DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
           
             
 
 
In the matter of: ) 
 ) 
  )  ISCR Case No. 08-03118 
  ) 
 ) 
Applicant for Security Clearance ) 
 
 
Appearances 
 
For Government: James F. Duffy, Esquire, Department Counsel 
For Applicant: William Bransford, Esquire, and  
Maria Coleman, Esquire 
 
 
______________ 
 
Decision 
______________ 
 
 
RICCIARDELLO, Carol G., Administrative Judge: 
 
Applicant failed to mitigate the government’s security concerns under Guideline 
K, Handling Protected Information, Guideline M, Use of Information Technology 
Systems, and Guideline E, Personal Conduct. Applicant mitigated the security concerns 
raised under Guideline C, Foreign Preference. Applicant’s eligibility for a security 
clearance is denied. 
 
On July 31, 2008, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued to 
Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the security concerns under 
Guidelines K, M, E and C. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, 
Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; 
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6; Defense Industrial Personnel Security 
Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the revised 
adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and 
effective within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006.  
 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
                                                          
 Applicant answered the SOR in writing on August 21, 2008, and requested a 
hearing before an Administrative Judge. The case was assigned to me on September 
17, 2008. I was advised through Department Counsel that Applicant and his Counsel 
requested the first available hearing date. I was available to hear the case on October 1, 
2008. With the concurrence of both Department Counsel and Applicant’s Counsel, the 
case was scheduled for October 21, 2008. DOHA issued a notice of hearing on 
September 29, 2008, and I convened the hearing as scheduled and with the 
concurrence of both parties. The government offered Exhibits (GE) 1 through 51, which 
were admitted without objections. The government also presented two witnesses. 
Applicant offered Exhibits (AE) A through D, which were admitted without objections. An 
additional exhibit was marked as Hearing Exhibit (HE) I and included in the record. 
Applicant testified and two witnesses testified on his behalf. The hearing was completed 
on October 22, 2008, and the record closed. DOHA received the transcript of the 
hearing (Tr.) on October 30, 2008.1  
 
Findings of Fact2 
 
 Applicant admitted the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 2.a, 3.a, 3.b, 4.a, and 
4.b and provided explanations. He denied the allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.d, 2.b, and 2.c 
and also provided explanations. His admissions to the allegations in the SOR are 
incorporated herein. In addition, after a thorough and careful review of the pleadings, 
exhibits, and testimony, I make the following findings of fact. 
 
 Applicant is a 50-year-old former Department of State employee. He served with 
the State Department from 1973 to March 2005, retiring after approximately 32 years. 
He was assigned to various postings around the world and received promotions to 
some of the highest positions in the agency. Immediately after he retired from the State 
Department, he was a contract employee, essentially working in the same job as before 
retiring. While with the State Department he held a Top Secret clearance and access to 
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI).  
 
 The following are the findings of facts for the allegations for which 
Applicant has admitted:  
 
 While employed by the State Department from 1978 to 1994, Applicant 
committed approximately 21 security violations or infractions. Some of these security 
violations and infractions occurred while Applicant was working in U.S. embassies 
overseas. He left classified documents unsecured on his desk or in his office or left his 
safe that was used for storing classified documents unsecured. Some of the same type 
of security violations or infractions occurred later at his office in the United States. He 
1 The record of hearing has two volumes and each begins its numbering of pages with the 
number 1. Therefore, the transcript does not have consecutive numbering. I have referenced the first 
volume using Tr. and the second volume as Tr.II.  
 
2 Some details have not been included in order to protect Applicant’s right to privacy. Specific 
information is available in the cited exhibits. 
 
3 
 
 
                                                          
testified that his office in the United States was located on a secure floor. He testified 
that it was determined that there was either no compromise of classified information or 
the likelihood of compromise was minimal.3  
 
 Specifically the records reflect from 1978 to 1979, Applicant had five security 
infractions while stationed at an embassy overseas.4 Applicant was counseled after 
each incident. Applicant was transferred to a new overseas embassy and had two 
security infractions one in 1982 and one in 1983.5 Five of the infractions from 1978 to 
1983 involved leaving both confidential and secret documents unsecured. Two of the 
infractions involved leaving the safe that stored classified documents unsecured. 
Applicant acknowledged that after each infraction he was counseled and advised of his 
responsibility to lock the safe and keep the classified documents secured.  
 
 From 1987 through 1990, Applicant committed eleven security infractions and 
one security violation while stationed at another overseas embassy assignment. Nine 
infractions were for leaving classified documents unsecured and two infractions were for 
leaving the safe that stored classified documents unsecured. Applicant’s security 
violation was for using an unclassified word processor for classified material. Applicant 
concurred that he was counseled after each infraction and violation, but stated “I would 
say in a perfunctory manner…”6 He did not recall having individual security briefings as 
a result of the number of security infractions and violations, but he did not exclude it.7  
 
 On December 22, 1988, Applicant received a letter from a senior State 
Department official advising him of official disciplinary action against him for “lack of 
effective security practices which led to nine security violations.”8 Applicant’s response 
as noted in the letter and his testimony at the hearing explained that his supervisor at 
the time was very difficult to work for; the bulk of the violations occurred during a period 
immediately after he arrived at his assignment and before an inspection; he had a busy 
office and there was a need to respond to issues on short notice and often after hours; 
and he was often the last to leave the office. He also noted as a factor in mitigation that 
there was a great deal of tension and pressure that he felt due to the senior person for 
whom he worked.9 Applicant’s response also included that he had met with the security 
3 Tr. II at 13; GE 2 at 17. 
 
4 GE 13. They occurred on August 2, 1978; August 31, 1978; December 12, 1978; September 18, 
1979; and December 13, 1979. 
 
5 GE 13. The two infractions occurred on June 7, 1982; and June 15, 1983. 
 
6 Tr. II 96; GE 13. The infractions and violations occurred on the following dates: July 8, 1987; 
August 12, 1987; August 25, 1987; February 25, 1988; March 29, 1988; April 1, 1988; April 23, 1988; 
April 27, 1988; April 29, 1988; May 7, 1988; March 13, 1989; and March 21, 1989.  
 
7 Tr. II 96. 
 
8 GE 14. 
 
9 Tr. II 17-20. 
 
4 
 
 
                                                          
officer and put into place new procedures that would alleviate future violations, and he 
had received other helpful suggestions. Applicant was reminded in the official letter that 
he was a role model to subordinates. In the official letter it also acknowledged that 
Applicant took his responsibilities seriously. This letter informed Applicant that he was 
suspended from his duties without pay for 16 days. It also informed him that, although 
all of the security violations were valid, two of them were discounted, in order to reduce 
the suspension from 36 days to 16 days, so it would not be a hardship on the office. He 
was advised that future violations would not be discounted. Applicant was further 
advised that a copy of the letter would be made a part of his official personnel file where 
it would remain for a period for two years.10  
 
 Applicant received a second official letter on May 21, 1990, in which he was 
informed that he would be suspended from his duties for ten days without pay for his 
“lack of effective security practices which led to eight security violations.”11 Applicant’s 
response in mitigation prior to the suspension was that he had been “interrupted by an 
urgent phone call” which he claimed minimized his full responsibility for the violation. He 
was further advised that the letter would remain in his official personnel file for a period 
of two years.  
 
 Applicant acknowledged at his hearing that these letters constituted “formal 
disciplinary actions.” He also agreed that being suspended without pay constituted 
disciplinary action.12 After Applicant’s two suspensions, he committed two more security 
infractions after he returned to the United States.13  
 
 In his answer to the SOR Applicant commented that the State Department 
determined that none of the security violations resulted in “having compromised 
security” and that all of the violations occurred within a controlled area with 24-hour 
security.14 He further stated in a sworn affidavit the following, “I obtained security 
briefings, letters of warning and reprimand.”15 
 
 Applicant admitted that while he was assigned a high level position in the State 
Department and while serving overseas from January 2001 to July 2003, he misused a 
U.S. Government (USG) computer by accessing sexually explicit internet websites, by 
viewing and downloading sexually explicit images, and by allowing a guest of his to 
10 Tr. II 96-98; GE 14.The letter does not specifically state whether his suspension was without 
pay, but Applicant admitted the allegation in SOR ¶ 1.a, which specifically states the suspension is 
without pay. 
 
11 GE 15. 
 
12 Tr. II 96-98. 
 
13 GE 2 at 18. 
 
14 Answer to SOR. 
 
15 GE 2 page 17. 
 
5 
 
 
                                                          
access sexually explicit websites. He explained that he had been using his personal 
computer for both official and personal use when due to an electrical power surge his 
personal computer was destroyed. A senior officer associated with the embassy 
provided a statement that explained:  
 
 [Applicant] expressed concern about keeping up with personal and 
informal correspondence and emails without that computer, not to mention 
business related messages on off hours and the weekend. I mentioned to 
[Applicant] that he could use his USG computer to keep up with his 
correspondence and get access to the internet. I mentioned that was my 
understanding of the policy regarding USG computers in [government] 
residences.16  
 
Applicant testified that he used the USG for both routine official correspondence and 
personal correspondence. Applicant provided a sworn affidavit that states: 
 
[Person A] said that I did not have to buy a new computer that the 
[government] would provide me with a computer for personal use and this 
was done. I know that there is a regulation to not view pornographic 
material on a government computer, but this was in my residence and for 
my personal use only. I did do work on the computer as well because I 
was dedicated to the mission, but nothing of a classified or sensitive 
nature. I would type speeches, press statements and use email. I do not 
know if the computer was connected to the [government] intranet. I 
accessed the internet and did not have to switch between systems as I 
have had to at other locations so I assume it was not. I saw the 
Department of State warning banner on the computer, but again I believed 
that this computer was for my personal use.17  
 
 Applicant also stated that although he did view pornographic material he never 
did so in the workplace where he knew it was a violation of regulation.18 
 
 A State Department memorandum regarding the investigation about the misuse 
of the USG by Applicant provided a summary of an interview of Applicant about the 
event.19 It stated:  
 
[Applicant] stated that he knowingly and deliberately viewed and accessed 
sexually explicit websites and downloaded sexually explicit images … on 
the USG computer located at his [residence]. [Applicant] stated that he 
16 AE A. 
 
17 GE 2 page 18. 
 
18 GE 2 page 19. 
 
19 GE 16.  
 
6 
 
 
                                                          
knew that his actions were contrary to Department regulation, but 
‘rationalized it as okay because he was violating regulations at the 
[residence] and not at his office.’20  
 
In addition, the memorandum stated: [Applicant] acknowledged that he told [Person A] 
that he accessed and viewed sexually explicit material on the USG computer located at 
the [residence].21 The memorandum also stated that: 
 
[Person A] advised [Applicant] that the Admin section would install a USG 
computer at the residence for his use. [Applicant] could not recall if he 
received a briefing or signed a “user access agreement” prior to 
installation of the computer at the [residence].22 
 
 Applicant stated he did not divulge this information when applying for a security 
clearance because he did not believe it involved a security violation and he believed he 
was only required to divulge those issues related to security violations. He further stated 
he was embarrassed by the event and was attempting to be discreet. Applicant 
acknowledged that in early 2004 he was suspended without pay for ten days for this 
violation. He also acknowledged that this action constituted disciplinary action.23  
 
 Applicant acknowledged a guest at his residence also accessed his computer to 
view sexually explicit material. He was aware his guest was using the computer, but did 
not know until he asked him that he was also accessing pornographic material. When 
asked how soon he spoke with his guest after he became aware the Government had 
discovered his violation, Applicant stated: “I really don’t remember how soon it was.” He 
then was asked if it would have been immediately. He responded “No, I don’t think it 
would have been immediately, but I really don’t recall.”24 
 
 Applicant admitted the allegation in SOR ¶ 2.a, but explained he believed the 
computer was issued to him for her personal use. I find Applicant was aware he was 
using a government computer to access inappropriate material, albeit at his residence. I 
do not find his statement credible that he believed the computer was only for personal 
use. It is clear from the earlier interviews with the investigators that he was aware he 
was using a government computer for official and unofficial purposes and he was 
attempting to minimize his actions by stating he only viewed and downloaded material 
at his residence. 
 
20 GE 16 at 4 
 
21 Id. 
 
22 Id. 
 
23 Tr. II 98-100. GE 17. 
 
24 Tr. II 116-118. 
 
7 
 
 
                                                          
 Applicant admitted the following: He worked for a high ranking military officer 
from September 2003 to October 2004, in an overseas location. Applicant was also a 
high ranking State Department employee at the time. After the military officer (Officer B) 
retired Applicant stayed in contact with him. Applicant stated in his sworn affidavit:  
 
I was aware, through conversation with [Officer B] that [Officer B] was 
consulting for [overseas command] and also for private companies (no 
specifics recalled). I assumed that [Officer B] still maintained his security 
clearance if he was with [overseas command], but I did not check this.25 
 
 Appellant additionally stated the following in his sworn statement: 
 
In February 05, [Officer B] emailed me and asked me if there was anything 
I could send him regarding [Country K]. [Officer B] was going to a 
[conference] and was going to talk about political issues regarding 
[Country K]. [Officer B] did not ask for anything in particular and did not 
ask for anything classified. 
 
I had a summary of what the U.S. policy was on [Country K] and the 
document was classified Secret. The document was sent to me by the 
State Department, but I do not know who classified the document Secret. I 
do not disagree with the classification and I have no authority to declassify 
material. 
 
The document was on my classified computer at my office in [City Q]. I 
tried to remove all of the classified marking on the document by 
highlighting the classified markings and then deleting them. I tried to make 
sure that I had accomplished this on all of the pages, but I was not sure if I 
was successful. I intentionally tried to cover up that the document was 
classified. I was trying to save time and effort on my part. I knew that what 
I was doing was wrong and a grave mistake. 
 
I downloaded the document to a disc and then uploaded it to my 
unclassified computer, also in my office. I did this on my own and with no 
help or assistance from anyone. It was on my classified computer that I 
removed the classification markings before downloading and emailing the 
document to [Officer B] on my unclassified computer. Within the body of 
the email to [Officer B] I had stated something to the effect of not sharing 
this with anyone or acknowledge having seen it. I did this i[n] an attempt to 
let [Officer B] know that the information was classified, without actually 
saying that.  
 
I do not know what [Officer B] did with the email, but after the investigation 
was completed and we had met for dinner, I believe that he told me that 
25 GE 2 page 29. 
 
8 
 
 
                                                          
he destroyed it. We never discussed the content of the email or whether 
the document was classified or not. I do not recall what happened to the 
disc that the document was placed on. I gave all discs to my assistant [Ms. 
N] and I do not know what she did with them.  
 
I realize that the release of this document to the wrong people could 
negatively affect U.S. security interests because it contained U.S. strategy 
and classified information on [Country K] and their future. I was not 
thinking of that and in trying to be expiedant (sic) I just emailed the 
document to [Officer B].26 
 
Applicant went on to say: “Due to the above, my SCI clearance was pulled in Mar/Apr 
05 and subsequently terminated.”27 In addition he stated: “I feel that I am aware of what 
is on my desk and have tasked my U.S. assistants with being vigilant with security and 
watching out for security issues. I take security seriously and watch for security 
concerns with the help of my assistants.”28 
 
 At his hearing Applicant testified that he provided the information to [Officer B] 
because of the following reasons: “[Officer B] asked me for information. Secondly, he 
was a friend. Thirdly, I knew he was, because he told me, that he was consulting for 
[command] and therefore had to have a security clearance.”29 He also knew [Officer B] 
would be attending a specific conference related to the information.30 Applicant 
confirmed that the document he provided was a discussion paper from the State 
Department prepared for the “Principles Committee” and had been approved by the 
Deputy’s Committee.31 Applicant recollected that the document was classified as 
“SECRET/NO FORN.” (Meaning no foreign personnel are authorized access to the 
document). These markings were the ones Applicant removed or attempted to remove. 
Applicant affirmed that this document is disseminated to the secretaries of various 
departments or the head of federal agencies. It is the type of document that is 
authoritative on the U.S. position of current events in the specific country, a “suggested 
way forward,” “next step in key elements and assumptions,” engagement strategy” and 
“an annex with a time line.” 32 Applicant reiterated in his testimony that “I made the error 
of deciding to send that document to [Officer B], even though I knew that it had 
26 GE 2 at 29-30. 
 
27 Id. 
 
28 Tr. II 110; GE 2 page 30. 
 
29 Tr. II 30.  
 
30 GE 2 page 30. 
 
31 Tr. II 31-32. 
 
32 Tr. II 101-105. 
 
 
9 
 
 
                                                          
classification on it.”33 He further admitted he knew he was doing something wrong when 
he removed the classifications. He did this because he did not want to cause Officer B a 
problem. His purpose was to help Officer B to help promote the U.S. interests.34 
 
 Officer B testified on Applicant’s behalf. After he retired from the military he 
stayed in contact with Applicant. Applicant had dinner with Officer B and his wife at their 
home and they also emailed each other. He considered Applicant a critical advisor 
when he was on active duty. Subsequent to his retirement, Officer B was to be a 
speaker at a conference and he admitted he asked Applicant if he could provide him 
with an update on Country K. He sent him an email and he received a response with an 
attachment to the email. The attachment showed a classification marking as “Secret.” 
Officer B stated he thought the document was misclassified or was going to be 
declassified.35 He verified that there were foreign nationals in attendance at the 
conference who did not have a security clearance.36  
 
 Officer B confirmed that GE 18 was a copy of the email that was sent from 
Applicant to Officer B and Officer B’s response. In Applicant’s email he stated: “PLEASE 
do not share this with anyone or acknowledge having seen it.” Officer B’s response to 
the email was: “Thanks for the info.” Officer B denied remembering the specifics of the 
document. He stated when he made the request to Applicant he did not request 
classified material and Applicant did not tell him he was sending a classified document. 
Officer B acknowledged that when he received the document he held a security 
clearance. He also acknowledged he received the classified document on his 
unclassified computer. He did not report that he received a classified document on his 
unclassified computer because he thought the document was unclassified and someone 
forgot to take the markings off of the document. He did not think to make such a report. 
He stated he assumed Applicant would not send a classified document. He also stated 
that it did not strike him as odd or unusual that Applicant specifically asked him not to 
share the document with anyone or acknowledge having seen it. Officer B 
acknowledged that he was never asked by Applicant if he still held a security clearance. 
Officer B was going to see Applicant at the conference the next day. He never asked 
Applicant about the classification of the document while at the conference. He stated he 
saw no need to verify the classification of the document until he was notified several 
weeks later that the matter was being investigated.37  
33 Tr. II 32.  
 
34 Tr. II 33, 106-109. 
 
35 Tr. 304-307. Officer B provided his personal assessment of the importance of the information 
contained in the classified document. His personal assessment, although admissible, is mainly relevant 
as to the extent of potential damage to national security.  
 
36 Tr. 321-322. 
 
37 Tr. 304-310. Officer B’s computer was seized and searched by forensic investigators. He 
subsequently was interviewed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
 
 
10 
 
 
                                                          
 Officer B has continued his association with Applicant and considers him a good 
friend. His opinion regarding his honesty, trustworthiness and ability to tell the truth is 
“extremely positive”. He felt honored that Applicant accepted the position at the 
command when he was in charge. He and Applicant worked closely for more than a 
year on high level and sensitive negotiations and his opinion regarding Applicant’s 
ability to safeguard classified material was that he was “very mindful” and made sure 
that all classified material was handled appropriately. He believes Applicant was 
properly trained and aware of the rules regarding security.38 
 
 Applicant stated when he lost his access to SCI he did not appeal the decision 
because he was advised by the central adjudication facility that it would have no bearing 
on his security clearance status. Applicant felt he did not need access to SCI.39  
 
 Applicant applied for and obtained recognition as a citizen of the Republic of 
Ireland. He admitted he applied for an Irish passport in 1991 and possessed it until 
relinquishing it before his hearing due to the security clearance implications.40 He 
sought recognition as an Irish citizen because of his Irish heritage and because two of 
his grandparents were born in Ireland. He became an Irish citizen for sentimental 
reasons. He also had in the back of his mind that he might buy property in Ireland one 
day and perhaps live there part of the year. He thought it might be useful to have Irish 
citizenship and an Irish passport. In the past he has visited Ireland annually, but used 
his U.S. passport. He has never traveled using his Irish passport. He admitted that he 
did not advise the State Department at the time he was recognized as a dual citizen. He 
did not recall if he had told his supervisor at the time that he was applying for 
recognition as an Irish citizen. When questioned if he had informed any official in the 
State Department he stated: “Not in a proactive way. I would have informed them on the 
next security update or any, for example [official governmental] forum, which came 
down the road about five years later for the position in [Country M].”41 Applicant 
provided a “declaration of alienage” to relinquish his Irish citizenship.42 His Irish 
citizenship was terminated on October 15, 2008. Copies of his current and expired Irish 
passports were provided.43 Applicant testified he surrendered his Irish passport to the 
Irish authorities, but did not provide documentation of his surrender or verification of 
such.44 
38 Tr. 310-313, 324, 336-338. 
 
39 Tr.II 36. 
 
40 Answer to SOR. 
 
41 Tr.II 86-89, 93-94. 
 
42 AE D. This document does not verify that Applicant’s passport was surrendered, but it does 
verify his Irish citizenship has been terminated.  
 
43 GE 23 and 24. 
 
44 Tr.II 86-89, 91; GE 24. Other than Applicant’s testimony there is no other proof that he 
surrendered his Irish passport.  
 
11 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 The following are the findings of facts for the allegations for which 
Applicant has denied: 
 
 Applicant was interviewed as part of a security clearance update in his office on 
June 7, 2006, by an investigator from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). The 
investigator credibly testified that she uses a list of questions directly from the 
investigator’s handbook and other questions she developed when questioning people. 
She uses these questions in all of her cases. She took very detailed notes during the 
interview with Applicant and later used her notes to write a summary of the interview. 
With regards to all pertinent information she would always make sure she wrote the 
information down in her notes. Prior to the interview the investigator administered to 
Applicant an oath which required him to tell the truth and cited the pertinent criminal 
code citation for violating the oath.45 The investigator confirmed that GE 3 was an 
accurate summary of her interview with Applicant.46  
 
 The investigator credibly testified that she asks a series of standard questions 
regarding every employment entry on the security clearance application (SCA).47 One 
of the questions is: “Have you ever committed any security violations or had any 
disciplinary action taken against you?” When Applicant was asked this question he 
indicated “he had not.” When she asked if he had any disciplinary action, he indicated 
“he had not.” Later during the interview the investigator, as part of her regular 
procedure, goes over the SCA and re-asks the questions in the document to make sure 
that the answers have not changed since the date the SCA was completed. She also 
asks supplemental questions that are required by OPM for each question. She asked 
Applicant whether he had been investigated by the U.S. government for any reason. 
Applicant indicated he was currently under investigation by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI). He indicated to the investigator that on the advice of his attorney he 
did not want to provide any information about the case. He intimated it was an 
investigation related to a security issue. Applicant also noted that there was a second 
investigation associated with his present command. He declined to comment on that 
case also on the advice of his attorney.48  
 
 Based on being informed of the two pending investigations the investigator 
testified as follows:  
 
 Since it was in direct contradiction to his earlier statements about security 
violations and his employment, I asked if there w[ere] any other security 
 
 
45 The investigator cited 18 U.S. Code § 1001. 
 
46 Tr. 42-50. 
 
47 Tr. 52-53. The other questions the interviewer asked were: Have you ever had any problems 
with your supervisor or coworkers? Have you ever had a negative performance review?  Have you ever 
committed any security violations or had any disciplinary action taken against you? 
  
48 Tr. 52-57. 
 
12 
 
 
                                                          
violations that he had not indicated. And he indicated there were a few 
minor ones when he was employed with the State Department and located 
[in various overseas locations], I believe. And he stated those were minor 
security violations that did not result in any compromise of any sensitive 
information. And he provided that those were mostly instances of him 
leaving documents on his desk in a secure location and that the Marine 
security guards, the MSGs49 at the [places] would do sweeps for classified 
information and if they found it on his desk, they would report it to their 
supervisor.50  
 
The investigator testified when a subject indicates he had a security violation she asks, 
as part of her regular procedure, for the details, including the dates, if there was a 
compromise, and if there was any disciplinary action. She asked Applicant those 
questions. She testified: 
 
Well, he provided as much information as he could recall. He couldn’t 
recall specific dates. He did provide the type of violation as I described 
and that there was no compromise [of] sensitive information. And when I 
asked about disciplinary actions, he said that he could not recall any 
disciplinary actions being taken against him regarding those security 
violations.51 
 
The investigator then proceeded to ask standard wrap-up questions. She would ask one 
general question as it is stated on the SCA. She stated she asked “if there is any 
information that they think would be pertinent to our case that we haven’t gone over that 
they would like to disclose to the government at this time.” Applicant indicated he had 
no further information.52 
 
 The investigator confirmed that during her interview with Applicant she 
questioned him twice about disciplinary actions. Asking him, “Once for every 
employment and then again after he gave me the information about the investigations 
on him.” His response was the first time that he did not have any disciplinary actions 
and at the end when we were discussing the earlier security violations he indicated he 
“could not recall any disciplinary actions.”53 When questioned further about the FBI and 
command investigation, he did not indicate any other investigations he had been 
49 MSG are the initials for “Marine Security Guard.” 
 
50 Tr. 57-58. 
 
51 Tr. 58. 
 
52 Tr. 59. 
 
53 Tr. 60. 
 
 
13 
 
 
                                                          
involved in.54 He did not divulge the investigation regarding his misuse of a government-
issued computer and the disciplinary action taken.55 
 
 As part of the investigator’s follow-up investigation, she was provided access to 
Applicant’s State Department file and discovered he had security violations that led to 
disciplinary actions and an investigation regarding his misuse of a government-issued 
computer.56 
 
 The investigator acknowledged that she had advised Applicant that her interview 
was for a periodic update to his security clearance.57 Applicant testified he believed the 
update covered the past five years.58 The investigator confirmed that the specific 
questions she asked Applicant were “[D]id you receive any disciplinary actions while 
you were with said employer, the State Department? And did you commit any security 
violations while you were with the State Department?”59 Applicant readily acknowledged 
the two pending investigations with the FBI and the command.60 
 
 The background investigation conducted on Applicant was his first Department of 
Defense investigation. The investigator acknowledged that Applicant should refer back 
ten years. She acknowledged that often times she would not have access to State 
Department or FBI records of investigation, so she would go back ten years. The 
investigator credibly testified she questioned Applicant about any past disciplinary 
action he may have received. She stated, “There was no time limit on that because we 
cover the entire span on someone’s employment when it is a single employment. I said 
did you ever have any disciplinary actions, security violations, negative performance 
appraisals, etc. . . .” She could not remember specifically if she used the word “ever” but 
she was certain that she used the word “any.”61 
 
 The investigator confirmed that Applicant never admitted during his interview that 
he was disciplined for security violations and he also never divulged his more recent 
disciplinary action for misuse of a government-issued computer.62 She confirmed that 
she asked a general question to the effect of while you were employed at the State 
54 Tr. 61. 
 
55 Id. 
 
56 Tr. 61-62. 
 
57 Tr. 65. 
 
58 Tr. II 21. 
 
59 Tr. 69. 
 
60 Tr. 70. 
 
61 Tr. 80-83. 
 
62 Tr. 86-87. 
 
14 
 
 
                                                          
Department were you subject to any disciplinary action?” Applicant indicated he was 
not.63 The investigator was confident Applicant understood the question.64 
 
 Applicant testified that he remembered his interview with the OPM investigator, 
but he had a poor recollection of the specifics. He testified his main concern was how to 
address the two on-going investigations. He remembered that part of the interview, but 
with regard to his overall recollection he stated “To the best of my recollection I want to 
emphasize again that my recollection is very fuzzy about that entire interview.”65 He 
confirmed he did not have a clear memory of the questions and answers during the 
interview about his security violations with the State Department. He did not take notes 
on the interview. He did not recall denying that he had security violations. He did not 
have any specific recollection about the investigator asking him about any disciplinary 
actions. He stated:  
 
I may have misunderstood her question. Perhaps it was not posed 
precisely as she said it was in her notes. I don’t know. Could have 
discussed the fact that I have not suffered adverse consequences in my 
career, heretofore as a result of these security violations and the 
reprimands and suspensions.66 
 
He went on to say:  
 
 So from my point of view, I didn’t suffer adverse consequences as a result 
of this record and I may, given what her testimony, that may have been 
what I was responding. But I do not have specific recollection of any part 
of the interview other than the two investigations that I had focused on and 
that I had thought in advance about how I would address those in the 
discussion with her.67  
 
Applicant could not “recall” or “recollect” most of the specifics of his interview with the 
investigator. He said he does not have any reason to dispute her testimony or agree 
with it.68 However, he did remember that he did not divulge his investigation about 
63 Tr. 87-92. 
 
64 Tr. 42-100. The transcript at these pages records the entire testimony of the OPM Investigator. 
Repeatedly throughout her testimony she confirmed that she requested but Applicant did not divulge that 
he had prior disciplinary actions by his previous employer, the State Department. He did not divulge the 
investigation regarding his misuse of a government-issued computer. She was asked many questions in 
different forms and different ways and her answers remained consistent. 
 
65 Tr. II 124. 
 
66 Tr. II 20-28. 
 
67 Id. 
 
68 Tr. II 123. 
 
15 
 
 
                                                          
misuse of a government-issued computer because it was in his view not a security 
matter.69 He stated:  
 
Well I may have been in error in not considering the misuse of the 
computer in the way I did misuse it as relating to security, but that was my 
view at the time. Now that I’ve been in this procedure and I’ve seen all the 
different criteria that are being applied in the case in DOD documents, I 
understand the relevance of it. This was not my situation when I was 
interviewed by [investigator]. I didn’t know about these criteria, my 
judgment was that this was not a security related matter and that I did not 
need to disclose it.70  
 
In response to a question whether the interviewer said anything to lead him to believe 
that she was only focused on security matters, he responded:  
 
I don’t have a clear enough recollection of the exchanges between the two 
of us to assert that. But it was a security update, she was an investigator 
for my security clearance, I did not think that that misuse of the computer 
is relevant. I now know there are criteria which make it relevant, I did not 
realize that at the time.71  
 
Applicant then testified that when he was asked a general question about whether there 
was anything else that was relevant concerning his security clearance, he did recall this 
part of the interview, but did remember that he volunteered the information about the 
two ongoing investigations by the FBI and other local command investigation.72 
Applicant could not recall if he advised the investigator about his disciplinary 
suspensions or the letters of reprimand he received.73  
 
 Applicant was asked the following question by his attorney and his response is 
provided: 
 
 Q. Did you know when you were interviewed by [OPM Investigator] 
in June of 2006 that she would find out about [country] or the [country] 
computer incident if she looked at your State Department files? 
 
 A. I wasn’t sure because these were personnel files and not 
security files. So I didn’t know that–whether she would have access to 
personnel files. Certainly, she would have access to the files contained—
69 Tr. II 126. 
 
70 Tr. II 127-128. 
 
71 Tr. II 129. 
 
72 Id. 
 
73 Tr. II 129, 189. 
 
16 
 
 
                                                          
that diplomatic security had, which dealt with the security violations in the 
embassies. But, diplomatic security was not part of the process on the 
misuse of the computer, it was a panel composed just of personnel and 
legal.74 
 
 I find Applicant’s testimony was not credible or believable. Applicant clearly had 
selective memory and his responses were evasive. I find Applicant intentionally failed to 
fully divulge his past security violations, disciplinary actions, and investigations. 
 
 While serving in a high level position overseas Applicant had a foreign national 
(FN D) who worked for him. While working for Applicant FN D held a security clearance, 
granted through his country. Applicant had both a professional and personal relationship 
with FN D and considered him to be a subject matter expert in an important area of 
international significance and a valuable employee. Applicant was advised in June 2005 
by higher authority that FN D’s security clearance was revoked by his country. Applicant 
was told by FN D that the revocation was due to a technical issue and would be 
resolved. When FN D’s security clearance was revoked it also revoked his employment 
contract because his position required a security clearance. Applicant was aware once 
a security clearance is revoked a person is not to have access to classified information. 
Applicant denied knowing FN D had access to classified material.75  
 
 Applicant personally advocated and requested that FN D be rehired, but with a 
contract that did not require access to classified information. He testified that his goal 
was to rehire FN D because he believed FN D would be vindicated and then could 
resume the position he had previously held.76 He further testified that he personally told 
FN D that his contract work was only to involve unclassified material. He stated he 
communicated this to the Chief of Staff of the command (COS-M) and to his personal 
Chief of Staff (COS). Not having a security clearance meant that FN D did not have 
unescorted access to the building where he previously worked. This was the same 
building where Applicant and his staff worked. Applicant denied any responsibility for 
ensuring FN D did not have access to classified material beyond advising and 
delegating this responsibility to his COS to ensure FN D did not have access.77 He 
stated: “I never had concerns that he was getting into classified areas. And I’ve testified 
74 Tr. II 185-186. 
 
75 Tr. II 135-140. The counterintelligence officer who testified verified that once a security 
clearance is revoked by the person’s country, there is no middle ground. The requirement is that upon a 
suspension, termination, or revocation, the individual’s employment must be immediately terminated. He 
emphasized that once a country withdraws a clearance, it is “pretty sacrosanct,” and we must “ax them.” 
“There is no middle ground, no wiggle room.” The command has no right to request the reason for the 
revocation as it is a sovereign issue. Tr. 190-196. 
 
76 Tr. II 149-151, 154. 
 
77 Tr. II 153. 
 
 
17 
 
 
                                                          
to that fact and I’ve sworn and affirmed it over and over again. I was not aware he was 
getting into classified material.”78  
 
 Applicant’s COS raised his personal concerns with Applicant about the 
arrangements for FN D to remain in the same office he had occupied prior to losing his 
security clearance and his job. He also was concerned that FN D was attending weekly 
staff meetings. Applicant acknowledged that the COS raised the concerns, but believed 
it was only once or twice, instead of the numerous times that the COS claimed he raised 
the issues. Applicant confirmed that the COS did not think it was right for FN D to be 
working on the contract because his security clearance had been revoked. He stated 
the staff meetings were not classified. Applicant testified he believed FN D was working 
on an unclassified project and he believed FN D would be vindicated and his clearance 
reinstated. He acknowledged he did not personally inform his staff that FN D’s security 
clearance had been revoked; rather he relied on his COS to ensure compliance with his 
directions. He also acknowledged that no announcement went out telling others in the 
command that FN D no longer had a security clearance, even though he was working in 
the same building, in the same office, and for the same people. Applicant was unaware 
of any efforts made to make an announcement and he did not personally do so. When 
FN D came to his private office he did not verify if he was being escorted. 79  
 
 Applicant admitted that he was attempting to establish a temporary position and 
a permanent position for FN D. He was working with the personnel office to write up a 
position description and the required qualifications. FN D was contacting the personnel 
office and advising them what the qualifications should be to hold the position. This 
position was to be advertised so others could compete to be hired. In effect, FN D was 
providing input on a position he was going to apply for. Applicant sat on the selection 
board for the position. Regarding a certain person who applied for this position, 
Applicant stated that FN D “may have” provided me input on this particular applicant 
based on the applicant’s paperwork, but he was not part of the interview process. This 
person was not selected. Applicant confirmed that FN D had input into writing the 
position description and it was designed for him to get the job. Applicant believed as 
long as the description and qualifications were valid for the position it was okay. 
Applicant did not believe these actions were subverting the system or that it was 
improper for FN D to be involved.80  
 
 FN D continued to occupy the same office he had prior to the revocation of his 
security clearance. He continued to attend some classified briefings and meetings 
78 Tr. II 153. 
 
79 Tr. II 149-157. 
 
80 Tr. II 163-168. The compliance and violation of personnel and administrative rules are not at 
issue in this case and are not considered for disqualifying purposes. The facts related to this area, 
however, will be considered when analyzing the whole person and credibility issues. GE 48 indicates a 
lengthy email correspondence on the efforts by the Applicant and those acting on his behalf to retain FN 
D as a full time employee.  
 
 
18 
 
 
                                                          
because those in attendance had not been advised that his security clearance was 
revoked. He produced weekly summaries on his particular area of expertise sponsored 
by Applicant’s office that included sensitive, restricted, confidential or classified 
information and listed himself as the author on the weekly summaries.81 Applicant 
confirmed if he was in the office he would approve the weekly summaries before they 
were published. If he was not available the COS would handle it. He stated “I didn’t pay 
attention to the classification markings on each of the individual paragraphs. I reviewed 
those documents for substance, not for format, not for classification. That was COS’ 
responsibility.”82 In addition, point papers were prepared by FN D that noted the 
classification as “restricted” material. On the point papers FN D included his title, which 
was the same title he held prior to having his contract terminated and his clearance 
revoked.83  
 
 Applicant admitted he “misplaced” his trust in FN D. He stated:  
 
 And had I realized the extent to which he was prepared to violate the 
rules, I would never even have contemplated allowing him to stay, but I 
had no reason to believe that and I had faith and confidence in him and it 
turns out to have been mistrusted, or misplaced, I beg your pardon, And I 
regret that very much, Yes, in retrospect, my supervision should have 
been more careful in this regard and I wish that I had been more careful to 
have avoided these problems.84  
 
Applicant denied he condoned or permitted access to classified material to FN D. 
Applicant believed he fulfilled his security obligations by delegating them to his COS.85 
 
 A high level inquiry was conducted concerning FN D’s access to classified 
information. The inquiry was completed by two senior personnel security and 
counterintelligence officers.86 Some of the findings of the inquiry are as follows:87 
81 AE 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, and 36. 
 
82 Tr. II 140. 
 
83 AE 37-40. 
 
84 Tr. II 183. 
 
85 Tr. II 184. 
 
86 It is noted that the counterintelligence officer who was one of the two who prepared the report 
testified to its accuracy. The original report, which was classified, was signed by him. The difference 
between the classified and unclassified reports is that the classified version uses the actual names of the 
individuals and was signed. This witness testified that he specifically used the term “inquiry” vice 
“investigation” due to the sensitive political and international ramifications of the issues. I have not 
included all of the findings of the report, although they are included in GE 20. I have only included those 
that specifically pertain to the issues of this case and Applicant. I have also made independent findings of 
facts from the testimony of the witnesses, Applicant, and all of the other evidence presented and 
considered all of it. The witness provided a lengthy explanation as to how the inquiry was conducted, 
 
19 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
• “In June 2005, Subsequent to [Security Office] notification of [command] that FN 
D’s security clearance had been revoked, [command] took appropriate steps to 
terminate FN D’s access to …classified information and FN D’s employment 
(E.g. FN D’s …access was terminated and FN D’s Class II security area building 
access pass was confiscated.) 
• “Circa August/September 2005, at the behest of the [Applicant], FN D was 
returned to employment at [command] as an ‘unclassified consultant.’” 
• “However, FN D was effectively returned to the same duty position within the 
same office of a Class II secure area.” 
•  “No one outside of the Command Group and FN D’s direct co-workers was 
informed of the fact that FN D had no security clearance.” 
• “As a result, FN D continued to be the recipient of . . . classified information. The 
information ranged from …RESTRICTED to . . .SECRET, and was provided to 
[different commands and headquarters].” 
• “Approximately one linear meter of …classified documents was discovered in FN 
D’s office. The majority of these documents were originated prior to the 
revocation of FN D’s security clearance. However, upwards of 20-25% of the 
documents were originated subsequently to the revocation of FN D’s security 
clearance.”88 
• “Although the [Applicant] instructed [COS] to ensure that FN D had no access to 
classified information, this was done to present the illusion of compliance with 
…security relations.” 
• “[COS] indicated that the [Applicant] was knowledgeable that [FN D] continued to 
have access to classified information, and in some cases authorized such 
access.”  
• “In fact, [FN D] continued to produce classified materials, to include the …Weekly 
Summary, at the …Restricted and …Confidential level and they were distributed 
to the [Applicant]. These documents were clearly marked with classification 
markings and indicated [FN D] as the author. The …Weekly Summary was 
disseminated to the [Applicant] and the Command Group,89 as well as places on 
the … classified LAN.”   
• “FN D’s continued physical presence in a Class II security area90 without a valid 
security clearance constituted a violation of …Security Regulations. Additionally, 
 
including interviewing between 50-60 people, searching and seizing documents from FN D’s office, 
viewing computer hard drives, etc. Tr. 199-202.  
 
87 Tr. 205-207. The witness also verified that GE 21 and 22 are the security regulations that were 
applicable during the time of the inquiry.  
 
88 This information was confirmed by the counterintelligence officer at the hearing. Tr. 202-203. 
Some of the documents seized are GE 30-40. The classified information that appeared in the document 
has been redacted.  
 
89 Tr. 142-143. The Command Group is made up of the highest ranking officers in the command. 
 
90 Tr. 143. A Class II secured area requires personnel to have a security clearance or be escorted 
at all times.  
 
20 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
no effort was made to remove [FN D’s] previous classified holdings from [his] 
office prior to [his] reoccupancy of this work space.” 
• “… classified documents at the …RESTRICTED91 and …CONFIDENTIAL [level] 
were produced on an Unclassified Internet enabled computer by [FN D].” 
• “[FN D] also continued to attend … classified meetings and conferences albeit 
without the knowledge of the chairs of these fora that [FN D] had no security 
clearance.” 
• “A number of [FN D’s] co-workers admitted to providing [FN D] classified 
information with at least some level of knowledge that [FN D] had no security 
clearance. However, the general claim of his co-workers was that they were 
never informed that [FN D’s] security clearance was removed, but rather that 
there had been an administrative error with [his] security clearance that would be 
corrected shortly.” 
• “[COS] admitted that [he] had been informed that [FN D’s] security clearance had 
been removed, but also stated that the [Applicant] indicated that this was an 
administrative oversight on the part of the …authorities. As such, the [Applicant] 
indicated to [COS] that [FN D] should continue to have access to relevant 
classified information necessary for [FN D] to work on [subject operation] and 
[subject project]. [COS] indicated that as time progressed, both the staff of 
[Applicant’s] office and [COS] became increasingly uncomfortable about [FN D’s] 
lack of security clearance. As such, [COS] claimed to have discussed this issue 
with [Applicant] on a number of occasions. When the [Applicant] did not react, 
[COS] informed [COS-M] in January or February 2006.”92 
• “Interviews of numerous individuals found that most were unknowledgeable of 
[FN D’s] security clearance status, and as a result, were unable to precisely 
indicate what specific classified information was provided to [FN D].” 
• “However, the inquiry determined that [FN D] was involved in a diverse range of 
classified areas. For example, [FN D] was involved with ….” 
• “Numerous individual’s claimed to have raised their concerns about [FN D’s] 
access to classified information with the [Applicant]” 
• “On 9 March 2006, [FN D] telephoned investigators and requested to meet with 
investigators.” (Additional information is contained in the report that is not 
specifically pertinent.) 
• “[FN D] stated from June 2005 until February 2006, that [he] worked as an 
unclassified consultant with no access to classified information. When asked 
about classified documents in [his] office, [FN D] could offer no explanation. 
When asked about receipt of classified information subsequent to the revocation 
of [his] security clearance, [FN D] could offer no explanation.” 
 
 
91 Tr. 212-213. “Restricted” by definition from the Treaty is a security classification and is 
considered classified information.  
 
92 Tr. 125-126. COS-M testified that he recalled that COS came to his office to discuss FN D. He 
stated he did not remember the specifics of the conversation, but believed it had to do with what level of 
access FN D should have. He stated his direction was that FN D should have unclassified access and 
have escorted access to the building. 
 
21 
 
 
An additional note was made in the report that stated the following: “Historically, both 
[COS-M] and [Applicant] routinely made extraordinary efforts for FN D.” Examples of 
such are in included in the report.93  
 
The conclusions of the inquiry are as follows: 
 
• “[Command] created conditions that resulted in a major compromise of ... 
classified information to FN D.” 
• “Actions on the part of [COS-M], and the [Applicant], U.S. national, to 
accommodate the continued employment of [FN D], following the revocation of 
his national security clearance, violated the intent of both the …Security and 
Civilian Personnel Regulation, and were the direct cause of [FN D’s] continued 
and routine access to … classified information.” 
•  “The manner in which [FN D] was subsequently employed constituted a direct 
and deliberate violation of … Security Regulations.”  
• “[COS] allowed [FN D] continued access to …classified information with the 
knowledge that [FN D] had no security clearance. However, [COS] did so with 
the informed consent and under the implied direction of [Applicant].”94 
• “[Applicant] was undoubtedly aware of [FN D’s] continued access to classified 
information without a security clearance, although [Applicant] denied any such 
knowledge.” 
• “The actions on the part of the [Applicant] placed the subordinate members of his 
office at serious risk of violating national espionage statutes involving the 
mishandling of classified information.” 
• “The full extent of the magnitude of the compromise is impossible to determine 
and, as such, a damage assessment cannot be conducted.” 
• “Lastly, although not a part of the …inquiry, “[COS-M]” and [Applicant’s] actions 
relative to FN D were part of a clear and continuing pattern to violate …rules on 
FN D’s behalf; to include violation of …Civilian Personnel Regulations, …Security 
Regulations, … Financial Regulations and possibly … Contracting Regulations. 
                                                          
93 Testimony by the counterintelligence officer confirming his findings in the inquiry are located at 
Tr. 209-291. Additional findings are included in the report regarding the irregularities in the personnel 
hiring regulations. 
 
94 At the hearing the counterintelligence officer explained that this finding meant that COS had 
complained to Applicant as time progressed and that his staff was, in turn, complaining to COS and that 
the implied direction is the instruction from Applicant to ensure FN D has everything he needs to do his 
work on a specific operation. In addition, COS as well as others in Applicant’s office were aware that FN 
D was attending classified meetings and this was allegedly conveyed to Applicant. It was confirmed that 
COS had a responsibility to ensure FN D was restricted to only unclassified information and that he be 
restricted while in the building. The counterintelligence officer’s report confirmed COS permitted FN D 
access to classified information and the COS’ contention was he was acting on the implied consent of 
COS M and Applicant. Tr. 254-258. 
 
 
22 
 
 
                                                          
Also, the civilian recruitment process was corrupted in an extraordinary effort to 
create a civilian position that was solely designed to be occupied by FN D.”95 
 
The final conclusion of the in-depth inquiry was as follows: 
 
The final conclusion of the inquiry should indicate that [COS-M] and 
[Applicant] were responsible for creating the conditions that resulted in a 
major compromise.96 [COS], while not blameless, should not be singled 
out as the primary responsible party. 
 
 The counterintelligence officer who conducted the inquiry confirmed that FN D 
had access to classified information after his clearance was revoked.97 He confirmed 
that he met with the country representatives that had originally authorized a security 
clearance to FN D and they were outraged because they believed the [Command] was 
non-responsive to their national decision and that both COS-M and Applicant had both 
provided memorandums of support for FN D in his legal battle, which they viewed as an 
interference in a national judicial matter.98 I find the counterintelligence officer’s 
testimony credible. 
 
 Applicant denied he was aware of the situation or responsible as outlined 
above.99 I find Applicant’s testimony was evasive, not credible and not believable.100 
95 GE 20. It is noted that some of the findings and conclusions of the inquiry are not considered 
for disqualifying purposes, but are considered in the whole person analysis and to show the relationships 
between the different people, a pattern, credibility, and a course of conduct. Conduct not alleged in the 
SOR may be considered: “(a) to assess an applicant’s credibility; (b) to evaluate an applicant’s evidence 
of extenuation, mitigation, or changed circumstances; (c) to consider whether an applicant has 
demonstrated successful rehabilitation; (d) to decide whether a particular provision of the Adjudicative 
Guidelines is applicable; or (e) to provide evidence for whole person analysis.” ISCR Case No. 03-20327 
at 4 (App. Bd. Oct. 26, 2006) (citations omitted). 
 
96 COS-M testified at the hearing. COS-M was asked if while attending a high level meeting 
whether the command’s legal advisor advised the Commander and others at the meeting that FN D’s 
continued unescorted presence in [Class II secured spaces] was a violation of … security regulations. 
COS-M’s response was “She may have done but I cannot remember.” Tr. 145. He also stated that he did 
not read the weekly summaries thoroughly, but rather skimmed them and did not notice anything that FN 
D had written that may or may not have been classified. Tr. 146. 
 
97 TR. 196. 
 
98 Tr. 197-198. Although the issue of interference in a nation’s sovereignty is not at issue in this 
case, this information is relevant in analyzing the relationships and actions by Applicant during this time. 
 
99 COS-M was asked if during the time in question if he was “aware of any circumstances or any 
situation where FN D accessed, or used, or discussed, or developed classified information.” His answer 
was “I was not actually aware of that practice, no.” Regarding whether he was aware if Applicant allowed 
or permitted the access of classified information by FN D, he answered “no, I was not and I would have 
been highly surprised had I become aware of it.” He was further asked if anyone complained to him about 
FN D accessing classified information or possessing classified information. He stated “There was one 
occasion, and I could not tell you when it was, COS did come up to my office and my aide opened the 
door and the three of us stood in my doorway and discussed it. And I reaffirmed the absolute intent, which 
 
23 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 Applicant submitted character statements from two high ranking supervisors. 
One supervisor wrote that, despite the allegations in the SOR, they “bear no 
resemblance” to Applicant, with whom he worked closely with for two years. He 
considers Applicant honest, trustworthy and reliable, and never doubted his loyalty. He 
referred to Applicant’s constant exposure to highly classified documents and being 
entrusted with the most sensitive information during certain negotiations, and at no time 
did he witness or hear that Applicant jeopardized that trust. He went on to say, “I can 
state unequivocally that he upheld the highest standards for handling classified material 
during our service together”.101 
 
 A second supervisor characterized Applicant as one of his most “invaluable 
advisors.” He was relied upon for his “expertise, his insightful analysis, and his sound 
judgment.” He has his fullest faith, trust and confidence in his “fidelity and loyalty to the 
United States of America, and I trust him to represent me personally before heads of 
state.” He confirmed that he is aware of the allegations against Applicant and believes 
they are inconsistent with his character and do not cast doubt on his opinion of 
Applicant.102  
 
 COS M testified Applicant’s loyalty to the U.S. is absolute and faultless. He 
commented on Applicant’s devotion to his work and his strong work ethic.103 
 
Policies 
 
 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the substantial discretion of the 
Executive Branch in regulating access to information pertaining to national security 
emphasizing, “no one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”104 As Commander In Chief, 
the President has the authority to control access to information bearing on national 
security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to have access 
to such information.105 The President has authorized the Secretary of Defense or his 
 
was shared in the Command Group, that FN D was denied access to anything above unclassified. His 
[access] account was closed and his access to the building was on an escorted basis.” COS-M could not 
remember if COS raised the issue that he believed FN D did possess or have access to classified 
information. He denied he permitted FN D to attend classified meetings. Tr. 125-126. COS-M could not 
recall being made aware that the continued contractual hiring of FN D on five successive contracts was in 
violation of civilian personnel regulations. Tr. 155-164. 
 
100 I have made independent findings based on all of the evidence presented, including the 
testimony of all of the witness and consideration of all of the documentary evidence. 
 
101 AE B. I have considered the entire statement. 
 
102 AE C. I have considered the entire statement. 
 
103 Tr. 131-132. 
 
104 Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988). 
 
105 Id. at 527. 
 
 
24 
 
 
ssified information. 
                                                          
designee to grant applicant eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a 
finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.”106 When 
evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the administrative judge 
must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition to brief introductory 
explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list potentially disqualifying 
conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in evaluating an Applicant’s 
eligibility for access to cla
 
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the 
criteria contained in the revised adjudicated guidelines (AG). These guidelines are not 
inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these 
guidelines are applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An 
administrative judge’s over-arching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common 
sense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information 
about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable.  
 
The government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with 
access to classified information. This relationship transcends normal duty hours and 
endures throughout off-duty hours. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the 
possible risk the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard 
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible 
extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified 
information. Clearance decisions must be “in terms of the nation interest and shall in no 
sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the [A]pplicant concerned.”107 Thus, 
nothing in this decision should be construed to suggest that I have based this decision, 
in whole or in part, on any express or implied determination as to Applicant’s allegiance, 
loyalty, or patriotism. It is merely an indication Applicant has not met the strict guidelines 
the President and the Secretary of Defense have established for issuing a clearance.  
 
Initially, the government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the 
personal or professional history of the Applicant that may disqualify an Applicant from 
being eligible for access to classified information. The government has the burden of 
establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR.108 “Substantial evidence” is “more 
than a scintilla but less than preponderance.”109 The guidelines presume a nexus or 
rational connection between proven conduct under any of the criteria listed therein and 
an applicant’s security suitability.110 
106 Exec. Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as 
amended and modified. 
 
107 See Exec. Or. 10865 § 7. See also Executive Order 12968 (Aug. 2, 1995), Section 3. 
 
108 See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531. 
 
109 See v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 
110 See ISCR Case No. 95-0611 at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996). 
 
 
25 
 
 
                                                          
Once the government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial 
evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the 
facts.111 An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it is clearly 
consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.”112 The 
burden of disproving a mitigating condition never shifts to the government.113 “[S]ecurity 
clearance determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.”114 
 
Analysis 
 
Guideline C, Foreign Preference 
Under AG ¶ 9 the security concern involving foreign preference arises: “When an 
individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the 
United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions 
that are harmful to the interests of the United States.” 
AG ¶ 10 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying: I have specifically considered AG ¶ 10 (a) (“exercise of any right, privilege 
or obligation of foreign citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign 
citizenship of a family member”), including but not limited to (“possession of a current 
foreign passport”) and (b) (“action to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign 
citizenship by an American citizen”). Applicant applied for and obtained recognition of 
dual citizenship with Ireland while serving as a State Department employee. He retained 
an Irish passport from 1991 until 2008. I find both disqualifying conditions apply. 
I have considered all the mitigating conditions applicable to this guideline. 
Specifically I have considered AG ¶ 11 (a) (“dual citizenship is based solely on parents’ 
citizenship or birth in a foreign country”); (b) (“the individual has expressed a willingness 
to renounce dual citizenship”) and (e) (“the passport has been destroyed, surrendered 
to the cognizant security authority, or otherwise invalidated”). Applicant’s dual 
citizenship status is based on his affirmative actions to be recognized as a citizen of 
Ireland. I find (a) does not apply. Applicant provided a document to support his 
renunciation of his dual citizenship status with Ireland. He stated he was required to 
relinquish his passport. He did not provide documentation to show that he actually did 
relinquish it. However, under the circumstances I find it is likely he did relinquish it.115 
Therefore, I find (b) and (e) apply. 
111 Directive ¶ E3.1.15. 
 
112 ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).  
 
113 See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).  
 
114 Egan, 484 U.S. at 531; See AG ¶ 2(b). 
 
115 It is troubling that Applicant applied for and retained dual citizenship while serving in high level 
positions in the State Department and did not advise or request permission from his superiors prior to 
 
26 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Guideline K, Handling Protected Information 
 AG ¶ 33 expresses the security concern pertaining to handling protected 
information: “Deliberate or negligent failure to comply with rules and regulations for 
protecting classified or other sensitive information raises doubt about an individual’s 
trustworthiness, judgment, reliability, or willingness and ability to safeguard such 
information, and is a serious security concern.” 
 
 AG ¶ 34 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying. I have specifically considered (a) (“deliberate or negligent disclosure of 
classified or other protected information to unauthorized persons, including but not 
limited to personal or business contacts, to the media, or to persons present at 
seminars, meetings, or conferences”); (c) (“loading, drafting, editing, modifying, storing, 
transmitting, or otherwise handling classified reports, data, or other information on any 
unapproved equipment including but not limited to any typewriter, word processor, or 
computer hardware, software, drive, system, gameboard, handheld, “palm” or pocket 
device or other adjunct equipment”); (e) (“copying classified or other protected 
information in a manner designed to conceal or remove classification or other 
documents control markings”); (g) (“any failure to comply with rules for the protection of 
classified or other sensitive information”); (h) (“negligence or lax security habits that 
persist despite counseling by management”) and (i) (“failure to comply with rules or 
regulations that results in damage to the National Security, regardless of whether it was 
deliberate or negligent”). 
 
 Applicant has a long documented history of security violations and infractions. 
His irresponsible attitude toward protecting classified information existed from 1978 to 
1994. It then remained dormant for a period of years until it escalated to deliberately 
disregarding security rules and regulations for protecting classified information. His 
attempt to minimize and mitigate his actions during the early period by explaining he 
was working for a difficult supervisor, was under a great deal of stress, or had a busy 
office and was interrupted by someone, is without merit. The repetitive security 
infractions and violations denote a lack of regard for the importance of his duties with 
regard to protecting classified information. He was repeatedly counseled about his 
conduct after each infraction or violation and received not one, but two suspensions 
without pay for his actions. 
 
Applicant has held increasingly more responsible and prestigious jobs in the 
State Department. With those important promotions came a higher degree of trust, 
responsibility and access to classified material and awareness of security rules. 
Perhaps his earlier infractions and violations could have been mitigated by time, but 
instead Applicant escalated his irresponsible attitude and lack of adherence to the rules, 
by deliberately downloading a “SECRET” document from a classified computer, placing 
the information on a disc and then removing the “SECRET” classification markings, and 
emailing it on an unclassified computer to Officer B, without first confirming if Officer B 
 
obtaining this status. He acknowledged it was likely that he provided information about his dual 
citizenship years later when he provided this information during a routine update.  
 
27 
 
 
still retained a security clearance. He does not know what happened to the disc on 
which the classified document was downloaded, as he gave it to his assistant. He 
acknowledged his wrongful actions. Applicant’s access to SCI was denied due to 
security concerns and security violations. It was also determined that the information 
was to be used at a conference where foreign nationals were present. Applicant 
acknowledged that this document is the type that contained the ”U.S. position of current 
events in the country”, “a suggested way forward”, “next step in the key elements and 
assumptions”, “engagement strategy” and an annex with a time line. 
 
 Applicant was in a high level position of trust and responsibility during his last job 
with the State Department and then when he became a contracted employee with the 
same command. He was responsible for ensuring FN D did not have access to 
classified information. His abdication of his ultimate responsibility to ensure FN D did 
not have any access to classified information is confirmed. His denial that he did not 
know FN D had access to classified information is not believable. The overwhelming 
evidence is that he was actively involved with FN D at many levels. He received weekly 
updates from FN D that showed FN D had access to classified material. I find Applicant 
was an active participant in the process that violated the security rules. I find Applicant 
was personally, deliberately and intimately involved and aware that FN D had access to 
classified information. I find Applicant knowingly and deliberately permitted FN D access 
to classified information. His testimony with regard to this issue was evasive and not 
believable. His attempt at passing all responsibility onto COS is also not believable. I 
also find that, even if one were to believe the facts as presented by Applicant, he merely 
gave the order and then was totally unaware that FN D continued having access to 
classified information. He never noticed weekly summaries or point papers to the 
contrary, or never heard complaints from his subordinates. Even if viewed in the most 
favorable position to Applicant, he did not act responsibly as FN D’s supervisor to 
ensure all classified material was protected. Even if Applicant were to be believed that 
he did not know what was going on, at some point, COS addressed the situation with 
him and he did not take appropriate action. He basically ignored all information that 
there was something terribly wrong happening.  
 
I find Applicant’s actions as noted above were deliberate and negligent. I find (a), 
(c), (e), (g), and (h) all apply. Although there was evidence that classified material was 
compromised there was no direct evidence that National Security was breached, and 
therefore (i) does not apply.  
 
 I have considered all of the mitigating conditions applicable to this guideline. 
Specifically I have considered AG ¶ 35(a) (“so much time has elapsed since the 
behavior, or it has happened so infrequently or under such unusual circumstances, that 
it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual currently reliability, 
trustworthiness, or good judgment”); (b) (“the individual responded favorably to 
counseling or remedial security training and now demonstrates a positive attitude 
toward the discharge of security responsibilities”) and (c) (“the security violations were 
due to improper or inadequate training”). Applicant has a history of security violations 
starting in 1978. He had 21 security violations and infractions from 1978 to 1994. He 
 
28 
 
 
admitted he was counseled about the violations. He received two suspensions without 
pay. He then committed two very serious violations, one deliberately changing 
classification markings on a classified document and transmitting it on an unclassified 
computer to a person he had not verified as retaining a security clearance and another 
event where he allowed a person to have access to classified information for a 
significant period of time, after his security clearance was revoked. Applicant has 
exhibited a 28-year history of security violations that escalated in seriousness and 
ultimately compromised classified information. Despite counseling and suspension his 
attitude did not change. He has not demonstrated a positive attitude toward the 
discharge of security responsibilities, but rather has ignored his own personal 
accountability and abdicated and abused his supervisory responsibilities. It is 
undeniable that Applicant has had a prestigious and successful career serving his 
country, and that he is respected and admired for his experience and aptitude. 
However, there is also a prevalent and troubling attitude and disregard for the 
importance of following security rules, even at the highest levels, in essence that the 
“end justifies the means”, which is dangerous when one has a duty to protect classified 
information and is in a high position of trust and authority. He has repeatedly reflected 
irresponsible conduct and has been personally responsible for security violations. I find 
none of the mitigating conditions apply. 
 
Guideline E, Personal Conduct 
AG ¶ 15 expresses the security concern pertaining to personal conduct: “Conduct 
involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply 
with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual's reliability, 
trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. Of special interest is any 
failure to provide truthful and candid answers during the security clearance process or 
any other failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.”  
AG ¶ 16 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying. I have specifically considered (b) (“deliberately providing false or 
misleading information concerning relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security 
official, competent medical authority, or other official government representative”) and 
(e) (“personal conduct, or concealment of information about one’s conduct, that creates 
a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress, such as (1) engaging in activities 
which, if known, may affect the person’s personal, professional, or community 
standing…”). Applicant admitted that he viewed and downloaded sexually explicit 
images and permitted a guest to access sexually explicit websites on a government-
issued computer. He stated he believed the government-issued computer was for his 
personal use. Based on all of the evidence I did not find his statements believable. The 
computer had a pop-up government banner warning about its proper use. Other 
evidence presented at his hearing showed he was aware that he was using a 
government-issued computer, but he attempts to mitigate his actions by explaining he 
was only using it at his residence. He acknowledged he was embarrassed by his 
actions. I find (e) applies with regard to his actions of viewing and downloading sexually 
 
29 
 
 
explicit images and websites and allowing his guest to inappropriately use a 
government-issued computer.  
Applicant denied he falsified material facts when he told the OPM investigator 
that he could not recall suffering any disciplinary actions as a result of his past security 
violations. At first during his interview with the OPM investigator he denied any security 
violations, but then later mentioned he had some earlier in his career. It is simply 
inconceivable that he would “not recall” that he was suspended without pay twice, once 
for sixteen days and again for ten days. These disciplinary actions are extraordinary 
events in one’s professional life, and Applicant’s assertion that he could “not recall” is 
simply not believable. He was asked about any disciplinary consequences in his past 
and could not recall any. Even if he believed he only had to divulge disciplinary actions 
regarding security violations, he failed to do so. Even if he only believed he had to 
divulge disciplinary actions within the past five years, he did not divulge his suspension 
for misuse of a government-issued computer in 2004. Applicant did not dispute the 
OPM investigator’s testimony; he simply could not recall or recollect what had occurred. 
I found her testimony credible. I find Applicant deliberately provided false and 
misleading information about his past violations, both security-related and otherwise, 
and his past disciplinary actions. Therefore, I find (b) applies. 
 With regard to SOR ¶ 2.c, Applicant provided a written response to DON CAF 
denying his involvement in allowing an employee (FN D) access to classified 
information. I have found, based on the entire record, that Applicant knowingly and 
intentionally allowed FN D access to classified information and the computer system. 
My analysis is provided above. Therefore, I find (b) applies.  
 The guideline also includes examples of conditions that could mitigate the 
security concerns arising under personal conduct. I have considered all of them and 
especially considered AG ¶17 (a) (“the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to 
correct the omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the 
facts”); (c) (“the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so 
infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur 
and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good 
judgment”); (d) (“the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling 
to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, 
circumstances, or factors that caused the untrustworthy, unreliable, or other 
inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur”); (e) (“the individual has 
taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or 
duress”) and (f) (“the information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable 
reliability”). Applicant’s testimony throughout the proceeding was troubling. On one hand 
he denied providing false statements. On the other hand he could not recall any of the 
pertinent parts of the interview with the OPM investigator, yet he could recall why he 
decided he did not have to divulge certain negative incidents in his past. I found the 
OPM investigator’s testimony credible. I found Applicant’s testimony was not credible. I 
find none of the mitigating conditions apply. 
 
30 
 
 
Guideline M, Use of Information Technology Systems 
 AG ¶ 39 expresses the security concern pertaining to use of information 
technology systems: “Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines, or regulations, 
pertaining to information technology systems may raise security concerns about an 
individual’s reliability and trustworthiness, calling into question the willingness or ability 
to properly protect sensitive systems, networks, and information. Information 
Technology Systems include all related computer hardware, software, firmware, and 
date used for the communication, transmission, processing, manipulation, storage, or 
protection of information.” 
 AG ¶ 40 describes conditions that could raise security concerns and may be 
disqualifying. I have considered all of them and especially considered (d) (“downloading, 
storing, or transmitting classified information on or to any unauthorized software, 
hardware, or information technology system”); (e) (“unauthorized use of a government 
or other information technology system”); (g) (“negligence or lax security habits in 
handling information technology that persist despite counseling by management”); and 
(h) (“any misuse of information technology, whether deliberate or negligent, that results 
in damage to the national security”). The allegations in SOR ¶¶ 1.b and 2.a are cross 
alleged under Guideline K, handling protected information, and Guideline E, personal 
conduct. The facts and analysis are the same as addressed above. Applicant admitted 
he deliberated removed “SECRET” markings from a document and emailed it on an 
unclassified computer to a person he had not verified had a security clearance. He put 
the document on a disc, but did not provide information as to the disc’s whereabouts 
other than to say he gave it to his assistant. In addition, he admitted he inappropriately 
downloaded sexually explicitly material on his government-issued computer and 
permitted a house guest to do the same. I find (d) and (g) apply. I find (h) does not apply 
under these facts as there is no evidence of damage to national security.  
 I have considered all of the mitigating conditions under this guideline. Specifically 
I have considered AG ¶ 41(a) (“so much time has elapsed since the behavior 
happened, or it happened under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur 
and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good 
judgment”); (b) (“the misuse was minor and done only in the interest of organizational 
efficiency and effectiveness, such as letting another person use one’s password or 
computer when no other timely alternative was readily available”) and (c) (“the conduct 
was unintentional or inadvertent and was followed by a prompt good-faith effort to 
correct the situation and by notification of supervisor”). Applicant made a deliberate and 
conscious decision to violate the security rules and download, copy, change 
classification markings and transmit classified information over an unclassified computer 
and internet based system. His behavior is recent and considering his present and past 
history of violating security rules and misusing information technology, I find it casts 
doubt on his reliability, trustworthiness and good judgment. His actions in deliberately 
violating security rules and also his actions of misusing a government-issued computer 
to download sexually explicit material and allow his guest to do the same are not minor. 
Even taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Applicant regarding his misuse of 
 
31 
 
 
a government-issued computer, when asked how soon after he became aware the 
government had discovered his violation did he speak with his guest, Applicant stated: “I 
really don’t remember how soon it was.” He then was asked if it would have been 
immediately. He responded “No, I don’t think it would have been immediately, but I 
really don’t recall.” His conduct and response is troubling. He did not take prompt 
corrective action regarding his guest’s misuse of a government-issued computer. I find 
none of the mitigating conditions apply. 
Whole Person Concept 
 
 Under the whole person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an 
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s 
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine 
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): “(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness 
of the conduct; (2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include 
knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the 
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to which 
participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other 
permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the conduct; (8) the potential for 
pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or 
recurrence.” Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility 
for a security clearance must be an overall common sense judgment based upon 
careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept.        
 
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all 
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant has a long and 
distinguished career with the State Department and has the support of high ranking 
officers. His loyalty and devotion to the mission is not in question. He has received 
regular promotions and served at some of the highest and most prestigious positions in 
our government. He is admired for his unique skills by those for whom he has worked. 
Among those who provided character statements, he is revered for his work ethic, his 
knowledge and unquestionable loyalty to the United States.  
 
Applicant has a long history of negligent and deliberate security infractions and 
violations, beginning early in his career in 1978 and continuing intermittently throughout 
his career. Some security violations were intentional, serious, involved knowledgeable 
participation and occurred after Applicant was trained on security matters. He received 
two periods of suspension without pay for his security violations from 1978 to 1990. In 
2001 to 2003, he intentionally accessed sexually explicit websites and downloaded 
images on his government-issued computer and allowed his guest to do the same. He 
was counseled and suspended without pay for a ten-day period in 2004 for this offense. 
In 2005, Applicant knowingly and intentionally permitted a foreign national whose 
security clearance was revoked and for whom he had direct supervision, continued 
access to classified information. He intentionally bypassed security rules and abdicated 
his supervisory responsibilities. In 2006, Applicant again deliberately and intentionally 
violated the security rules by personally downloading a classified secret document from 
 
32 
 
 
a classified computer, removing the secret classification markings, then transmitting it 
on an unclassified computer through the internet to a recipient that he never verified 
prior to sending the document, was authorized access to classified information. 
Applicant was a mature and experienced senior official at the time these more recent 
security violations occurred and when he was officially disciplined for his actions 
regarding his government-issued computer.  
 
Applicant was interviewed by an OPM investigator as part of his security 
clearance update and was asked about any prior disciplinary actions he may have had. 
He knowingly and intentionally failed to fully divulge the extent of his prior conduct or the 
official disciplinary actions and punishment he received. His testimony at his hearing 
was untruthful, repeatedly evasive, and lacked candor. He claimed he could not recall 
many of the specific and pertinent facts regarding incidents he was personally involved 
in. I have carefully considered all of the evidence and testimony presented at the 
hearing. I have considered the candor and directness of each witness, as well as their 
specific testimony. I have considered the nine adjudicative factors when analyzing the 
whole person and how they specifically related to Applicant. Based on all of the 
evidence and my analysis above, the record leaves me with serious questions and 
doubts as to Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these 
reasons, I conclude Applicant failed to mitigate the security concerns arising from 
handing protected information, use of information technology and personal conduct. 
Applicant has mitigated the security concerns arising from foreign preference.  
 
Formal Findings 
 
 Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR, 
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are: 
 
 Paragraph 1, Guideline K:    AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 1.a:    Against Applicant 
  Subparagraph 1.b:    Against Applicant 
  Subparagraph 1.c:    Against Applicant 
  Subparagraph 1.d:    Against Applicant 
 
 Paragraph 2, Guideline E:    AGAINST APPLICANT 
   
  Subparagraph 2.a:    Against Applicant 
  Subparagraph 2.b:    Against Applicant 
  Subparagraph 2.c:    Against Applicant 
 
 Paragraph 3, Guideline M:    AGAINST APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 3.a:    Against Applicant 
  Subparagraph 3.b:    Against Applicant 
 
 
33 
 
 
 Paragraph 4, Guideline C:    FOR APPLICANT 
 
  Subparagraph 4.a:    For Applicant 
  Subparagraph 4.b:    For Applicant 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In light of all of the circumstances it is not clearly consistent with national security 
to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified 
information is denied. 
 
 
                                                     
_____________________________ 
Carol G. Ricciardello 
Administrative Judge