1
                                                             
                           DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
         DEFENSE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS
          
            
In the matter of: )
)
)       ISCR Case No. 08-02553
SSN: )
)
Applicant for Security Clearance )
Appearances
For Government: Robert Coacher, Esquire, Department Counsel
For Applicant: Michael F. Fasanaro, Jr., Esquire
______________
Decision
______________
HENRY, Mary E., Administrative Judge:
Based upon a review of the case file, pleadings, exhibits, and testimony,  I
conclude that Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
Applicant submitted his Security Clearance Application (SF 86), on August 20,
2007. On July 12, 2008, the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) issued a
Statement of Reasons (SOR) detailing security concerns under Guideline J. The action
was taken under Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classified Information within
Industry (February 20, 1960), as amended; Department of Defense Directive 5220.6,
Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program (January 2, 1992), as
amended (Directive), and the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG) promulgated by the
President on December 29, 2005, and effective within the Department of Defense for
SORs issued after September 1, 2006. 
 
Applicant acknowledged receipt of the SOR on July 22, 2008. He answered the
SOR in writing through counsel on August 22, 2008, and requested a hearing before an
GE 1; AE A; AE B; Tr. 20-22, 59-76.1
GE 1; Tr. 20, 44, 78.2
2
administrative judge. DOHA received the request on August 28, 2008. On October 20,
2008, DOHA amended the SOR to add additional security concerns under Guideline G.
Applicant answered the amended SOR through counsel on November 4, 2008.
Department Counsel was prepared to proceed on November 20, 2008, and I received
the case assignment on November 24, 2008. DOHA issued a notice of hearing on
December 15, 2008, and I convened the hearing as scheduled on January 13, 2009.
The government offered four exhibits (GE) 1 through 4, which were received and
admitted into evidence without objection. Applicant and four witnesses testified on his
behalf. He submitted two exhibits (AE) A and B, which were received and admitted into
evidence without objection. The record closed on January 13, 2009. DOHA received the
transcript of the hearing (Tr.) on January 26, 2009.
Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings
Notice
Applicant received the hearing notice on December 31, 2008. (Tr. 10.) I advised
Applicant of his right under ¶ E3.1.8 of the Directive to 15 days notice before the
hearing. After consulting with counsel, Applicant affirmatively waived his right to 15 days
notice. (Tr. 10.) 
Findings of Fact
In his Answer to the SOR, dated August 22, 2008, Applicant admitted the factual
allegations in ¶¶ 1.a through 1.m of the SOR, with explanations. He admitted the factual
allegations in ¶¶ 2.a through 2.e of the Amended SOR. He also provided additional
information to support his request for eligibility for a security clearance.  
Applicant, who is 40 years old, works as senior field technician for a Department
of Defense contractor. He began his job two years ago and his employer promoted him
in August 2008 to the position of installation coordinator. Applicant, a mechanical
person, installs information technology and communication networks. His current
employer describes his work performance as consistently excellent. His supervisor
rated him outstanding in August 2008. His work attendance is very good. Former co-
workers also describe him as an excellent worker and some one who came to work
every day.1
Applicant married his first wife in 1992. They divorced in 1996. They have a
daughter who is now 16 years old. Subsequent to his divorce, Applicant met a woman
with whom he lived between 1997 until 2000. He married his second wife a few days
before the hearing. They lived together for five years prior to their marriage.2
Tr. 37-38.3
GE 3.4
GE 3; Tr. 38.5
GE 2; GE 4; Tr. 39-40.6
3
In October 1994, the police arrested and charged Applicant with domestic assault
and battery after he pushed his first wife out of bed. Applicant denies that alcohol was
involved in this incident. The court found him guilty. The record contains no evidence
which indicates the sentence imposed by the court.3
On January 29, 1995, the police charged Applicant with driving under the
influence (DUI) and hit and run. Following a trial before a judge, the court found
Applicant guilty of DUI, fined him $250 and assessed $68 in costs, which Applicant paid.
The court, however, dismissed the hit and run charge.4
In 1995, Applicant and his wife separated. They argued over custody of their
daughter on the phone one evening. The argument led to Applicant’s arrest in April
1995 for threatening, profane and abusive language over the telephone. Emotions, not
alcohol, controlled this situation. The court found Applicant guilty of this offense,
sentenced him to 30 days in jail, suspended, and fined him $250. Appellant had no
other incidents with his first wife.5
Applicant started dating a woman (P) in 1997. They moved in together, but did
not marry. They often drank then argued with each other. Their arguing escalated into
mutual physical combat and to police calls. Several arrests occurred because of these
fights. In January 1998, the police arrested Applicant for the first time for felonious
assault. The court dismissed this charge a few weeks later. In a February 1998
argument,  P threw a brick through Applicant’s car window and hit him over the head
with a golf club. Applicant broke the golf club then hit P with it. The police arrested and
charged Applicant with assault and battery on a family member after this fight. He
declined to file charges against P. The court found him guilty, fined him and sentenced
him to 12 months in jail, which was suspended except for 10 days. Applicant served his
sentence through a weekend work release program, doing community service. The
police arrested and charged him with violation of probation in May 1998. The court
dismissed this charge in September 1998. The record contains little information on
these 1998 incidents between Applicant and P.6
In October 1999, the police again arrested and charged Applicant with assault
and battery on a family member, P. Applicant does not remember the October 1999
arrest, but acknowledges that it is listed on his arrest report. This arrest case was nol
prossed at court. In February 2000, the police again arrested and charged Applicant
with felony assault and battery on a family member following yet another fight with P.
Applicant believed that the October 1999 arrest and the January 2000 arrest were the same incident. The7
court record indicates that his February 8, 2000 arrest is for an incident on January 22, 2000. GE 3 at 5.
GE 2; GE 3, GE 4; Tr. 40-44.8
GE 2; GE 3; GE 4; Tr. 44.9
GE 2; GE 3; Tr. 44-46.10
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The court record indicates that the incident occurred on January 22, 2000.  I find that7
the February 8, 2008 arrest and the listed January 22, 2000 arrest are for the same
incident based on the court record. In August 2000, Applicant pled guilty to the felony
assault charge. The court sentenced him to three years in jail and suspended the
sentence. Applicant paid court costs of $348. Following his arrest in February 2000,
Applicant and P ended their relationship. He described this arrest as a “wake up call” for
him. Applicant did not seek counseling in 2000 because “he was too stubborn to believe
he needed it for himself”. He thought P needed counseling. He also did not believe he
had an alcohol problem.   8
In August 2000, the police charged Applicant with threatening calls to P, a
misdemeanor. Applicant appeared in court in November 2000 with tapes of the
telephone conversation. After hearing the tapes, the court dismissed the charges.
Applicant has not been involved with P since 2000. He has not been arrested for assault
and battery since February 2000.9
Applicant joined a local Moose lodge in 2003. On April 17, 2003, the Moose
Lodge held its initiation ceremony. During the ceremony, Applicant drank four drinks in
two hours. The drinks were stronger than he realized. He decided to drive home. The
police stopped him because he had not turned on his car headlights. The police
conducted a field sobriety test and administered a breathalyzer test. As a result, the
police arrested and charged him with DUI, a misdemeanor. The court found him guilty of
DUI, sentenced him to 20 days in jail, three years good behavior, three years
unsupervised probation, restricted his driving privileges, and directed him to attend a
state alcohol and substance abuse program. He served his jail sentence on weekends,
paid a fine, and completed the alcohol program.   10
Because his second DUI occurred less than three years after his sentence in
August 2000 for assault and battery, the State filed a felony violation of probation
charge against Applicant in August 2003 and the court issued a warrant for his arrest.
When he learned that the arrest warrant existed, Applicant presented himself to the
police on June 17, 2004, where he was arrested. Applicant pled guilty to the violation of
probation charge. The court placed him on good behavior for three years, ordered him
into an alcohol treatment program, assigned a probation officer, and ordered him to
attend domestic violence and anger management counseling. He completed the
required alcohol treatment and domestic violence and anger management counseling.
He recalls that his counselor prepared a final report, but he does not know the contents
GE 2; GE 3; Tr. 47-49.11
GE 1; GE 4; Tr. 49-50.12
Tr. 24-27, 34-35, 54-57, 61, 65, 72, 80-85.13
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nor does he know what type of diagnosis, if any, was made. The record does not
contain this report.  11
Applicant began living with his current wife in 2003. In June 2006, they argued.
When she asked him to leave the house, he refused. Although no physical violence was
involved, she felt threatened and called the police. The police arrested him and charged
him with disorderly conduct and disturbing the peace, a misdemeanor. He spent five
days in jail. His wife later dropped the charges and the court dismissed the case. After
his arrest and detention, he called his employer and advised his employer that he was
in jail. His employer discharged him from his job when learning of his arrest. He
acknowledges that alcohol was involved in this incident.12
Applicant began drinking occasionally at age 12 and seriously at age 21, when
he joined the United States Navy. He drank to excess and often. He acknowledges that
he is an alcoholic, but denies he is alcohol dependent. During his alcohol treatment
program in 2005, he did not drink. He describes this treatment program as “effective”.
He returned to drinking after he completed treatment, but consumed alcohol at much
lower levels than in the past. Applicant drank four beers on October 31, 2008 and one
beer on November 2, 2008 while watching a football game. He has not consumed
alcohol since this date and does not plan to drink alcohol in the future. He believes it is
in his best interest not to drink. His wife rarely drinks and confirms his abstinence. She
also stated that he no longer associates with his drinking buddies and was never
physically violent with her. He plans on contacting his counselor again. His co-workers
stated that he never observed any problems with his work performance and attendance.
His wife describes a 100% improvement in him since 2006. He has a better outlook on
life and his values have changed.13
Policies
When evaluating an Applicant’s suitability for a security clearance, the
administrative judge must consider the revised adjudicative guidelines (AG). In addition
to brief introductory explanations for each guideline, the adjudicative guidelines list
potentially disqualifying conditions and mitigating conditions, which are useful in
evaluating an Applicant’s eligibility for access to classified information.
These guidelines are not inflexible rules of law. Instead, recognizing the
complexities of human behavior, these guidelines are applied in conjunction with the
factors listed in the adjudicative process. The administrative judge’s over-arching
adjudicative goal is a fair, impartial and common sense decision. According to AG ¶
2(c), the entire process is a conscientious scrutiny of a number of variables known as
After any decision, the losing party has a right to appeal the case to the Defense Office of Hearings and14
Appeals  Appeal Board. The Appeal Board’s review authority is limited to determining whether three tests are
met:
E3.1.32.1. The Administrative Judge’s findings of fact are supported by such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion in light of
all the contrary evidence in the same record. In making this review, the Appeal Board shall
give deference to the credibility determinations of the Administrative Judge:
E#.a.32.2. The Administrative Judge adhered to the procedures required by E.O. 10865
(enclosure 1) and this Directive: or
E3.1.32.3. The Administrative Judge’s rulings or conclusions are arbitrary, capricious, or
contrary to law.
The Appeal Board does not conduct a “de novo determination”, recognizing that its members have
no opportunity to observe witnesses and make credibility determinations. The Supreme Court in United States
v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 690 (1980) succinctly defined the phrase “de novo determination”:
[This legal term] has an accepted meaning in the law. It means an independent determination
of a controversy that accords no deference to any prior resolution of the same controversy.
Thus, in Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 23 [(1974)], the Court
had occasion to define “de novo proceeding” as a review that was “unfettered by any
prejudice from the [prior] agency proceeding and free from any claim that the [agency’s]
determination is supported by substantial evidence.” In United States v. First City National
Bank, 386 U.S. 361,368 [(1967)], this Court observed that “review de novo” means “that the
court should make an independent determination of the issues” and should not give any
special weight to the [prior] determination of the administrative agency.
(Internal footnotes omitted). See ISCR Case No. 07-10396 (App. Bd., Oct. 2, 2008) and ISCR Case No. 07-
07144 (App. Bd., Oct. 7, 2008). In ISCR Case No. 05-01820 (App. Bd. Dec 14, 2006), the Appeal Board
criticized the administrative judge’s analysis, supporting grant of a clearance for a PRC-related Applicant, and
then decided the case itself. Judge W hite’s dissenting opinion cogently explains why credibility determinations
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the “whole person concept.” The administrative judge must consider all available,
reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, in
making a decision.
The protection of the national security is the paramount consideration. AG ¶ 2(b)
requires that “[a]ny doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to
classified information will be resolved in favor of national security.” In reaching this
decision, I have drawn only those conclusions that are reasonable, logical and based on
the evidence contained in the record. Likewise, I have avoided drawing inferences
grounded on mere speculation or conjecture.
Under Directive ¶ E3.1.14, the Government must present evidence to establish
controverted facts alleged in the SOR. Under Directive ¶ E3.1.15, the Applicant is
responsible for presenting “witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate,
or mitigate facts admitted by applicant or proven by Department Counsel. . . .” The
Applicant has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable security
decision.  14
and ultimately the decision whether to grant or deny a clearance should be left to the judge who makes
witness credibility determinations. Id. at 5-7. See also ISCR Case No. 04-06386 at 10-11 (App. Bd. Aug. 25,
2006)(Harvey, J., dissenting) (discussing limitations on Appeal Board’s authority to reverse hearing-level
judicial decisions and recommending remand of cases to resolve material, prejudicial error) and ISCR Case
No. 07-03307 (App. Bd. Sept. 29, 2008). Compliance with the Agency’s rules and regulations is required. See
United States ex. rel. Acardi  v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954); Lopez v. FAA, 318 F.3d 242, 247-
248 (D.C. Cir 2003); Nickelson  v. United States, 284 F. Supp.2d 387, 390 (E.D. Va. 2003)( explaining
standard of review).
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A person who seeks access to classified information enters into a fiduciary
relationship with the Government predicated upon trust and confidence. This
relationship transcends normal duty hours and endures throughout off-duty hours. The
Government reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in individuals to whom it
grants access to classified information. Decisions include, by necessity, consideration of
the possible risk the Applicant may deliberately or inadvertently fail to protect or
safeguard classified information. Such decisions entail a certain degree of legally
permissible extrapolation as to potential, rather than actual, risk of compromise of
classified information.
 
Section 7 of Executive Order 10865 provides that decisions shall be “in terms of
the national interest and shall in no sense be a determination as to the loyalty of the
applicant concerned.” See also EO 12968, Section 3.1(b) (listing multiple prerequisites
for access to classified or sensitive information).  
Analysis
Criminal Conduct
Paragraph 30 of the new adjudicative guidelines sets out the security concern
relating to criminal conduct: ACriminal activity creates doubt about a person=s judgment,
reliability, and trustworthiness. By its very nature, it calls into question a person=s ability
or willingness to comply with laws, rules and regulations.@
Under AG ¶ 31, the following conditions could raise a security concern and may
be disqualifying:
31(a) provides that Aa single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses@
may be disqualifying;
(c) allegation or admission of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the
person was formally charged, formally prosecuted or convicted; and
(e) violation of parole or probation, or failure to complete a court-mandated
rehabilitation program.
 
8
Appellant admits the police charged him with assault and battery on a family
member five times, twice with alcohol-related driving offenses, twice with threatening
conduct, once for disorderly conduct and twice for violation of probation. These offenses
are either misdemeanor or felony crimes. The evidence establishes the above
disqualifying condition.
The adjudicative guidelines also set out some potentially mitigating conditions.
Under & 32, an Applicant may mitigate the security concerns by
(a) so much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior happened, or it
happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur
and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or
good judgment;
(c) evidence that the person did not commit the offense;
(d) there is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including but not limited
to the passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity, remorse or
restitution, job training or higher education, good employment record, or
constructive community involvement;
Applicant’s criminal record reflects 11 years of conduct which resulted in
numerous arrests. His first assault and battery arrest occurred when he was married to
his first wife. They divorced in 1996. Thereafter, he entered into a relationship with P,
which can best be described as toxic. They drank alcohol, argued, and engaged in
physical combat with each other. Their arguments led to four arrests for assault and
battery on a family member and two convictions, the last in August 2000. Applicant
ended this relationship in 2000 when he recognized how detrimental the problems were
to him. He has not been arrested for assault and battery since 2000. The police twice
arrested and charged him with abusive and threatening telephone calls, the last in
August 2000. The court convicted him of this conduct in 1995, but based on his
evidence, dismissed the charges in 2000. He has not been arrested for threatening
telephone calls since 2000. Given the length of time since his abusive physical conduct
last occurred and the fact that he ended his relationship with P, there is little likelihood
this type of conduct will occur in the future.
Applicant’s last DUI arrest occurred in 2003. This arrest resulted in a 2004 finding
by the court that he violated his probation for his 2000 assault and battery conviction.
Since 2004, he has not been convicted of another crime, although he was arrested once
for disorderly conduct in 2006. Applicant’s criminal conduct and behavior leading to his
arrests has changed significantly in the last five years.  Several of the offenses for which
he was arrested were dismissed by the court after hearing. I infer from the court findings
that evidence showed that Applicant either did not commit the offense for which he was
charged or there was insufficient evidence to show he committed these offenses.
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Because alcohol played a significant role in most of Applicant’s criminal conduct
and he only recently stopped drinking, I find that it is too soon to conclude that his
conduct has been successfully and fully rehabilitated even though his physical violence
ended in 2000. Applicant has established mitigation of his criminal conduct under AG ¶¶
32 (a) and (c).
Guideline G, Alcohol Consumption
AG ¶ 21 expresses the security concern pertaining to alcohol consumption,
“Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment or
the failure to control impulses, and can raise questions about an individual's reliability
and trustworthiness.”
AG ¶ 22 describes conditions that could raise a security concern and may be
disqualifying:
(a) alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while under
the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, disturbing the peace, or
other incidents of concern, regardless of whether the individual is
diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent;
(c) habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired
judgment, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an alcohol
abuser or alcohol dependent;
Applicant began drinking at age 12 and seriously drinking at age 21. He drank to
excess frequently. As a result, the court twice convicted him of DUI and assault and
battery on a family member. His second DUI arrest also resulted in a felony charge and
conviction for violation of probation. The police arrested him on numerous occasions for
conduct related to drinking between 1998 and 2006. Thus, these disqualifying
conditions apply in this case.
AG ¶ 23 provides conditions that could mitigate security concerns:
(a) so much time has passed, or the behavior was so infrequent, or it
happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or
does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness,
or good judgment;
(b) the individual acknowledges his or her alcoholism or issues of alcohol
abuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and
has established a pattern of abstinence (if alcohol dependent) or
responsible use (if an alcohol abuser);
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(c) the individual is a current employee who is participating in a counseling
or treatment program, has no history of previous treatment and relapse,
and is making satisfactory progress; and,
(d) the individual has successfully completed inpatient or outpatient
counseling or rehabilitation along with any required aftercare, has
demonstrated a clear and established pattern of modified consumption or
abstinence in accordance with treatment recommendations, such as
participation in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar
organization and has received a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified
medical professional or a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff
member of a recognized alcohol treatment program.
Applicant acknowledges that he is an alcoholic. He stopped drinking two months
before his hearing, a fact confirmed by his new wife. However, because he stopped
drinking in 2005 then returned to drinking, this short time of no alcohol consumption is
insufficient to establish a pattern of abstinence. There is no evidence of record that he
has been diagnosed as alcohol dependent or an alcohol abuser by a professional. He
did enter and complete a court ordered alcohol treatment program in 2005. Whatever
diagnosis the counselor may have made at that time is not of record. What is known is
that he returned to drinking. The evidence of record is insufficient to establish mitigation
under AG ¶ 23.
Whole Person Concept
Under the whole person concept, the administrative judge must evaluate an
Applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance by considering the totality of the Applicant’s
conduct and all the circumstances. The administrative judge should consider the nine
adjudicative process factors listed at AG ¶ 2(a):
(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct; (2) the
circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable
participation; (3) the frequency and recency of the conduct; (4) the
individual’s age and maturity at the time of the conduct; (5) the extent to
which participation is voluntary; (6) the presence or absence of
rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes; (7) the motivation
for the conduct; (8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or
duress; and (9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence. 
Under AG ¶ 2(c), the ultimate determination of whether to grant eligibility for a security
clearance must be an overall common sense judgment based upon careful
consideration of the guidelines and the whole person concept. The decision to grant or
deny a security clearance requires a careful weighing of all relevant factors, both good
and bad. In so doing, an administrative judge must review all the evidence of record, not
a single item in isolation, to determine if a security concern is shown. A determination of
an applicant’s eligibility for a security clearance should not be made as punishment for
11
specific past conduct, but on a reasonable and careful evaluation of all the evidence of
record to decide if a nexus exists between established facts and a legitimate security
concern.     
I considered the potentially disqualifying and mitigating conditions in light of all
the facts and circumstances surrounding this case. Applicant’s arrests and court
convictions are directly related to his excessive alcohol consumption. He recognized the
negative impact his relationship with P was having on him and terminated the
relationship. Since ending this relationship, he has not been arrested for assault and
battery. He, however, declined to acknowledge the role alcohol played in the problems
with this woman until very recently. Applicant continued to drink from 2000 until two
months ago. His drinking resulted in a second DUI and a finding that he violated his
probation. He enrolled in court ordered treatment for alcohol, domestic violence, and
anger, which he completed. Although he stopped drinking while in the program, which
he considers effective, he returned to drinking at a lower volume. In 2006, he had his
last arrest for an alcohol related incident, which is significant given his long history of
alcohol related criminal arrests. His new wife does not tolerate abuse from him and
credibly presented a picture of a change man. However, his decision to stop drinking
two months ago is too recent for him to show a track record of abstinence. Given that he
acknowledges he is an alcoholic, his decision to not drink in the future is admirable as
well as difficult to honor. Had he abstained from drinking after his treatment in 2005, he
would have mitigated any security concerns about his alcohol consumption. Because of
the serious problems his alcohol consumption has caused, Applicant needs to show that
he can refrain from alcohol consumption over time to mitigate security concerns under
Guideline G.
Overall, the record evidence leaves me with questions or doubts as to Applicant’s
eligibility and suitability for a security clearance. For all these reasons, I conclude
Applicant mitigated the security concerns arising from his criminal conduct, but he has
not mitigated security concerns arising from his alcohol consumption.
Formal Findings
Formal findings for or against Applicant on the allegations set forth in the SOR,
as required by section E3.1.25 of Enclosure 3 of the Directive, are:
Paragraph 1, Guideline J: FOR APPLICANT
Subparagraph 1.a: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.b: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.c: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.d: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.e: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.f: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.g: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.h: For Applicant
12
Subparagraph 1.i: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.j: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.k: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.l: For Applicant
Subparagraph 1.m: For Applicant
Paragraph 2, Guideline G: AGAINST APPLICANT
Subparagraph 2.a: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.b: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.c: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.d: Against Applicant
Subparagraph 2.e: Against Applicant
Conclusion
In light of all of the circumstances presented by the record in this case, it is not
clearly consistent with the national interest to grant Applicant eligibility for a security
clearance.  Eligibility for access to classified information is denied.
                                                              
MARY E. HENRY
Administrative Judge