicant’s reliability,
trustworthiness, and ability to protect classified information based on his past personal
conduct and actions. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful and candid
answers during the security clearance process or any other failure to cooperate with the
security clearance process. On more than one occasion, Applicant deliberately denied
using illegal drugs since the age of 16 or within seven years preceding his application
for a security clearance. Consequently, Personal Conduct (PC) Disqualifying Condition
(DC), AG ¶ 16(a) (deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts
from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form
used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or
status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary
responsibilities) applies.
When Applicant denied past drug use on his April 2007 security clearance
application, he did so in order to make his answers consistent with those he provided
while still in college. Having matured considerably since finishing school, he regretted
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this decision and wanted to set the record straight regardless of the repercussions. In
July 2007, on his own initiative, Applicant disclosed the truth about his past drug at his
first meeting with investigators. But for this disclosure, the truth may never have come
to light. The Appeal Board, however, has repeatedly determined that such a protracted
period of time is insufficient to be deemed “prompt” under PC Mitigating Condition (MC)
1, AG ¶ 17(a) (the individual has made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the
omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts). 
Applicant concedes that he first failed to disclose his past drug use because he
was immature, then felt trapped into not varying from his prior answers. He described
his decisions to conceal the truth as “stupid.” Therefore, PC MC 2, AG ¶ 17(b) (the
refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment was caused or significantly
contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of authorized personnel or legal
counsel advising or instructing the individual specifically concerning the security
clearance process. Upon being made aware of the requirement to cooperate or provide
the information, the individual cooperated fully and truthfully) does not apply.
Using marijuana and giving false information during an investigation are criminal
acts. Applicant used marijuana on a monthly basis during a three year period in college.
He concealed his drug use more than once. Applicant admits his drug use and his
misrepresentations were immature and ill advised. Therefore, PC MC 3, AG ¶ 12(c) (the
offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it
happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast
doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment) does not apply. 
To his credit, Applicant matured considerably between 2006 and 2007. Although
he kept it secret, he took the initiative to quit using drugs, change his lifestyle, and focus
on a career. Feeling compelled to perpetuate his “stupid” lie about past drug use, he
again denied it in 2007. Maturity and adult integrity, however, won out. This was
demonstrated when he chose to tell the truth and correct the record despite any
adverse professional repercussions. Further, since taking that corrective action, he has
moved on and proven himself to be a reliable, valued professional who has learned a
valuable lesson. Consequently, PC MC 4, AG ¶ 17(d) (the individual has acknowledged
the behavior and obtained counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive
steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused
untrustworthiness, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is
unlikely to recur), PC MC 5, AG ¶ 17(e) (the individual has taken positive steps to
reduce or eliminate vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress), and PC MC 7,
AG ¶ 17(g) (association with persons involved in criminal activity has ceased or occurs
under circumstances that do not cast doubt upon the individual’s reliability,
trustworthiness, judgment, or willingness to comply with rules and regulations) apply.
No other mitigating conditions apply.
The amended adjudicative guidelines provide slightly more leniency than their
predecessors. Applicant’s correction as to his false answers was not sufficiently prompt
to invoke AG ¶ 17(a), It does, however, seem sufficient under the facts and
circumstances unique to this Applicant to demonstrate his mature and earnest attempt
 Because Applicant readily admits he bought the marijuana he used, specific discussion as to the unique25
facts involved in how he solicited such purchases is reserved for Guideline E, Personal Conduct.
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to rectify his immature, collegiate actions. He did so after weighing his recognition of
doing the right thing versus jeopardizing his career and his eligibility for a security
clearance. Today, he is drug-free, performs reliably at work, and comports his behavior
with that expected of a 25-year-old professional adult.
Guideline H, Drug Involvement
Applicant used marijuana once or twice a month for three years in college.
Consequently, Drug Involvement (DI) Disqualifying Condition (DC) AG ¶ 25(a) (any drug
abuse) applies.  With a disqualifying condition thus established, the burden shifts to25
Applicant to mitigate security concerns.
Applicant’s collegiate use of marijuana, while illegal, is far from unique. As his
graduation day approached, he recognized that it was time to comport his behavior with
that expected within the professional milieu to which he aspired. This included
discontinuing his occasional use of marijuana, a use he learned in 2006 was proscribed
for those holding a security clearance. He has now been drug-free for two and a half
years, a not insignificant amount of time considering the few years he abused the drug
and given his relative youth. In disclosing the truth regarding his past drug use,
Applicant demonstrated personal growth, maturity, and candor. It also demonstrated a
clear understanding and acknowledgment that drug abuse is illegal and incompatible
with the possession of a security clearance. Given the adult honesty and responsibility
demonstrated, in conjunction with his resolve never to again use drugs, DI Mitigating
Condition (MC) 1, AG ¶ 26(a) (the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent,
or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt
on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment) applies. 
Applicant ceased using marijuana two and a half years ago, a not insignificant
amount of time given the fact he recently turned 25. He has repeatedly declared his
intent not to use drugs in the future. He no longer associates with those who use drugs
or moves within an environment that accepts them. With the aid of his security officer,
Applicant has signed a statement noting that he is aware of Department of Defense
drug policies and that he will waive his right to appeal if he is caught or suspected of
using illegal drugs in the future. DI MC 2, AG ¶ 26(b) (a documented intent not to abuse
any drugs in the future, such as: (1) disassociation from drug-using associates and
contacts; (2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used; (3) an
appropriate period of abstinence; (4) a signed statement of intent with automatic
revocation of clearance for any violation) applies. None of the remaining mitigating
conditions apply. 
In resolutely quitting his use of marijuana, trading in his collegiate lifestyle for that
of a professional, and coming clean with investigators, Applicant demonstrated that he
has matured. As the result of his maturation, he demonstrated his ability and
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willingness to comply with the rules and adult judgment. Such a showing directly
addresses this guidelines concerns.
Guideline J – Criminal Conduct
With respect to Guideline J (Criminal Conduct), the Government has established
its case. Under 18 U.S.C. ¶ 1001, it is a crime to knowingly and willfully make any
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation in any matter within
the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the United States.
Applicant admits he answered questions regarding present and past drug use
incorrectly. Such conduct and admissions are sufficient to raise security concerns,
invoke Criminal Conduct Disqualifying Conditions (CC DC) 1, AG ¶ 31(a) (a single
serious crime or multiple lesser offenses), and CC DC 3, AG ¶31(c) (allegation or
admission of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was formally charged,
formally prosecuted, or convicted), and initiate inquiry.
Applicant provided incorrect answers on two security clearance applications, one
in 2006 and one in 2007. The only unique aspect of these two instances is the fact
Applicant felt under pressure to keep his 2007 answers consistent with those he gave in
2006. Consequently, Criminal Conduct Mitigating Condition (CC MC) 1, AG ¶ 32(a) (so
much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior happened, or it happened under
such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the
individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment) does not apply. Moreover, the
type of pressure experienced by Applicant to keep his answers consistent was not he
type contemplated in CC MC 2, AG ¶ 32(b) (the person was pressured or coerced into
committing the act and those pressures are no longer present in the person’s life), so it
does not apply.
Because Applicant admits his actions, CC MC 3, AG ¶ 32(c) (evidence that the
person did not commit the offense) does not apply. However, Applicant did come
forward to correct the record at the first opportunity he had to meet with investigative
personnel after submitting his 2007 questionnaire. He did so maturely and with full
knowledge that disclosing the truth could jeopardize his obtaining a security clearance.
This action is consistent with the personal growth and maturation Applicant has
experienced as he has aged and entered the professional working world. There, he
excels in his work and has merited promotion based on his skills and reliability. Despite
this concerns raised through this process, he maintains the support and working rapport
with his employer and security officer. Such factors raise CC MC 4, AG ¶ 32(d) (there is
evidence of successful rehabilitation; including but not limited to the passage of time
without recurrence of criminal activity, remorse or restitution, job training or higher
education, good employment record, or constructive community involvement) and
highlight how his past acts of concealment were the result of an immaturity since
replaced by maturity and a desire to set the record straight no matter the potential cost.
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Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, the Administrative Judge must evaluate an
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the
Applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances. The Administrative Judge should
consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): “(1) the nature,
extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct,
to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct;
(4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) extent to which
participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other
permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for
pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or
recurrence.” Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility
for a public trust position must be an overall common sense judgment based upon
careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept. 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case, as well as the “whole person”
factors noted above. Applicant is a college graduate who socially used marijuana for
three years at school. Recently turning 25-years-old, he quit using marijuana before
graduation as he prepared to transition from a sheltered college life to the working
world. He has since focused on leading a responsible, professional lifestyle. While
undergoing this transition, however, he falsely denied using marijuana shortly before he
quit using it. Once the answer was given, he initially felt compelled to stick to the lie.
Ultimately, and with full knowledge that setting the record straight could jeopardize his
application and his career, he disclosed the truth and took all responsibility for his
earlier, immature actions. 
Applicant’s initial conduct was clearly the result of ill judgment and it
demonstrated unreliability. Given that his silence may well have left his secret
undisclosed, his remedial disclosure and subsequent performance at work demonstrate
his maturation and rehabilitation. They also demonstrate the type of candor and
honesty expected of one holding a security clearance. While more time to demonstrate
maturity is often required in such cases, Applicant’s credible testimony and demeanor
contain sufficient evidence that he has matured and is not likely to repeat any related
conduct. Additional time and additional anecdotes would merely be cumulative.
Applicant has adequately mitigated personal conduct, drug involvement, and criminal
conduct security concerns. Clearance is granted. 
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline E: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
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Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline H: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: For Applicant
Paragraph 3, Guideline J: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 3.a: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with national security to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance. Clearance is granted.
ARTHUR E. MARSHALL, JR.
Administrative Judge