KEYWORD: Guideline E; Guideline J
DIGEST: The Judge weighed the mitigating evidence against the seriousness of the disqualifying
conduct.  The Judge found in favor of Applicant as to some of the allegations and reasonably
explained why the mitigating evidence was insufficient to overcome the security concerns raised
by others.  Adverse decision affirmed.
CASENO: 07-00463.a1
DATE: 01/12/2009
DATE: January 12, 2009
In Re:
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Applicant for Security Clearance
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ISCR Case No. 07-00463
APPEAL BOARD DECISION
APPEARANCES
FOR GOVERNMENT
James B. Norman, Esq., Chief Department Counsel
FOR APPLICANT
Alan V. Edmunds, Esq.
Applicant’s Brief at 5.1
Id.2
The Judge’s favorable findings as to SOR paragraphs 1(h)-(j) are not at issue on appeal.3
2
The Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) declined to grant Applicant a security
clearance.  On February 28, 2008, DOHA issued a statement of reasons (SOR) advising Applicant
of the basis for that decision—security concerns raised under Guideline E (Personal Conduct) and
Guideline J (Criminal Conduct) of Department of Defense Directive 5220.6 (Jan. 2, 1992, as
amended) (Directive).  Applicant requested a hearing.  On October 22, 2008, after the hearing,
Administrative Judge Roger C. Wesley denied Applicant’s request for a security clearance.
Applicant timely appealed pursuant to the Directive ¶¶ E3.1.28 and E3.1.30.
Applicant raised the following issue on appeal: whether the Judge’s adverse clearance
decision is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
Applicant contends that the Judge’s adverse decision should be reversed because the Judge
did not give sufficient weight to Applicant’s mitigating evidence.  Specially, he argues that, although
he falsified material facts in two interviews with a government investigator and in a signed sworn
statement, “[b]y the completion of the investigating process, [he] had made a good-faith effort to
correct earlier omissions.”   He also argues that the disqualifying conduct is not likely to recur in the1
future, and that “ . . . the threat of exploitation, manipulation, or duress ha[s] been greatly reduced.”2
Applicant has not demonstrated that the Judge decision is arbitrary, capricious or contrary to law.
The presence of some mitigating evidence does not alone compel the Judge to make a
favorable security clearance decision.  As the trier of fact, the Judge has to weigh the evidence as a
whole and decide whether the favorable evidence outweighs the unfavorable evidence, or vice versa.
See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-10320 at 2 (App. Bd. Nov. 7, 2007).  An applicant’s disagreement with
the Judge’s weighing of the evidence, or an ability to argue for a different interpretation of the
evidence, is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge weighed the evidence or reached conclusions in
a manner that is arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-17409 at 3
(App. Bd. Oct. 12, 2007).
In this case, the Judge weighed the mitigating evidence offered by Applicant against the
seriousness of the disqualifying conduct and considered the possible application of relevant
conditions and factors.  He found in favor of Applicant with respect to several of the SOR factual
allegations.   However, the Judge reasonably explained why the mitigating evidence was insufficient3
to overcome the government’s security concerns.  The Board does not review a case de novo.  The
favorable evidence cited by Applicant is not sufficient to demonstrate the Judge’s decision is
arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.  See, e.g., ISCR Case No. 06-11172 at 3 (App. Bd. Sep. 4,
2007).  After reviewing the record, the Board concludes that the Judge examined the relevant data
and articulated a satisfactory explanation for his decision, “including a ‘rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm
3
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States,
371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).  “The general standard is that a clearance may be granted only when
‘clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.’” Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484
U.S. 518, 528 (1988).  Therefore, the Judge’s ultimate unfavorable security clearance decision under
Guidelines E and J is sustainable.
Order
The decision of the Judge denying Applicant a security clearance is AFFIRMED.
Signed: Michael Y. Ra’anan      
Michael Y. Ra’anan
Administrative Judge
Chairman, Appeal Board
Signed: Jeffrey D. Billett           
Jeffrey D. Billett
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board
Signed: William S. Fields            
William S. Fields
Administrative Judge
Member, Appeal Board