1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
------------------------ )       ISCR Case No. 08-03648
SSN: ---------------- )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: James B. Norman, Esquire, Chief Department Counsel
For Applicant: Josiah M. Black, Esquire
______________
Decision
______________
MATCHINSKI, Elizabeth M., Administrative Judge:
Applicant submitted an Electronic Questionnaire for Investigations Processing (e-
QIP) on May 29, 2007. On July 12, 2008, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals
(DOHA) issued to Applicant a Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing the security
concerns under Guideline B that provided the basis for its action to deny her a security
clearance and to refer the matter to an administrative judge. The action was taken
under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within Industry
(February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6, Defense
Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as
amended (Directive), and the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the
President on December 29, 2005, and effective within the Department of Defense for
SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on July 17, 2008. Acting pro se, she
answered the SOR on August 19, 2008, and requested a hearing before an
administrative judge. On September 22, 2008, counsel for Applicant entered his
appearance. The case was assigned to me on September 23, 2008, with a request for
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2007, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),1
dated March 11, 2008 (IV), Country Specific Information-China, dated December 10, 2007 (V), and
Background Note: China, dated April 2008. The Background Note was not included in the list of source
documents but it was referenced in several footnotes in the government’s Administrative Notice request and
a copy of the document was provided for review.
Intelligence Threat Handbook, excerpts, dated June 2004 (I). The document was prepared for the2
Interagency OPSEC Support Staff by the Centre for Counterintelligence and Security Studies, a private
contractor.
2007 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, extracts,3
dated November 2007 (II).
Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage-2005, dated4
August 2006 (III).
Press Release—Chinese Resident Pleads Guilty to Having Export Controlled Thermal-Imaging5
Cameras Sent to China, dated July 16, 2008 (VI), Press Release—Chinese National Sentenced For
Committing Economic Espionage to Benefit China Navy Research Center, dated June 18, 2008 (VII), Press
Release—Third Defendant Pleads Guilty in China Espionage Case, dated May 28, 2008 (VIII), Press
Release—Chinese Agent Sentenced to Over 24 Years in Prison for Exporting United States Defense Articles
to China, dated March 24, 2008 (IX), and  Press Release—Former Chinese National Convicted of Economic
Espionage to Benefit China Navy Research Center, dated August 2, 2007(X). None of the press releases
pertained specifically to Applicant.
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administrative notice pending from the government, infra. On October 14, 2008, I
scheduled a hearing for November 20, 2008.
At the hearing held as scheduled, three government exhibits (Ex. 1-3) and seven
Applicant exhibits (Ex. A-F) were admitted and Applicant and a maternal uncle testified,
as reflected in a transcript (Tr.) received on November 28, 2008. Based upon a review
of the case file, pleadings, exhibits, and testimony, eligibility for access to classified
information is granted.
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings
Request for Administrative Notice
On September 5, 2008, then assigned Department Counsel Gina Marine
requested administrative notice be taken of certain facts relating to the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) and its foreign relations, including with the U.S. The request
was based on publications from the Department of State,  the Centre for1
Counterintelligence and Security Studies,  the U.S. China Economic and Security2
Review Commission,  and the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive,  as3 4
well as on press releases from the U.S. Department of Justice.  The government’s5
formal request and the attached documents were not admitted into evidence but were
included in the record.
Applicant testified she has about 60 relatives living in the U.S., about 90 percent of whom are U.S.6
citizens (Tr. 50). Her great-uncle testified that he has 37 relatives living in the U.S. (Tr. 98).
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On June 4, 2008, I notified the parties of my intention to take administrative
notice of specific facts, subject to revision based on the evidence admitted at the
hearing and any valid objections. The parties were granted until October 22, 2008, to
file any objections to my taking notice of the facts set forth in the Order, and for
Applicant to propose facts for administrative notice.
The government filed a timely request to extend the deadline to October 31,
2008, which was granted without any objections. On October 31, 2008, the government
requested that administrative notice be taken of additional facts not explicitly included in
the October 2, 2008, Order. Applicant filed no response, but indicated at the hearing
that she did not object to administrative notice being taken of the facts set forth in the
Order as supplemented by the government on October 31, 2008. I agreed to take
administrative notice of particular facts pertaining to the PRC, as set forth in the
Findings of Fact.
Findings of Fact
DOHA alleged under Guideline B, foreign influence, that Applicant’s sister is a
citizen and resident of the PRC (SOR ¶ 1.a), and that Applicant traveled to the PRC to
visit her in at least 2001, 2004, and 2005 (SOR ¶ 1.b). In her answer of August 19,
2008, Applicant admitted the allegations, adding in explanation that her sister at age 25
exceeded the age limit when the rest of their family immigrated to the United States
(U.S.). Applicant indicated that her sister is employed as an accountant for a private
company in the PRC and is awaiting a visa to immigrate to the U.S. After considering
the evidence of record, I make the following findings of fact.
Applicant is a 28-year-old computer software engineer who has been employed
by a U.S. defense contractor since April 2007 (Exs. 1, F). She seeks a secret clearance,
never having held a security clearance in the past (Ex. 1).
Applicant was born in a southern province of the PRC in January 1980 to native
citizens (Ex. 1, Tr. 23-24). She was raised with an older sister, who was born in
December 1973 (Ex. 1). Her mother was employed as an assembly worker in a balloon
factory and her father worked for a construction company. Neither were ever members
of the Chinese Communist Party (Tr. 25).
In early February 1999, when Applicant was 19, she immigrated to the U.S. with
her parents. They were sponsored by Applicant’s paternal grandfather, who immigrated
to the U.S. in 1989 (Tr. 26-27, 38). They joined many paternal relatives in the U.S. who
had immigrated earlier (Ex. B, Tr. 42-49), including Applicant’s great-aunt who has been
in the U.S. more than 40 years (Tr. 45) and a great-uncle who arrived more than 30
years ago (Tr. 48).  Because her sister was 25 years old at the time, she was ineligible6
to immigrate on her grandfather’s petition so she remained behind in the PRC where
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she was employed as an accountant (Exs. 1, 2, Tr. 25-27). Applicant entered the U.S.
on a PRC passport valid from March 6, 1998, to March 5, 2003 (Exs. 3, A).
Applicant and her parents lived with a great-uncle from 1999 to 2004 (Tr. 49, 99).
This uncle came to the U.S. under the sponsorship of his spouse’s sister in March 1975
(Tr. 96), and he worked as a senior programmer for a defense contractor for 25 years
(Tr. 99-100). 
Applicant attended the local public high school from February 1999 to June 2001
(Tr. 21). After graduating from high school, she started her college studies that Fall at
the state’s university at a branch nearby. From late December 2001 to mid-January
2002, Applicant traveled to the PRC to visit her sister (Exs. 1, 2, 3, A, Tr. 72-73). In
January 2003, she renewed her PRC passport for another five years (until March 5,
2008) (Exs. 3, A).
In January 2004, Applicant transferred to the university’s main campus to
continue her undergraduate studies in computer science (Ex. 1, Tr. 21).  She had work-
study obligations during the school year. Unemployed that summer, she took the
opportunity to return to the PRC for a couple of weeks in August to visit her sister. As
she had in 2002, she traveled on her PRC passport (Exs. 1, 2, 3, A, Tr. 73).
In November 2004, Applicant and her mother became naturalized U.S. citizens
(Ex. 1). Unbeknownst to Applicant at the time (Tr. 28), the acquisition of U.S. citizenship
served automatically to revoke their PRC citizenship (Ex. 2). Applicant’s father remained
a legal permanent resident of the U.S. with PRC citizenship due to his limited facility
with the English language (Tr. 107). On January 18, 2005, Applicant obtained a U.S.
passport which is valid to January 17, 2015 (Exs. 1, 3). In March 2005, Applicant’s
mother applied for Applicant’s sister to emigrate from the PRC to the U.S. and her
petition was approved in August 2005 (Ex. D, Tr. 27).
From May to July 2005, Applicant was a summer intern in an undergraduate
summer program at another university. Unemployed on her return to the area, she
traveled to the PRC from August 4, 2005, to September 3, 2005, to spend time with her
sister. Needing a visa for the trip, she sent both her PRC and U.S. passports to the
Chinese Embassy in June 2005. Her Chinese passport was invalidated (stamped
cancelled and cut in the upper right hand corner) and then returned to her (Ex. A, Tr.
28-35). She entered and exited the PRC on her U.S. passport (Exs. 1, 2, 3, Tr. 74).  On
this and previous trips to the PRC, she stayed with her sister (Tr. 92).
In January 2006, she began a co-op position as a quality assurance tester with a
computer technology company. She finished her academic studies in December 2006,
and was awarded her bachelor of science degree in February 2007 (Ex. 1). In about
April 2007, she left the job with the technology company for her present employment
because it would allow her to write computer code (Tr. 21-22).
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At the request of her supervisor (Tr. 23), Applicant executed an e-QIP on May
29, 2007. She disclosed her birth in the PRC, her U.S. naturalization in November 2004,
and her possession of a valid U.S. passport issued in January 2005. She also disclosed
that she had held a PRC passport from about June 1998 to October 2004, which she
indicated was invalid after she became a U.S. citizen. Applicant reported her sister’s
PRC residency and citizenship. She also listed her travels to the PRC from December
2001 to January 2002, in August 2004, and from August 2005 to September 2005,
indicating the purpose of each trip as “other.” (Ex. 1).
On January 25, 2008, Applicant was interviewed by a government investigator
about her foreign ties. She mistakenly indicated that her Chinese passport did not
expire until 2009, but she also denied any use of that passport after she acquired her
U.S. passport in January 2005 and any intent to renew her foreign passport. Applicant
expressed her ultimate loyalty to the U.S., which she considered her home. According
to the investigator’s report, Applicant also expressed her intent to renounce her
citizenship with China if it meant she had to in order to remain a U.S. citizen, although
she was unsure of the procedure or whether it was in fact possible. Applicant disclosed
that her sister worked as an accountant for an Internet service provider in the PRC, and
that she visited her in the PRC in late 2001 into 2002, in 2004, and in 2005. Applicant
denied any untoward contact or activities. On February 12, 2008, Applicant was re-
contacted by the investigator to discuss her contacts with her sister, which she indicated
were by electronic mail once weekly. Applicant added that her sibling was unaware that
she had applied for a “national security position.” (Ex. 2).
In March 2008, Applicant asked her employer to destroy her invalidated PRC
passport. They refused to do so, so Applicant retained possession of the passport (Tr.
34).
DOHA requested Applicant verify the investigator’s reports of her January 2008
interview and February 2008 contact. On May 19, 2008, Applicant indicated that the
reports were inaccurate in that she had mistakenly indicated that her PRC passport was
valid through 2009 when it had expired in March 2008, and that she did not consider
herself a dual citizen as when she applied for her U.S. citizenship, she “effectively
renounced” her PRC citizenship. She added that she had not used her Chinese
citizenship after the trip in August 2004. During her stay in the PRC in September 2005,
she visited her sister and old classmates and friends. Apart from routine border contact,
she denied any interaction with Chinese government officials. Applicant reiterated that
her loyalty lay with the U.S. government and that her contacts with her sister by
telephone and email generally concerned dating, shopping, new movies (Ex. 2). At the
request of DOHA, Applicant furnished copies of her expired PRC and current U.S.
passports (Ex. 3).
Applicant’s sister has worked for the privately-owned Chinese Internet company
as an accountant since April 2004 (Ex. C, Tr. 52, 55, 108). Applicant speaks to her by
telephone once a month. Applicant has not told her that she has applied for a security
clearance (Tr. 52-53). Their conversations revolve around their parents, whom her sister
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has not seen in almost three years, and everyday issues of mutual interest such as
clothing and movies (Tr. 53). Her sister is awaiting a visa and intends to immigrate to
the U.S. (Tr. 60). Applicant’s sister has a stable job and owns her home in the PRC.
Applicant does not provide any financial support for her sister (Tr. 61). To Applicant’s
knowledge, her sister is not politically active in the PRC (Tr. 62).
Applicant has four maternal uncles and some cousins who are resident citizens
of the PRC (Ex. E, Tr. 66-68). Applicant visited with these relatives during her trips to
the PRC (Tr. 70), but she has otherwise had only one contact with them since
immigrating to the U.S. in February 1999. She spoke with an uncle on the occasion of
her grandmother’s funeral in 2007 (Tr. 69-70). To Applicant’s knowledge, none of these
relatives have ever worked for the Chinese government (Tr. 71).
Applicant has two female friends from elementary school who are resident
citizens of the PRC. One works as an accountant for a private trading (import/export)
company. The other is an assembly worker in a commercial steel factory (Tr. 74).
Applicant sends birthday greetings but has not spoken to these friends in more than a
year (Tr. 75).
Applicant’s father is employed as a plumber and her mother as an assembly
worker in a piano factory in the U.S. (Tr. 24-25). They travel to China on occasion to
visit their daughter, most recently in about 2006 (Tr. 107).
As of November 2008, Applicant had no current plans to travel to the PRC (Tr.
75). All of her financial assets (car, checking and savings and retirement accounts) are
in the U.S. She lives with her parents in an apartment (Ex. 1, Tr. 20). Applicant owns no
real estate in the PRC or in the U.S. (Tr. 76).  Registered to vote in the U.S., Applicant
has performed jury service here twice (Tr. 77). She belongs to a couple of Asian-
American organizations, one at work and one in the local community. The organizations’
activities are social as well as professional (networking, career programs) (Tr. 88-90). 
 
Applicant has proven to be an organized, hardworking, and competent employee
for the defense contractor (Exs. F, G). Her direct supervisor is confident of her ability to
handle situations “with thoughtfulness and maturity” (Ex. F).  Applicant has abided by
her employer’s policies concerning the confidentiality of sensitive information (Tr. 85-
86). Applicant recently started a master’s degree program in systems engineering to
improve her skills (Ex. F, Tr. 88).
 
Following review of official publications of the U.S. government that address the
economic, political, and intelligence activities of the PRC, I take administrative notice of
the following facts:
The PRC is a large and economically powerful country, with a population of just
over 1.3 billion people. Its economy has recently grown at about 10% per year. China
has an authoritarian government dominated by the Chinese Communist Party. The
National People’s Congress, the PRC’s legislative body, is the highest organ of state
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power. With China firmly committed to economic reform and greater openness, the
influence of people and organizations outside the formal party structure has increased,
but in all important government, economic, and cultural institutions in China, the
Chinese Communist Party ensures that party and state policy guidance is followed.
During 2007, the PRC government’s human rights record remained poor, with a trend
toward increased harassment, detention, and imprisonment by government and security
authorities of those perceived as threatening to government authority. Foreign visitors in
the PRC may be placed under surveillance by security personnel, their hotel rooms,
telephones, and facsimile machines monitored, and their personal possessions,
including computers, searched without their knowledge or consent. The security
services in China routinely monitored and entered residences and offices to gain access
to computers, telephones, and fax machines. Foreign government officials, journalists,
and business people with access to advanced proprietary technology are particularly
likely to be under surveillance. Americans not staying in hotels in China, including those
staying with friends or relatives, must register with local police as soon as they arrive.
Since the Tiananmen Square crackdown in June 1989, the PRC has become a
key participant in the international community through its seat as a permanent member
of the Security Council of the United Nations, and through diplomatic relations with other
countries. The U.S. and PRC have a history of cooperation on scientific and
environmental issues. Recently, the two countries have cooperated with growing
effectiveness on counterterrorism and on various aspects of law enforcement (computer
crime, intellectual property rights, human smuggling, corruption). China, a member of
the World Trade Organization since December 2001, is an important trading partner of
the U.S. Its trade surplus with the U.S. was $256.3 billion in 2007 while U.S. goods
exports to China accounted for 5.7% of total U.S. goods exports.
The PRC possesses large military forces (strategic nuclear forces, army, navy
and air force), which are in the process of transformation into a smaller, more mobile,
high-tech military. In the last decade, the PRC’s strategic posture has been one of
selective modernization with an increasing focus on space-based assets. Civil-military
integration has led to increased utilization of commercial systems in military
applications. The PRC places enormous pressure on foreign companies, including U.S.
firms, to transfer technology to Chinese companies as part of doing business in China.
In furtherance of these efforts, the PRC has aggressively targeted sensitive and
protected U.S. economic and militarily critical information subject to export control laws.
The PRC blends intelligence and non-intelligence assets, relying on covert espionage
activity by personnel from government ministries, commissions, institutes, and military
industries independent of the PRC intelligence services, and by targeting ethnic
Chinese who have access to sensitive information. Americans of Chinese ancestry are
considered prime intelligence targets.
A record number of countries (108) were involved in collection efforts against
sensitive and protected U.S. technologies in fiscal year 2005 with a small number,
including the PRC, among the most aggressive. As of 2007, as Chinese espionage
against the U.S. military and American business continued to outpace the overwhelmed
There is no allegation that Applicant has engaged in any economic espionage or attempted to violate7
export controls for the benefit of the PRC. The criminal activity of others is relevant to the extent it reflects
ongoing efforts by the PRC to target U.S. sensitive technologies.
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U.S. counterintelligence community, critical American secrets and proprietary
technologies were being transferred to China. Ethnic Chinese with U.S. citizenship
and/or legal residency have been convicted of procuring and exporting or attempting to
export sensitive U.S. technology to the PRC in violation of export controls. U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials have rated China’s espionage and
industrial theft activities as the leading threat to the security of U.S. technology. The
Federal Bureau of Investigation stepped up counterintelligence efforts against Chinese
intelligence operations in the U.S. in July 2007 because of substantial concern about
those operations. In March 2008, an engineer who conspired with family members to
export sensitive naval technology to the PRC was sentenced to 293 months in federal
prison. In May 2008, a U.S. naturalized citizen, who operated as an unregistered agent
of the PRC government in the U.S., pleaded guilty to conspiracy to deliver national
defense information to the PRC. A PRC citizen with U.S. permanent residency was
convicted of aiding and abetting this unregistered agent between March 2007 and
February 2008. In June 2008, a software engineer was sentenced under the Economic
Espionage Act (18 U.S.C. § 1831) for misappropriating a trade secret from his former
employer with the intent to benefit the PRC.7
Policies
When evaluating an applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in
evaluating an applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s overarching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common sense decision. According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
the “whole person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on
the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
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Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security
decision. 
A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the government predicated upon trust and confidence. This relationship
transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The government
reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it grants access to
classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of the possible risk
the applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or safeguard classified
information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally permissible extrapolation
as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information). 
Analysis
Guideline B, Foreign Influence
The security concern for foreign influence is set out in AG & 6:
Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual
has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or
induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a
way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by
any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should
consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or
financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such
considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United
States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a
risk of terrorism.
Applicant and her parents, natives of the PRC, immigrated to the U.S. in
February 1999. They joined many members of her father’s family, who had immigrated
before them. They left behind Applicant’s sister, who at age 25 was ineligible for
immigration as a minor under their grandfather’s sponsorship. AG ¶ 7(a) (“contact with a
foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who
is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of
foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion”) applies.
Applicant has ongoing contact, by email and/or telephone, once monthly with her sister,
In ISCR Case No. 06-17838 at 4 (App. Bd. Jan. 28, 2008), the Appeal Board discussed the8
precedential value of the decisions predating the revision of the Adjudicative Guidelines, and determined
where the language of the Directive is unchanged or not substantively altered, the precedent remains valid.
AG ¶ 8(c) apparently adopted the Appeal Board’s interpretation of foreign influence mitigating condition 1
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who is a resident citizen of the PRC, a country known to aggressively target U.S.
sensitive technology. Applicant traveled to the PRC in 2001, 2004, and 2005 to visit her
sister. AG ¶ 7(b), “connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that
create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect
sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person,
group, or country by providing that information,” is also implicated.
Applicant is close to her parents, with whom she has resided since coming to the
U.S., if not her entire life. The bonds that her parents share with their daughter in the
PRC also must be taken into account in assessing the risk of undue foreign influence
(see AG ¶ 7(d), “sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of
citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement,
manipulation, pressure, or coercion”). While the extent of her parents’ ongoing contacts
with their older daughter is unclear, they have traveled to the PRC on occasion to visit
her, most recently in about 2006. Within a year of her U.S. naturalization, Applicant’s
mother applied for her daughter to immigrate to the U.S. I conclude AG ¶ 7(d) applies
as well.
Applicant does not have any current plans to travel to the PRC. No evidence was
presented as to the extent of her parents’ travel plans. Future travel to the PRC cannot
be ruled out by Applicant or her parents as long as Applicant’s sibling is in the PRC.
Their vulnerability is heightened in the event of any such travel, as they would be within
the reach of Chinese entities, including the PRC government, that might seek to exert
influence to gain access to classified information. At the same time, there is no evidence
showing that Applicant or her parents have engaged in any conduct or been targeted
while in the PRC that would implicate AG ¶ 7(i), “conduct, especially while traveling
outside the U.S., which may make the individual vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or
coercion by a foreign group, government, or country.”
Applicant candidly disclosed at the hearing that she has several maternal uncles
and cousins and two friends from elementary school who are PRC resident citizens.
While she visited with at least some of them when she was in the PRC, her contact with
them since 1999 has otherwise been limited. She has spoken to one uncle on the
occasion of her grandmother’s death in 2007, and while she sends birthday greetings to
her friends, she has not had contact with them for more than a year. Given the absence
of any evidence of ongoing contact by Applicant or her parents with these foreign
nationals,  these relationships do not present a heightened risk (see AG ¶ 8(c), “contact
or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little
likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation”). However, AG ¶
8(c) does not apply because of Applicant’s and her parents’ contacts with her sister in
the PRC, which cannot reasonably be termed “so casual or infrequent.”8
(FIMC 1) under the previous guidelines. The Appeal Board had determined that contacts with relatives living
in a foreign country must be both casual and infrequent to apply FIMC 1. See ISCR Case No. 04-12500 at 4
(App. Bd. Oct. 26, 2006). Moreover, contacts with such family members are presumed to be “not casual.” Id.
The Appeal Board has articulated a “heightened risk” or “very heavy burden” in People’s Republic9
of China (PRC) cases because of that country’s hostility to the U.S. and aggressive intelligence collection
efforts. See ISCR Case No. 06-24575 at 4 (App. Bd. Nov. 7, 2007) (articulating “very heavy burden” standard
and reversing grant of clearance in case involving family members living in the PRC); ISCR Case No. 07-
02485 at 4-5 (App. Bd. May 9, 2008); ISCR Case No. 07-02485 at 4-5 (App. Bd. May 9, 2008).
11
Applicant’s unrebutted testimony is that her sister is nonpolitical and has no
connection with the PRC government. It must also be noted that the U.S. has approved
her sister for immigration to the U.S. However, mitigating condition AG ¶ 8(a) (“the
nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are
located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the
interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of
the U.S.”) does not apply because of her and her parents’ close bonds with her sister in
the PRC, and the PRC’s aggressive pursuit of U.S. sensitive and classified information.9
Her sister’s employment as an accountant for a private Internet provider does not fully
mitigate the risk of her being exploited by the PRC government or by those in industry
that might target U.S. classified data for competitive advantage. As reported by the U.S.
State Department, the PRC government tightened restrictions on freedom of speech
and the press in 2007, in part by increasing its efforts to control and censor the Internet.
The risk of foreign influence may yet be mitigated by deep and longstanding
relationships and loyalties in the U.S. (see AG ¶ 8(b), “there is no conflict of interest,
either because the individual's sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person,
group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and
longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected
to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest”). Applicant is a relatively
recent emigree, having lived in the U.S. for less than 10 years. Yet, Applicant and
parents chose to immigrate to the U.S., knowing that they would have to leave her sister
behind. Applicant left the PRC when she was 19, before she had an opportunity to
establish herself professionally or financially in the PRC. Since coming to the U.S. in
1999, she has developed significant ties to the U.S. that establish the expectation that
she will act in the U.S. interest. She attended public high school when she would have
been a few years older than her fellow students.  After graduating in 2001, she went on
to college, where she had work-study obligations in addition to academics. She held a
co-op position as a quality assurance tester with a technology company while finishing
her undergraduate studies. Shortly after she earned her B.S. degree, she began
working for her current employer. She has performed her duties competently and in a
trustworthy manner. All of her financial assets (savings, salary, and retirement) are in
the U.S. Shortly after she became eligible, she applied for U.S. citizenship, and she took
the oath of naturalization by choice in November 2004. In January 2005, she obtained
her U.S. passport, and traveled on that passport to the PRC in late August 2005.
Applicant’s only significant tie to the PRC at this point is her sister, who intends to
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immigrate to the U.S. once a visa becomes available.  All of the other family members
to whom she is close, including her parents and the great-uncle who provided them a
home until 2004, are in the U.S. AG ¶ 8(b) fully applies to mitigate the foreign influence
security concerns.
Whole-Person Concept
Under the whole-person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence.
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall commonsense judgment based upon careful consideration
of the guidelines and the whole person concept.
The salient issue in the security clearance determination is not in terms of loyalty,
but rather what is clearly consistent with the national interest. See Executive Order
10865, Section 7. I have considered all the factors as previously discussed under the
foreign influence guideline, supra, as part of the whole-person analysis. An applicant
may have the best of intentions and yet be in an untenable position of potentially having
to choose between a dear family member and the interests of the U.S. A Guideline B
decision involving the PRC must take into consideration the geopolitical situation. With
China firmly committed to economic reform and greater openness, the influence of
people and organizations outside the formal party structure has increased, but in all
important government, economic, and cultural institutions in China, the Chinese
Communist Party ensures that party and state policy guidance is followed. During 2007,
the PRC government’s human rights record remained poor, and the PRC is a known
collector of U.S. intelligence and economic information. While Applicant’s sister has
been approved for U.S. immigration since August 2005, it is unclear at this point when
she will be given the required visa. But what is known about Applicant, her parents, and
her father’s family, is that they have chosen to make their life in the U.S. There is no
evidence showing that they have any connection to, or affinity for, the PRC government.
Applicant has sufficient relationships with U.S. residents and loyalties to the U.S. to
make me confident that she would resolve any conflict that should arise in favor of the
U.S. interest (see AG ¶ 8(b)). After considering all the available information, I am
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persuaded that Applicant can be counted on to fulfill the fiduciary obligations of a
security clearance.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline B: FOR  APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For  Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For  Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances, it is clearly consistent with the national interest
to grant Applicant eligibility for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to classified
information is granted.
ELIZABETH M. MATCHINSKI
Administrative Judge