KEYWORD: Guideline F; Guideline E
DIGEST: Applicant’s claim that his due process rights were compromised by his self-
representation, the record demonstrates that Applicant received detailed pre-hearing guidance
from DOHA explaining his rights and was advised of his right to employ counsel, or to have
some other person represent him at the hearing; his right to present evidence and witnesses; his
right to cross examine witnesses against him; and his right to object to evidence.  A review of the
entire record discloses no basis to conclude that Applicant was denied the rights due him under
the Directive or that he had not been adequately advised of those rights.. Having decided to
represent himself during the proceedings below, Applicant cannot fairly complain about the
quality of his self-representation or seek to be relieved of the consequences of his decision to
represent himself.  Adverse decision affirmed. 
CASENO: 07-09842.a1
DATE: 12/10/2008
DATE: December 10, 2008
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 07-09842
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
The Judge’s favorable findings under Guideline F and under paragraphs 2(f) and 2(g) of Guideline E are not1
at issue in this appeal.  
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Braden M. Murphy, Esq., Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Bruce B. Elfvin, Esq.
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On February 12, 2008, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant
of the basis for that decision–security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations)
and Guideline E (Personal Conduct) of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended)
(Directive).  Applicant requested a hearing.  On July 31, 2008, after the hearing, Administrative
Judge Shari Dam denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Applicant filed a timely appeal
pursuant to Directive ¶¶  E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issues on appeal: whether Applicant, who acted pro se at the
hearing, was denied due process; whether the Judge erred in her application of the pertinent
Guideline E mitigating conditions; and whether the Judge’s whole-person analysis was erroneous.1
Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the Judge.  
The Judge made the following pertinent findings of fact: Applicant is a former Air Force
member who is currently employed by a federal contractor.  He “has a history of arrests, many of
which involved alcohol.”  Decision at 2.  In 1981, 1985, 1987, and 1998 he was arrested and charged
with Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol (DUI).  In 1987, he was arrested and charged with
failure to control his vehicle, following an automobile accident.  Additionally, in 1998 he was
arrested and charged with misdemeanor fraud for writing bad checks.  In 1987 and again in 1997
Applicant received inpatient treatment for alcohol dependence.  He has experienced financial
problems, which have resulted, among other things, in vehicle repossessions, a garnishment for child
support payments, and a discharge in Chapter 7 bankruptcy.  In 1995, and again in 2007, Applicant
filled out security clearance applications (SCA).  Applicant did not provide truthful answers to
questions concerning his criminal history, his alcohol dependence treatment, his bankruptcy, his
wage garnishment, and his vehicle repossessions.
The Board has considered the issues which Applicant has raised on appeal.  Concerning
Applicant’s claim that his due process rights were compromised by his self-representation, the record
demonstrates that Applicant received detailed pre-hearing guidance from DOHA explaining his
rights.  Among other things, he was advised of his right to employ counsel, or to have some other
person represent him at the hearing; his right to present evidence and witnesses; his right to cross
examine witnesses against him; and his right to object to evidence.  A review of the entire record
discloses no basis to conclude that Applicant was denied the rights due him under the Directive or
that he had not been adequately advised of those rights.  See Tr. at 4-6.  “Having decided to represent
himself during the proceedings below, Applicant cannot fairly complain about the quality of his self-
See, e.g., Government Exhibit 10, Statement of Subject, dated September14, 1996, in which Applicant2
attributed false statements on the 1995 SCA to having been advised by an unnamed person “that the information wouldn’t
be checked thoroughly.”  
See, e.g., Decision at 13-14:  “Despite several questions that sought adverse background information, he did3
not disclose any information about his criminal history, alcohol treatment, or financial problems.  He excused his
omissions by claiming all incidents fell outside a seven-year time period that he was told applied . . . [H]e maintained
that position, despite specific questions that used the word “ever” and did not mention seven years as a cut-off period
. . . His explanations for omitting information are neither credible nor persuasive . . . His explanations for his omissions
are disingenuous and unbelievable.  He knew or should have known (having gone through the same process ten years
earlier) that the Government was seeking all adverse information in his history.”  
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representation or seek to be relieved of the consequences of his decision to represent himself.”  ISCR
Case No. 02-08032 at 4 (App. Bd. May 14, 2004).  
To the extent that the remaining issues include a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the
Guideline E security concerns, the record demonstrates that the Judge’s conclusions were based upon
substantial record evidence.  See  Directive  ¶ E3.1.32.1.  (Substantial evidence is “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion in light of all the
contrary evidence in the same record.”) The Judge reasonably explained her conclusion that
Applicant’s answers to the questions at issue were deliberately false: e.g., that the questions were
clear in their meaning, that his testimony was evasive, and that he had made prior statements
inconsistent with his claim of innocent mistake.   Decision at 12.  Furthermore, the record2
demonstrates that the Judge considered appropriate mitigating conditions, holding in favor of
Applicant as to the Guideline F security concerns and two of the factual allegations under Guideline
E.  However, she concluded that Applicant had failed to meet his burden of persuasion as to the
remaining Guideline E allegations.  See Directive ¶ E3.1.15.  Viewed in light of the record as a
whole, this conclusion is sustainable.  The Judge’s whole-person analysis is also sustainable.   See3
ISCR Case No. 03-22861 at 2-3 (App. Bd. Jun. 2, 2006).  See also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the
United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)(quoting Burlington Truck
Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))  “The general standard is that a clearance may
be granted only when ‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’”  Department
of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  Accordingly, the Judge’s decision is neither
arbitrary, capricious, nor contrary to law. 
Order
The Judge’s adverse security clearance decision is AFFIRMED. 
Signed; Jean E. Smallin          
Jean E. Smallin
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
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Signed: William S. Fields          
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: James E. Moody            
James E. Moody
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board