1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 07-03204
SSN: )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Eric Borgstrom, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
______________
Decision
______________
HENRY, Mary E., Administrative Judge:
Based upon a review of the case file, pleadings, exhibits, and testimony,  I
conclude that Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
Applicant submitted his Security Clearance Application (SF 86), on September
27, 2007. On September 12, 2008, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals
(DOHA) issued a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the security concerns under
Guideline F for Applicant. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865,
Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended;
Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security
Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive), and the revised
adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and
effective within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant received the SOR, which he answered in writing on September 18,
2008. He requested a hearing before an administrative judge. DOHA received the
request on September 25, 2008. Department Counsel was prepared to proceed on
Response to SOR.1
GE 1 (Applicant’s security clearance application, dated September 27, 2007).2
Two brothers died in separate accidents in 1976. Tr. 56-57.3
2
October 9, 2008, and I received the case assignment on October 21, 2008. DOHA
issued a notice of hearing on November 10, 2008, and I convened the hearing as
scheduled on December 10, 2008. The government offered eight exhibits (GE), 1
through 8, which were received and admitted into evidence without objection. Applicant
and one witness testified on his behalf. He submitted seven exhibits (AE), A through G,
which were received and admitted into evidence without objection. In addition, the
government offered GE 9 and the Applicant offered two decisions by colleagues, which
are marked as Hearing Exhibit 1. These exhibits were admitted for administrative notice
purposes only. The record closed on December 10, 2008. DOHA received the transcript
of the hearing (Tr.) on December 16, 2008.
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings
Request for Administrative Notice
Department Counsel submitted a formal request that I take administrative notice
of certain facts relating to Taiwan. (Tr. 16.) The request and the attached documents
were not admitted into evidence, but were included in the record as GE 9. Applicant
submitted two recent decisions by DOHA administrative judges, who granted
clearances to individuals from Taiwan, which are marked as Hearing Exhibit 1, asked
that I take administrative notice of these decisions. (Tr. 38.) The facts administratively
noticed are set out in the Findings of Fact, below. 
Findings of Fact
In his Answer to the SOR, dated September 25, 2008, Applicant admitted the
factual allegations in the SOR, with explanations. He also provided additional
information to support his request for eligibility for a security clearance. After a thorough
and careful review of the pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, I make the following
findings of fact.1
Applicant, who is 50 years old, works as an engineer and technical staff person
for a Department of Defense contractor. He has worked for this contractor since 2003.2
Applicant, the youngest of six sons,  was born and raised in Taiwan. He3
graduated from a public Taiwanese university with a degree in mechanical engineering
in 1980. Upon his graduation, he served his legally required two years of duty in the
Taiwan military, performing administrative duties. He achieved the rank of sergeant and
received an honorable discharge. He did not hold a security clearance while in the
Under the laws of Taiwan, all male citizens are required to serve in the military. Tr. 49-50, 63.4
GE 1, supra note 2; AE A (Adoption Judgment); AE B (College transcript for adopted daughter); Tr. 42-44,5
51, 53-55.
Response to SOR; Tr. 46-48.6
GE 1, supra note 2; AE D (Information on brother’s employment with a private university); T.41-42, 44-45,7
48, 56-62, 64.
3
military. Two brothers also served in the Taiwan military as required by law. His third
brother was exempt from service because he did not meet the height requirement.4
In June 1983, Applicant married a Taiwanese woman. Shortly thereafter, they
immigrated to the United States (U.S.) and he entered graduate school. He completed a
master’s degree at a major U.S. university. He has worked in the U.S. at U.S.
companies since his graduation. He and his wife have two children, ages 16 and 14,
who are U.S. citizens by birth and reside in the U.S. He became a naturalized citizen in
1996. His wife is also a U.S. citizen. In 2002, they adopted his wife’s Taiwanese niece
under U.S. law to help her obtain a better education. In 2007, he and his wife divorced.
They have joint and shared physical custody of their two children. Since the divorce,
Applicant has had little contact with his adopted daughter (niece), who is a college
student, a Taiwan citizen and a permanent U.S. resident. She is now eligible for U.S.
citizenship and plans to apply for it.5
Applicant’s mother died in an earthquake in 1999. His father received injuries in
the same earthquake. His father died in 2007. In the last few years prior to his death,
Applicant’s father required extensive hospital care. Because of his father’s health
issues. Applicant visited his father five times between December 2003 and August
2007. Applicant returned to Taiwan for his father’s funeral in October 2007. Six weeks
after his father’s funeral, Applicant returned to Taiwan once more to sign papers
relinquishing any inheritance rights under his father’s estate. He saw his brothers during
these visits.6
Applicant’s three living brothers are citizens of and reside in Taiwan. One brother
works in fundraising for a private university in Taiwan. In November 2008, a second
brother retired, after 30 years, from his human resources job at a private company. His
retirement income comes from investments, not the Taiwanese government. His third
brother closed his fish farm. He now works for a private security company at desk
security for his residence. Applicant considers this brother semi-retired. Two brothers
are married and one is divorced. All three have children in Taiwan. His two sisters-in law
work for private companies. His brothers have not held political office or worked in a
government job. One brother has traveled to the U.S. to raise money for his university,
and while in the U.S., stayed one night with Applicant. Since his father died 15 months
ago, Applicant’s contacts with his older brother have declined to about twice a year. His
contacts with his other brothers are about twice a year. He has two aunts still alive and
living in Taiwan. He has not had any contact with them since leaving Taiwan in 1983.  7
Response to SOR; AE E; AE F; Tr. 46, 65.8
AE G (Retirement accounts); AE H (Deed); AE I (Deed); Tr. 56, 65, 67, 70.9
Tr. 19-27.10
Id. 42, 56, 70.11
22 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3316 12
4
Prior to his present employment, Applicant worked for two companies, which
required him to travel to Taiwan on business. Between January 2001 and October 2003,
Applicant made nine business trips to Taiwan. He traveled on his U.S. passport, which
he has used for international travel since becoming a U.S. citizen.8
Applicant does not have any financial interest in Taiwan. All his financial interests
are in the U.S. He owns a house, valued at $500,000, and an investment property,
valued at $600,000. His debt on both properties totals $530,000. He also has a 401K
account and another retirement account, with a total value of approximately $170,000.
He pays his taxes every year and has voted in every U.S. election since becoming a
citizen. He does not provide any financial support to his brothers in Taiwan.  9
Applicant’s department manager and former direct supervisor testified on his
behalf. He describes Applicant as a conscientious, committed, motivated, honest, and
intelligent worker with a very good work ethic. Applicant is an excellent performer with
unique skills. The witness indicated that their work group does not normally handle
classified information, but must test the technology hardware they develop in a
classified laboratory. Occasionally, his staff may have access to classified information
and future projects may necessitate a security clearance. He would trust Applicant with
classified information.10
Applicant describes himself as a very loyal American. His closest ties are to his
two children who live in the U.S. He has chosen to invest in the U.S., not Taiwan. He
intends to remain in the U.S., where he has deep roots.11
I take administrative notice of the following facts. In 1949, Chinese refugees fled
a civil war in mainland China to the Island of Taiwan. That same year, Communists in
mainland China established the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), and these refugees
established a separate, independent government in Taiwan. The PRC does not
recognize Taiwan, and insists there is only “one China”. 
 Taiwan is a multiparty democracy, a U.S. ally, and a major trading partner.
Through nearly five decades of hard work and sound economic management, Taiwan
has transformed itself from an underdeveloped, agricultural island to a power that is a
leading producer of high-technology goods. On January 1, 1979, the U.S. formally
recognized the PRC as the sole legal government of China. The U.S. also announced
that it would maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people
on Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA),  which was signed into law on April 10,12
The PRC’s Military Intelligence Department’s main intelligence target is Taiwan.13
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1979, created the legal basis for the unofficial relationship between the U.S. and
Taiwan. 
Maintaining strong, unofficial relations with Taiwan is a major U.S. policy. The
U.S. does not support Taiwan independence, but it does support Taiwan’s membership
in appropriate international organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO),
which it joined in 2002, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and the
Asian Development Bank. In addition, the U.S. supports appropriate opportunities for
Taiwan’s voice to be heard in organizations where its membership is not possible. 
The TRA enshrines the U.S. commitment to help Taiwan maintain its defensive
capability. The U.S. continues to sell appropriate defensive military equipment to
Taiwan, in accordance with the TRA. President Bush publicly stated in 2001 that the
U.S. would do “whatever it takes” to help Taiwan’s defense and approved a substantial
sale of U.S. weapons to Taiwan, including destroyers, anti-submarine aircraft, and
diesel submarines. 
More recently, U.S.-Taiwan relations have changed. Taiwan’s new president
disavowed key concepts long embraced by the opposing party - the “status quo” that
there is only one China and Taiwan is part of it - and instead has adopted the more
provocative position that Taiwan already “is an independent, sovereign country,” a
“status quo” he promises to maintain. While still pursuing a close relationship with
Taiwan, U.S. officials now appear to be balancing criticisms of the PRC military buildup
opposite Taiwan with periodic cautions and warnings to the effect that U.S. support for
Taiwan is not unconditional, but has limits.
Taiwan’s Constitution provides its citizens with many rights similar to those
provided to U.S. citizens. It has a good human rights record. It maintains a large military
establishment whose primary mission is the defense of Taiwan against the PRC.  On13
the other hand, Taiwan is an active collector of defense, medical, economic, and
computer information through industrial espionage. There are reports of cases involving
the export of certain devices to Taiwan without approval of the Department of
Commerce. 
The government claims through Administrative Notice that Taiwan poses a threat
to national security because, in the past, it was one of the countries most actively
engaged in industrial espionage and the collection of foreign economic information. The
request cites to the Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and
Industrial Espionage of 2000. This report lists Taiwan as one of the most active
collectors of industrial and economic intelligence. However, the government also
attached to its request the more recent Annual report from 2005 which was dated
August 2006. The report does not list Taiwan as being one of the biggest collectors of
economic and industrial espionage. It does list the PRC and Russia as the most active
collectors. The report states the U.S. is targeted by a large number of foreign countries
for economic and industrial espionage. The report notes that the foreign private sector is
All of the information about Taiwan is contained in GE 9.14
6
the most active collector of this type of economic and industrial intelligence, but there is
ample evidence that foreign intelligence services and other government organizations
remain aggressive in collecting information by using the private sector to collect
information for them and by their own continued direct intelligence gathering operations.
Taiwan does not appear to be any more active in the collection of economic and
industrial intelligence than many other allied countries. 
The government also presented information concerning individuals in the U.S.
convicted of engaging in espionage practices on behalf of Taiwanese companies or
officials, as well as companies that violate export control requirements in sending items
to Taiwan. Where companies are involved, the government has not identified any
specific individuals of Taiwanese descent as the person responsible for the decision to
violate U.S. law. Some of these cases involve individuals in the U.S., native born and
foreign born and citizens and non-citizens of the U.S., that formed friendships with
Taiwan Intelligence agents and then provided the agents with classified information.
While the government presented information only on Taiwan cases, it is not difficult to
assume that there are cases that pertain to other countries as well. The fact that there
are cases of Taiwan intelligence agents accepting intelligence information from sources
in the U.S., no matter how obtained, does raise security concerns. 
The geographical closeness of Taiwan and the PRC causes Taiwan concern and
can led it to engage in industrial, military, and economic espionage to ensure that it is
strong enough to counter threats from the PRC. However, that threat is counter
balanced by the need of Taiwan to continue friendly relations with the U.S. as one of its
prime protectors and sources of military equipment. The relationship between the U.S.
and Taiwan is defined in the Taiwan Relations Act which recognizes Taiwan. Taiwan
has a long history of friendly relations with the U.S., including substantial levels of
foreign trade. Taiwan is an ally and friend, but also poses a security threat because of
its activities and efforts to obtain economic, industrial, and national security
information.14
Policies
When evaluating an Applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in
evaluating an Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s over-arching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common sense decision. According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available,
After any decision, the losing party has a right to appeal the case to the Defense Office of Hearings and15
Appeals  Appeal Board. The Appeal Board’s review authority is limited to determining whether three tests are
met:
E3.1.32.1. The Administrative Judge’s findings of fact are supported by such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion in light of
all the contrary evidence in the same record. In making this review, the Appeal Board shall
give deference to the credibility determinations of the Administrative Judge:
E#.a.32.2. The Administrative Judge adhered to the procedures required by E.O. 10865
(enclosure 1) and this Directive: or
E3.1.32.3. The Administrative Judge’s rulings or conclusions are arbitrary, capricious, or
contrary to law.
The Appeal Board does not conduct a “de novo determination”, recognizing they have no opportunity
to observe witnesses and make credibility determinations. The Supreme Court in United States v. Raddatz,
447 U.S. 667, 690 (1980) succinctly defined the phrase “de novo determination”:
[This legal term] has an accepted meaning in the law. It means an independent determination
of a controversy that accords no deference to any prior resolution of the same controversy.
Thus, in Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 23 [(1974)], the Court
had occasion to define “de novo proceeding” as a review that was “unfettered by any
prejudice from the [prior] agency proceeding and free from any claim that the [agency’s]
determination is supported by substantial evidence” and, in United States v. First City
National Bank, 386 U.S. 361,368 [(1967)], this Court observed that “review de novo” means
“that the court should make an independent determination of the issues” and should “not . .
give any special weight to the [prior] determination of “the administrative agency.
(Internal footnotes omitted). See ISCR Case No. 07-10396 (App. Bd., Oct. 2, 2008) and ISCR Case No. 07-
07144 (App. Bd., Oct. 7, 2008). In ISCR Case No. 05-01820 (App. Bd. Dec 14, 2006), the Appeal Board
criticized the administrative judge’s analysis supporting grant of a clearance for a PRC-related Applicant, and
then decided the case itself. Judge W hite’s dissenting opinion cogently explains why credibility determinations
and ultimately the decision whether to grant or deny a clearance should be left to the judge who makes
witness credibility determinations. Id. at 5-7. See also ISCR Case No. 04-06386 at 10-11 (App. Bd. Aug. 25,
2006)(Harvey, J., dissenting) (discussing limitations on Appeal Board’s authority to reverse hearing-level
7
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on
the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security
decision.  15
judicial decisions and recommends remanding cases to resolve material, prejudicial error).
8
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
The security concern relating to the guideline for Foreign Influence is set out in
AG & 6:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism. 
Under the potential disqualifying conditions described in AG ¶ 7, the following
conditions could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying in this case:
(a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional
associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a
foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign
exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion; and
(b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to
Under the old adjudicative guidelines, a disqualifying condition based on foreign family members could not16
be mitigated unless an applicant could establish that the family members were not in a position to be exploited.
The Appeal Board consistently applied this m itigating condition narrowly, holding that its underlying premise
was that an applicant should not be placed in a position where he is forced to make a choice between the
interest of the family member and the interest of the United States. (See, ISCR Case No. 03-17620, (App. Bd,
Apr. 17, 2006); ISCR Case No. 03-24933, (App. Bd. Jul. 28, 2005); ISCR Case No. 03-02382, (App. Bd. Feb.
15, 2005); and ISCR Case No. 03-15205, (App. Bd. Jan. 21. 2005)). Thus, an administrative judge was not
permitted to apply a balancing test to assess the extent of the security risk.
9
protect sensitive information or technology and the individual's desire to
help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.
Since his divorce, Applicant has not had any contact with his former wife’s family.
Thus, no security concern is raised by any contacts his former wife may have with her
family. His two children are citizens and residents of the U.S. Thus, his relationship with
his children is not a security concern.  His adopted daughter (former wife’s niece) is a
permanent resident of the U.S., who is planning on becoming a U.S. citizen. She is in
college. Since he does not have any contact with her following his divorce, there is no
security concern related to her. However, Applicant’s three brothers are citizens and
residents of Taiwan. Applicant maintains a normal, but limited, familial relationship with
his brothers. These relationships are not per se a reason to deny Applicant a security
clearance. The government must establish that these family relationships create a
heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion
or would create a potential conflict of interest between his obligations to protect
sensitive information and his desire to help his family members.  
In determining if a heightened risk exists, I must look at Applicant’s relationship
and contacts with family members as well as the activities of the government of
Taiwan. See ISCR Case No. 07-05809 (App. Bd. May 27, 2008). The risk that an
Applicant could be targeted for manipulation or induced into compromising classified
information is real, not theoretical. Applicant’s relationship and contacts with his
brothers in Taiwan raises a heightened risk of security concerns because Taiwan does
engage in economic, industrial, and other types of espionage, and Taiwan officials and
companies have engaged in such espionage with individuals in the U.S. There are no
indications in these instances that Taiwan targets U.S. citizens to obtain protected
information. Taiwan and its intelligence agents did receive protected information from
persons in the U.S., but in these cases the information was offered to the agents by the
U.S. citizens rather than Taiwan targeting the U.S. citizens by exploiting, manipulating,
pressuring, or coercing U.S. citizens for protected information. The government has not
established a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation,
pressure or coercion by the geographic proximity of Taiwan to the PRC. The geographic
closeness might induce Taiwan to obtain protected information from U.S. sources, but in
obtaining that information Taiwan does not use tactics and methods that could cause
issues with the U.S. as its main protector and supplier of military equipment. 
Under the new guidelines, the potentially conflicting loyalties may be weighed to
determine if an applicant can be expected to resolve any conflict in favor of the U.S.
interest.  In determining if Applicant’s contacts in Taiwan cause security concerns, I16
10
considered that Taiwan is an ally of the U.S., has a defense agreement with the U.S.,
and is a substantial trading partner of the U.S. I considered that the people of Taiwan
enjoy basic freedoms similar to U.S. citizens. While the U.S. has a one-China policy, the
U.S. does maintain cultural, commercial and other ties with Taiwan. I considered that
Taiwan does engage in economic and other types of espionage. There are no
indications in these instances that Taiwan was targeting U.S. citizens to provide
economic or other sensitive information. While Taiwan is a country that is friendly to the
U.S., it could engage in espionage against U.S. interests. Friendly countries may have
profound disagreements with the U.S. or have engaged in espionage against U.S.
economic, scientific, or technical interests. A friendly relationship is not determinative,
but it makes it less likely that a foreign government would attempt to exploit a U.S.
citizen through relatives or associates in that country. Taiwan is not a hostile country,
nor are its interests inimical to the U.S. The U.S. and Taiwan are large democracies,
enjoy good relations, and are trading partners. It is reasonable to consider that Taiwan
would not take any action to jeopardize its friendly position with the U.S. because of its
need for trade and defense assistance from the U.S. It would be considered an act
unfriendly to the interest of the U.S. to coerce its citizens with relatives in the U.S. to
pressure their U.S. relatives to provide economic or other espionage information against
the interest of the U.S. Taiwan has cooperated with the U.S. in the investigation of
espionage incidents with Taiwan. While none of the considerations by themselves
dispose of the issue, they are all factors to be considered in determining Applicant’s
vulnerability to pressure or coercion from his family members in Taiwan. Because of his
frequent trips to Taiwan between January 2001 and January 2008, which included
contacts with his family members, the government has established that there is a
heightened risk that Applicant will be targeted under AG ¶¶ 7(a) and (b).
In deciding if Applicant has submitted evidence of mitigation, under AG ¶ 8 (a), I
must consider: 
the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which
these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in
that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a
position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual,
group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.
and under AG ¶ 8(b), I must consider if
 
there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual's sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is
so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships
and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any
conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interests.
Applicant’s normal relationship with his family members is not a basis to deny
him a security clearance; however, his burden of proof on mitigation requires more than
statements about the limited scope of his conversations with his three brothers. See
ISCR Case No. 07-02485 (App. Bd. May 9, 2008). Applicant’s three brothers have
11
never worked for the Taiwanese government nor held a political position. They do not
rely upon the Taiwan government for their income or retirement benefits. Applicant
provides no financial support to his brothers and relinquished all his rights to any
inheritance he may have from his father’s estate. His only financial interests are in the
U.S., not Taiwan. Applicant’s business trips to Taiwan ceased in 2003. He has voted in
U.S. elections since he became a citizen in 1996. His children live in the U.S. Balancing
these factors against Taiwan’s espionage activities and the lack of evidence that Taiwan
targets U.S. citizens for protected information, I find that Applicant would resolve any
conflict in favor of the U.S. interests. Applicant has mitigated the government’s security
concerns as to his family contacts specified in SOR ¶ 1.a, 1.b and 1.c under AG ¶¶ 8a
and 8b.
Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall common sense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept.       
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. The “whole person” concept
requires consideration of all available information about Applicant, not a single item in
isolation, to reach a common sense determination concerning Applicant’s security
worthiness. Applicant’s brothers in Taiwan work in private industry, not for the
Taiwanese government. They are not politically active. They do not depend upon the
government for income, even in their retirement.  Given their circumstances and
Applicant’s strong ties to the U.S., it is unlikely Applicant will be placed in a position to
choose between the interests of his family and the interest of the U.S. or be exploited,
pressured, or coerced because of his brothers in Taiwan.
Applicant came to the U.S. more than 25 years ago, as a young man. He has
lived most of his adult life in the U.S. His children, who are his closest family members,
were born in the U.S. and are being raised in the U.S. He came to the U.S. for an
advanced college education and remained. He has contributed to the country through
12
his work and has achieved the American dream of financial success and home
ownership. His employer praises his work ethic and treasurers the unique skills and
talents he brings to the workplace. He enjoys his U.S. lifestyle and intends to remain in
the U.S. His contacts with his family members in Taiwan do not indicate a security risk
nor does his past travel to Taiwan.
Overall, the record evidence leaves me without questions or doubts as to
Applicant’s eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I
conclude Applicant mitigated the security concerns arising from his financial
considerations. 
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: For Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
                                                              
MARY E. HENRY
Administrative Judge