DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
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---------------------- )       ISCR Case No. 07-18488
SSN: ----------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Fahryn Hoffman, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Pro Se
January 16, 2009
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Decision
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TESTAN, Joseph, Administrative Judge:
On July 15, 2008, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) to applicant detailing the security concerns under
Guidelines B and C. The action was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of
Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
Program (January 2, 1992), as amended (Directive); and the revised adjudicative
guidelines (AG) promulgated by the President on December 29, 2005, and effective
within the Department of Defense for SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant answered the SOR in writing on July 31, 2008, and requested an
Administrative Determination by an Administrative Judge (AJ). Department Counsel
issued a File of Relevant Material (FORM) on September 19, 2008. Applicant filed a
response to the FORM on November 4, 2008. The case was assigned to me on
December 8, 2008. Based upon a review of the case file, pleadings, and exhibits,
eligibility for access to classified information is granted.
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Findings of Fact
Applicant was born in Italy in 1959. She moved to the United States with her
parents in 1960. In 1972, she became a naturalized United States citizen.
On a trip to Italy in 1981, she became engaged to an Italian citizen. They married
in 1984. From1981 to the present, applicant has lived in Italy.
Applicant has worked for an international organization to which the United States
belongs for over twenty years.
Applicant’s parents are United States citizens. They have resided in Italy since
1981. Applicant’s three siblings are dual citizens of the United States and Italy and
reside in Italy. At least two of her siblings have lived in Italy since 1981.
Applicant’s three children are dual citizens of the United States and Italy and
reside in Italy.
Applicant’s mother-in-law and siblings-in-law are citizens and residents of Italy.
Applicant and her husband own their home in Italy. In addition, they own two
apartments and vacant land in Italy.
Applicant has voted in Italian elections since 1984.
Applicant currently works as an assistant to a high ranking United States official.
The official submitted a letter on applicant’s behalf. In it, the official states that the
official has had daily contact with applicant since November 2007, the official “simply
cannot overemphasize the absolute critical role [applicant] plays” in helping the official
carry out the official’s duties, applicant has the official’s “fullest faith, trust and
confidence in her fidelity and loyalty to the United States of America,” after reading the
SOR and applicant’s response to it the official has “absolutely no security issues with
[applicant],” and based on the official’s experience, the official firmly believes granting
applicant a security clearance is clearly consistent with the national interest.
 
 Policies
The President has “the authority to . . . control access to information bearing on
national security and to determine whether an individual is sufficiently trustworthy to
occupy a position that will give that person access to such information.” (Department of
the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518,527 (1988).) In Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding
Classified Information Within Industry (February 20, 1960), the President set out
guidelines and procedures for safeguarding classified information within the executive
branch. The President authorized the Secretary of Defense or his designee to grant
applicants eligibility for access to classified information “only upon a finding that it is
clearly consistent with the national interest to do so.” (Exec. Ord. 10865, Section 2.)
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To be eligible for a security clearance, an applicant must meet the security
guidelines contained in the Directive. Enclosure 2 of the Directive sets forth personnel
security guidelines, as well as the disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions
under each guideline.
Initially, the Government must present evidence to establish controverted facts in
the SOR that disqualify or may disqualify the applicant from being eligible for access to
classified information. (Directive, Paragraph E3.1.14.) Thereafter, the applicant is
responsible for presenting evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate the facts.
(Directive, Paragraph E3. 1.15.) An applicant “has the ultimate burden of demonstrating
that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue his security
clearance.” (ISCR Case No. 01-20700 at 3 (App. Bd. Dec. 19, 2002).) “Any doubt as to
whether access to classified information is clearly consistent with national security will
be resolved in favor of the national security.” (Directive, Paragraph E2.2.2.)
A person granted access to classified information enters into a special
relationship with the government. The government must be able to repose a high
degree of trust and confidence in those individuals to whom it grants access to
classified information. The decision to deny an individual a security clearance is not a
determination as to the loyalty of the applicant. (Exec. Ord. 10865, Section 7.) It is
merely an indication that the applicant has not met the strict guidelines the President
has established for issuing a clearance.
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
The security concern relating to the Foreign Influence guideline is set forth in
Paragraph 6 of the AG, and is as follows: 
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion
by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
Paragraph 7 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying. Under Paragraph 7.a., “contact with a foreign family member, business or
professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign
country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement,
manipulation, pressure, or coercion” may be disqualifying. Under Paragraph 7.b.,
“connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential
conflict of interest between the individual's obligation to protect sensitive information or
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technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by
providing that information” may be disqualifying. Under Paragraph 7.d., “sharing living
quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship
creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.”
Lastly, under Paragraph 7.e., “a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a
foreign country . . . which could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign
influence or exploitation” may be disqualifying.
Applicant’s marriage to an Italian citizen raises obvious concerns under the first
three disqualifying conditions. Applicant’s large financial interests in Italy raises
concerns under the fourth disqualifying condition.
Paragraph 8 sets forth conditions that could mitigate security concerns. Under
Paragraph 8.a., it is potentially mitigating if an applicant can demonstrate that “the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of
the U.S.” Under Paragraph 8.b., it is potentially mitigating if an applicant can
demonstrate “there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual*s sense of
loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal,
or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S.,
that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S.
interest.” Lastly, under Paragraph 8.c., it is potentially mitigating if an applicant can
demonstrate that the “contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and
infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or
exploitation.”
None of the foregoing mitigating conditions is applicable. Applicant*s relationship
with her husband, standing alone, creates a risk for foreign influence or exploitation.
Applicant provided insufficient credible evidence that it is unlikely she would be placed
in a position of having to choose between the interests of Italy and the interests of the
United States, or that she is not vulnerable to a conflict of interest.
Guideline C, Foreign Preference
The security concern relating to the Foreign Preference guideline is set forth in
Paragraph 9 of the AG, and is as follows:
When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a
foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to
provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of
the United States.
Paragraph 10 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may
be disqualifying. Under Paragraph 10.a., exercising any right or privilege of foreign
citizenship after becoming a United States citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a
family member, such as (3) accepting educational, medical, retirement, social welfare,
or other such benefits from a foreign country, (5) using foreign citizenship to protect
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financial or business interests in another country, and (7) voting in a foreign election,
may be disqualifying. All three disqualifying conditions apply.
Paragraph 11 describes potentially mitigating conditions. I have considered them
all and conclude none apply.
“Whole Person” Analysis 
Under the whole person concept, the AJ must evaluate an applicant’s security
eligibility by considering the totality of the applicant’s conduct and all the circumstances.
An AJ should consider the nine adjudicative process factors listed at AG Paragraph
2(a): “(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the circumstances
surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation; (3) the frequency and
recency of the conduct; (4) the individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct;
(5) extent to which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation for the
conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and (9) the
likelihood of continuation or recurrence.” Under AG Paragraph 2c, the ultimate
determination of whether to grant a security clearance must be an overall common
sense judgment based upon careful consideration of the guidelines and the whole
person concept.       
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant is a mature woman who,
after becoming a naturalized United States citizen, moved back to Italy in 1981, married
an Italian citizen in 1984, and gave birth to and raised her children in Italy. Except for
retaining her United States citizenship and registering her children as United States
citizens, she has, for all intents and purposes, no current ties to the United States. In
most cases, these facts alone would require denial of her clearance request.
However, this case does not fall in the “most cases” category. This case is
unique in the sense that a very senior United States official, who has significant
experience and knowledge in the security arena, has stated without equivocation that
based on the official’s daily interaction with applicant since late 2007, applicant should
be granted a security clearance. This opinion, together with the fact that Italy and the
United States are close allies, leads me to conclude that applicant should be granted a
clearance based on the “whole person” concept.
Formal Findings     
Formal findings for or against applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by Section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Guideline B: FOR APPLICANT
Guideline C: FOR APPLICANT
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Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is
clearly consistent with national security to grant applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is granted.       
                                      
JOSEPH TESTAN
Administrative Judge