KEYWORD: Guideline F
DIGEST: The challenged finding is based on substantial evidence.  Furthermore there is no
indication that the Judge drew any pejorative inferences from the finding.  Adverse decision
affirmed.
CASENO: 07-15804.a1
DATE: 12/29/2008
DATE: December 29, 2008
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 07-15804
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Pro Se
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On April 22, 2008, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant of
The Judge’s favorable findings as to SOR paragraphs 1(d), (g)-(k), (m), and (n) are not at issue on appeal.1
Decision at 3.2
Applicant’s Brief at 1.3
Transcript at 23.4
Decision at 10.5
Id.6
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the basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline F (Financial Considerations)
of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as amended) (Directive).  Applicant
requested a hearing.  On October 8, 2008, after the hearing, Administrative Judge Mark W. Harvey
denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.  Applicant timely appealed pursuant to the
Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s factual findings are
supported by substantial evidence; and whether the Judge’s adverse clearance decision under
Guideline F is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.1
Applicant contends that the Judge erred as to one of his findings of fact.  He also contends
that the Judge’s adverse decision should be reversed because the Judge did not give sufficient weight
to his mitigating evidence, which indicated that his financial problems resulted from the operation
of a business and were unlikely to recur.  Applicant has not demonstrated the Judge erred in his
findings or that his decision is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
(1) Applicant argues that it was factual error for the Judge to find that: “Because he was
passed over for promotion, the Army declined to accept him on active duty as a volunteer in 2001-
2002.”   Applicant claims that the erroneous finding demonstrates that the Judge failed to understand2
the distinguished nature of his military service.   The Board does not find this argument persuasive.3
The finding at issue is based upon Applicant’s own testimony at the hearing: “ . . . when I
tried to get back in, the Army said no, you’re a lame duck.  Because you’ve been passed over twice
for major, we won’t take you back in.”   The Judge did not appear to draw any pejorative inferences4
from that testimony insofar as the distinguished nature of Applicant’s military service was
concerned.  On the contrary, the Judge later noted in his decision that: “ . . . he is an honest, hard-
working employee, a good father, and patriot.  He is an honorable former Army officer.  I have no
doubt that he is loyal and would give his life for the United States.”   The Judge then went on to base5
his adverse decision on the security concerns raised by Applicant’s financial problems stating:
“Notwithstanding these positive attributes, he has not established his financial responsibility . . .”6
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support such7
a conclusion in light of all the contrary evidence in the same record.  Directive ¶ E3.1.32.1. “This is something less than
the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not
prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v. Federal Maritime
Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620, (1966).
“Applicant learned of the security significance of his delinquent debt when he received the SOR, and did not8
use the next five months to address his six delinquent SOR debts.  He made no real progress in resolving these six
delinquent SOR debts.”  Decision at 11.  
3
Accordingly, after reviewing the record, the Board concludes that the challenged finding is
based on substantial evidence,  or constitutes a reasonable characterization or inference that can be7
drawn from the record.  There is no record evidence that convinces the Board that, as regards his
military service, the Judge misconstrued Applicant’s hearing testimony.  Applicant has not identified
any harmful error likely to change the outcome of the case.  Considering the record evidence as a
whole, the Judge’s material findings of security concern are sustainable.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No.
06-21025 at 2 (App. Bd. Oct. 9, 2007).
(2) The presence of some mitigating evidence does not alone compel the Judge to make a
favorable security clearance decision.  As the trier of fact, the Judge has to weigh the evidence as a
whole and decide whether the favorable evidence outweighs the unfavorable evidence, or vice versa.
See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-10320 at 2 (App. Bd. Nov. 7, 2007).  An applicant’s disagreement with
the Judge’s weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the
evidence, is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in
a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-17409 at 3
(App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2007).
In this case, the Judge found that Applicant had a serious history of not meeting financial
obligations.  At the time of the hearing, Applicant still had significant outstanding debts, and was
still trying to resolve his financial problems.   In light of the foregoing, the Judge could reasonably8
conclude that Applicant’s financial problems were still ongoing.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 05-07747
at 2 (App. Bd. Jul. 3, 2007).  The Judge weighed the mitigating evidence offered by Applicant
against the seriousness of the disqualifying conduct and considered the possible application of
relevant conditions and factors.  He found in favor of Applicant as to several of the SOR allegations.
 However, he reasonably explained why the mitigating evidence was insufficient to overcome all of
the government’s security concerns.  The Board does not review a case de novo. The favorable
evidence cited by Applicant is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge’s decision is arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-11172 at 3 (App. Bd. Sep. 4, 2007).
After reviewing the record, the Board concludes that the Judge examined the relevant data and
articulated a satisfactory explanation for his decision, “including a ‘rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made.’” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States,
371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).   “The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when
‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484
4
U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  Therefore, the Judge’s ultimate unfavorable security clearance decision under
Guideline F is sustainable.
Order
The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Jeffrey D. Billett           
Jeffrey D. Billett
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: Michael D. Hipple           
Michael D. Hipple
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields        
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board