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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
         
            
In the matter of: )
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------------------------ )       ISCR Case No. 08-05497
SSN: ---------------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Daniel F. Crowley, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro se
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Decision
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LYNCH, Noreen A., Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted his Security Clearance Application (SF 86) on June 29, 2006.
On August 13, 2008, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the basis for its preliminary decision to deny him
application, citing security concerns under Guidelines B (Foreign Influence) and C
(Foreign Preference). The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the revised adjudicative
guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and effective
within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on August 25, 2008; answered it on
the same day; and requested a hearing before an administrative judge. The case was
assigned to me on September 9, 2008.  DOHA issued a notice of hearing on September
16, 2008. I convened the hearing as scheduled on October 16, 2008. Government
Exhibits (GX) 1 and 2 were admitted in evidence without objection. Applicant testified on
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his own behalf, and presented the testimony of one witness. Applicant submitted Exhibits
(AX) A-C, which were admitted without objection. DOHA received the transcript of the
hearing (Tr.) on October 22, 2008.  Eligibility for access to classified information is
granted.
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice
of certain facts relating to Israel (Tr. 9). The request and the attached documents are
included in the record as Hearing Exhibit I. Hence, the facts administratively noticed are
limited to matters not subject to reasonable dispute. The facts administratively noticed
are set out in the Findings of Facts, below.
Findings of Fact
In his answer to the SOR, Applicant admitted the factual allegations in ¶¶ 1.a, 1.b,
1.c, 1.d, and ¶¶ 2.a, 2.b, and 2.c. His admissions in his answer to the SOR and at the
hearing are incorporated in my findings of fact.  I make the following findings:
Applicant is a 31-year-old man. He has been employed as an information
specialist with a defense contractor since October 2005. He is regarded by his employer
as a valuable asset to the company. Applicant may be involved in certain projects that
require a security clearance (AX A).
Applicant was born in Israel and moved to the United States (U.S) when he was
nine months old (Tr. 11). He graduated from high school in 1993. He graduated from
college in 2000. After college, he worked in his area of expertise. He completed his
Master’s degree in 2005 (Tr. 29). 
Applicant’s parents are divorced and living in the U.S. His father is a naturalized
U.S. citizen. His mother was born in the U.S. They were married in Israel. Applicant has
one brother (Tr. 34). While growing up in the U.S., Applicant visited Israel with his
parents on a few occasions (Tr. 40). 
Applicant’s extended family from his father’s side (an aunt and cousins) live in
Israel. Applicant’s cousins are citizens and residents of Israel. (Tr. 35).  He has little or
no communication with them. He visited with them on past trips to Israel for
approximately one hour (Tr. 36).
In 2003, Applicant studied in Israel for a period of approximately three months.
The program involved American students who wanted to learn more about their religion.
In 2004, Applicant attended the short program again (Tr. 38). This program is funded by
philanthropists.
In March 2005, Applicant married. His wife was born in Israel to American
parents. Her parents emigrated to Israel and returned to the U.S. after a few years. She
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has extended family in Israel. Her grandparents are there and she communicates with
them a few times a year. Her grandfather has a private importing business (Tr. 37). 
After his marriage, Applicant visited Israel with his wife. They stayed with his
wife’s grandparents and also in hotels in the country. The visit was a wedding trip (10
days) and an opportunity to visit his wife’s grandparents (Tr. 38).  
In December 2007, Applicant told a security investigator he maintained dual
citizenship because it makes it easier to travel to and from Israel. At that time, he had a
valid Israeli passport that would expire in May 2016. Applicant used that passport when
he traveled to Israel. He explained that due to Israeli law he had a passport so that he
could enter and exit the country in previous times (AE A). He had renewed his passport
in 2006 so that he could travel with his wife.
In September 2008, Applicant surrendered his Israeli passport to the Israeli
Consulate to be invalidated (AE B). He wrote to the consulate and initiated the process
of formal renunciation of his Israeli citizenship. The passport is stamped “cancelled.”
Applicant was candid and straightforward at the hearing. He has no plans to visit
Israel and if he does it will be on a U.S. passport. He has no property in Israel. He has
never voted in an Israeli election nor has he served in their military (Tr. 47). 
Applicant’s manager praised Applicant for his exemplary work. He hired Applicant
as an intern in 2002 and has known him for several years. Applicant has a very strong
work ethic, and holds himself to a high standard and takes responsibility for his duties.
Applicant’s manager traveled with Applicant for work and conferences and attested to his
loyalty. He recommends him for a security clearance without reservation (Tr. 24). 
I take administrative notice of the following facts about Israel.  Israel is a1
parliamentary democracy with a diversified, technologically advanced economy. Almost
half of Israel’s exports are high technology, including electronic and biomedical
equipment. The U.S. is Israel’s largest trading partner. Israel has been identified as a
major practitioner of industrial espionage against U.S. companies. Israel generally
respects the rights of its citizens. When human rights violations have occurred, they have
involved Palestinian detainees or Arab-Israelis. Terrorist suicide bombings are a
continuing threat in Israel, and U.S. citizens are advised to be cautious. The U.S. and
Israel have close cultural, historic, and political ties. They participate in joint military
planning and training, and have collaborated on military research and weapons
development. Commitment to Israel’s security has been a cornerstone of U.S. Middle
East policy since Israel’s creation in 1948.
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Policies
“[N]o one has a ‘right’ to a security clearance.”  Department of the Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  As Commander in Chief, the President has “the authority to . .
. control access to information bearing on national security and to determine whether an
individual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position . . . that will give that person
access to such information.”  Id. at 527.  The President has authorized the Secretary of
Defense or his designee to grant applicants eligibility for access to classified information
“only upon a finding that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.”  Exec.
Or. 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry § 2 (Feb. 20, 1960), as
amended and modified.  
Eligibility for a security clearance is predicated upon the applicant meeting the
criteria contained in the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG).  These guidelines are not
inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the complexities of human behavior, these
guidelines are applied in conjunction with an evaluation of the whole person. An
administrative judge’s over-arching adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common
sense decision. An administrative judge must consider all available, reliable information
about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable.
The government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in persons with
access to classified information.  This relationship transcends normal duty hours and
endures throughout off-duty hours.  Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the
possible risk the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard
classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible
extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified
information.
Clearance decisions must be “in terms of the national interest and shall in no
sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the applicant concerned.”  See Exec. Or.
10865 § 7. Thus, a decision to deny a security clearance is not necessarily a
determination as to the loyalty of the applicant.  It is merely an indication the applicant
has not met the strict guidelines the President and the Secretary of Defense have
established for issuing a clearance
Initially, the government must establish, by substantial evidence, conditions in the
personal or professional history of the applicant that may disqualify the applicant from
being eligible for access to classified information.  The government has the burden of
establishing controverted facts alleged in the SOR.  See Egan, 484 U.S. at 531.
“Substantial evidence” is “more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.”  See v.
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 36 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 1994).  The guidelines
presume a nexus or rational connection between proven conduct under any of the
criteria listed therein and an applicant’s security suitability.  See ISCR Case No. 95-0611
at 2 (App. Bd. May 2, 1996).  
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Once the government establishes a disqualifying condition by substantial
evidence, the burden shifts to the applicant to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the
facts.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating that it
is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security clearance.”
ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).  “[S]ecurity clearance
determinations should err, if they must, on the side of denials.”  Egan, 484 U.S. at 531;
see AG ¶ 2(b). 
Analysis
Guideline B (Foreign Influence)
The SOR alleges Applicant’s extended family members are citizens and residents
of Israel. (SOR ¶ 2.a). It also alleges Applicant’s wife’s relatives in Israel are U.S. citizens
(¶ 2.b). Finally, it alleges Applicant traveled to lsrael to study in 2003, 2004, and 2006 (¶
2.c).  The security concern relating to Guideline B is set out in AG ¶ 6 as follows: 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
A disqualifying condition may be raised by “contact with a foreign family member,
business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident
in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation,
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.”  AG ¶ 7(a).  A disqualifying condition
also may be raised by “connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country
that creates a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect
sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person,
group, or country by providing that information.”  AG ¶ 7(b).  Finally, a security concern
may be raised if an applicant is “sharing living quarters with a person or persons,
regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion”  AG ¶ 7(d). Applicant’s wife was born
in Israel of American parents, and she has family in Israel. Applicant’s extended family
lives in Israel and they are citizens of Israel. Based on this evidence, AG ¶¶ 7(a), (b),
and (d) are raised.
Since the government produced evidence to raise the disqualifying conditions in
AG ¶¶ 7(a), (b), and (d), the burden shifted to Applicant to produce evidence to rebut,
explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts.  Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  An applicant has the
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burden of proving a mitigating condition, and the burden of disproving it never shifts to
the government.  See ISCR Case No. 02-31154 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep. 22, 2005).  
Security concerns under this guideline can be mitigated by showing that “the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of
the U.S.”  AG ¶ 8(a).  The totality of an applicant’s family ties to a foreign country as well
as each individual family tie must be considered.  ISCR Case No. 01-22693 at 7 (App.
Bd. Sep. 22, 2003). Similarly, AG 8© “contact or communication with foreign citizens is
so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign
influence or exploitation.” Applicant has contacts with extended family members living in
Israel and through his wife to her family in Israel so that these two mitigating conditions
cannot be fully applied.
Guideline B is not limited to countries hostile to the United States.  “The United
States has a compelling interest in protecting and safeguarding classified information
from any person, organization, or country that is not authorized to have access to it,
regardless of whether that person, organization, or country has interests inimical to those
of the United States.”  ISCR Case No. 02-11570 at 5 (App. Bd. May 19, 2004). 
Furthermore, friendly nations can have profound disagreements with the United
States over matters they view as important to their vital interests or national security.
Finally, we know friendly nations have engaged in espionage against the United States,
especially in the economic, scientific, and technical fields.  See ISCR Case No. 00-0317,
2002 DOHA LEXIS 83 at **15-16 (App. Bd. Mar. 29, 2002).  Nevertheless, the nature of
a nation’s government, its relationship with the U.S., and its human rights record are
relevant in assessing the likelihood that an applicant’s family members are vulnerable to
government coercion. The risk of coercion, persuasion, or duress is significantly greater
if the foreign country has an authoritarian government, a family member is associated
with or dependent upon the government, or the country is known to conduct intelligence
operations against the U.S.
Security concerns under this guideline also can be mitigated by showing “there is
no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the
foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such
deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be
expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest.” All members of
Applicant’s immediate family are U.S. citizens and live in the U.S. AG ¶ 8(b).Applicant
has lived in the U.S. his entire life. He received his education in the U.S. He has visited
Israel a few times in his lifetime. He has his family and property in the U.S. His career is
in the U.S.  Applicant’s testimony at the hearing showed his willingness to sever his ties
to Israel. As such, his testimony supported this mitigating condition. 
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Guideline C (Foreign Preference)
The SOR alleges Applicant, born a U.S. citizen, has dual citizenship with Israel (¶
1.a), possessed an Israeli passport in June 2006 that would expire in May 2016 (¶ 2.b),
used his Israeli passport for travel to Israel (¶ 2.c), and applied for an Israeli passport in
2006 even though he was a U.S. citizen by reason of birth in the U.S.(¶ 2.d). The
concern under this guideline is set out in AG ¶ 9 as follows: “When an individual acts in
such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then
he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the
interests of the United States.”  
Dual citizenship standing alone is not sufficient to warrant an adverse security
clearance decision.  ISCR Case No. 99-0454 at 5, 2000 WL 1805219 (App. Bd. Oct. 17,
2000).  Under Guideline C, “the issue is not whether an applicant is a dual national, but
rather whether an applicant shows a preference for a foreign country through actions.”
ISCR Case No. 98-0252 at 5 (App. Bd. Sep 15, 1999).
A disqualifying condition may arise from “exercise of any right, privilege or
obligation of foreign citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen,” including but not limited to
“possession of a current foreign passport.”  AG ¶ 10(a)(1). Applicant possessed an
Israeli passport prior to the hearing and traveled to Israel on that passport. AG ¶ 10(a)(1)
is not established because Applicant surrendered the passport in September 2008.
Thus, Applicant does not have a “current foreign passport.”    
Nevertheless, the record established, as noted above, that Applicant exercised his
Israeli citizenship by using his Israeli passport on numerous occasions. The disqualifying
condition under AG ¶ 10(a) is raised, even though none of the illustrative examples are
applicable. The burden shifted to Applicant to rebut, explain, mitigate, or extenuate the
facts.  Several mitigating conditions are potentially relevant.
Security concerns under this guideline may be mitigated by evidence that “dual
citizenship is based solely on parents’ citizenship or birth in a foreign country.”  AG ¶
11(a).  This mitigating condition does not apply in this case.
Security concerns under this guideline also may be mitigated if “the individual has
expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship.”  AG ¶ 11(b).  Applicant has written
to the consulate and initiated the process of renouncing his dual citizenship. His
testimony was sincere and credible on this issue. AG ¶ 11(e) “the passport has been
destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security authority, or otherwise is invalidated”
applies because the passport was surrendered or invalidated by the Consulate.
Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, an administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
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conduct and all the circumstances. An administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a): 
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a
security clearance must be an overall common sense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept.  Some of the factors in
AG ¶ 2(a) were addressed above, but some warrant additional comment.
There are significant factors supporting the approval of Applicant’s access to
classified information. Applicant is a mature, well-educated, and very intelligent adult. He
loves his family and is proud of his culture and heritage. He is a U.S. citizen who
received his education in the U.S. and lived his entire life in the U.S. his employment and
investments are in the U.S.`  He has a longstanding loyalty to the U.S. Although his
spouse was born in Israel, his immediate family lives in the U.S. and are U.S. citizens.
His employer praises Applicant for his diligence and dedication. Israel is a longtime U.S.
ally. I do not believe he is a threat to the United States, but rather an honest, hard-
working young man.
Applicant was born in Israel and was a dual citizen by birth. He had an Israeli
passport which he used when traveled to Israel in 2003, 2004 and 2006. However, he
has surrendered the passport and it is invalid. He has initiated the process of renouncing
his Israeli citizenship. He has mitigated the foreign preference security concerns by his
recent actions.
After weighing the disqualifying and mitigating conditions under Guidelines B and
C, and evaluating all the evidence in the context of the whole person, I conclude
Applicant has mitigated the security concerns based on foreign influence and foreign
preference. Accordingly, I conclude he has carried his burden of showing that it is clearly
consistent with the national interest to grant him eligibility for access to classified
information.
Formal Findings
I make the following formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set
forth in the SOR, as required by Directive ¶ E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3:
Paragraph 1, Foreign Preference: FOR APPLICANT
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Subparagraphs 1.a-1.d: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Foreign Influence: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraphs 2.a-1.c: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                              
Noreen A. Lynch
Administrative Judge